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Leader (1850-1860), 14th April 1855, Edition 1 of 2, Page 340, Untitled Article

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      Reau - Admiral Pbnaud is announced in the Moniteur as the commander of the French naval division in the Baltic rr . u tut-t * The Women leaving Sebastopol ,. —The Mthtary Gazette of Vienna contains a letter from Sebastopol , which states that General Osten-Sacken ^ on the 18 th ult . published an order of the day enjoining all women to quit the town at once . The , Grand Duke Nicholas , taking into consideration that a great number of these women possess nothing in the world , has been pleased to accord from his privy purse 100 roubles to each woman having a family , to enable her to remove , and from 20 roubles to 50 roubles to each unmarried woman , according as the case might seem to require ( the rouble is a little over 4 f . ) . It was supposed that this order was given in anticipation of active hostilities being on the point of being resumed .

      _ Russian War Contributions . —For the second time , the clergy of the convent of St . Sergius , near Moscow ( which passes for one of the richest convents m Russia ) , have presented a sum of money to the Emperor for the purpose of carrying on the war , their gift on this occasion amounting to nearly a million francs . The Sardinian Contingent . —The Genoa Cornere Mercantile of the 6 th instant announces the arrival in that port , on the 5 th , of the English steamers Chanty , of 1007 tons , and Cleopatra , of 1019 tons , with several sailing transports . Those vessels formed part of the flotilla which is to convey the Piedmontese troops to the East . The Military Gazette states that the expeditionary corps is to remain pro tempore at Constantinople , with the French Imperial Guard . This is to be the army of reserve of the Allies . . .

      The Russian Army of the North . —A letter from Hamburg in the Independance Beige asserts that the Allies will find in Finland 100 , 000 Russian troops , under the command of General de Berg , ready to oppose them , and that a force still more considerable will operate , under the command of General Sievers , against any attempt at disembarkation at Courland and Livonia . Statements such as these , however , must be received with caution . Government Parsibioniousness . — The engineer officers have complained that the fusees employed have in manyjnslances been so old as not-to be depended upon . Some , it is stated , have been dated as far back is 1803 , since which time they have been lying in store it Malta or elsewhere . —Daily News Correspondent .

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      THE FRENCH OFFICIAIr EXPLANATIONS OF THE EASTERN EXPEDITION . A vert important article appears in the Moniteur of Wednesday- It is , in fact , an official revelation of the secret plans and motives of the French Emperor in connexion with the war . The document is very long ; but we subjoin the most important points . The writer thus summarises the chief perplexities which lie undertakes to explain : — " In what manner was the Eastern Expedition conceived ? What are the expectations and the data that dictated its plan ? What are the causes that modified" it ?—Why was the Anglo-French army landed- in the Crimea instead of acting on the Danube and making a campaign in Bessarabia ? How must we explain the long resistance of the * besieged in presence of the ardour and heroism of the besiegers ?"

      Then follow the written instructions which the Emperor gave to Marshal St . Arnaud . They are contained in the annexed document : — " In placing you , Marshal , at the head of a French army , about to fight at more than six hundred leagues from its native land , my first recommendation to you is to bestow the greatest care on the health of the troops , to spare them as much as possible , and not to come to an engagement unless you have made sure of two-thirds at

      least of the favourable chances . " The peninsula of Gallipoli has been selected as the chief place of debarkation , because it is intended to be , as a strategical point , the basis of our operations—that ia to say , the l place d ' armes , ' where we can place our depots , ambulances , and provisions , and whence we can easily advance or re-embark . That will not prevent you on your arrival from stationing , if you deem it advisable , one or two divisions in the barracks either to the wost of Constantinople or else at Scutari .

      " So long as you are not in the presonce of the enemy , tho dislocation of your forces will be of small moment , and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may produce a good moral effect ; but if , by chance , after advancing on tho . Balkans , you should be constrained to boat a retreat , it would bo far more advantageous to regain the coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople , for the Russians would nover venture from Adrianople to Constantinople , leaving as they would on their right a choice army of 60 , 000 men . If , nevertheless , there snould bo a wish to fortify the line of Karassu in front of Constantinople , it should only be done with the intention of allowing it to bo defended : by tho Turks alone , since , I repeat it , our position will bo moro independent , more formidable , by being on the flanks of the Russian army , than by being blocked up in the peninsula of Thrace . " Thia first point established , and tho Anglo-French army once united on the shores of tho Sea of Marmora ,

