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    3Pt4**iYfmnv i^UniUlUW -''' + ' ¦ • ¦ '

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    The Marquis of Nobmajjb \ 's version of the incidents of 1848 will not remain unanswered M . Louis Blajstc is preparing for the press a formal exposure of the inaccuracies contained in the diplomatist ' s narrative . Written in the . English . language , and inspired throughout by English feeling , this workwitt probably procure for its- author such an English recognition as he has never yet obtained . It will prove him to be not only a master of English , literary art , but an adept in English habits of thought .

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    THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 . Eistoire de la Campagnede 181 * : Waterloo . Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Charras . London : Jeffs

    ( First Article . ) This work of Colonel Charras will be welcomed by all military students . The campaign of 1815 must have a perennial interest for them . The book is written with care , soberness , and impartiality . It is perfectly fair to the Jhiglish and the Prussians . Towards the French army it is , of course , loyal throughout . It brings no charges against the Dutch-Belgians . On the otherh&nd it unduly praises the military abilities of the Prince of Orange , ft leaning that may be traced perhaps to an amiable desire on the part of Colonel Uharras to repay in some degree the hospitalities of the Dutch people , find the facilities afforded to the historian by the authorities at the Hague . There is also a deep tinge of personal animosity to Napoleon , for whose fallibility no allowance whatever is madean animosity wbich leads to some

    in-, fustice . But for 4 hu it is easy to account . We set aside altogether any political motive * that might be supposed to have animated the historian . We are sincerely willing to believe that his greatest object was the truth ; wad we can well understand the strong feelings of even a Frenchman , who loves truth , when he reads the stories of Waterloo written by his countrymen . It must be confessed , too , that the authors of these atones may be excused to a great extent , ' since they have founded some of their most ilagraoit statements on the writings of Napoleon . They were in the position of Colonel Charraa before exile made him familiar with the scene of the struggle —thev believed , and he believed . * aux ecrits de Nanole ' on . ' It was a studv

    of this brief canqpajgn , Mes Merits de Napoleon a . la mam / that raised doubts in thomlnd or Colonel Charras , led him to the sources of history , Mid finally'landed him in very clear , and generally sound , conclusions Mtpe « ting the truth . The sources to which he had recourse were the ttterMure of Waterloo , the archives of Farfs and the Hague , and the Mtttbnal testimony of survivors . After reading hi * book , lie says , " Un jslgmme parattra peut-etre hien diinlnu 6 ; maia , en revsmahe , rarm £ e franoaiae wm \ tk plus grande , la France mo ^ ns ah » ias * e . " In ftain l&ngfon , the fJKJ ^^ tWift Wid 1815 ape * twwn wtip % < m jta fltyoM ^ VIiMprieoa . K » ^ M ^ Mmfvmti * H n&w&MM * viym \ f \ }** ¦ £ become nun * so wl ^ m « pmoB ^ 4 $ ri mm 4 tmm P »<* only a Frenchman ,

    but a soldier with high scientific acquirements and great professional know-It is not easy to compress into the space at our disposal even an outline of the astonishing events of June , 1815 , so as to remind our readers of the capital errors of Napoleon and of his antagonists . Although so short , being practically determined in four days , although simple and bold in its dramatic movement , yet it was so full of complicated incidents , so swift and grand in its development , so overwhelming in its issue , that , as we see , whole -volumes are absorbed in its narration ; it attracts around itself a whole literature ; the last word respecting it can hardly , perhaps , be said in ourdayA ; it will certainly be one of the great subjects of speculation to the critics of all time . Nor could it well be otherwise with a campaign destined to manifest the tremendous fact that the Nemesis he had conjured

