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bo proper arrangements wet * ™* & tofurmsli tbig fuDpS ? " The ablence of Lord Raglan from hu post ofmater-General of * the Ordnance the Committee consider to have been the cause of much mismanagenST since the Lieutenant-General , appointed for ihe occasion , though believed by the Government to possess all the powers of his superior , had not in fact equal authority . The Surveyor-General of the Ordnance was also employed abroad ; so that , in time of war , " two officers were wanting whose tunctions the most economical administrations had been unable to dispense with in times of peace . ± ne evidence is then referred to for instances of the disorganisation which ; resulted from this absence of the le gitimate head of the department—Mr . Monsell interfering with Sir Thomas Hastings , and the work of one member being often thwarted by the will of
another . " In noticing the unseemly conduct of this board ( that of the Ordnance ) , and the differences which were brought prominently forward in the evidence , your Committee observe with regret that the public service has Bu ffered from the want of judgment and temper on the part of officers who were entrusted during a critical period with important public duties . " The Committee are further of opinion that " a vague intention of remodelling the Ordnance Office affords no justification" of the maintenance of Lord Raglan at its head when he could no longer discharge the duties . The contract system of the Ordnance
is also condemned ; and the wretched character of the tools supplied to the army is pointed out , without any person or department being charged with the blame . Side by side with this , however the Committee acknowledge " the admirable equipment of the corps of the artillery , " and " the efficient armament provided for the navy . " With respsct to the transmission of stores to the East , various instances of mismanagement are quoted from the evidence , and " the unnecessary sufferings of the soldiers" are held to be " directly referrable " to these causes ; " but on what department the blame should rest—whether on the office of the
Commanderin-Chief , or of the Secretary at War , or of the Secretary of State for War—the Committee are unable to decide . " Dr . Menzies , and Dr . Andrew Smith both called attention to the subject of transport ships ; and the Government , about the end of October , directed Admiral Dundas to confer with Lord Raglan about having two large steamers fitted for this service . But the Admiral did not act upon this direction , because , as he stated , " every one expected to be in Sebastopol in a few days . " " Thus , "
pays the report , " it appears that the preparation of ships for the conveyance of the sick and wounded ; was at . first forgotten , and subsequently neglected . " It is thus shown that the deficiency of transport ships in the Black Sea was owing to the inability to decide who was responsible for their management . In the Bosphorus , Admiral Boxer , who had the ordering of all transports in that water , applied , as early as the 8 th of September , for the services of a slap with artificers and mechanics ; but the Admiralty refused the request . Some months later , they iiltered their determination ; but it was then too " late .
" Sir James Graham says he regrets that the first application was not acceded to ; and when the hurricane of * he 14 th of November , with all its disastrous consequences , is remembered , it is obvious that this unfortunate decision may have increased the difficulties oX that deplorable crisis , and may have subjected Rear-Admiral iBoxer to some of the charges brought against him . . ' , ; , ?* Your Committee are of opinion that there waa some unnecessary detention of transports at Constantinople , , ftnd that the arrangements for coaling were very defiqicnt ; but , as they have not been able to examine Admiral Boxer , they cannot pronounce an opinion as to his share of the responsibility . His letters in the Appendix show that he exerted himself strenuously to discharge duties for which it is admitted that his means were inadequate , and , if he failed under these difficulties , hia subsequent endeavours in the harbour of Balakluva appear to have been successful . "
With respect to the land transport , the Report observes : — i " The army landed in the Crimea without the animals necessary for the conveyance of tlie baggage , or for the removal of the aick and wounded ; much inconvenience and suffering resulted from this deficiency ; but if , aa stuted to your Committee , every available vessel waa employed for other purposes , the Commissariat cannot bo held responsible . "
. ; , The want of a proper road from Balaklava to the oamp was , partly owing to the contraction of our line of , operations after the battle of Balaklava , owing to which we were obliged to abandon the fine Russian foad called the Woronzoff-rond . The Committee , however , think that , if a military force could not b # vo been spared to orente a now road , " measures should have been takon to obtain other labour in the &R 5 t , or application should liuvo been made to the Jlomo Government , who might have sent labourers from England . The probable fuilure of tho communication was . npjt , howeyor , brought to tho notice of
the Puke of Newcastle unjfcU too late to enable , him to take measures in England to prevent the serious calamities which subsequently arose . " As regards the transmission of fuel and other necessaries , Deputy Commissary-General Smith is not held responsible , as he was unable to obtain transport vessels . The Report sketches the chief deficiencies in the supply of rations , and pertinently remarks that " any result derived from an average of rations issued is delusive , because privation on one day is not compensated by superfluity on another . " " To what extent tie Commissariat is responsible for the deficiency in all these supplies is a question to which it is not easy to give a definite answer .