      you will have to come to an understanding with Omar Pacha and Lord Raglan respecting the adoption of one of the three following plans : 1 . Either to march and meet the Russians on the Balkans . 2 . Or to seize the Crimea . 3 . Or to land , say at Odessa , or at any other spot on the Russian coast of the Black Sea . " In the first case , "Varna seems to me the important point for occupation . The infantry might go . to'it by sea , and the cavalry more easily perhaps by land . In no case ought the army ever to remove too far from the Black Sea , in order that it may have its communications constantly open with the fleet . In the second case , the one concerning the occupation of the Crimea , it is necessarv above all thing 3 to be sure of the

      landing-place , in order that the disembarkation may be effected at a distance from the enemy , and that this place may be capable of being fortified quickly , so that it may serve as a support in case of a retreat . The capture of Sebastopol ought not to be attempted unless you are provided with at least half a battering train and a great many sacks of earth . When you approach that place do not neglect to seize Balaklava , a small port situate four leagues to the south of Sebastopol , by means of which communication may be easily kept up with the fleet during the continuance of the siege . In the third case , that in which an enterprise should be resolved on in concert with the admirals against Odessa , my principal advice is , never to divide your army , but

      always to march with all your troops united ; for a compact mass of 40 , 000 men is always an imposing force ; broken , it is worth nothing . If , however , you are obliged to divide your army , make arrangements for reuniting it on some spot in twenty-four hours . If on the march it forms several columns , fix upon a point of reunion sufficiently distant from the enemy to prevent any column being attacked singly . If you repulse the Russians , proceed no farther than the Danube , unless . the Austrians join in the movement . As a general rule , every movement ought to be concerted with the Commander-in-Chief of the English army . It is only on certain exceptional occasions , as when the safety of the army is concerned , that you should act on your own sole decision .

      " Marshal , I have full confidence in you ; I am convinced that you will remain faithful to these instructions , and that _ you will bring fresh glory to our eagles . " The writer in the Moniteur then defends these instructions seriatim . He says that Gallipoli was selected as the point _ of debarkation because it is easily defended , and readily provisioned through the Sea of Marmora and the Thracian Gulf . A further consideration is thus stated : "At the period the expedition was about to leave , that is to say in April , 1854 , inquiries were anxiously made whether our militarv forces would arrive in time

      to cover Constantinople . A defensive war then appeared much more likely than an offensive one . Had the Turks lost a single battle on the Danube , the Russians would have been' able to reach the Balkan in three days' march , and would have had the road to Constantinople open to them . The occupation of Gallipoli entirely covered that capital . The two allied Governments were fully alive to the fact , that , even had a Russian army entered Adrianoplef it would . not have been-able to advance upon Constantinople , leaving an army of 60 , 000 English and French on its right flank ; and this foresight is to be found in the instructions of the Emperor . "

      When , however , the allied armies landed in the Crimea , " the scene began to be changed ; " the advance of the Russians was broken by the defence of Silistria ; and the French and English generals thought they should be able to arrive " in time to save Silistria , " or at any rate to hold the Balkans , " having , as it were , the two wings of their army protected by the fortresses of Schumla and Varna . " It is added that , " if the Russians had taken Silistrin , the Jail of which was announced as inevitable in the reports of Omar Pacha , the fate of the Ottoman Empire might have depended upon one general engagement . " The writer then says that , upon the retreat of the Russians , it would have been madness

      for the Allies to pursue , as the state of the country was such that it would have placed them in poril of starvation , or death from pestilent disease . An advance into Bessarabia , without tho co-operation of Austria , would have been fatal , sinco the base of their operations was the sea , and they were without the proper provisions , means of transport , artillery , or munitions for such an undertaking . The simple reconnaissance of two days in the Dobrudseha , in which the Allies suffered a murderous loss , is instanced as a proof of this . The help of Austria would have altered the case ; but Austria was naturally waiting for the co-operation of Germany , with its 500 , 000 troops .

