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    able circumstances , capable of itself "becoming a separate individual , as is found by cuttings , buddings , graftings , and other horticultural processes This being the case , it follows that what is proved of one branch , is true of all the others . We have seen a pear-tree laid prostrate on the ground by storms , but , with its roots still fixed in the soil , sending out a branch from its side 3 which mounted upward , and took a form precisely like that of the parent tree . The other typical or model form is the leaf . We have shown that all the appendages of the plant are constructed on this type . « IJnnsms had a presentiment of something of this kind , and , in his Prolepsis Plantarum , carried it out in such a -way that , starting from the consideration , of a perennial plant with regular periodicity of vegetation , as in our forest trees , he explained the collective floral parts , from the bracts onward , aB the collective foliar product of a five-year old shoot , which , by anticipation and modification , was developed in one year . This view is , in the first instancetaken from the most limited point possible , from the

    examma-, tion of a plant of our climate ; and , secondly , imagined and earned out with great want of clearness . " The true doctrine was first propounded by C . 1 . Wolff ( Theoria Generationis , 1764 ) , but his treatise lay buried in neglect till the doctrine became established by the influence of others . It was first presented to the world "by the great German poet , Goethe , who , though not learned in the artificial botany at that time taught in the schools , had a fine eye for the objective world . We are not willing , indeed , to admit that the form in which Goethe expounded the doctrine is in every respect correct . It is wrong to represent floral organs as metamorphosed leaves , for they never have been leaves in fact ; the accurate statement is , that these organs and leaves are formed after the same general plan . Nor are we to represent nature as striving after a model form ,

    which she fails to reach , in the various modifications of organs ; for the modifications are as much an end and intended as the parts which may be pointed to as patterns . Still , Goetbe may be regarded as having seized the great law of vegetable morphology . His Versueli die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklaren was published in 1790 , and has furnished the foundation to scientific botany . But as Goethe had no name among the initiated , little attention was paid by botanists generally to his speculations till long after , when they were mentioned by Jussieu , and brought into general notice by De Candolle , in his " Organographie , " published in 1827 . The doctrine somewhat modified , is now acknowledged by the great doctors , and has been sanctioned by the great councils of science .

    According to this idea , a plant is conrposed of two essentially distinct parts , the stem and leaf . The leaf is attached to the ascending stern , and besides its common form , it takes , while obeying the same fundamental laws , certain other forms , as scales , bracts , sepals , petals , stamens , and pistils . Sehleiden , who has developed this view , gives , in his " Plant , a Biography , " a picture of a typical plant constructed on this principle . This makes a plant a dual . " But it appears to us possible to reduce a plant by a more enlarged conception of its nature to a unity , that is , to show that there is a unity of plan running throughout the whole . We have no space to give Dr . M'Cosh ' s views on this subject , because , without his illustrations , they would not be intelligible .

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    OMAR PACHA'S CAMPAIGN . The Trans-Caucasian Campaign of ike Tvrltish Army under Omar Pacha . A Personal Narrative , by Laurence Oliphant . Blackwood and Sons . Mr . Owphant ' s volume on the Russian Shores of the Black Sea , his Minnesota , and his pamphlet on the project of a campaign in Trans-Caucasia , have given him a reputation which it will be found is hardly sustained by the present unpretending work . We certainly looked for something more substantial , something less of the superficial correspondent , in the account which Mr . Oliphant , an eye-witness , would give of Omar Pacha ' s campaign . The expectations which the brilliant pamphlet of May , 1855 , led us to form are not , however , gratified ; and we confess to considerable disappointment . But having said this much , we are bound to admit that the reader will find here what he will not , tliat we are aware of , find elsewhere : a good account of Omar Pacha ' s campaign , and of a part of Mr . Oliphant ' s travels in Abasia and Mingrelia .

