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    Prince Gtobtschakofjf ' s army remaining to the south of Perekop ; it would toe leift * o the Allies to choose between , an active and a passive war . , They eould guard the Crimea with the coasts of the Euxine and the Sea or Azof , and intimate to Russia that she should not trade on those waters , or collect taxes in those territories , until certain settlements had been effected . This process

    might be continued for forty years without extorting a concession . Or , the conquerors of the Crimea might push on , across the Dnieper , and bury themselves in the recesses of Iiittle Russia , or startle with their drums the roving Cossacks of the Don . In another direction they might compel the besiegers of Kars to quit the ground , and hide in the passes of the Caucasus . Or , the war might be transferred to the Danube , or the Baltic .

    No one , we imagine , however skilful in the draughtsmanship of diagram campaigns , advises the Allies to attempt the invasion of Little Russia . But there are some who suggest an Asiatic expedition , to pierce the outworks of the empire , through the denies of the Caucasus . It might be judicious in a political , as well as in a military sense , to open various avenues of attack ; but were the entire country between the Euxine and the Caspian cleared of Russian armies ; were even the Ciscaucasian territories , between Daghestan and the region of the Black Sea Cossacks , occupied by the Allies ^ supposing

    such a consummation possible- —the vital elements of Russian power wotild remain undebilitated . Why should the Western nations of Europe , combating Russia , seek her most distant frontiers in the Eastern , the farthest from their own arsenals , the least important , to her , from an imperial point of view , and only dangerous to feeble states , such as Turkey and Persia ? If we really intend to establish in the Crimea and in Asia practical barriers against Russian aggression , let England be required at once to furnish the fleet and the funds , and France the army ; and by this means the Ottoman Empire may be protected , while it goes to ruin in its own way .

    Satire apart—these suggestions are ridiculous . Should the conquest of the Crimea have no effect upon the policy of Alexander II ., other conquests must be sought in other fields . The question of the day isin what fields ? It is at this point that statesmen find their cul-desao preferable to the wide arena in which armies might be unmanageable by diplomacy . Diplomacy

    has staked out the ground , and Austria in her turn , has become the judicious bottle-holder . But this state of affairs cannot long endure . There are two lines of attack , one of which must be selected , when our military operations in the Crimea have beon brought to a close . The first is that of the Danube , and tlio second , that of St . Petersburg or Riga , on the Baltic .

    General KjjAPKA has circulated an erroneous statement respecting the occupation , b \ Austria , of the Danubian Principalities Austria has no monopoly of military occupation in those territories ; nor does her separate treaty with the Porte give her any claim to a veto upon tho passage , either of a Turkish or of a combihod army , through Moldavia and Wullachia into Bessarabia . Ju

    DRIFTING . The nation is perplexed . It has penetrated tho breastwork of a cul-de-sac . The bombardment has succoedeel ; tho enemy ' s ramparts are- blown up ; an amazing victory has filled nil England with joy ; but whuro is tho result ? Tho Czar ' s army is beaten ; but tho Ok Alt ' s attitude continues tho same . From Sebastonol , then , whither ? Russia proflbrs no capitulation . How to extort it ? We have worked a little way into the surface in tho Crimea—shall wo go on , and by slow triturdtion destroy a district of the empire ? Obviously such a catastrophe lias few terrors for Alexander II . we cannot strike through that broken frontier at tho heart of his dominions . Suppose not a man of

    tho Convention of tho 2 nd of December it is stipulated that Austria shall hold tho Jino of the Danube against all ltiiHHinn nitaoho ; Ouv that tho Allies , or any ono of thorn , shall movo freely , whenever their CubiuoJ * , . « , - determine , in and throug h tho U m ^ l Otherwise the agreement o * V ^ . t" rnont ^ Jtt * $ 2 ? £ ssz £ 2 li ^ 3 ^**^ ^ ° -

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    Mmmm * & ^®®> * fiftM the ^ apeb . 935

