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    by abstract metaphysics alone , ^ e may yet , without much effort , perceive the weakness and inconclusiveness of those arguments * by which the doctrine of Necessity is attempted to be sup ^ ported * Mr . Cogan observes , in your first

    Number for the year , " The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this , that every volition or determination of the mind * is the . jaeceesary result of the state of the mind at the

    time when the determination is formed . " This appears to me to be what is called an identical proposition , and as such , it asserts nothing . What can the state of the mind mean , if we ab > - stract from it volitions and

    determinations ? At all events , these are the principal ingredients in the state of every man ' s mind ; and if so , the proposition amounts for the most part to this—that " the state of every man ' s mind results from the state of his

    mind , " Until it can be shewn that the state of the naiad , also , is the result of Necessity , the advocate for this dootrine gains not a single step by ** the proposition /' €€

    Mr * C . says * The advocate fox Liberty maintains , that there is in the human mind a self-determining power , to which , as their proper cause , all the volitions or detern&nations of the mind

    must be referred / ' I doubt if it be judicious in the assertor of Liberty to contend for such a self-deteraiifiing power , unless he can define it sjsciirately ; because what he may rationally contend for in one restricted sense , ikJM he applied , and shewn to be ab&wd in

    some , other sense . Let the phrase be submitted to a number of learned persons , and it is probable they will aid vary in their explanatiao of it . > Mx C replies to two or three ex > planationB ^ f his own suggesting , wlrieh have green him an opportunity for an ingenious

    combat with shadows . In consequence of this uncertainty , five or six oi ttdto ensuing paragraphs are bo 4 > bscii # e or ^ meaning , tiuit they baffle all nU tempts at replying to them by concise sad close rmsomng * Metaphysical & ubtilti £ 8 > wbeu protracted in . * bi&

    manner , elude the force of the mind , ^ ftd thus are calculated mAjto perplex , and not no convince . We coajMi to , emnetlimg tateUagftrte * hfire , tus . quotes S * r . CJlftrite . 4 ? Tdpwe ** ue , prai * £ r , immediate ^ php i ^ al , « ffi ^

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    c ^ ewt cause action J » fi&z pow ^ r of self-motion in men , which exerts jtself freely , hjt consequence of the U&t judgment of the un ^ r ^ tAix ^ ing . " Vpm these words Mr . 0 . ^ Jf » fa ^ k § : — If this ppwer always obeys ibe last judginent of the understanding , the Necessitarian will ask no more . " Then he

    may be silent for < &ver ; for unless h $ can shew that the last judgment pf the understanding is the result of Necessity , the result from the power of self-motion is nothing to the purpose . The question to be deckled is not whether the last judgment of the understanding

    will certainly produce correspondent actions , but whether the judgment itself has been the result of Necessity . A short case may give us some definite ideas upon this subject . A poor man

    finds a valuable purse , which he is strongly inclined and tempted to apply to his owfi use . He pictures jto himself the comforts it may afford him j but again , the still small voice of qonscience reminds Mm not to forfeit

    selfesteem and the favour of God . After wavering for some time between these conflicting motives , he at last decj . de according to the siiggestions of Ida conscience 2 he iiijquires for the man who lost the purse , he iiuds him jaud

    restores it . Now , the last judgment of his understanding caused fcim to restore the purse 5 but what was it that caused this last judgment of the understanding ? Was it philosophical Necea&fcw , vim ik the ^ e&iite state of

    hie mind , or &ome speii&c valitx ^ us i Nonsense ! In conttti& $ rt ; id all &D 2 &K phpical jargcm J contfind tkat thisJtist judgmenst of his understajiding was ib& r&mt of foee-woll , and of a virtuous struggle in hfe mind . In the remainder of . the letter Mr .

    C- cambats the selW ^ terminingpow ^ r in a manner v ^ hiah codglat g » ve ru ^ e to a volume of arguoje » t and leave . the question ae ( much at iaoue sit the ead aa at the beginning . Bui ; he <\ &wt $ m inference fmrn it , which mtiVea it

    probable th ^ t hia idea off £ his « &iure& * fii < Na differs widely fymu thai ; ofttertain ^ ed by the aaserfcor of LVberty . " M a man , says lie , " had within Jam 8 « oh a capridtous principle as a Mtf * detaoemk&ig power , tJwe applicatipBiof punfeiKpient mould t > e iropxopejr , t ^ e ^ cwt&e it would be iusel ^ ft . ^ v ^ e , m ay be joortaift that tihp Aofctw » e of fiMi&-wiU Qautaot be fttirty stated , tehmz eucfajau

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    # ¦ - . » • P G [( of Itemorks en Mt * # g * p * £ # per * w N&tmtifa . $ & ?

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Oct. 2, 1821, page 597, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2505/page/29/