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    Divine perfections , must appear oa the smallest consideration . The Divine goodness suggested the communication of happiness . But without creation no happiness could be communicated . But whatever is created is limited : whatever is

    limited is so far imperfect . Thus , not even Omnipotence itself could prevent metaphysical evil , because it could not effect contradictions . It could not render that which is finite infinite , nor therefore create any being which should not be subject to defect . Absolute perfection it could bestow on none of its works .

    Metaphysical evil must therefore have existed , or the power , wisdom and goodness of God , must have remained inert , and no creation . have been produced . There is then in the very nature of created being , an absolute necessity of metaphysical evil or defect . "—Pp . 276 . 280 . 281 .

    After these observations the author proceeds to state , that from this necessity of defect or of metaphysical evil iri the very nature of every creature , we shall be gradually led to apprehend that the permission of the two other classes of evil , namely ,

    rr * oral and physical , is not inconsistent with the Divine perfections of wisdom and goodness ; that it may be proper , to consider first moral evil , because natural evil proceeds in a great measure from it j and that as moral evil has been defined the abuse

    of free a gency , it becomes necessary to shew that men are free agents and to explain and illustrate the specific nature of free agency itself- P . 286 . In doing this trie learned Principal defines liberty , " the power of

    perceiving , choosing and pursuing some object : " and adds— " But the term liberty when used to signify the power of executing volition , is employed in a lax and popular sense . Its more accurate meaning is that of volition and choice . Whoever wills to move

    or to act , is mentally as free as he who really moves or acts . J ~ Hs mind exercises its energy even when his body is chained . " P . 290 . In thus making liberty consist , in Volition , the learned Principal differs somewhat from the libertarians who

    have gone before him . The liberty of a moral agent , J > r . ? teid says , is ** # pottier over tffe deterfnmatiom of his own will" And Dr . Gregory affirm * that m ^ iv possesses «< 31 * independent , self--1 && £ M W 3 ^ ^ ™^ ^ JWyr » wpieja he may at hip own discretion / 4 it ; ert > by # ctfng either according to

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    motives , or in opposition to moti ve * or withoutany motives at all . *'* Thia is an admirable account of the doctrine of philosophical liberty , and we cannot but regret that Dr . Brown was

    no auspicious inspired with an equally clear and just conception of it . But though Principal Brown cannot define as well as son ^ e , he can

    assume as well as any of his predecessors : and we give the following passage as a very curious and edifying example of the argument called by logicians the petitio principii .

    fi All beings possessed of intelligence and reason' must also enjoy freedom of -will . Indeed to will and to act , imply to will and to act freely . To will and to act necessarily involves a downright contradiction , because necessity is applicable to what is passive and cannot be predicated of volition and action . From this

    it appears that the genuine notion of liberty consists in the power of acting or abstaining froin -action , and of electing among various modes of action . A free agent cannot choose whether he shall lvave volition or not . For to free agency volition is necessary , and by this he to whoa it belongs is disposed either to action or to rest . In a word wherever will exists

    there is freedom . " Dr . Brown defines necess \ ty to be " that the contrary of which involves a contradiction , and can neither exist nor coalesce in one idea . " p . 2 § 5 . And this is the only necessity of which he speaks . But he adds , * ' Certainty of event is often confbutided with

    necessity of existence , although these terms express very different notions /* p . %$ > " Those , " he says , p . 2 Q 7 , " who maintain a constant series of independent causes and effects , by which the human will is influenced without any internal principle of mdtion and action , maintain an eternal Series originating

    no where ! ! " Still it is urged , " adds the Doctor , p . 2 Q 8 , " that the will is influenced ty the last determination of the unrfep standing , and h therefore constrained . Constrained certainly it is in every

    sense which the advocate of n ecessity attaches to the term . The test <*<** - mittation of tTie understanding ? s , let ™ snr / pbse , that ^ n object ; 'Which it ha * contemplated isdesfrtfbte ; that noW

    . - _ —— - ~ * Dr , Gregory '* Philosop hical fl *****" Sec . I . P . si .

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    666 Review *— -Erourns Prize Essay .

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Oct. 2, 1816, page 606, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2457/page/42/