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Leader (1850-1860), 19th May 1855, Edition 1 of 2, Page 462

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      eB » a ® U- Bb- ( tf 1 * TOtnees ) appointed ., Admirals Bosrer , ans , th «> atrength of ; & . refl » mmendatioa , by Six Thomas Qai&v , , whe > ilk . 1 S& 0-: represented him _ as an admirable ) rjc » T * ffi ° ' Besides , having acted a& harbour-master at Quebec , he- wa » well acquainted .. -with , the embarkation and disembarkation of troops and stores . The responsibility of affiairsin the harbour at Balaklava wasentirely / under Admiral Dundas , as well as everytMng ^ relatmg . to the transport on the Black Sea . Captain- Christie-was- appointed by the-witness- on the rev commeodation-of Gaptain MHnes ? and , as there was a naval harbour-master at Balaklava , Captain Charistie was innoway responsible fdr the confused state of the harbour : The witness added that- Captain Christie had

      made two mistakes ; for-which he has been- ordered to be tried by court-martial—an order which has- almost broken Ms heart . The first ofthese was in allowing the Prince ( the vessel which was lost ) to remain outside the harbour ; the second consisted in ordering- a transport wiffi Turkish troops to come to Balaklava , instead of going- to Eupatoria . Immediately afterwards , however , Sir James Graham stated : that the admission , or refusal of admission , of the Prince into harbour rested entirely with the officer in command of the harbour ; and not" witfi Captain Christie , who was in no respect responsible for her loss . In justice to Admiral Boxer , he might mention that on one occasion he represented to the Admiralty the necessity for having a receiving-ship

      at Constantinople ^ and the answerrat first sent out was that it was not thought ; necessary ^ though he ( Sir James-Graham ) reconsidered the question ; and , ; finding the emergency of the service increasing , he ordered at depot ship to be sent in October . It had not been officially notified to the Admiralty that there was any defect in the transport service in the Black Sea ,, nor was he ( Sir James ) aware of it . The amount of naval transport was limited at first , having been constituted with , a view only to operations in Bulgaria and JLifchuania . The supply was limited out "there ; " but if he were asked as to its supply " here , " he would say that you might get it as you would get a cab off the stand . ( A laugh . ') They exerted themselves to the

      utmost , andexhausted all available means of transport . He- was in favour of fixed hospitals , rather than floating hospitals ; hut , upon the urgent request of Admiral Baser , he sent out directions , in a private letter to Admiral Dundas , that two or three large steam transports should , be fitted up as hospitals without delay . Notwithstanding that this communication was private , her could make Admiral Dundas responsible for nonobeyance of the instructions so conveyed . Almost in the , same breath , however , Sir James declared that Admiral Dundas might , shield himself under cover of toe privacy of the communication , but that he thought a man of so honourable a character would not . — Lord Raglan possessed , supreme power over the

      movements of the transports , and had a veto on the directions of Admiral Dundas . Sir James had received no official complaint whatever of the conduct of Admiral Boxer . With respect to . the sufferings of the sick and wounded , Sis James : begged the committee to consider the immense numbers which were thrown on the hands of the authorities from the commencement of September till nearly the end of February . In answer to a question about the blockade , the witness stated that the Government , in the most emphatic manner ^ called the attention of the naval commanders-in-chief to the necessity of keeping

      up a strict blockade . On the 6 th of April ( war being declared on the 29 th of March ) , the Admiral was ordered to / q ua * , tibet . largest discretionary powers ia regard to the pootsunoth * Black ! Sea . Oa the : 29 £ h . of May , Admiral Djtadas , ite conjunction ; with the Frenchi admiral ^ waa onAcnsd ¦ to establish ; the- blockade without delay . The ' scj ] tema > of ¦ blockade which : was prepared' by Admiral DoMdasiand Admiral HameHn ; contemplated the ; stoppage oifethra entrance to the' Bosphomis to- trading ? vessels ) , and itiwotMSonfrto England and France by tha respective ambafModossk A letter written on the 26 th- ofi October ,

      eccpsmMdi regret ; that , that blockado- had .- not . then baesr ge « eBa ] fly / 3 Kmd vigorously established . Darning ; thai monthsofi ) Sept « mbe » - aads > October-Admiral Hondas gave ^ ust no > iniovmation in regard to thai blockade ^ Mgr tha- Chaiianan , — -The plun of blockade , am arranged byt Admirals-Dundaa . and Homolln ,. wa » quite effectual ; , bo * IiiOsd Stratford and th » French ; Ambassador ; did not thttriC ' it admissiblay and timowas lost by -itai > boingore' - feuced home . Admiral Duadas had not establishodi a . bloohade before * qnittingr the station ^ It is . not olearly

      pnoved * that astaamercame-out of Sebastopol and eflteeted 4 i dJgxwsrfon on th *« Tui-kislu coast . Such an occurrence migtefrihave taken pluoo , but theiwitneaswaa not . saiasficd tbJWtibdfeU ) H »> th 4 H * detailed ! further and ; still more impevaiiirtt orion * that ; th » blockade should be offieofcively * ca * iri 6 d" 0 ui ? inwBpeolave' o £ expense . He wosi not , how cvOTtfdispoMdtitoi blame . Admiral Dundas for not having caaonttA' out-the blookado ; for tlio collu . upon the . naval semiMfei / ini : th * wac - 'o £ bringing up reinforcements * , were so . > gr «** t : tbatih * doubted' if the . AduairaJL had disposable mMws « 4 tap « QffilctiiM » 'the object ;

