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    Mil; BRIGHT AT BIRMINGHAM. tlmt

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    " \ ^/" E cannot wonder JMr , Bright s organ should ex-* * tromcly angry with tho Times for comparing its hero to the " carcase of adefunct tabby " floating on the tide ; but the criticism ol' an enemy , however unsavoury , is often valuable , and if ; would be Avell for the honourable member "' for Birmingham and his adherents to consider , not whether such an expression is justifiable , but what there has been in his conduct which may have suggested to an unscrupulous opponent ao coarse an invective . From Mr . Bujgiit ' s long prominence ) . before the country , and hia acceptance or assumption of the position of leader of the lloform party , it might have been reasonably cxpectod that ho would guide , not simpl y follow opinion—that Iio would rule the elements he hnd invoked , nnd prove master of the

    circumstances , which ,. to some extent at least , he had produced If these are recognised as the duties and attributes of n political leader , it will bo impossible tc » road Mr . Blight ' s Birmingham oration without disappointment nnd regret . Delivered just boforo the mooting of ParmWent , \\\ a city famous for its services to reform , and by the man put forth as the champion of tho un-

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    muster an annoyance incident to Ms high station ; but as the House csm , if it so p leases , go on balloting , without results for an indefinite period , and rather likes the dead-lock , inasmuch it allows long speeches de , omnibus rebus—and the pay runs on all the whiles—Mr . Buchanan has done well to walfr . no longer , arid force the ' House—as the delivery of Ids message will have the effect of doing—to elect its Speaker and go to work . The message has lost much of its interest in this country , by the delay which has already taken place in its publication . Whatever interest we may feel in the internal politics of the United States , and their relations to Spain and Central America , we are of . course much more concerned about our own dealings with them ; and if there happens , as is usually the case , to be a " difficulty" between the two Governments some where * we are eager to learn what the President has to say about it . The paragraphs , therefore , which refer to the San Juan affair , would have possessed considerable interest whilst the results of General Scott ' s mission were unpublished ; but since it has become known that the question was in train for an amicable arrangement , the remarks of the President have lost their attraction . It is satisfactory , however , to have his distinct official announcement that there is no longer any fear of a collision between the forces of the two countries , and that the question has become the object of special negotiations . It would have been but right that Mr . Buchanan , whilst commending the forbearance of the British admiral , should have rebuked the temerity and insolence of General Harney ; but it would , perhaps , be too much to ask an American President who lias not entirely abandoned the hope of re-election to directly censure the- hero ' of , ' . a class .-which exercises so potent an influence upon ' ¦ the elections . We are not at all surprised to be told that the differences arising P \ i % of the Clayton-Bui / web . treaty are not yet adjusted . The same statement will be . probably repeated in two or three future messages , since the difficulties in question depend partly for their solution upon arrangements with two or three of the petty republics of Central America , and have their sole origin in the repudiation Uy the ¦ United States of its own distinct engagements . They will probably prove again a pretext for stirring up ( the ; anti-English feeling amongst the Irish democrats of the north ; but as something of that kind must be done every year , it is really better that the occasion should be a matter nboiitCwhich Englishmen certainly will never excite themselves , and , consequently ,. @ne which can hy no chance lead to war . Upon the whole , the message is as friendly towards us as is consistent with the traditional style of suck documents , and we may congratulate ourselves accordingly . It is upon Spain that the weight of Mr . -Buchanan's denunciations falls . If we have been spared , it is only that she may be trounced more severely . There is a paltry sum of some 3 50 , 000 dollars , called the " Cuban claims , " alleged to bo due to certain American citizens , for duties unjustly exacted from American vessels in Cuba about fifteen years ago , which " always figures prominently in the . presidentnl indictment against Spain , and is , of course , made much of by Mr . Buchanan . The claim may be a just one , but if settled at once Spain would obtain no relief . If Mr . Buchanan has any project which deserves the name of a policy , it is the acquisition of Cuba . He first directly proposed the scheme , has successfully traded upon it as a politician , and , having gained power , adheres to it . lie is , therefore , at least , entitled to such merit as consistency in a bad cause may entitle him to , He recommended tlie acquisition of Cuba in the famous or infamous O 3 tend manifesto ; he recommended it'in his last message , and asked Congress to take the question into consideration *—a request to which Congress very sensibly paid no attention . He repeats the recommendation and request in the present , message . Of course tho question is mainly one for Spain and the" United States to settle by themselves . It may bo as Mr . Buchanan put it in his previous message , that the geographical position of the island makes its acquisition inecessai'y to the tJnited States , while its possession is of little importance to Spain . It may be quite true that America is rioh and Spain poor , and that the bargain-would be a mutually advantageous one ; and if they can agree upon terms , well and good . But it must not be forgotten that Mr . Buchanan has calculated upon the probability of Spain's refusal , and propounded a policy to be adopted in that event . It will scarcely be lor the interest of civilization and progress that the dootx'ines of the Ostond manifesto should prevail ; and it may bo useful , as some guide to tho principles-which influence the ruler of tho United States , to repeat hove the sentiments he expressed in 1 S 54 i .. — " After we shall have offered Spnia a price for Cuba far beypmd its present value , and this sl ' uill havo been , refused , it will then be time to consider tho question , Does Cuba in tho possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal , peaco , and the existence of our cherished Union P *• Should this question be answered in the affirmative , then ,