    up had at length overtaken its warrior-worshipper ; ttat Napoleon , whose power had been built on battles , had in battle suffered irretrievable defeat and hopeless ruin . Colonel Charras strikes the key-note of his estimate of Napoleon ' s proceedings by endeavouring to show that in 1815 he djd not display that prodigious energyand fertility oFresource in collecting , equipping , and organizing troops , for which he has hitherto received great credit . We will here take that for granted . Colonel Charra 3 seems also to lean to the opinion that Napoleon would have acted more wisely had he waited for the invasion of France by the Allies , instead of becoming the assailant , and if he had used the grace allowed him to improve and augment his army . This also we will take for

    granted ; but if it were admitted that Napoleon ' s -view of the course it behoved him to adopt were correct , then it cannot be denied that the moment chosen was altogether in his favour . He had the initiative . His immediate opponents , Wellington and Bliicher , uncertain where , if it fell , the thunderbolt would strike , had scattered their troops far and wide over the country between Liege and Courtrai . By an agreement with their imperial allies , they were precluded from sending even a reconnoitring party across the French frontier , and were , therefore , compelled to depend for intelligence upon spies . Napoleon knew the disadvantages of their situation , and resolved to make the most of them . Without a declaration of

    war , without any warning , he suddenly concentrated his troops to strike at the point where the allied armies came in contact . On the 14 th of June all was uncertainty ; oh the 15 th Napoleon ' s tToops , in compact and converging masses , rose , as it were , out of the earth , and sprang into the » midst of the Allies . So well timed , so swift had been his advance , that when Napoleon held his legions in hand on the left bank of the Sambre , between Fleurus and . Charleroi , Bliicher had barely more than one corps at Ligny , and Wellington had not moved at all . Bliicher does not for one moment seem to have doubted that the ostensible object of Napoleon was the real one , and he hastened the concentration of his corps d ' armee . But "Wellington , always cautious , was more than usually so , because he was not so -well informed of what had actually taken place ; and although prepared beforehand for any attack , he was slow to believe that Napoleon's apparent object was his real one . Colonel Charras takes great and deserved

    credit on behalf of the Dutch-Belgian general , Perponcher , for occupying Quatre Bras . We do not question Perponcher ' s merit , but was it hot natural that he , on the spot , with such precise information as the actual appearance of Pire ' s dragoons and cannon at Frasne , he should judge more correctly than Wellington , less perfectly informed , at Brussels . The result of the operations of the 15 th were , that Napoleon had indeed carried his advanced-guard to Fleurus and Frasne , but he had not brought up tie rearmost troops into close connexion with those in front , so as to be ready for another spring in the morning . Bliicher had put every one of his corps in motion at an early hour , but at night had not half his army within reach . It was not until eleven at night that Wellington , then for the first time in possession of indisputable information , directed his divisions upon Quatre Bras . His sole justification for the delay is , that he was not informed soon enough of the irruption of Napoleon , and that he feared , even so late as the 18 th , that he would be turned or attacked on his right .

    Dans cette journde du 15 juin ( writes Colonel Charras of Wellington ) , si mal employee , on ne reconnait ni sa per 8 picacite " si profonde , ni son coup-d ' oeil si sftr , nison activite si hatituelle . S'il avait eu ( levant lui le Napoldon d'ltalie et do Ratisbonne , il aurait pu payer bien clier , le lendemain , ses lenteura prolongdes . But the Napoleon of Charleroi was a different being . The day ' s work had overwhelmed him with fatigue at eight in the evening ; and he had not energy enough to draw all his divisions into such a compact combination as would r have enabled him with , the morning's lig ht to have begun his design , of defeating his enemies in detail by sweeping the Prussians from their half-occupied position at Ligny and St . Amand . The

