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Leader (1850-1860), 20th February 1858, Edition 1 of 2, Page 174, Untitled Article

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      17 THE LEAD E-R . _ [ No . 413 , Pebiujaiiy 20 , 1858 .

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      sceptical as to the whole truth of the Uurkaru report , though , from the knowledge of the known courage and bravery of my troops , I feel inspired with the brightest and most sanguine hopes . However , I am most anxious that you should write all the particulars without delay . May the Almighty protect and preserve you . Be vigilant , be happy !" It is stated that the prisoners are to be boiled in oil . ARRIVAL OF THE LADIES , &C ., FROM LUCKNOW AT CALCUTTA . A correspondent of the Daily News gives the subjoined account of the arrival at Calcutta of the women and children from Lucknow : —

      " At six o ' clock on Saturday morning ( January 9 th ) , a crowd of p « ople assembled at Prinsep ' s Ghaut , but a dense fog delayed the arrival of the Madras , and it was not until a quarter to eight that she could be sighted . A royal salute of twenty-one guns from the ramparts of Fort William announced her arrival , and other salutes followed from the men-of-war in the river . All vessels in the river , -with the exception of the American ships close to Prinsep ' s Ghaut , were dressed out with all tkeir flags and presented a very imposing sight . Along the steps from the Ghaut down to the water ' s edge was formed a sort of gangway , guarded by policemen , and along the whole red carpeting was laid out , such as it is customary to use on state occasions . At last , the Madras arrived off the Ghaut , but owing- to some cause or

      other considerable delay took place before the passengers eould be landed ; the public in the meantime looking on in stem silence , as if afraid lest even now some accident might happen to those whose escape from the hands of a barbarous and bloodthirsty enemy was decreed by a merciful Providence . The whole scene partook of a solemnity rarely witnessed , and , indeed , the expression on the faces of the bystanders betokened universal svmpathy for those they were about to welcome to the hospitable City of Palaces . Mr . Beadon , the secretary of the Home Department , on behalf of Government ; the Hon . — Talbot , private secretary to the Governor-General , on behalf of Lord Canning ; and Dr .

      Leckie , as secretary to the Relief Committee , went down to the water ' s edge to receive the ladies . A sxidden rush towards the river , a thronging towards the gangway , . and a slight whisker of voices , indicated that the landing had begun . Cheers were given at first , but only slowly responded to , people evidently being too much occupied with their own reflections to think of cheering ; but as the ladies and children proceeded up , people dotted their hats almost mechanically , silently looking on as the heroines passed up . At this moment , another ship in the harbour fired a salute , but it did not sound joyfully ; it appeared rather like minute guns in remembrance of those whose widows and orphans were now

      passing in solemn review before us . " The black dresses of most of the ladies told the tale of their bereavement , whilst the pallid faces , the downcast looks , and the slow walk , bore evidence of the great sufferings they must have undergone both in mind and body . " SIR HENRV HAVELOClt ' S LAST DESPATCH . The despatch of the lamented General llavelock , describing the relief of Lucknow in conjunction with Sir James Outram , has been published during the week . The subjoined extract will be read with melancholy interest ;—

      " From this point [[ the bridge of Charbagh ] the direct road to the Kosideucy was something less than two miles ; but it was known to have been cut by trenches , and crossed by pulisades at abort intorvuls , the houses also being all loopholed . Progress in this direction was impossible ; so the united column pushed on detouring along the narrow road which skirts the left bank of the canal . Its advance was not seriously inturrupted until it had coma opposite the King ' s palace , or tbo Kiiiscr Bagh , whoro two guns a ^ u ft body of morc . ona . ry troops wero entrenched . Trora this entrenchment a firo of grape and musketry ayrb opened , under which nothing could live . The artillery and troops had to pass a bridge

      partially under ita influence ; but wore then ahrouded by the buildings adjacent to the palace of Furoed Buksh . Darkness was coming on , and Sir Jamea Outram at first proposed to halt within tho courts of the Mohul for the night ; but I esteemed it to be of such importunco to let tho boloaguorod garrison know that Buccour was at hand , thnt , with hi * ultimate sanction , I directed the main body of tho 78 th -Highlanders and regiment of Ferozepore to advance . This column rushed on with desperate gallantry , led by Sir Jamoa Outram and myself j ond Lieutenants Hudson and Hargood , of my staff , ^ iiroUBirBtW < St 8 " of"flnt = roofedj ^ looplioled > v . hou 8 eB , _ . ft oni -which a perpetual flro wna kept up , and , overcoming every obstacle , established itself within tho enclosure of tho JReaiuonpy . "