    by every law , human and divine , we shall be justified in wresting it from ' Spain if we possess the power ; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbour , if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying- his own home . " Perhaps the most important portion of the message is that which relates to Mexico . The President , after dwelling- upon the outrages inflicted upon American citizens , asks Congress to pass a law authorizing him to employ military force against Mexico for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the past and security for the future . Should the request Tje granted , that most unhappy country will be exposed to the horrors of invasion , as well as to those of civil war . It is scarcely possible , however , that things can be much worse than they now are ; and it is becoming the conviction , even of those most averse to American filibustering policy , that the only hope for Mexico and Central America lies in their annexation by the United States . It is evident that such a consummation must come sooner or later ; it is merely a question of time ; and the sooner , therefore , the American Government introduces order and something like security , the better for the people and the world generally . The United States themselves have most to ' apprehend from such an acquisition ; but if , in pursuance of what they deem their manifest destiny , they ivill even seek pretences for hastening it , it is not for ¦ ¦ us to attempt to stay them . Mr . Buchanan ' s domestic policy seems to be a vigorous support of Slavery , and a strong show of hostility to the-Slave trade . The one event recorded in the message which fills liim with joy is the recognition of Slavery by the Supreme Court as a fundamental , we might almost say necessary , institution of tho Union . We can understand his satisfaction , ns a strong pro-Slavery man , at this decision ; but not his presumption that it will prove a final settlement of the . question . As singular is his belief that the events at Harper ' s Ferry will be the means of allaying existingy excitement . The decision of the Supreme Court , and" tho Harper ' s-Ferry-outbreak audits results-, may prove that the" law is on the side of the Slavery ' party , and that their opponents arc rather hair-brameid . 'enthusiast ' s than practical politicians ; . but they no ; more dispose of the agitation , or cement the Union , than , the pettiest election'triumph gained by a democrat in one of the open States . They rather hasten the " irrepressible . conflict , " and increase the danger of " a . dissolution of the " cherished Union . " The Federal law may-be against the " Republican * , " but . they will render it practically inoperative in the states in which they predominate ; and the judicial declaration that Slavery is the keystone of the Union will lead many who were before friendly to it to ' desire its dissolution . The victories of the slaveholders are like those of Pyhkiius : another great one may prove their ruin . A cause like theirs cannot be maintained by . aggression and propagandist )! ; their hope lies in their own -quietude , and the absurd excesses of their opponents . It is but consistent that the supporter of one-kind of spoliation , in . the shape of slav-cay , should be the advocate of that other , which takes the form of protection and prohibition . Nothing more natural , therefore , than the President's recommendation to raise the import duties . Mr . Buchanan's message is not one , in which the friends and well-wishers of the great Republic , which , according to him , enjoys the " special protection of Divine Providence , " can Hnd much satisfaction . It portrays her greedy for fresh territories , unscrupulous about the means of acquiring them , and all tho while distracted at home by an agitation which threatens to find its solution in a disruption of the Union which has made her what she is .

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    32 The Leader and Saturday Anahjst . J ^ n . , 1800 .

    Mil; Bright At Birmingham. Tlmt

    tlmt Mil ; BRIGHT - AT BIRMINGHAM .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 14, 1860, page 32, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2329/page/4/