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    of what I write , to any person whatever , and promise to burn the letter whenever I desire you . To which 1 wish that you would have the goodness to add a third condition , namely , ( hat those genfletneu would do me the honour to communicate to me the

    argument ^ on which they themselves establish the Unity of God . The question you propose to me , reduces itself to this ; How may the Unity of God he established ? Or in other words ; How may it be proved tltdt there is but one God ?

    To resolve this question , it is necessary to know before we come to the proofs of the Unity of God , what we understand by the term God , The common idea of God , entertained by those who acknowledge his existence ,

    and , as I think the true one , is , that he is a Beingy infinite , eternal , incorporeal and all-perfect . Such an idea being ohce entertained , it appears to trie very easy thence to deduce the Unity of GbcL In fact , a Being who is ^ 1-perfect , 6 r , so to speak , perfectly

    perfect , can be only one , because a Being all-perfect cannot want any of the attributes , perfections , or degrees of perfections , which it imports him tnbre to possess than to want . For otherwise he would be , so far , not

    entirely perfect . For example , to have power is a greater perfection than to be without it ; to have more power is a greater perfection than to have less ; and to have all power ( that is , to be omnipotent ) is a greater perfection than not to have all . These

    positions being established , two Beings all-powerful are incompatible ; because the inference is unavoidable , that the one must will , necessarily , whatever the other wills ; and in that case , of these two . the one whose will

    is necessarily determined by the will of the other is not free , and , therefore , has hot that perfection ; because it is better to be free than to be subjected to what is determined by the will of another . If , however , they are both reduced to the necessity of always willing the same thing , then one may will to do what the other

    would wish to hinder , in which case the will of the one would prevail over the will of the other , and thas , of th

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    much as the other . Thus one of the two is fiot all-powerful . There is not then , npr can there be tiv 6 , all-powerful , nor consequently two Gods . By the same idea of perfection we

    arrive at the knowiedge-that God is omniscient * But , on the supposition of two distinct beings , which have a distinct power and will , it is an imperfection that one cannot conceal his

    thoughts from the other . But if one of the two conceal his thoughts from the other , that other is not omniscient , not merely because lie knows not all which can possibly be known , but because he is even ignorant of that which is known to another .

    The same argument will apply to the omnipresence of God . It were better that he should comprehend the whole extent of infinite spactfc , than be excluded frorri some part of it ; for should he be excluded from some

    place , he cannot act there nor know what is transacted there , and consequently he would be neither omnipotent nor oitnniscient . If to invalidate these arguments of mine , it be alleged that the two Gods supposed , or the two hundred

    thousand , ( for by the same mode of argument by which you may have ttvo , you may have two millions , as there is no limit to the number *) if , I say , it be objected that several Gods may have a perfect omnipotence which is exactly alike , that they may also have

    the same knowledge and the same will , and may exist , equally , in the same place , this is only to multiply the same Being , but , at length , it is in reality only to reduce a supposed plurality to a simple Unity , For , to describe two intelligent Beings who know , will , and do incessantly the

    same thing , and who have no separate existence , is to describe , in words , a plurality , but really to establish a simple Unity . For , to be inseparably united in design , will , action , and place , is to be as , closely united as an intelligent Being can be united to himself ; and consequently , to suppose that where there is such an union

    there may be two Beings , is to Suppose a distinction without a difference , and something divided from itself . JL have ventured to send you wiy reflections on thie subject * < they ardse in Iwy mind , Without fcueh a « orderly arrangement as might rentier

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    148 Tfke Correspondence between Locke and Limboreh , translated .

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), March 2, 1819, page 148, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1770/page/12/