On this page

• Text (2)

  Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

  • 

    Untitled Article

  • 

    Untitled Article

• Transcript

  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

    Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

    Untitled Article

    were the countless transport-ships , some of them the finest ever called forth by a stimulating commerce , which , ceaselessly plying between the Crimea and the French , English , and Italian ports , entirely sustained the vast fleets and armies engaged in actual warfare . The theatre of the contest , viewed from end to end , was on a scale corresponding Avith the magnitude of the contending forces . It involved points in a territory—itself one-seventh of the globe—stretching from Archangel to Petropaulovski , from Constradt to the Crimea , from the Sea of Azof to Lake Van . The central figure in the group of separate operations which go to make up the whole of the year ' s campaign is undoubtedly Sebastopol . Here we find the troops supplied by the Allies rising from barely 50 , 000 , twelve months ago , to nearly 200 , 000 ; we rind the guns used in the siege gradually augmenting as difficulties arose , from two to eight hundred ; we find an amazing quantity of work executed on both sides , miles of trenches , batteries and forts , colossal in magnitude ; mines and galleries sunk ; in the Russian works a chaos of \ mderground habitations ; and all this in addition to the constant and dangerous watch in the trenches , relieved by midnight encounters , and midnight onsets . We see a railway made and locomotive engines at work . Gradually , as the army increases , the troops cover more ground , until Balaklava is defended by a triple line of works and soldiers in position , Baidar is occupied by French and English , and an offset from the army seizes Kertch . The Russian external army augments , but it dares not fight . Week after week , the circle of attack contracts , and rises up closer and closer to the fortress ; each bombardment is more redoubtable than the last ; each day the slaughter of the enemy becomes more terrible ; and , as his situation grows insupportable , he ventures to assail the covering army of the Allies on the Tchernaya , only to be beaten with great loss . Then the Russian General begins to build a bridge for the retreat of his army ; the final bombardment , unexampled in the history of sieges , precedes the assault and capture of the MalaklioiF , and leads to the evacuation of the city . Properly speaking , the attack upon Sebastopol was not a siege—it . was an attack upon an entrenched camp . Surrounded on the south by positions , naturally very strong , Sebastopol in the hands of 'JLWixkuun became almost impregnable . But it was throughout a battle of linos against lines , and cannon ag ainst cannon , the Russians having an overwhelming number of guns in reserve . The issue even of tin ; last day . showed the . soundness of the maxim that holds entrenched camps open in the rear to be inaccessible ; for on every point but one , notwithstanding the searching lire of tin- Allies their stunning columns were repulsed , and in the instance where they succeeded the cntrenehed works were closed to the rear . We doubt ; whether there is on record any operation similar to the so-called sie ^ c of Sevastopol , either in magnitude , duration , or necessities When Selmsbopol was abandoned it was anticipated that the . Rusmmii army would be driven from the Crimea by ( skilful » u < l rapid operations on their flank and rear . Such an anticipation has proved incorrect . It has been found Unit , the- rear of the Russians is covered by desert , waterless steppes , and ( 50 , 000 men in position ; and thai ( he front and left ( lank are secure behind inaccessible , rocks and defiles , manned by above a hundred thousand troops . The two armies have , therefore , practically gone into winter quarters , and some persons speculate that there will be no more cainpniiifriii ^ in the Crimea .

    What has been gained by the campaign in the Crimea ? For more than a year the Allies have compelled the Russian Government to send men , money , and stores of all kinds to a remote point in its dominions—a process of exhaustion far greater than can be conceived . The Allies have captured the " standing menace" to Constantinople , and destroyed that fleet of nearly a hundred ships prepared to follow up the threat by a blow . As a consequence of the operations in the Crimea , the enemy has been forced to abandon the mouth of the Danube , to surrender Kertch , and lose his supremacy in the Sea of Azof ; to abandon Anapa , and retire across the Kouban , and to surrender Kinburn . In other words , the fruits of fifty years' toil have been snatched from him in a single year by the military and naval operations of the Allies . On the other hand , the enemy has gained some compensation for his losses by the capture of Kars . The Russian army was only fifteen or twenty miles from Gumri—its base of operations ; the Turkish army was shut out from the world . For six months this isolated garrison sustained itself against twice its numbers ; and at length capitulated , not to force of arms , but force of hunger . In the meantime , Omar Pacha had won a battle on the Ingour , and passing southward , had gained the high road running from Redout ICaleh to Tiflis by lvutais . What will he do when he hears of the fall of Kars ? The balance of a year's warfare , alone with Turkey in Asia , is j greatly in favour of Russia ; the fruits of her patience are Kars mid the road to Erzeroum , Bayazeed , and the road to P ersia ; and against that we have only the fruitless battle on the Ingour , and" the probably fruitless , but able march on Kutais . Except in the Baltic and the Sea of Azof , the naval campaign has been made in conjunci tion with troops . In the Baltic our success [ has been negative—keeping down the commerce of the enemy ; compelling him to maintain large forces around St . Petersburg ; and forcing his Avar fleet to rot ingloriously in harbour . The positive services have been the destruction of the smaller forts cast of . Sweaborg , and the bombardment of that fortress . Undoubtedly this was a smart , although an imperfect operation ; and hi g hly useful inasmuch us it demonstrated the value of the gun and mortar boats . in the Sea of Azof the services of the ilotilla have been positive , inasmuch us they have consisted iu the destruction of vast stores of food and forage for the enemy , and the closing of one of his Jiue . s of communication , not only with the Crimeu , but with Transcaucasia . In all these proceedings there has been n «> lack of gallantry and daring ; it is evident that the pluck of the navy is as # reat as ever ; and that prudent and daring leaders and adequate means have been wanting to complete- success . On the whole , we have cause to be satisfied with the campaign of this year , except in the liallie and Asia . in the former , « reat succor was impossible , because inadequate means had been provided ; in the latter , . success was impossible , because for some reason or other the war was starved , and : i . brave , enduring garrison ,-aeriliced to tbe laches of the Allies . Jl " peace be not made , it is in the I ' mltio and in Asia that we shall have to make up for lost time ; and let us liopcj that no political jealousies in either quarter will cause the enemy to be spared .

