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    IRRITATION AND FORTIFICATION.

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    LORD Palmerston ' s fortification speech still forms the topic of conversation , and , we add , of condemnation . The peaee-at-any-price party are , of course , furious at the bare idea of any further outlay for warlike purposes ; and Mr . Bright , who was so tame and inactive in repelli ng the aggression of the Lords , threatened division aftt'r division if the Premier persisted in attempting to carry his proposition the night it was introduced . The hon . representative for ht in the shameful trick

    Birmingham was quite rig resisting of taking the House by storm , as there is ample need for deliberate discussion and investigation ; but he and other members of his party will set all the country against them if they permit themselves to become as frantic at plans of fortification as bulls in the Spanish areua do at the sight of the red flags of their tormenting assailants . If IVfanchester were situated on the coast in the position of Portsmouth , the nation might defer to the wish of its inhabitants—if they entertained

    ifc __ that the great City of Cotton should trust implicitly to the protecting influence of the Commercial Treaty ; but the safety of Portsmouth and Plymouth is a matter of far greater importance , as the destruction of our arsenals might easily lead to a decline as a naval power . The people know that steam and long range guns have completely changed the conditions of naval warfare , and they will not grudge any expenditure really necessary to compensate for these alterations , and leave a decided balance both of offensive and defensive power

    on our side . What we have to look to is , that the arrangements to be made are Taased xipon sound principles ; that they are not too costly , and that they are adapted to the peculiarities of a densely peopled and free constitutional state . Mr . Sidney Herbert may consider that the . time has gone by when the people will view with jealousy the building ' -of large ports , and the augmentation ' of the regular army ; but in both these particulars he is decidedly wrong . Whatever works are necessary to prevent a naval attack xipon . our arsenals will meet with universal approbation ; but schemes to fortify all approaches to . them by land do not so readily which isstill less

    commend themselves to the public mind , ' - disposed to look with equanimity upon the erection of huge strongholds in the interior , of the country . Lord Pai ^ ierston and Mr . Sidney Herbert seem to have- rejected the Commissioners' plan of protecting London by a Bastille on Shooters-hill , or if they entertain it—which should be distinctly ascertained on Monday— -they prudentially keep' it in the background . With or without this monstrous fort they admit that the metropolis must be defended in-the field , and they ask leave to begin their task of protecting the coast by an outlay of two millions and a-half for the current year , to of eiht and half

    be followed by a further expenditure g a"" millions , the wHolc to bi ^^ ed-ivy ; iunmties-termina ^ le 4 nthirty years . These eleven millions will not , according to the 1 calculations already made , prove anything like sufficient for all the expenses that will be incurred ; and the so-called " Defence Committee , " consisting of the Duke of Camhkidge ; * and five other officers , tell us that an increase of the regular army will be necessary . They say that the proposed fortifications will require garrisons , which the regular army cannot provide without being enlarged , and that if these fortifications are not erected , a still greater augmentation of regular forces

    must take place . There is thus before us an indefinite prospect of taxation and ¦ expenditure , a great increase of tho patronage so corruptly employed by the Horso Guards and naval departments , and a complete change in the relations between the Government and the people by an augmentation of the standing army , and the erection of forts more likely to alarm our own . countrymen than to frighten the French . These proposals come at a time when the aristocracy usurp the functions of the Commons , when the working classes are excluded from the Volunteer movement , arid insultingly told

    that if they hud rifles they would take the property of others , and when the smallest modicum of Parliamentary Reform has been refused upon the ground that any extension of the suffrage would lead to an adjustment of taxation to which the olig arch y would object . Taking all these circumstances tog ¥ the f 3 ^ duty if it sanctions the plans of the Cabinet without considerable modification , and without taking securities against a gross perversion of funds . The best plan would be to grant as muoh money as may be necessary for the sea defences , and stop all that is demanded for land works , at any rate until a muoh better case had been made out for their construction . The Government plan is simply this— -that they will

    undertake to provide for the public safety if they have a much larger army , and an unlimited pull upon the public purse , for fortifications and new depots . Nothing like a systematic programme of defence has been laid before the country ; and the ¦ in tention is obviously to lead Parliament on bit by bit to consent to the separate portions of a frightful expenditure . A ¦ wise ' system of- volunteer forces , a divisio ' n of the country into military districts adapted-to a method of defence by Volunteers , together with an increase of the navy and a few coast works , would provide all that ought to be desired ; but this method

