On this page

• Text (1)

  Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

  • 

    Untitled Article

• Transcript

  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

    Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

    Untitled Article

    ft *" -, * ' . *_ " inference may be drawn from it ; but I do not see how the Necessitarian can repel this inference from his own premises . No argument can ^ reconcile any rational man to the justice or propriety of punishing a person who had no choice between good and evil . But Mr . C . thinks it may be justified when

    it is considered , that punishment will be corrective and will operate for his good . Such a plea is inconsistent with the doctrine which first supposes in Ais world a fate or necessity uncontrollable by the will of man , and consequently an arbitrary supreme power .

    If such frightful powers existed at any time , they would exist for ever ; and if they should pursue the unfortunate but blameless sinner , if the expression can be allowed , to the next state , and visit him with punishment , this punishment could never be corrective nor

    produce moral goodness . Unless he should be fated to believe a lie , how could it produce remorse and sorrow for sin , to which the victim had been impelled by necessity , and consequently

    of which he was innocent ? Sorrow , indeed , it would cause for his hapless fate ; but , except that it would be unmerited , it would be Kke that worthless sorrow described by Prior : —

    O Father , my sorrow will scarce save my bacon , For ' twas not that I murder'd , but that I was taken . No ; future punishment cannot be corrective unless the will be free both here and hereafter .

    In a note , Mr . C . says , " A simple question presents itself / Can the mind will this or that without a certain feeling or disposition that prompts the volition ? " If the feeling and disposition can be supposed entirely distinct from the volition , which seems

    doubtful , then the proper question should be — " Is the feeling or disposition that prompts the volition , the result of Necessity V * If Necessity rules any one of these , it rules them all ; and farther ; if it rules the feelings , dispositions and

    wills of one man in his senses , it rules them in all men . I will add , if it thus rules all men , it has ruled him who teas in all points tempted like as we are , , yet without sin , and who prayed , Father , not my will but thine be done . We cannot stop here , but must extend the rule to all beings who think , but

    Untitled Article

    who are fated to think falsely , that they have a knowledge of good and evil . The next Number of your Repository contains a reply from Mr . C . to objections brought against the doc - trine of Necessity . As first , " It

    annihilates the distinction between virtue and vice / ' His answer is , " The objection is not true ; a benevolent deed will retain its character , though the doctrine of Necessity be admitted . " On his principles , the advocate for Liberty denies that benevolence or vir

    tue can exist ; and Mr . C . replies by assuming benevolence , at all events , on his view of the question . He might with equal reason overturn the assertion , that brutes are not capable of morality , by saying , that a moral deed by a brute will retain its character ,

    though it be admitted that the brute is not a moral being . We have another presumption in the next sentence , that Mr . C . ' s notion of a self-determining power of the will must differ widely from that entertained by the advocate for

    Liberty . As actions , says he , proceeding from such a power , would indicate no disposition of the heart , they would have no moral quality . " One would imagine that in this place he is replying to the Necessitarian . But I leave the expression of a

    self-determining power to be justified by those who introduced it . Second objection . (< The doctrine of Necessity subverts the foundation of praise and blame . " Answer . " Then praise and blame can have no foundation at all . The truth is , we view

    moral beauty with complacency , and moral deformity with disgust ; andi praise and blame are expressions ^ of these sentiments /* The objection implies the denial of moral beauty or deformity on the principles of the Necessitarian ; and Mr . ( J . replies to the objection by assuming them both

    without proof . Third objection . " The doctrine of Necessity , if true , renders man an unfit subject for reward and punishment . " Answer . ' The objection is false , unless it can be shewn , that upon Necessitarian principles , reward and punishment cannot operate to the

    formation of virtuous affections , which , were men really constituted upon the principles of Philosophical Liberty , they certainly could not . " Though the ob-

    Untitled Article

    598 Remarks on Mr . Cogah ' s Papers on Necessity .

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Oct. 2, 1821, page 598, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2505/page/30/