    Napoleon did not on the 16 th repair the error of the preceding day . velocity of his irruption had alread y slackened . Wlile Bliioher was hurrying up to Ligny every soldier within his reach , and while the British divisions were marching upon Quatre Bras , IC l ' armce Franchise rcstait immobile dans Ie 3 positions oil elle avait passd la nuit . " Napoleon had miscalculated the force before him . " II oubliait ses lenteurs , ses retards de la veille et du matin meme . 11 comptait sans la tenacity de Wellington , sana l ' activite , Taudace de Bliicher , toujours jeune en d < 5 pit des nn rices , Souffrunt , inddcis , abutf . u , il jugeait ses adversaires sur sa mesure . " In short , he had lost the advantage he had gained on the 15 th , when at eight o ' clock , five hours after sunrise , he put the army in motion . Nnpoleon did not

    anticipate a battle at Ligny ; did not foresee any serious resistance at Quatre Bras . When he was forming his army in front of the Prussians , unknown to him Bliicher and Wellington were actually looking on from the mill at Bussy , and concerting a plan of operations . Napoleon was too late . ^ The Prussian army , which he thought was still scattered up and down the country , was , with the exception of one corps , in position before him : while the English army was gradually drawing together . Into the details of the two actions fought on that day we have not space to go ; nor is it necessary : the results are all . Napoleon delayed ao long that he had just daylight enough to win the field of battle from Bliicher , and no more . Wellington , in spite of his delays , was able to collect sufficient tttKtpft to defeatlSTey at Quatre Bros , and to atand his ground . Both these actions are related by Colonel Charras with tolerable impartiality , but Quatre

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    result of & much greater amount of thought and labour than is usually bestowed on Review articles . All who are acquainted with the author ' s writings willinow that this is perfectly true . With , the most extensive command of special fact , and a wealth of illustration that brightens his pages with picturesque detail , Mr . HDebbekt Smbnceb . ' s special power is philosophic , his chosen work being to search for higher laws . Every paper written by him gives the result of his search in some particular direction , and the value of his Essays , therefore , mainly consists in the principles they evolve and illustrate . "La . any special science he looks for the radical ideas which connect it with other

    sciences , an any particular branch of knowledge the harmonizing principles which connect it with the whole . The volume before us affords an excellent illustration of his peculiar power as a thinker , as well as of the range of his labours . The Essays contain high and original generalizations in science and philosophy , literature and art . While , however , his range of speculation is thus catholic , thereis , our readers are aware , one most important , but rnuchneglected , Held of inquiry wtech Mr . Spbnceb has made / peculiarly his ownth& debateable ground between , physiology and psychology . Of the rare zeal and success with which he has cultivated this fruitful field , the new volume contains many happy illustrations . We may refer in particular to ' The Haythorne Papers / and the Essay on ' The Origin and Junctions of Music . ' Of the more political and practical papers in the volume we may note as of special value the one on'Railway Morals andRailway Policy , ' which excited so much attention on its first appearance in the Edinburgh Review three years ago , and another on 'Over-Legislation , which originally appeared in the Westminster .

    wcrib } . A . 8 a portion of the Tolume— « The Haythorne Papers '—originally appeared hi our pages , and most of the other Essays were noticed in the leader at the time of their appearance , we have little else to do than acquaint onr readers with the fact that they need no longer hunt up these striking papers in the pages of the various Beviews to which they were at first contributed , but may possess them for themselves in a . permanent and convenient form . We ought to add , however , that these Essays pre-eminently deserve lepublication . Mr-Spbvceb . says , in his preface , that the articles were severally written with the view of being ultimately collected in a permanent form , and that each is the

    Was have jwfc received a volume that will be cordially welcomed by our readers—Mr . Hekbbbt Spencer ' s Collected Essays . These papers , which were originally contributed to various leading journals , principally the Quarterly BeyJews , ~ fcrei bow gathered together and republished in a single volume , uniform in size and type with Mr . Herbert Spencbe ' s other

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    ' w ' .... . . Critics are not the legislators , but -tKe judges and police , of ^ literature . They do not make J » w * -th * y interpret aaad try to enforce them . —Edinburgh JBoviJw .

    3pt4**Iyfmnv I^Uniuluw -''' + ' ¦ • ¦ '

    1 ¦ ¦ ¦ Crttratiitt .

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    ^ THE LEADER . [ No . 404 , December 19 , 1857 .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 19, 1857, page 1216, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2222/page/16/