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    Alma , defective as it was in disposition , and therefore barren in results , has been glorious in execution , and covered with a lustre of immortality the renown of the British and French soldier y ; but the battle of Inkerman , from the first in rank to the last , was a prodigy of valour scarcely inferior to the miracle of Agincourt . The history of 1854 , whatever be its records about the state wisdom of those who rule , will hand down with imperishable renown to the admiration of posterity the impetuous military ardour of the French , and the stem , immovable courage of the Britons who fought in the Crimea . However , they fight on a battleiield richer iu glory than in possible results , and richest in < Jeath . One more such victory as that of Inkerman and the army is lost . It is a sad consolation to know that the tombs of those glorious dead around Sevastopol can say , like those of Thermopylae , " Wanderer , tell England thou bast seen us lain obedient to our country ' s laws . " The English public have been told of late that there never was a position

    that can forestal instead of waiting on events , and can arert evils which it may be impossible to repair . That is perfectly just , though somewhat of an after-fact wisdom come out too late . _ But if ib be just , then there is no good service to England in lulling public opinion to sleep by advising it to let bygones be bygones . A forestalling mind must look to the past for instruction . And the great lesson of accomplished facts is , that England's policy , in reference to the present war , has been wrong Ln its direction , and inefficient , unsuccessful , and disastrous in details . Let us analyse the situation . Your gigantic armada iu the Baltic is nearly without a laurel to rest its head upon . To do something effective there , the co-operation of Sweden was a matter of prime necessity . England did not get it , because England ' s policy

    • was wrong . I told England six months ago that the cooperation of Sweden is to be got only by calling Poland to arms . And that was the answer which " three months later , King Oscar gave to General Baraguay d'Hilliers . You have taken Bomarsund—a small matter forsooth—yet when the time comes that necessity will force you to remember Poland , and you shall have to thank her for the advantage of getting Sweden over to your side , then Bomarsund -would-Lave proved an acceptable offer to Sweden ; but you blew it up ! as if afraid of your own victory , as if bent on the purpose not to have anything to offer to Sweden .

    What a gigantic blunder ! England pretended to strike a blow at the commerce of Russia by blockading her coast , and England just succeeded in turning Russian commerce to Prussia . England has bent her mind on bringing Austria over to herself j she has sacrificed to this one aini everything —numerous millions spent in vain , the life-blood of the flower of England spilt in vain—principles , political reputation , the liberal character of the war , and the very issue of the war—everything . And lias your Government gained Austria ? ( . , no ) . Has it gained that Austria to whom it has sacrificed everything—that Austria of whom even the Times is bound at last to acknowledge that " You are fighting her battle more than your own ? " QNo , no ) . What a . proud sneer ing there was in official quarters when I , months ago , told the good people of England that they believe they pay and bleed for freedom , when in reality they are made to tight for Austria . How it comes out at last . Truth will come out , like murder will . Well , has your Government gained Austria ? Q ? fo , ) Go and read the well-founded lamentations in the organs—even the Ministerial organs—of publicity about the treacherous attitude and tho overbearing insolence of that Austria which your Government persisted in courting with so much submission , and which in return facilitates the enterprises of . Russia , insults your allies , and counteracts your combinations . It is not only that you have not gained over Austriabut you

    , lisvre the Turks arrested in the midst of their victorious course ; and the fruit of that heroic struggle , poor Wallachiu , played over into tho treacherous hands of despotic Austria . There is the Turkish army paralysed on the one hand , and thoro is on the other hand the Czar made and left free to throw overpowering numbers upon tho flank and the rear of your gallant ranks in tho Crimea . There you havo the spirits of tho Turkish army , high-flowing as they were by the victories at Silistria and Giurgevo , now deprossed ; there you havo tho spirits of the Russian army , depressed as they wero , now restored . And oh , I could tdl you what it is to neglect the moment of spirited excitement in a victorious army , and -what it is to givo time to i \ demoralised enemy to