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      SPECIAL LETTERS VliOM INDIA . , ( From a Military Correapontlent . ' ) Nagpore , December 27 , 1857 . I BjiouLw \ fQ aowy if any imporfijutlou , a of expression in my former letters should huvo led your readers to

      suppose that I am an advocate for rapid and radical and sweeping changes in the government and administration of India . I pbjecfc to our general policy of the last thirty years , especially during Lord Daihousie ' s tenure of office , as having been essentially radical , revolutionary , and destructive , both in imperial acts of state , and in minor fiscal and administrative measures ; as having tended to ruin and exasperate the most reflecting and influential classes , and with them to destroy elements of strength , stability , and harmony , which a stroke of the pen in a period of transition may efface , but which a century of the wisest government cannot create . I deprecate as destructive a policy which , instead of introducing and encouraging our own absolute securitj' of propertv , and of its descent , has rendered the

      tenure of the proudest and most valued rights , possessions , and privileges , more precarious than it was under the despotic but patriarchal rule of the native princes . I do not regard as conservative that system which threatens to perpetuate the retention of all offices of dignity and high emolument in the hands of a chartered and " ' covenanted' guild of foreigners , and to exclude the most able and the best qualified natives from all possibility of an honourable and distinguished career , from all interest in our empire , and all fellowship with our race . But , although I certainly do consider that some acts of restitution and restoration might be appropriately and gracefully blended with those brilliant rewards Vor the fidelity and active aid of native chieftains , which are required no less for the support of our national

      honour than as an expression of our national gratitude ; and although 1 consider that we must prepare to abandon the present most dangerous , 'inhuman , and insulting 83-stem of official hierarchy , monopoly , and exclusion , vet no one can be more convinced than I am of the necessity of caution and care . What I earnestly desire to see is rather some evidence of altered disposition , aims , and principles , than any striking and immediate change in our outward , practice and policy . Let us lose no time , however . We can better afford to lay the foundations in the plenitude of our power and triunipli , than in a period of discontent and agitation . Let us not present one more example of the neglect of " that wise lesson which experience teaches , that there is a time when to yield winsJthe affections , another , when it only obtains the contempt of mankind . " * ¦ - ' ¦

      The scrupulous conservation of rights and possessions , the extension by commutation , by new grants , and , 1 should add , by sale , of our English security of- landed tenure , administrative and * social reform , and vitalization of the empire , by the gradual association of distinguished natives in all grades and departments of the public service , and the gradual elimination and exclusion of unqualified Englishmen , should be the guiding principles of the new era . The absorption and decay of the old system will give ample time for the sure and solid growth of the new .

      And when an institution , a law , a ceremony , or an establishment has fallen into contempt and disuse , has become inadequate from the lapse of time , or has become corrupt , dangerous , and offensive , it is no true conservatism to endeavour , in defiance of every indication and warning , t © prop it up once more , or to gulvanize it into unnatural and mischievous life . Thus tho Indian Regular Army bus exploded in blood and ( iro , the Bengal Array has abolished itself effectually ; the Bombay and Madras Armies have felt tho contagion , and have indeed nothing in themselves so peculiar ds should make the warning loss significant with regard to them . Nothing has been moro distinctly manifested during tho late period of rebellion and exoitement , both in . the Bengal and Bombay corps which mutinied , and in tho Madras

      regiments that wore tampered with , than tho utter helplessness and want of influence of the European officers . It id painful , it is odious , " to bo compelled to write in this strain at a time when so many of those countrymen of ours have exhibited such glorious dovotion , when so many have suffered and perished nobly , and so many moro are doing good and gallant service ; but , in truth , in many instances , the bloodshed and Buffering wore augmented by , and thoiSo very nets of daring and devotion wore tho offspring and consequence of , that very want of influence over the Sbpoys and insight into thoir true feeliuga , to which I . havo culled attention . They are indeed doing good and gallant' service , but not with thoir regiments . The regimental system wua at fault , not the men : tho system by which the delicate

      duty of commanding mined man of another race and colour was entrusted £ 0 unqualified oillcuro , without experience , without interest in tho work , and without authority ; tho system by which tho ignorant and ouroloss cadet could grow up by moro seniority to bo tlip ignorant und careless commandant of a regiment or gqnoi : aLof .. ft « div . ial « a . j ^ it 4 ^^^^ wjifla ^ Jault , and ita faults have now boon blazoned hi characters ofUloTjOIHTd ilainu , ho that all can sco who arc not wilfully blind . I iogret to seo that three now ' extra' regiments have boon raised in tho Mudrua Presidency , und that all tho native battalions of tliut army huvo boon ruoruitcd up to 1000 strong frum thoir formor strength of 700 Sepoys oaoh . But wo will consider this aa u mere measure of iuunodiale and temporary emergency . Tho rogulnr

      Sepoy regiment system must be doomed for ever ; it is condemned by its fruits ; nor can we afford , financially or prudentially , to keep up so large a force of trained and formidably armed infantry , tq do duties which could be better performed by an efficient police . We should lose nothing in real military strength by reducing our Sepoy infantry to the lowest possible number of battalions , organized on the irregular plan , sufficient to furnish reliefs for Pegu , Aden , Singapore , and other foreign stations , and to form a valuable auxiliary to the British infantry in India , and in any Eastern campaign . Both for preserving the public peace in India , and for imperial and external warfare , for which Sepoy infantry never could be relied on , we should foster the irregular cavalry , the arm in which the British army has always been deficient .

