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Leader (1850-1860), 8th September 1855, Edition 1 of 2, Page 868

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      centuries artfully encouraged . mutual distrust , ha * red , xivaUt 5 r , contempt , recrimination , and divisidhiamon ^ th e variotis states . We know ^ too well that ihfhmany interests , necessarily touched , ^ he many passions inevitably raised , the political mtolerancfeof some , and the various discordant elements put in motion by a revolution , cwse disunion at ; the . xety time when the greatest wisdom , the greatest strength , and the greatest unanimity is required : I do not feel disposed to flatter my countrymen , for 1 feel they need a more substantial diet , but I , wi | lnot accuse them-of shaving caused a failure of which they are only partially responsible . It is as great , a fault in the people of Italy to have returned to a worse despotism , as it is a merit in the Jredmontese to have secured a liberty for which they had not fought . There is in Piedmont material for a hundred reactionary movements if the Government chose to use them . What could the Piedmontese have effected if the constitution had been revoked as it was at Naples , Rome , and Florence ? They , like the xest of Italy , could only complain , hope , and wait . The people in every country are what their rulers make them , and the rulers , when weak , are what their more powerful neighbours suffer them to be . What has been , I fear , will be again . Have not Austria , England , and France shaken hands , and pledged themselves to uphold a system of despotism in Europe , to which Russia , like a prodigal son , will shortly return to claim a share ? It is a repetition of the same principles and actions , with the exception of the incident of the Eastern war , which is a question among the partners as to which of them is to have the greatest share in the scramble . If I express myself thus , it is not that I ever expected , or even wished , foreign aid for Italy . No Italian , proud of his name , has ever accepted , much less degraded himself by " seeking aid "—this disgraceful practice , this declaration of weakness , must be left to Austria when she wishes to crush Hungary , and ( pardon the inevitable allusion ) to England when she finds it difficult to overcome the Russians . I am at a loss to discover what expression in my letter has : given to the " Believer" an opportunity , when speaking of Italy in 1848 , " to deprecate the habit of seeking aid . " On the contrary , we find that the historical word of Charles Albert , " UItalia farh da se , " and the reception given to Rome to the French troops , clearly show that the Italians are anxious to prevent all foreign interference in the affairs of their country . The hope expressed that England and Europe may employ a more liberal policy in favour of the oppressed nationalities , is not to seek aid from any , but relies solely on the progress of hujnanity . Now I cannot regard the question of an Anglo-Italian legion as slightly as your co-respondent desires . I might perhaps overlook the incongruity which I noted in my former letter , and agree as to the utility of Italians being instructed and exercised in the use of arms , but I see no reason why it should not be done under the Italian flag , unless it be the fear that Piedmont may -become too important in the oyes of Austria , France , and other despotic states . If English popular . anil official sympathy for Piedmont be a reality and not a " sham , " why not permit the King of Sardinia to . appeal to the Italians of overy state , and enrol them under his flag to fight for the allies ? VVhy not accustom the Italian liberals at home and abroad to regard that flag as the symbol of all thia ' t is noble , generous , and national in Italy ? VVhy should Italians not boast of their noble deeds , performed .,. , under the \ r owncommanders and in the name of their own country ? Would not such an event tie ,, the precursor of that day when Piedmont shall , ill the hea 4 of aril Italian army , light the battles of Italy ? "JTus alone would raise Italy and Piedmont to a high position , among European nations , and provide for ' tho future of Italy far better than the declamations of statesmen or of nowspapers ; this would furixfeJLi the Allies with an Italian army instead of a 1 ^ 9 " ^ , t ^ his would make Italian soldiers no longer l ^ itn ' ^ jp ^ a ' n '/ uns yn ^ natiie ' tic' oath of fidelity to the C £ u eeri , " . but by "ii hea ^ t-felt devotion to the only Italu \\ i king , tight bravely in the cause of progress and of humanity . Witty these observations I take my leave , trusting that my fellow-countrymen may respond to the gcnoroua idea of your correspondent , find know their creed bo that they may be united and strong . I differ from him more in regard to tho past than to tho future of Italy i while our common wish is—may that future not be far off . Yours truly , An Italian .

