Current:

Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), February 1822, Edition 1 of 1, Page unpag, Untitled Article

Page unpag
Page 1
1 of 64

On this page

  • Departments (1)
    • Mr. Cogan's Examination of Mr. f-Iume's Objection to the Argument for the Being of God.
  • Text (5)
  • Transcript

    • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

      Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

      Untitled Article

      blR , OyE of the most plausible objections to the arguments for the being" of a God is that which is suggested bv Mr . Hume , namely , that we

      have no experience in the origin of worlds , and therefore cannot safely conclude , because ships , cities , &c . are made by human art , that the universe must have had an intelligent Author . This objection I propose to consider .

      The universe exhibits in innumerable instances an adaptation of means to ends , or what , for the sake of brevity , I shall sometimes call contrivance , not meaning thereby to assume the matter in dispute . And this adaptation of means to ends seems to be as

      truly prospective as any thing which we call contrivance in the works of art . The eye appears to have been as manifestly formed for seeing , as the telescope for assisting the vision of the eye . The universe , then , is justly comprehended in the general description of works which indicate a fitness

      of means to ends ; and if I may not , in the case of the universe , call this fitness intentional , I muSt maintain that it is strictly analogous to the effects of intention in the works of art . As "far as relates to the appearance of design , the works of art nave no advantage over the works of nature .

      The question , then , is , why I should not apply to the latter the reasoning which I apply without hesitation , and , as it seems , without error to the former . Is it not reasonable to maintain , as a universal truth , that such an adaptation of means to ends as was never known to be fortuitous xnust be

      referred to an intelligeht Author ? But I have h ^ no e ^ p etfpnce in the origin of worlds }; T ) $ i is true ; nor is this experiejnci ^ raer $$ d > , I jiave seen , j n cages inmj ^ rj ^ l ^ be tween iiitelleetm a designing cause , a the , maflT ^^ in the "" ^ gg ^ MB ^ m SSm ^^ 11

      Untitled Article

      clearest analogies , I may safely infer that this connexion must be universal . Contrivance is contrivance , wherever it be found ; and the connexion between cause and effect is not more certain

      than the connexion between an effect which indicates contrivance , and an intelligent or designing cause . We gain our knowledge of both these connexions in precisely the same manner , or rather they are virtually the same , the latter being only a specific modification of the former . But Mr . Hume

      says , that all that we can pretend to know concerning the connexion of cause and effect is constant conjunction . That conjuction is all that we perceive is true ; and a more harmless truth was never made known to the

      world For until some disciple of Mr . Hume shall assign a better reason for constant conjunction than that tne things thus conjoined are necessarily connected , the huirran mind will go on to reason from effect to cause , as it did before Mr . Hume ' s discovery sa ^ wr the lisrht . Could Mr . Hume ' s

      observation disjoin what we see to be conjoined , it would do something ; but the fact remains exactly as it was , and where we see that an effect is , there we cannot help concluding that a cause has been . And this is sufficient for all purposes of reasoning . And if any one shall choose to believe that cause

      and effect are always conjoined but never connected ; for example , that , though a ball , when struck by a cricket-bat ; is invariably put in motion , yet , for any necessity that oper&tfes , it might invariably remain at rest y he

      may , indeed , enjoy the satisfaction of not thinking with the vulgar , but assuredly he will not have me credit of thinking with the , v ? iae . Bjit Mr . Hume farther observes , tjiat " all , reasoning from the relation of' causes and effects is founded on a certain ' instinct of our

      nature , and rjo ^ y fefc faMactoi * s apd d ^ ceitftd . " If thfc $ prop ^ ioA ia iMettdM iperely ttf ; % Mfa $$ kte ¦ # j&o $$ ifiifiiff >^ p the reasoriikg ^ irr qne ^ tiojrrmfcy * 4 ft £ « B

      Untitled Article

      No CXCIV . ] FEBRUARY , 1822 . [ Vol . XVII .

      Mr. Cogan's Examination Of Mr. F-Iume's Objection To The Argument For The Being Of God.

      Mr . Cogan ' s Examination of Mr . f-Iume ' s Objection to the Argument for the Being of God .

      Untitled Article

      THE

      Untitled Article

      vojj . ' AfvafT ^ ' ** ' { K

  • Citation
    • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Feb. 2, 1822, page unpag, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2509/page/1/