    resume ita spirits and to take breuth . One such moment ' s nogleotin a war , and it is not battles , gcntluinen , not buttles , but empires that may bo lost by it . And at last , alas I not least , thoro is Sebastopol . Every British heart h : is watched tbo great bloody drama there with intense anxiety . I nni not wanted to toll you the tnlo of your liuart . I am not wanted to describe how your braves have found thcro tin entrenched cainp , with an army , instead of n fortress with a . garrison ( as your Government appours to luivo anticipated ) — "how now armies are pouring upon your shattered ranks , aaypur Government docs not nppoar to havo anticipated , or else it would bo more than iin error to > net as tlio Government did , All I am wnnted to do is to quota from publio reports those words : — " Tho question is no longer whether we ahull take Sobastopol or not . Tho siege of Sobastopol , though not raised , may Go regarded as at a stumi-still . VVo tiro reduced to tho defensive , Sudi ih tho situation . " Tho lenvos aro turned ; Russia is the besiogov , you uro tliube . iiuged . " And at what price has thia situation been purchased ?

    KOSHDTU S PHOt'HKCr . Gentlemen , on tho 6 th of July , ton weeks before England embarked ou that expedition , ill-advised as well an ill-prepared , I , hi it speech , the contents of which would have boonwall for Gruat Britain to mind , spoke thoso words ut Glasgow : — " Not one out of five of your bravos will sou Albion again . " Of coui-ho I used tlio number ugura . tlvuly , us imlicntivo of a / rrout loas , Now , if . is a and talo ; number your < lond , your mmndod , mid your disabled—inoru than 20 , 000 men out of IJO . OOO aro already lost . My aad antiinpiiiiwns uro literally fulfilled ! And horo « t homo ? Why , hare tho number of widows and orphan * applying for support to

    patriotic chanty amounts to 11 . 000 ! Such is the position , gentlemen ! Now , with that position thus analysed , I call on contemporary age and on history to say whether I -was exaggerating or too harsh in saying that England ' s policy has peen wrong , that it has been successful nowhere , but inefficient , unsuccessful , and disastrous everywhere . But you are told for all consolation that " no human foresight could have fully anticipated the extraordinary position which you find yourselves in . " Now , as to this , I must say it is not true . Many a man must have anticipated that position . I , for one , have foretold it fact by fact , and word by word . And I certainly claim not the slightest credit for perspicacity on that account . I wonder how any thinking men could do otherwise than know all this . Yet , if such there were , they could have used the modest light of my poor oil-lamp . It is true the people of Great Britain gave me tremendous cheers in return , and went home to toil on , and then to

    sleep . It is as if I would have been mendicating favours for myself , whereas it was England ' s honour , dignity , interest , and snecess that I held np before their eyes . They went to toil and to sleep , and the flower of your nation went to die ; and now , after my disregarded words have proved true , some of them ( the Scottish press ) say— " The words he spoke read like the inspiration of a seer , or a picture drawn from , history . " Others , v the Times , say : " No human foresight could have anticipated tho extraordinary position in which England finds herself . " Extraordinary ! Why , what is there extraordinary in the inexorable logic of concatenation between cause and effect ? Is it extraordinary that Sebastopol is found to be an entrenched camp with a numerous army in it ? Is it extraordinary that the Czar is pouring whole fresh armies to its , defence ? The Czar has been left perfectly free , and with ample time afforded to doit ; nay , in fact , he has been invited to do it by the Turco-Austrian treaty , negotiated under England ' s auspices .

    POLAND TJSEFUX TO THE ALLIES . The most extraordinary thing in the matter is 1 not that he has sent reinforcements to Sevastopol , but that he has not sent double ... the number , and a month earlier . I take this to be so extraordinary that I find only two explanations to account for it . The first is , that to begin a war with Russia with landing an expedition in the Crimea , is au idea so extremely absurd , that the Czar , giving more credit for foresight to his ^ fi-nemies than they deserved , did not believe it until . you actually landed off Eupatoria . Secondly , and chiefly , you are indebted to Poland for not having to meet 100 , 000 Russians more at Sebastopol- If England did disregard the fact that Poland is the vulnerable part of Russia , the Czar was prudent enougli to mind it . In the Crimea proud England and France attack him ; he is content with opposing 100 , 000 men to them . On the Danube the flower of the Turkish army , elated by victory , defies and menaces