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      ctf&S - ' TM E CO ^ mA / D E BVT [| Cd * i 2 W ^ u ^ DJB 3 Wter , K

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      ' .. ; ' , PEACE OF U T RE C II T . ¦ ' <¦'¦ ( To the Editor of the Leader . ' ) $$ *»> , In your prospective comparison of Mr . DIsr ^ eli tyith Lord Botingbroko , you nnticipato tho possibility of that statesman hereafter concluding a treaty analogous to tho pence of Utrecht . You further quote Mr . Hallam to show that tho terms of

      that peace were disgraceful to Great Britain , and you might have added the authority of Lord Mahon , Dr . Russell , and , indeed , of the majority of writers who have taken in hand to treat of that period of English history . Smollett and Macphersori , however , view the matter more dispassionately , though admitting that more advantageous terms might have been extorted from the vanquished foe . Had the war been originally undertaken for the sake of conquest , it would no doubt have been highly inconsistent to have waived one iota of the most extreme terms that could be safely exacted . But very different was the motive that originated hostilities with France . It was to counteract the ambitious views of Louis XIV ., which threatened the freedom of Europe , that a coalition was formed between the German Empire , Great Britain , and the Netherlands . The Belgic provinces had been already annexed by arms , and it seemed probable that Spain would be annexed by marriage , so that the balance of power would have been fatally compromised . It is needless to recapitulate how the genius of Marlborough and of Prince Eugene dissolved into yielding air the mighty visions conjured up by an insatiable lust of power . In spite of our allies * the fortune and arms of Britain triumphed over the ablest generals and bravest soldiery of France , and the object of the war was fully attained . But surely it was not to be expected or desired that the resources of the nation should be exhausted in a vain attempt to gratify the revengeful feelings of the Emperor and the States-General . The English people had long grown weary of the constant drain on the population and wealth of the country for a purpose unintelligible to the majority . It is , therefore , no fair subject of reproach to Ministers that they availed themselves of the earliest opportunity to bring the war to a conclusion . Their only fault was the manner in which they set about to compass this end . They would have acted with more honour and dignity had they proceeded openly to work , and duly apprised the allies of their intention . But their long experience of the impracticability of the Dutch character , and of the feeble obstinacy of the Germans , rendered them doubtful of the success of any negotiations in which these infelicitous elements were allowed to interfere . Even this consideration , indeed , hardly excuses their insincerity , for it tarnished the fair fame of England by attaching a suspicion of perfidy which long decades of honourable aud disinterested dealing have scarcely yet effaced from the minds of foreigners . To the treaty itself , however , no great objection can be made . It is thus summarised by Macpherson : — " The advantages which Great Britain obtained for herself , though neither adequate to her victories nor to her expense , were solid and even splendid . She secured the dominion of the Mediterranean , by obtaining Gibraltar and Minorca . She strengthened her limits and extended her dominions in America . 'She forced France to relinquish all pretensions to Newfoundland , to cede Hudson ' s Bay , and to yield St . Christopher's . She obliged the French king to acknowledge the Protestant succession , and to cense to protect , ami even to abandon the Pretender . She reduced him to the humiliating' necessity of destroying Dunkirk , whose very ruins were to remain as a monument of his disgrace . As the last triumph over his pride , sho terrified him into the greatest concessions to the Duke of Savoy , whom , of all the allies , ho hated most . " France was humbled and Austria not rendered too powerful , tho independence of Holland secured , and Great Britain sufficiently aggrandised . Such a conclusion-to a long-protracted war cannot justly be deemed disgraceful to the Minister who brought it about . It will be well for Europe if future historians shall be able to say of Mr . Disraeli that he terminated the present struggle by a peace which humbled Russia without rendering France too powerful , which secured tho independence of Turkey and maintained the moral ascendancy of Great Britain . But is it not just possible that the unpopularity of the pence of Utrecht may bo partly due to its having indirectly conduced to tho South Sea Bubble ? The clause that conferred upon England the shameful privilege of supplying tho Spanish settlements with African slaves , formed tho backbone of tlie South Sou Company , and enabled it to mako tho enormous profits which proved the temptation to a swindle more monstrous oven than the Mississippi scheme of the Scotch adventurer . It is as difficult to form a duo estimate of the influence of such associations on tho public mind , as it is to trace the ri . se and progress of prejudice in individuals . But however this may be , if wo have no Airthcr cause t ;> rogrot the present war than its termination by a treaty analogous to tlio peace of Utrecht ; u load of distrust and apprehension > vill have woighod without causo on tho mind of Yours truly , J . H . Bath , Sept . 4 .