" Your Committee have not been able to examine Cornmissary-General Filder or Rear-Admiral Boxer ; and they cannot therefore decide upon whom the blame should rest . "Before closing their observations on the Commissariat Department in the East , your Committee notice with pleasure the willing testimony which many witnesses have borne to the zeal and energy which some subordinate officers of the C ommissariat displayed in procuring supplies , and in relieving , as far as they were able , the distress of the troops during a period of trying exigencies . "
The failure of the ambulance corps is attributed to Lord Raglan having overruled the suggestion of Dr . Andrew Smith , that the corps should consist of able-bodied soldiers ; instead of whom , pensioners were employed . The Committee are of opinion that a too strict economy , and a fear of incurring responsibility , led prob ' ably to some evils . In connexion with the management of the hospitals , Dr . Menzies is acquitted of a considerable amount of the blame , on account of the too heavy and complicated duties which he had to perform .
Nevertheless" Your Committee must declare it to be their opinion that blame attaches to Dr . Menzies , inasmuch as he did not report correctly the circumstances of the hospital ; he stated that he -wanted nothing in the shape of stores or medical comforts at the time when his patients were destitute of the commonest necessaries . " Dr . Hall is also held to be reprehensible for having misled both Lord Raglan and the Government by reporting the hospitals at Scutari to be " in as good a state as could reasonably be expected , " when , at
that time ( in the course of last October ) , they were in a most wretched condition . The Committee also conceives that " heavy responsibility attaches to the Commander-in-Chief , who retained Mr . Ward in his office ( of purveyor ) after he had been pronounced unfit to discharge its duties . " They likewise refer to the apothecary ' s department at Scutari , where no accounts were kept from the 24 th of September till the 28 th of November . In connexion with the supply of medical necessaries and comforts , the Report observes : —
" When the quantities of hospital stores winch were sent from England are contrasted with the scarcity , or rather the absolute dearth , of them at Scutari , and when the state of the purveyor's accounts is remembered , it is impossible not to harbour a suspicion that some dishonesty has been practised in regard to these stores . " The instructions to the ambassador at Constantinople the Committee consider injudicious , since , " if the division and uncertainty of responsibility was a serious evil , the evil couM only be increased by the interference of another authority , having neither relation to , nor connexion with , our military administration /'
In conclusion , the Committee bear grateful testimony to the noblo labours and valuable suggestions of Miss Nightingale and her band of nurses , of Mr . Macdonald ( the Times Commissioner ) , and of Mr . Augustus Stafford , the Hon . Jopceline Percy , and the Hon . and Rev . Sidney Godolphin Osborne . In the discussions which preceded the adoption by the Committee of the above Report , a motion was made from the chair to the effect that those whom the evidence pointed out as responsible for tho calamities in the Crimea ought to be pointed out to the Housp . This was negatived by 9 to 1—Mr . Layard being tho solitary voter . A vote of censure on Lord Raglan , proposed by tho chairnmn ( Mr . Roebuck ) met with precisely tho same fate—the one supporter being again Mr . Layard .
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Disaster and temporary reverse have succeeded to the successes of the last few weeks . On the anni versary of the greatest victory ever gained bv English arms , an attack by the Englis ' n on the Redan , and by the French on the . Malakoft Tower was repulsed with great slaughter . It was a eariy daybreak on the morning of that memorable 18 th that the sons of the bitter antagonists of forty jears ago struggled side by side at no great intervening distance , and poured out their blood without stint for the attainment of the same object . What a difference between 1815 and 1855 ! Did the traditions of that day cross the minds of the soldiers of either army ? or was the conflict too hot and bloody for thought ? One can almost imagine the ghost of Wellington hanging over the smoke and glare , and leading on his countrymen—but not this time to
victory . The silence of the telegraphic wires during the greater part of the past week is thus accounted for ; and the sinister rumours which floated up and down day after day , filling the minds of most people with undefined fears , have received a painful confirmation . The worst of the business , after the immense loss of life , is the fresh encouragement it will give to the Russians , who were beginning to get disheartened with their recent reverses . It is not , however , to be for a moment supposed that we , in « our turn , shall be disheartened . Disappointed and pained we must be : but we are not accustomed to lose our spirits ¦ with a temporary failure .