    ¦ would have two defects in the eyes of a Minister of the oligarchy , as Lord Palmerston has proved himself to be . It Avould place power in the hands of the people , and diminish the means of corruption and intimidation at the disposal of the advisers of the Crown That the present Parliament will take a patriotic view of the emergency is more than can be expected of it ; but it may be persuaded to proceed with some caution , unless the Premier is strengthened by an unreasonable opposition on the part of the Manchester school , who have an unhappy knack of provoking a reaction whenever they meddle with warlike affairs .

    Having thus briefly contemplated the question of defence , let us look at the extraordinary speech by which Lord Palmekston astonished the House on Monday night . His oration was a long one—Jong enough to have contained abundant explanation of the plans he advocated , and of the reasons for . '" their ' . adoption . But it has never been his Lordship ' s practice to tell the people anything that he could manage to conceal , and on this occasion he followed his old method , and did his best to create doubt and alarm , and to get the House to vote away millions with its eyes blindfold , and its brain stupefied . When his Lordship tells us that the

    army and navy of France are larger than can be requisite for purposes of defence he announces what has become a mere truism , and no one will deny that the vast armaments of our next door neighbour must be balanced by armaments of our own . ThcT bearing , of a speech can be sought , not in a few passages containing ^ statements so . obvious that their mention can excite no-surprise , but in its whole tone and scope , and , so examined , Lord Palmerstox ' s " utterance is a prolonged war-whoop against the man he has done so much in

    to aggrandize and sustain . Little objection , the . , way of denial can be made to the soyeral statements . It certainly was a general war in which this country " was engaged against the first Bonaparte ; at its close our defences were neglected ; the Duke of Weltjngtox sounded his alarm boll . The " future is not free from danger , " and the " horizon is charged with clouds that betoken the possibility of a tempest , " and we havcv " right to look for our . security to the mere forbearance of u rival power . " But to string these mtd ^ th ^ r-siinUai ^ -facts-togethf r like , - . Ji ,, rosai ; y pf wnr , without ,

    any decided expressions of hope that the peace may bo preserved ; to speak of France ns " a rival power " . without any intimation of expectation that sufficient ' grounds of agreement may be found to prevent the desire for collision—this , in a man holding the very responsible position of chief adviser of the British crown , is conduct which can only bo excused or palliated by a knowledge of facts which the Premier did not communicate to the House . If nothing

    morn exists than a general conviction that the peace of the Continent will be again broken , and a . possibility arise that France will support ideas that the English Government may not agree to , then Lord Palmerston ' s proceedings amount to no less than a flagitious and wanton trifling with the best interests of his country . Ho knows full well the impression his words Avill produce abroad , and ho could scarcely have made a speech more calculated to endanger our relations with

    Franco . When the Premier exclaims , " Now is there nothing in the state of Europe that leads us to think that we might in the course of events be called upon to defend ourselves from a hostile attack ? " Is the policy he is pursuing—which is alienating him from Mr . Gladhtone , and securing something like an idolatry of the Tory faction—is this policy calculated or intended to place us in opposition to France upon the European h ht to

    questions that are likely to arise ? If so , we ave a rig knoww ^ at-tlmt pol ^ wrong . Jf the Premier does not mean this , ' he must contemplate the occurrence ofawaiMyithns for tho mere purpose oi ' ambition and revenge—a war in which the French Emperor will show how it is that he «• represents " " defeat of Waterloo A few passages from Lord Palmerston ' s speech will surest this inference . Let us take the following : — " I do not mean to say tlmfr tlmt « rmy is raised for the deliberate pur-

    Untitled Article

    J uly 28 I 860 . ] The Saturday Analyst and Leader . 683

    Irritation And Fortification.

    IRRITATION AND FORTIFICATION .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), July 28, 1860, page 683, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2358/page/3/