    After the Ingour the army did not move for six days , a delay which gave the enemy time to destroy his barracks and provision depots . Neither did the army move directly upon . Kutais . Whether Omar Pacha was afraid of losing his communication with the sea , or whether there were difficulties in the direct path from Sugdidi to Kutais that could not be overcome , are questions which Mr . Oliphant does not answer . Omar Pacha did move off to the right when . lie arrived at Sugdidi , instead of pushing straight on , apparently to shorten the distance between his army and its supplies . By this movement he gained the road which runs between Redont Kaleh and TiflUr , and moved forward to Ziewie , where he encamped . Here the expedition began to show signs of failure . The end of November was now approaching ; fine weather had lasted for two months , and could , not be expected to continue : the weakness of the army was its land transport ; and the troop 3 were

    chained to the camp at Ziewie , because they had to send their annuals for supplies . ct Here , " says Mr . Oliphant , " we found Skender as usual chafing at delay , and in an agony lest the Russians should retire without fighting , " Two or three rivers , only fordaole'iu dry weather , lay between the Turkish army and Kutais . So long as they delayed , the season fought on the side of the enemy . Yet on the Ziewie they remained until winter and December had come together . The rain began to fall incessantly ; the river Ziewie became a torrent , and swept away a bridge that had been with some difficulty built over it ; and it was not until another was constructed that the army could move . We cannot but regard this advance its one of a most daring character . Having left the swollen Ziewie in their rear , they advanced to the equally swollen Techoua . Mr . OUphant ' s description alone can do justice to the scene : — The whole army was assembled upon the plain , which was at an elevation of about seventy feet above the river , and knee-deep in mud . Aides-de-camp were galloping , soldiers were wading , guns were sticking , and baggage-horses rolling in the mire . Below us swept the turbid sti'eam , about fifty yards in breadth , and at this point unfordable . Across it a narrow and very fragile-looking foot-bridge had . been placed ^ -while below it a ferry , constructed of two pontoons , was making an . experimental trip across . The soldiers now began in single file to pass the trembling bridge , and form on tlie other side . The guns were carefully let down the bank , and , with muck difficulty , placed upon the ferry ; but from the time occupied iu this operation , and in the traject of the men , it was clear that many

    hours much elapse before the whole army would be collected upon the other side It was most fortunate , then , that a ford was discovered lower down , and long lines of cavalry , infantry , and artillery , were soon after seen following one another into the rapid current . The water reached up to the waists of the men . After t had forded , I turned to sketch the scene ; it was one worth remembering . A $ three different points the army was crossing the river , at each in a different method , wMIst on the bank above , a group of horsemen were assembled , whose more brilliant uniforms denoted the presence of the Commander-in-chief sitperintendirig operations . The picturesque old casfcle I have before named crowned ous of the hills in the background , whilst the lofty range closed the prospect ' "

    In spite of the difficulties the army got over by mid-day , and continued its advance towards the Skeniscal , crossing several smaller streams , and marching knee-deep in mud . The next evening the army was within two miles of the Skeniscal . Omar Pacha knew that t"he enemy lay on the opposite bank of the river ; and he promised his soldiers that the next day they should fight the Russians . It was not destined to be . Rain began to fall that very afternoon ; all night it came down in torrents ; and tbe next day the Skeniscal was almost as effectually a protection for the Russians as the Atlantic would have been . Tlve whole country was flooded , and every gulley became an unfordable stream . Poresti trees rolled by , borne onward by the turbid flood of the Skeniscal , now two hundred yards broad . It was a provoking situation . The enemy was posted about two miles from the left bank of the river ; Kutais itself was only a two hours ride from the

    enemy ' s position . Had the Turkish army made a continuous march from the Jngour to the Skeniscal they would have not only arrived in time to cross the latter before it became a torrent , but we believe before the reinforcements sent by General Mouravieff joined the army defeated on the Iugour . The want of land transport ruined the expedition . The retreat was very painful , as it rained all the way ; but the rear was gallantly covered by the crack Turkish corps , Ballard ' s Rifles , very excellent troops , and the enemy did not dare to molest them . The Turks ultimately formed that camp at Choloni , which they have only just quitted for Trebizoncl . On the whole , considering the great difficulties of the country , the lateness of the season , and the smallness of the means at bis disposal , the Trans-Caucasian

    campaign is very creditable to Omar Pacha and his army . Mr . Oliphant ' s volume contains , besides a pretty good analysis of the Kars Blue Book , so far as it relates to Omar Pacha ' s expedition , several speculations on tbe campaign . He evidently does not understand why some measures were not taken "to injure Russia where she is most vulnerable and to protect Turkey whore she is most exposed . " " Had the campaign , " he continues , " been undertaken at a sufficiently early period of the year , and with such troops as would have insured success , military and political results would have been attained , among which the salvation of Kars would have been the most certain , but at the same time the least important . " Mr . Oliphant evidently considers that the French Marshal indirectly caused the loss of Kars : —