      A state of inactivity , however , was impossible consistently with honour . The expedition to tho Crimea was thoroforo decided on ; and Marshal St . Arnaud received " hints or advice" to the following effect : — " He will mako himself thoroughly acquainted with tho nature ¦ and amount of the Russian forces in tho Crimea ; find out whether those forces are too formidable ; and land in a spot which'may serve as a bnsiu for future operations . The best place seoma to bo

      Theodosia , called Kaffa now . This spot , however is objectionable , as being forty leagues from Sebastopol . but it offers great advantages . In the first place the bay is large and safe . The ships of the squadro n are there in perfect safety ; and the same remark applies to the barques which bring supplies to the army . In tho next place , our army , once established on the spot raav use it as a proper base of operations . If we occupy the extreme east of the Crimea , we can repel all the reinforcements coming by the way of the Sea of Azof and the Caucasus . We make our way onward towards the centre of the country , at the same time that we hare its resources at our command . We take possession of Simpheropol , the strategical centre of the peninsula , and have the road open to Sebastopol , on which , probably there will be a great battle . In the event of this being against us , we may retreat upon Kaffa , and nothing is compromised . If it is in our favour , we can besieg e Sebastopol , and by investing it completely we shall compel it to surrender in a tolerably short interval . ' Unluckily this advice was not taken . Whether the generals-in-chief had not sufficient troops to undertake this long journey in the Crimea , or whether they expected a speedier result from a bold and . unexpected coup de main , they resolved , as is now . well known , to land at some few leagues distant from Sebastopol . " Subsequent events are then briefly touched on , and the writer adds : —" The consequence of retreating towards the south was to give up the northern heights—in other words , to abandon the idea of investing the fortification . The Anglo-French army , in fact , was not sufficiently numerous to invest the place completely . " The possibility of an assault is thus alluded to : — " When the Anglo-French army arrived before Sebastopol , perhaps it was practicable to attempt an assault ; but such an enterprise would have been somewhat adventurous , inasmuch as the allied forces had not sufficient artillery to silence that of the enemy . Doubtless , nothing was impossible to an Anglo-French army , composed of generals and soldiers such as those who for the last six months have manifested their character in the perils , fatigues , and sufferings of this long siege ; but nothing short of success could have justified a couj ) so audacious . The responsibility of command imposes prudence before all things ; and prudence prescribed to the generals-in-chief not to deliver the assault with an army of 50 , 000 men at most , placed on a rock , wanting artillery , ammunition , reserves—not having its rear secured by entrenchments in case of a check , and having no refuge but its ships . That would have been to risk the fortune and the fate of the expedition , and nothing should be hazarded at a distance of 800 leagues from one ' s own country . The coupde main , which the generals thought possible after the battle of the Alma , escaped them , and it only remained to proceed with the siege after the .-rules of military art . " The Moniteur then goes into very minute technical details with respect t * the modes of attack employed in the siege . Into these it will not be necessary for us to enter , as they would not be of interest to , or even understood by , the general reader . The article concludes with a panegyric on the marvellous nature of the siege ,-and- on-the courage and-skill . of . the French and English .

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      THE VIENNA CONFERENCES . The sitting's of tho Plenipotentiaries have been resumed ; the Ninth Conference being held on Monday . According to a telegraphic despatch from Vienna , published in the Times of Wednesday , the sitting was very short , and not satisfactory , and it is uncertain when the next Conference will be held . Nothing , however , is decidedly known ; and the public is distracted with a perfect Babel of rumours having no authentic origin , often contradicting one another , and tending to no other effect than confusion mid uneasiness . Indeed , in the present lull , both of political and of war news , the probabilities and possibilities ( to say nothing of the converse ) arising from the negotiations form the staple topic of professional politicians , both here and abroad , and nlTbrd them ft magnificent field for the display of their conjectural ingenuity , Some maintain with undiminished confidence that the consultations of the state p hysicians will infallibly lead to peace ; others , with greater probability , say they will but leave tho quarrel where they found it . But , at the end of nil these assertions and reasonings , we are forced to adopt tho modest self-criticism of Socrates— " We only know

      that wo know nothing . " -... ., With respect to tho alleged shortness of tho NinUi Sitting , the evening organ of our Government ( tlic Globe ") remarks : —" The meeting notlned above niny have been for the purposo of formally introducing the now French and Turkish Envoys , nnd its brevity may arise from the fact , that tho Russian bnvojs had not received their instructions to recommence the formal discussions . Indeed , tho despatch owiw to state whether the Hussian Envoys even attention tho meeting . " . Tho Indtipcndancc of Tuesday takes pains to remove an impression that M . Droiiyn de Lhuys goes to Vienna with on ultimatum—to bo accepted worn

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  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), April 14, 1855, page 340, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2086/page/4/