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    cot ntfance exists to counteract im-^ siob * that its' attainment will be productive of happiness , and that the [ nea&s to attain it are within its reach . This perception and determination of the understanding places the mind in a certain condition , namely , in the to

    state of desire and of determination elBRi * F > cw er to gratif y that desire . } Jow this peculiar condition ot the mind is termed will , or volition , and the question is , whether it could probably be different from what it actually is . The state of the mind and all the

    circumstances remaining exactly the same , that is , an object appearing desirable anfl nothing occurring to counteract the impression , that the attainment of it , will be productive of happiness , caa ^ k jivojd desiri ng it ? And perceiving the means by which it can obtain the gratification of its desire ,

    can it avoid exerting them ? tf not , if tli £ desirableness of an object must excite desire , and the consciousness that the means olf attaining it are within reach must induce the determination to excite them ; then it is most obvious that volition and action are necessary

    in the only sense which in ^ this controversy is meant to be conveyed by this term ; that is to say , . volition and action could not possibly be otherwise than they are , the constitution of the min ^ anql the circumstances in which it is p lace . < I remaining the same . \ VWhat has led to so much coiafusion

    on this subject , is the indistinct and false notion which has been annexed to the term will . Will is nothing but a modification of desire , and therefore cannot possjbly , be , excited by the mini ! kself at Us own pleasure . It is induced by objects which the mind perqeives to pegood or evil , pleasing or painful , <> r imagines to be so / The mind cannot

    will wilj - but objects appearing to it pleasurable excite the desire or will to f x > 8 sess them , or appearing painful , indtM # the ^ lesire or will to avoid ! them : and the ^ mesiion again recurs , ca , a an ° Pject apprehend ^ yT to be thus painful or Pleasurable , fail tp induce the

    corres ponding desire or will and the ^ Sf Went action ? v - * • -. The . whple of 4 , hjs controversy turns , S * tosbeen we ]} siatqd by Mr . $ elsham tal V ^ P ^ Stwestiqn ,: " Can volition &fe P m ^^^ y ^ : ; wp ^ ift * v ^ 7 motive whatever moves or ? Wfi * eg theinindirrtls chaise ; thus El uding both this bias of the mind

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    itself and the end in view : in a word , comprehending every circumstance immediately previous to the volition ; and which in the feast degree contributes to generate the choice . Can volition take p lace independently of motive as thus denned ? Trie libertarian contends

    that in the same previous circumstances and with views and inclinations precisely the same , a different choice maybe made . The necessarian denies this , and maintains that there can be no difference in the choice without a

    correspondent difference in the previous state of the mind ; that is , in the judgment or inclination of the agent- " * This is the simple question stated in p lain and simple language 5 and had L ) r . Brown taken the paius to understand it , he would not have written the many absurdities by which this part of his work is deformed ^ He would not ,

    for example , have defined necessity to be " that the contrary of which involves a contradiction and can neither exist nor coalesce in one idea * " For if to the term necessity some metap hysicians have affixed the notion expressed in this definition , Dr . Brown knew , or ought to have known , that the advocates for the doctrine of

    Philosophical Necessity expressly distinguish between this sense of the word and that which they annex to it- Dr . Brown takes upon himself to say * p . 269 , that Dr . Priestley , together with Hobbes and Spinosa and Bayle

    and Voltaire and Hume , has acquired celebrity by attacking the doctrines of a Divine Providence and of the freedom of the will . Was the Reverend Principal really acquainted with the writings of Dr . Prie&tiey ? Dr . Priestley has acquired celebrity by attacking the doctrine of a Divine ] rrovidence ! And

    this affirmation goes forth to the world with the authority of the Reverend Principal of Marischal College . To attempt to justify Dr . Priestley from the charge of attacking the doctrine of a Divine Providence were an insult to

    his memory and to the understandinjg of the reader ; and with regard to his attack ing # the freedom of the human will , the ' most charitable opinion is thatDr . 3 rown was utterly ignpijan-t . of the writings of the man eVenon this subject whom he presumes tfius deeply

    to censure . . " . ¦ '" ' r > i " ^ T " * Belsham ' s JElemeuts of the HUlesoptij 0 / the Mind . P . 230 . : '" :. ''

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    Revirw . —JBrowri * s Prize Essay . 607

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Oct. 2, 1816, page 607, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2457/page/43/