    Whatever may have boon the nogleot of the Turkish Go-vernmenfc in the first ; instance , with rogard to tho commissariat of the garrison—how distressing soovei : the apathy and corruption of the Ottoman officials may thon , have beon—there can fce no doubt that , in Hpifco of all these evil and disastrous influences , had tho French Government entertained tho proposition of Omar Pnoha when it was first pressed upon them by Lord Olitrondon , instead of leaving it to the generals in the Crimea , Kavs would novor have boon taken . Thoro in indeed a very fair proba "bility that , even at tho eleventh hour , when Sobastopol had fallen , and General Simpson stated that ho had no further ucod for tbe presence of the Turkish army if General Poliaaier had then authorised its departure , instead of three weekfl l « tor , that unfovtuuato garrison would have been saved . ~ Bv . t whether this was B ( or not , it ia certain that , in that case , tho Turkish uvnvy would have boon at thii moment in possession of tlio Pitas of Suramm , from > vhonoo the fertile valley of tbv Kur , and tlio cities of Oori and Tillis , lying at its foeb , would offer a . n inviting fieli of operations far a spring campaign ; while those four populous provinces o Imortia , Miugrelia , Gouriel , and Abkhasia , wrested from tl » e dominion of RubbIs

    Mr . Oliphant was on the plateau before Sebastopol when it was determined that , Pelissier permitting , Omar Pacha should make an effort for the relief of Kars . He left the Crimea a week before the fall of Sebustopol , and proceeded by Kertchand Anapa to Abasia . After much steaming an A counter-steaming up and down the coast in a man-of-war , he finally settled down at Souchum Kaleh a few days before the first movement or" the Turkish army was made towards Kutais . Not satisfied with the slow operations of the army , our author diverged right and left in search of amusement or forage , and did not join the army again until it was far on its way to tbe Ingour . Our readers may remember that the passage of that river was effected by the Turkish troops on the 6 th November . Opposite the main ford two batteries were constructed , and while they occupied to some extent the attention of the enemy , Ballard , Simmons , and Osman Pacha successfully forced the fords lower down . One of those two batteries was begun under the superintendence of Mr . Oliphant ; and it was brought about in this way : —

    As engineer officers arc scaroe in the Turkish army , or , at all events , as none wore forth coming upon that ; ocoasion , Colonel ; Simmonsgavo me a lesson , in batterymaking , and sent me to Skendor Pacha to get the men and gabions necessary for one battery , while ho superintended the construction of tho other . About ten o ' olook p . m . I found Skondorwibh his reserves , bivouaakednear the wood ; and ho , BU JPPosing : rne in tho dark to bo an officer , gave mo , not only a working party of two hundred men , but a regiment of infantry and two field-pieces , a command with which I was considerably astonished and overwhelmed . Howover , I thought lfc would aoaroely bo discreet to undeceive him , so we marched off , and half an uouv _ aftorwards were silently and vigoroualyat work on tho bank of the river , within about hundred

    a yards of tho Russian sentries . Wo had almost filled our trout row of gabions wbon tho Turkish Mnjor whispered that he saw tho Russians ooming down to tho river iu force . This was a most startling announcement , I certainly flaw , through the darknoaa , three blaok lines drawn up upon the opposite shore . As my experience in military matters was exactly that of most other . Lincoln s-inn barristers , aud my knowledge of Turkiah did notiucludo a single word ot oommnud , the thought of tho two fiold ^ pieoes and tho regiment of infantry began rather to trouble me—more particularly ow tho artillery officer suggested something that I did not in , tho least understand . Howover , I peremptorily ordered him not , and discovered , to my intouao relief , on looking through my oporo-glaea , that tho Russians wore , iu f « ot , three rows of logs , which successive floods had stranded upon tho bank .

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    Apr , ! . 19 , 1856 . 1 TH ^ iLEABER , 377

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), April 19, 1856, page 377, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2137/page/17/