      ' HjMp * etuig > a < statement that , om- sending ; out the- oacpedHitoN »> 'tO'th «* € Jrimeai r . the Government had ; no infbrma * tlon oatto tlwaimnxnt ofrtho troops , and . tho notnreof tho daBtncwatogebastopal ; Sir < Jams * fluid :: —^ Instead o £ on > oniMMu& ' wili'gto * y « m a » faakt Iatho . nuxntfe of Julyy

      I sow , su Crimean * authority ( who , ! of camssej ; nuns * , be nameless ) who had lefttheiCEuaea > injt 4 te'nw » ttlb 7 , of June . I examined him myself at the Admiralty ., and his evidence was taken down by an officer belonging to the department . It was , on the whole , most circumstantial —giving an account of the Crimea , its harbours , roads , and productions , and the supply of water it afibrded ; but what was most important was his statement of the force of the enemy , which he estimated at 78 , 000 men—r 8000 cavalry , 40 , 000 constituting the garrison , of Sebastopol , and , the remaining 30 , 000 dispersed throughout the Crimea . I sent that information ta Admiral Dundas on the 29 th July , and directed him to give a copy of it to Lord Raglan . It must have been received by

      Admiral Dundas before the expedition sailed for Varna . This person was a most intelligent Englishman . I had the utmost reliance upon his statement , and subsequent events- have proved that his estimate of the Russian farce at that period in the Crimea was' accurate , with the exception of a few hundred men ; and , more than that-, this individual was afterwards in personal communication with Lord Raglan . Also , immediately after the declaration of war , I sent out an engineer who had been employed in . a packet-boat plying , between Sebastopol and another port in the Black Sea , and who knew the harbour of Sebastopol just-as -well as the commander of a Ryde steam-packet knows Spithead . I also- sent to Admiral Dundas : an engineer , an Englishman , who had

      been employed . hy the Russian Government , and knew every shoal and every battery on the Crimean coast . "In answer to a ,, question by the Chairman , Sir James said that when the head of the . Ordnance Department is three thousand miles away , it is impossible that that department can work , wellT The witness , so far from thinking that the expedition ought to have sailed earlier , considered that August , September , and October are the best months for an operation of that kind in the Black Sea . There was a- difference of opinion between Admiral Dundas and Lord Stratford ; but Sir James did not believe that- it interfered in any way with the public

      service . Her could not think of a single instance . ( In immediate juxta-positioik . with this denial , Sir James added that at such a crisis , the misunderstanding could not have failed to produce some bad effects upon the public service . ) In December , 1854 , the Government received information of the roads constructed by the Russians between the Putrid Sea and Perekop ; but until that time those roads were unknown at Constantinople and through the English and French fleets . No attempt was made to blockade the Sea of Azoff , because it would have been impossible without a . supply of vessels of light draught .

      TUESDAY ( LAST SITTING ) . The Earl of Aberdeen gave evidence , and stated that preparations for war were made about three months before the declaration of war . Previous to January , there were differences of opinion as to the probability of hostilities ; and " perhaps , " said the Ear ] , " I was more sanguine than any other member of the administration . " No Cabinet Councils were held from the prorogation of Parliament in the middle of August until the middle of October , and the members of the Cabinet were " dispersed in various directions , " with the exception of the Duke of Newcastle and Mr * Sidney Herbert ; but they could have assembled m London within eight-and-forty hours if there had been , an occasion for them , and he did not

      see that there was any necessity at that time for Cabinet Councils . The general belief was that Sebastopol would fall by a coup de main ; but hia lordship did not think that the complexion of the expedition was altered by the fact of the army having to lay regular siege to the fortress . He did not know whether it waa too late in the year to undertake the expedition . In conjunction with Lord John Russell , he came to the opinion early last year that it waa > not a fit time for the consolidation of the War Departments . The witness then , in answer to questions , gave a narrative of the facts which led . to the split iix the Coalition . Government ; but this doe * not iu any way differ from the explanations made in Parliament at the period . He believed a good deal of the distress in the Crimea existed for some time without tho

      Government having any official notice of it . They were in ignorance longer than they ought to have boon . The authorities ou tho spot were tho responsible parties for this omission . It was understood that tho Lieutenants General of thoi Ordnance received tho same- powers aa tho Master-General ; but that was a question the witness was unable to decide . Boing asked by the chairman , if he thought it wiao to send tho head of the- Board of Ordnonco 8000 miles away at such & time , ho answered that it might not have been , but that Lord Ragjan'a services were urgently required in the Crimea * , To a further question , as to whether any beneficial object was attained by keaping Lord Raglan at tho head of the Ordnance , ho said ,. " None at alL" Tho only rcaaoix why , tho conunisuariat department was not transferred to tho War Minister until the . 22 nd of Docembar was tho waut

      of houHoroom . Aftar a . few . more romarlaj oh-matters of' arrangoment , Lord . Aberdeen , retired * , tho- room waa olearud , and in about half'aa hour the Oommitfcoo separated .. With the examination ojB tiu * late Premier , them laboure , aa far aa tjhe reception of ovidonpe i » i cooaornad ^ cQuuludud ..