      One absolute and conspicuous result of the rebellion of 1857 , is therefore the spontaneous reduction of our Eegular Sepoy Army by upwards of fifty battalions ; and it is to be hoped that the lesson to be drawn from this great fact will not be missed . It may be remarked en 2 > assant that by universal admission the Sepoys , both on our side , as the 31 st at Saugor , and against us , everywhere , . have fought quite a > well without any European officers as they ever did on any occasion with them . Another result is equally obvious and indisputable—a great increase of our financial difficulties , a loss and

      extra expense combined in one year which perhaps would not be much over estimated if taken at ten crores of rupees ; or ten millions sterling , the climax of a deficiency of a million and a half per annum during five years . * I can see no remedy for this but in a reduction of the army and other establishments , which must be in a great measure prospective . Although the permanent proportion of European troops in India must certainly be . somewhat increased ( not to any great extent ) , yet 011 the whole the army and other establishments , as majbe explained in detail when required , could be rendered much more efficient at a . much less expense than at present .

      But the most important results , and the , gravest lessons and warnings arising from the events of 1857 , remain yet to be considered . Has such a result boon produced as must in some degree modify our relative position , and our general tone and bearing for the future , with the Native States of India ? What effect has been produced on the public opinion of India ? When all opposition has ceased , when every trace of the rebellion has disappeared , will the popular belief in our invincible power have been strengthened or diminished ? I believe that our relative position with the Native States has been materially filtered by the occurrence and course of this rebellion , and that the Native Princes have morally and politically gained a higher and more independent standing than they enjoyed before the

      outbreak . I believe it , and I rejoice at it ; I believe that this is no loss of power to us , but that on the contrary our paramount imperial power on the continent of India may now be consolidated and secured , openly avowed and distinctly acknowledged , ' in a manner that has not been hitherto attained , —if the . lesson to be learned from the events of the year 1857 be duly appreciated and carried out . Our position towards the Native States partly from tho essentially faulty nature of the unlimited right of interference exercised , by the British ^ Residents in conformity with treaties , partly by really unauthorized encroachments in tho same direction , had become most anomalous and embarrassing to both parties ,

      weakening anil dograding the Nabivu Sovereign and his ministers without adding in the least to our influence or dignify . The general tone and bearing of our intercourse' with the Native States , and of the consultative minutes 6 f the Supreme Government , especially during Lord Dalhousio ' s tenure of olHcc , with regard to them , appears to me to have been very bad , unfair , unfriendly , offensive , and threatening . I ^ rejoice therefore at tho inevitable change of their position and of our tone nml bearing , and cannot regard the change as anything but a gain both for ua and for them . At the sumo tiiuo 1 consider that it involves a striking contradiction and condemnation of Lord Dulhouaic ' s foreign policy .

      Lord Dalhousio , writing in 18 f > l to tho Nizam oi Bydornbnd , on tho subject of tho balance of a debt duo to our Government , recommends him to cU . imi-fs or roduco tho number of his Arab troops , and romimls him that oura is ' a great Government by whoso friendship alone' ho has 4 so long been suatainetl , whoso resoutmont it ia dangerous to provoke , ' ' and whoso power cau crush ' him * at ita will . 'f Now , grunting all this to bo true , whoro was tho necessity ol this vulgar blustering in time of profound poioc , und on a -mutter of nnunuo / Could it bo suppoMud thut tho Nissam wiw ignorant or forgetful of tho oiionnous jioivor of tho British Ciovcrnmont' ? - ™ H > iroly-such ^ lanKiiutfe-nntfl » t , luiyo ,. | j « UHJ'e ^ l ^ ii until thoNiauin had taken no mo unlriuiKlly or treacherous coursi ' , which no mumber of lila fuinily has done during tho last sixty years . In mid * a case , what terms inuio galling , what throat moro unequivocal , could bo u » u < l ' * Vhlu Lord Dnlliousio ' a iiirawoll Minute , pur . M , p . 8 . t Papers rolutlvo to territory codod by tho Nlssuin , p . 4 : 2 . 185 d .

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      • Roebuck ' s History of tho Whig Ministry . '

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Feb. 20, 1858, page 174, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2231/page/6/