    Untitled Article

    * December 29 , 1855 . ] THE LEADER . 1247

    Untitled Article

    POLITICAL SYMI'TOMH . Tin : deplorable infatuation that has induced sumo of the middle , and industrious classes to fiive up t . lm idea of political reform has nut proceeded far . We have received khe strong

    testimony on this point . The inattention of the mass of people to domestic politics may be ascribed to two causes . First , they are preoccupied by the war ; they understand little of foreign affairs , and . dare not assume any initiative , lest they should fall into blunders . . Consequently , diplomatists and Parlimentary leaders have a clear field before them ; the only question on which the popular voice is prepared to decide being that of P ^ ace or War . Before the War began , however , the same inactivity , amounting almost to apathy , was displayed . The reason was , that the political organisations of the country had been dissolved . There was a confusion of parties in the Legislature , an extinction of parties in the nation . The old . leaders Avere either dead , or had deserted their ranks , or stood aloof in cynicism and disgust . Exhausted by the Chartist agitators and by the Anti Corn-law League , the people fainted ut the close of the first epoch of Reform . The Second Bill , Lord John Russell ' s Appendix to the Act of 1852 , is now a I curiosity , and Avas never more than a piece of J paper . It alarmed the Tories , it disgusted the i Liberals ; no one believed in it , and had not the War come to supersede all home questions , lit must either have been stilled ignominiously , or so modified that its author might have be' come its opponent . ! As matters stand , the cuiestion is not dead , j but sleeps . It would be unseasonable to dis-: turb it , were it not that Eng lishmen have a tendency to ignore the future , and to blind themselves to the domestic struggles that must j follow the Russian War . If , after the actual ' conflict is ended , a revolution in Europe , or a ' collision of governments in the Avar , do not prolong-, the succession of distracting events abroad , a great agitation is inevitable at home . How is the nation preparing for it ? There are three " movements" in existence ; the Administrative Reform Association , which is a degradation of \ Vbig » ery ; the National and Constitutional Association , to which not a . man of character , and scarcely a man of sense , belongs ; and the hysterical Midland League , Avhich melts down the frittering of Chartism , the refuse of diplomacy , the enthusiasm of \ some men , the egotism of others , and the ig-I uorant suspicions of a very small section of the middle and industrious classes . Clearly , none of these has any life or power . The first rs a company formed to abolish corruption , yet based on the worst principles thai uphold class I mid family government—narrow , exclusive , and | totally destitute of intellectual . stimulus . The second is so obscure , and lias published such unreadable , petitions , thai il is only noticeable ] as a symptom of tbe little \ il ; ilily remaining ¦ in English politics . The third , of course , is a chimera , pail Iy an imposture , partly a delusion , only interesting to the persons wlio . se consequence it seems l «> increase . If we consider the tone of the press , it is generally devoid of political feelinj . ; . One or two Liberal organs iu the metropolis , and a fuw journals in the secondary towns and cities , represent all that remains of the spirit of Kol ' unn . The explanation is , not , that Reform is obsolete-- , but Unit , no urbanisation exists to keep it- moving . Sunn .- ol ( lie old Chartist leaders would be willing enough to put lliemsulvesatthc Ik-.-lI <> f I J . eir Order ; but their Order will n-. l . have ilieni---il . is tired oi illiterate rhapsody . Tin : chief of the Ln ^ hsl . democracy , im |» n " , eii .:,, l . l .: e .-. ccp ,. ,, s mo . nfor . s during then .,, ' , ^ - ^ n- ; . « . ^ '"» » K * is in ti . e lent of A . un . i . i ,, ; . Mr . lluium ; upon a uvihtjiI election , illicit I' -nni bow tyrannical unVl nn ^ niLoful an Knj / lihli con J il ueney mny be ' I'liO younger school of modilied Liberals — men ofthe stamp of Lord Vuumir . n—pr « - , se ,-vc their quietude ; a f- w individuals who

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 29, 1855, page 1247, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2121/page/11/