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      The most striiking intelligence from Sebastopol is that wrhlcli closes : the week—the resigaatioa ^ m ill health , of General Canrobert . St . Arnaud has already perished without grasping the fruit of victory : is the same fate to attend his successor ? The latest intelligence fromXord Raglan which we possess , dates as . far back as last Saturday , the 12 th of May » The telegraphic message of that , day announces that ,. on the night , before , " the-enemy made

      a sortie on the advanced works of the left , attack . They moved forward in two columns , but both , were immediately repulsed with considerable loss . TJie conduct of tlie troops was admirable * . Our loss consisted , of 1 officer and 5 men killed , and 30 men wounded . " A telegraphic despatch of the day before intimates that , on the preceding night ( Thursday , May 10 th ) , the Russians " opened a heavy fire on our trenches ^ and maintained it for nearly two . hours . Their troops , however , did not attack , our advanced parallels . "

      Despatches from General Canrobert down to May 16 th , have been received in Paris . During the night of the 13 th ( last Sunday ) , two sorties were made upon the French lines by the Russians , who were vigorously repulsed . We also hear of two sorties on the-night of the 14 th ; but , from a similarity in the statements , we are inclined to think that both refer to the same events . General Canrobert says that " the works of the siege . are continually advancing , " and that " several camouflets have been employed , with complete success , to annoy the Russian garrison . " These " camoyftets" it may be as well to

      inform the reader , are , in plain though unsavoury Saxon , known as " stink-pots ; " and , whatever may be said as to the unromantic nature of such warfare , it is known to be very effective . Lord Dundonald ' s invention is said to be a camouflet upon a large scale . We are now within fifty yards of the Russian sentries , and are still constructing new batteries . " The second parallels , both on the left and right attack , " says the Daily JYews Correspondent , " have been greatly strengthened . . Several new batteries have been constructed , and guns of heavier metal brought into position . On the Greenhill attack several batteries have been made and armed in the

      third parallel , and , still further in advance , a work known as the Redoubt has been thrown up . From this work our riflemen are enabled to do much execution against the enemy's artillerymen in the Flagstaff and Barrack Batteries and the adjoining earthworks . " The French , also , are pushing forward , and , on the right , are nearly approaching the foremost Russian redoubt on Mount Sapoune , and the works on the Mamelon and MulakoflT hills . On their left , there is but a small space between their third parallel and the Flagstaff Bastion . The Russians have strengthened their new works constructed in the quarry below the Redan , and have opened six or seven new rifle-pits , not far off * from the ambuscades which our troops took from them on the 19 th of April . These pits renew the annoyance which we experienced from the former . We presume that sooner or later they will be taken .

      A despatch from General GortschakofT , dated the 6 th inst ., states that " On the evening of the 1 st of May , the greater portion of the enemy ' s ( French and English ) fleet stood out to sea , it is said with 10 , to 15 , 000 troops on board . On the 2 nd , it was seen sailing past , Yalta , it is believed in the direction ot tho coast of Anapa . " Another despatch from tlie same source , dated two days later , says that the allied fleet got under way on the 3 rd , and that it only went as far as Kertch , and then returned . It is added— " A portion of the troopa that were on boaru the ships appeared to have been landed in Ivamiescn Bay . " A telegraphic despatch , received by the hoiov 31

      Daily News from its correspondent . J ?? }* topol , speak * of this expedition as having lelt isuia .-klkva on tho 4 th , with Kertch for its destination ; und says that the troops were composed ot aouu French and 5000 English , under tho command ot wr George Brown . These contradictory accounts are sufficiently confusing , ; but not so strange as . tin « lord Raghxn , in his telegraphic despatches ot tnc 1 , 1 th and 12 th of May , should not make tho least mention of the expedition . But did he really _ inaKt no mention of it ? and has tho Government suppressed , tho allusion ? If so , why ? Tho foUowuig additional particulars of this very mysterious move ment are from tho Morning Herald . correspondent ,

      ¦ writing , on the 3 d , of May : — " Tho deatiiiadon of the expedition ia ,. of course , impenetrable aocrot . Homo aco Buflteiontly porvowo » - to , boUove ia Yalta , other * uphold the JUtuha- ; J- « ltl 1 * fmda many Huppoutore , but , on the whole , "J "" ' , Kontch arc , the fa-vouritOH . Yalta is out of all . puw biUty , aa tho only road , from thonca would only « ru b back to . DolaJdova .., KaBcha . and ttorokop ura »>«™ posaiblM ttt » u . nroliiiW « , , aud Oiia $ m . wouM wHtJ »«« » ottL

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  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), May 19, 1855, page 462, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2091/page/6/