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    Q . 3 . Must not the soul perish with the body ? It grows up with the body , suffers with it , shares all its changes , and in age becomes feebler as the body gradually decays . A hard blow upon the head can reduce the freates t genius into idiocy : must not the power to think cease when the ody is no more ? " Quest . 1 . Can matter have in itself the power to think ?

    " I believe that this has been demonstrated to be impossible ; and that the objections against the arguments , which have been offered , reach the terms only in which they are expressed , which cannot be chosen so as- to exclude every objection , because language itself is not flexible enough for the subtilty of the inquiry . Among other methods of proof , the following has appeared to me very convincing . It will be granted , that the objects in nature , or the things which are external to the thinking power , have each its own proper subsistence . Their conjunction depends upon mutual relations and proportions , which are not found in the objects alone , but in order to exist must

    first be thought of . For example , a house taken solely as an object , is not different from a pile of stones : but when the thinking" power comes in , com * pares the parts , and perceives their relation to a whole , the pile is then irregular ; but symmetry and order are observed in the building . In what do a well-ordered state and a promiscuous multitude differ from one another ? Only in the proportion of the parts , and their relation to a whole ; and these are not found in the citizens , as they exist objectively and severally , but in the comparison of each with all the rest . Father and son , stem and fruit , are in themselves isolated existences ; but considered in their relation as cause

    and effect , they are conjoined . " Suppose an object to be impressed on a certain part of a thinking material system ; the impression as well as the external object must exist individually . Let A , B , C , D , be external objects , and a , b , c , d , parts of the percipient matter . Then will the percipient particle ( a ) have , as its immediate object , the impression upon it of the external object ( A ) which it represents ; and all the other sentient atoms the same . But where will the proportion or

    relation of the objects be perceived ? Not in any one of the percipient particles ; for each notices only its own object , and things are seen to be related only by comparison : neither is it perceived in all the particles taken together , for the being taken together presupposes the perception of proportion or relation between them , without which each atom remains for ever individual , and never , in conjunction with the rest , composes a whole . In order to perceive relation , which supposes comparison , besides the thinking partiis office

    cles a , b , c , d , we must have a central particle ( e ) , to which th belongs . This particle must retain the impressions of all the objects A , B , C , D , that it may be able to compare them with one another . Since the central particle ( e ) is composed of parts , either the impressions must be again dispersed , or each of the parts which compose it must receive them all . In the first case , to compare them with one another is impossible ; and in the latter case , we must come at last to what is indivisible , an atom , uniting the i of all the d capable also of comparing them with aim tuso ui tuui i wiciu wim vim

    mpressions objects , an one impressions or an me oujects , uapauie : | j » ma another , and perceiving their mutual relation . This indivisible , simple existence , which receives all the impressions , and is able to discern , combine , compare them , is essentially different from matter , which is , in its nature , divisible and aggregationai . We distinguish it by the name of soul . I may leave to my opponent the choice , whether he will have the material substance consisting of such percipient atoms or indivisible particles 4 or will admit but

    one single , indivisible thinking substance , which receives and compares the impressions of all objects . In both cases it is not matter , or wha ||^ g # regated , which thinks , but what is simple and indivisible ; only tha ^^^^^^ case , instead of making the soul to be a corporeal being , with tue ^||| NRR& he changes the body itself into an aggregate of souls . In a word , ti $ mUSfe tion or thinking it is necessary that what is multifold as an object > j 3 B | PJ

    Untitled Article

    Letters from Germany . 31

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Jan. 2, 1831, page 31, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2593/page/31/