. There is also a report—which , however , requires confirmation—of another reverse to the Allies , in the shape of the recapture by the Russians of Anapa ; but , as the date of this rumour is Varna , June 17 , one day earlier than the attack on Sebastopol , we should probably have certain intelligence of the fact , if it had occurred—unless , indeed , the Government are attempting to suppress it . From the same source we learn that the Ruesians have been repulsed in an attack on Kars . Altogether the war news of the week has been gloomy . The deliberate murder of sixteen English sailors under a flag of truce ( the details of which will be found below ) has excited in the minds of all men a feeling of horror and indignation to which no words can do justice . Universal history can scarcely find a parallel to that atrocious deed ; for the murdered men were engaged in performing an act of kindness to their murderers . " We don't care a d—n for your flag of truce , " exclaimed the head murderer ; " we'll show you how the Russians can fight . " And the butchery straightway commenced . Well , we accept the definition . This is how the Russians fight . It is only a still further addition to a knowledge we already possessed . The massacre at Sinope —the torturing and hacking of wounded wretches lying helplessly on the ground—drunken sorties by night of men turned into fiends by raki and fanaticism—dogged resistance behind earthworks and stone walls , and flight before open attack—this is how the Russians fight , as we already knew ; and the murder at Hango but confirms their own definition of their mode of warfare . But the crime will not pass unavenged . A dozen defeats could not dishearten our men so much as this act will stimulate them to . make the perpetrators repent . Tho recollection of Hango will give intensity , and perhaps venom , to our future attacks . A despatch from Marseilles , dated June 19 th , says : — " It appears that the Mamelon was defended in the late attack by twenty Russian battalions . Two English battalions penetrated into the Redan and spiked the guns , but wore obliged to retire . The French and Turks now occupy tho Mamelon , and have turned fifteen of the Russian guns upon tb , e enemy . " In a despatch from Constantinople , of June 1 . 3 th , wo read as follows : — " TheTurka have evacuated Itatoum and Chourouk-su . Nassif Pacha haa advanced with hia general stuff to Kars . Tho French Consul has quitted Jiatoum . i' «> Russian forces have advanced and encamped near Redout-Kaleh . The recruiting for tho British Legion progresses slowly . " THK TAKINU OK TUB MAMBWW ANI > TIIK QUAMUE 8—OFFICIAL . ACCOUNT F 11 OM I . OKD RAOI-AK . Before Sebastopol , Juno 9 , 18 W . My Lord , —I have tho great satisfaction of informing your lordship that tho assault which waa made upon tu Quarries in front of the Redan , from our advanced P ' in tho right attack , on tho evening of tho 7 th mutant , attended with perfect success , and that tho bravo n who achieved thin advantage with a gallantry an" " termination that does thorn innnito honour , m » i ntft "' themselves on tho ground they liad acquired , notwi Htiuulinff that ( luring tho night , and in tho nl 0 rnl " * L , yeiUerdny , the onomy mn < lo ropoatod attempts to u tin-mi out , ouch attempt ending in failure , iillhoug" » U ported by largo bodies-of troop * , and by heavy aimsHftrt , " of musketry , and ovory Hpccios of oflonaivo missile . . Tho l'Yonohon our right had shortly beforo moveu
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THE W A R
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KQS > THE LE APBB , [ Sattjbdat ,
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Cathicjdral and Coulkoiatic Ciiuncifjss . — Ihe report of tho Commissioners for inquiring into the state of Cathedral and Collegiate Churches recommends tho erection of a new bialiopric for Cornwall , to have its see at St . Columb-Major . Tho commisaioners think that a better management of the episcopal estates , especially those in Cornwall , -would bo found to supply a largo portion of the revenue necessary ; and tho Rev . E . S . Walker , rector of St . Columb-Major , offers further to facilitate tho creation of tho proposed aoo by roHigning ecclesiastical preferments to tho amount of 1 ( 500 / . por annum , and to givo besides three hoiinc . i to tho now bishop . Tho Bishop of Kxotor cordially concurs in tho division of his diocoso , and offers to givo up all patronage in Cornwall .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), June 23, 1855, page 592, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2096/page/4/
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