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    ^ consisted of * be i&oitfriloff Bastion and the Little JRedam , whueh ^ rere connected by . a curtain or wall of earth Tunning from one tc the other . The Korniloff Bastion was the citadel of the whole , and to prevent its being turned , or entered by the rear , the Russians had elosed up the gorge , or outlet , behind . But the connecting curtain , the Little Redan , and the Central Bastion on the town face were open in the rear . The importance of this distinction will be speedily seen . As the French lad carried their sap , or artificial cover , to within thirty yards of the defences , it was arranged that a simultaneous attack should be made on the whole Malakhoff front ; and that when the French columns were firmly established in the Korniloff Bastion , the English should storm the Great Redan , and the French the central Bastion on the town face . The reason for these multiplied attacks , even although the Malakhoff was stormed , was that they were required beeause the garrison was an army , and it was necessary to occupy them as much as possible on as many points as possible . The grand point was to secure a firm hold of the Malakhoff . Success or defeat on other points had quite a subordinate importance . If they were successful , then the Russian retreat would have become nearly impossible ; if they failed , then ultimate victory would have been secured by the capture of the Malakhoff . The chances of success were great , because you can never tell how an army will behave when the citadel of his defence has been taken . The French captured the Malakhoff in admirable style in a quarter of an hour , and secured it in the rear against- all chances . We should h « re remark that the dashing Zouaves and Chasseurs who first entered the work not only had a short thirty yards to run , but that the engineers who followed them speedily constructed a sheltered road into a bastion , so that reserves could pour in without loss . Tlie attack on the Little Redan and the curtain failed , because although they were carried at the first rush , the French could not hold them in the face of the heavy fire from the Russian batteries that looked directly into the rear of these works , that of the steamers in the harbour , and of the masses of troops hurled against our brave allies . Coming to the attack on the Great Redan , we find our troops subjected to a similar repulse from similar causes , heightened and increased by the peculiar circumstances under which the attack was made . From the nature of the ground , and the flanking fire of the enemy's batteries , our engineers had found it utterly impossible to carry their approaches nearer than two huudred yards from tho front of the Redan . Another circumstanco of no small weight is , that our attack being made after the storming of the Malakhoff , the whole garrison of the place were on tho alert , and must have been quite prepared for the assault . Instead , therefore , of rushing thirty yards to their torriblo work , our men had to run two hundrod ; instead of bounding over a short space not swept by the firo of tho enemy , they had to traverse a long distance within short range of 08-pounders charged with grape ; instead of surprising tlio onomy as tho men who entered the Komiloft" Bastion did , tho British troops found him propared . Nevertheless , tho storming columns , at tho signal from the Mamolon , dashed forth like lions . But they wcro shattered in tho transit . Officers and men fell in scores before tho hail of bullets . The 200 men who formed the ladder party had their numbers sadly thinned . ITeii this was the least part of their neroio tabk . When they arrived at tho ditch

    • they "were blown , and "their order was destroyed . The severity of the ordeal through which they passed may be estimated by the fact that only four leaders of parties reached the work , and only one brigadier . ^ Nevertheless these gallant fellows dashed over the parapet , mastered the salient of the "work , and drove the eiiemy to the breastwork &t % the base . The few who entered the Redan in disorder got at once under cover , and began to fire on the enemy . And here the advantage of the Russian position became manifest . They occupied the base of a triangle and its flanks , covered from fire by the breastwork and the flanking traverses . The enemy , therefore , poured into the angle of the Redan occupied by our men a concentrated and converging fire , which could only be replied to by a fire divergent from the angle to the base . It is said that our troops should not have fired at all , but have charged at once . And it is easy to say this . But such a charge could only have been made by troops in a solid formation ; and for this there was no room in the confined angle of the salient . Colonel Wikdham , with a heroism above praise , did his utmost to form the men and carry the breastwork ; but as fast as they showed themselves in line , they fell under the concentrated musketry and grape of their foes . When the supports arrived they only added to the carnage , for the salient was already too crowded . Had a stronger column been sent from the trenches , it would have been exposed to the murderous fire of the flanking batteries in its transit , and would have offered a surer mark in proportion to its numbers . Yet , under these circumstances , the British soldiers held the Redan for nearly two hours , and did nob give wayuntilthey were literally forced out by the overwhelming numbers , augmented by the expelled garrison of the Malakhoff , which pressed on their scattered bands . The causes of the failure in the three unsuccessful attacks were all similar ; and if there be any disgrace in the failure , it falls as much on the French , who assailed the Little Redan and Central Bastion , as it does on the English , who attacked the Great Redan . But there is no disgrace . All these troops fought like men , and failed only as heroes fail . But there may have been some mistake in the plan of attack ; on that we will offer no opinion , but frankly state that we do not see any other mode by which the difficulties could have been decreased . There may have been some mismanagement in its execution on the part of those high in command ; of that we have no evidence . But , although we have great confidence in the British army , wo candidly confess that the circumstances attending the attack on the Redan , and the charactor of the despatch in which it was described , have considerably lessened what confidence wo may have had in General Simpson . The army wants a new chief .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 29, 1855, page 935, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2108/page/11/