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      TfiE WAR . 1 ( 7 b the Editor of the Leader . ) Sib , — -When the Leader was first projected , an " Open Council" was to be a characteristic feature , and , as I have subscribed to two hundred and eighty-three numbers , I am well able to bear my testimony to the conscientiousness of its Editor in having executed this part of its programme with so much faithfulness and impartiality . On previous occasions I have availed myself of this advantage , which enabled me to submit a few opinions upon passing events to its readers . In one of your articles last week , I discover I am one of those insignificant persons whom you stigmatise as noisy and heedless , and who are guilty of inconstant impetuosity , simply because I entertain an opinion that the war should be stopped . Now , Sir , this is a harsh judgment , because it is an unfair one , and if you can spare the room , I may be able to vindicate myself at least from your ill-judged reproach . When the war broke out the Leader contained some admirable articles upon it , informing its readers of the prospective advantages which musk-follow if carried on for national objects , but if prosecuted only for dynastic purposes , then it would be a folly and a crime to continue a contest from which nothing but fruitful , and I may add frightful , evils result . All those who approved of the war at the commencement did so from a"conviction of its necessity as well as its righteousness ; none undervalued its difficulties nor dangers , but all were inspired by the desire to check the overweening arrogance and ambition of a most unscrupulous despot whose power was so extensively used to extinguish freedom in neighbouring states . Conceiving the proper time to have arrived to check Russia , we were naturally hopeful that our governing classes would inflict a blow in the most vulnerable part of his dominions , and we were accordingly lavish of everything that could tend to realise that object . And now what is the result of the sacrifices we have made ? Have your poisoned arrows entered the heel of this northern Achilles ? Nay , have you directed your powerful forces in that direction ? Let Mazzini and Kossuth and Mieroslawski reply . And our ministers , what have they done to create confidence in our minds ? Why , have they not displayed the most elaborate ingenuity in circumscribing it within limits where it can do the least possible injury to our foes ?—for we have more than one—and have they not showed how eagerly they will clasp at those four points which you have rightly said were ridiculed and mercilessly criticised by all of us who take any interest in the preservation of that dignity we are ajl so proud of , and the welfare of others , and which only the pride of our enemy saved us from the shame of accepting ? What guarantee have we , I say , that this farce shall not be successfully perpetrated the next time by that facetious oM Lord who now misrules our destinies , and who has shamefully acknowledged he had no sympathy for the claims of those oppressed nations which the Leader , I am proud to saj r , has constantly recognised . There has been no -want of " calm and logical persuasions , " for they have been unceasingly and energetically directed to the object we all have so much nt heart ; we have had also a " sincere , and rational expression of public opinion , " which you aflinn is the only want ; and tltosu wretched Vienna Conferences testified to their value , and proved to us , notwithstanding our well known aspirations , how willingly our Cabinet would have sacrificed them all for a hollow peace . I hardly know how any one can resist , after a calm review of the war , the conclusion I and others have arrived at , that tho war should bo quickly terminated , when wo find our mighty energies directed to the consummation of such pigmy objects . I am forced to tho conclusion that there is only one thing that can effectually curb tho encroaching avariciouaness of the Czars of Russia , and that is , the freedom of Europe , which I am sorrowfully compelled to admit can bo only realised by the sanio means we have obtained ours , and that is by revolution . When that time comes , I trust England will not be unfaithful to those traditions which three of the most memorable epochs in our history havn left us . Yours respectfully , tfllEUISRIO A . CnKEO , Haverstock-hill , Camdon-town .

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      Thr Eabt . y Ci-ohino Association . —Tho first of tlui autumnal sories of meetings of tins aHflociation wus held on Wednesday ovoning nt Exeter Hall , Mr . Mocbi , tint well known Tiptreo model farmer in tho chair . Sovonil roHolutioiiH wore agreed to , congratulating thonHMoemtion on the pro&prcwa which tho cause has made within tho last few years . Wo trust that it will mako atill further progress when a knowledge of tho principles of humanity and good Bonao on 'which it is founded ia yot moro widely diffused .

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 8, 1855, page 868, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2105/page/16/