    him , he is content to oppose them with 8 C , 0 O 0 men . But to Poland , where there is not one man in arms , but where the unquenchable fire of a heroic nation ' s hatred is smouldering , he sent an army of 300 , 000 men , to be prepared , for emergencies . Some may tell you that it is due chiefly lo a precaution against Austria . But it is clear to demonstration that the Czar feels perfectly easy about the submissive obedience of his proconsul in Vienna , or else he certainly would not have left the very existence of his 80 , 000 men , on the other side of the Pruth , at the mercy of his good friend the Hapsburg . Yes , it is the name of Poland you have to thank for the fact that your whole army in the Crimea , all heroes as they are , has . yet fallen a victim to overpowering numbers . But the situation is sad enough , such aa it is . To be sure there may have been some strategical and tactical mistakes in the operations themselves , such as they are .

    CONDUCT OP THE WAR . Sir , I have not the pretension to say that my past could impart authority to my remarks about military matters . I have not been brought up a soldier , neither can I claim the honour of having had to act the part of n soldier in our glorious war . My duties were high anil great , but somewhat of a different nature . They were just what tho duties of your Government aro now , only that mine wero a great deal more difficult . We lmd to fight two great powers alone ; you are three great powers united to fight only one of them . And I hnd no ready army , no rich treasury , no abundantly-stored arsenals , and no ' frce communication with the world . I hnd to create everything with nothing out of nothing ; money and armies , and arms , and all military imp lements , secluded as we wero from all the world , and in the interior , with the deluded third part of our population , armed with the firebrand and with murder , in a condition

    worse than tho Vondtfe over was in Frnnco , or Iroland soinotiutes to you . Those wero iny duties , and , besides , my duty has been to designate tho objects of military operations , and to direct tho war in general , just as tho duties of your Govornmont are . Yet , as soldier I was not at that time , I could not draw the plan for tho buttle , nor direct it mysolf . But tho fact is , had 1 been able to add tho skill of a soldier to my patriotic devotion , no troaaon would have crept into our ranks , and Hungary were now free—not nil tho Cssurs of the world could have defeated us . And who can yet toll whether I may not yet bo called upon to servo mycountry ? Thoreforo , I thought tho lime of my exile may bo best employed in preparing for possible emorKiwcios , by

    learning what , unforlunutoly , 1 have not known before . And modest as bo my humblo abilities , I oortuiuly dare say , if assiduous application and discretion , guided by oxperienoo , may mas tor tho myaterius of an art , 1 ttm a soldior now , and fool competent to judge of military miittors . With this oonaeiousnows , I nay thoro havo certainly boon oomo vory serious mistakes connooted with tho operations iu tlio Omnou . 1 consider it , an unaccountable mistake to havo engaged in tho bIoro of Scbustopol without taking previously hold of tho strait of Purukop in tho north , anil taking command by sou of tho buy of Kartell j n tho oust , ho ub to prevent , or ut loast retard , tho roinlbrcomonts which it was easy to forotol that , Russia would send . And that nogleot onco omitted , I cortuinly cannot undurstuud tl » o logic of shifting tho bnnls of operation down Lo the oouthormnost corner of tho peninsula ,

    thas leaving ; the whole of the land free . to draw hence supplies to Sebastopol , and leaving the Russians not only entirely at liberty to send reinforcements to the Crimea but leaving to them , besides , the very road , perfectly open and unimpeded , even to enter Sebastopol in small or large numbers , just its they please , without iiaving to fight for it . My opinion is that , yours being what is called a moveable basis ( the fleet ) , you could choose that point all along the coast which was the best to rest upon . Uow , the bulk of your allied squadron is actually , not south of Sebastopol , at Balaklava , but north of Sebastopol , off the Katcha river . Why not remain there with the army likewise ? Why not dra-w up your lines , leaning on the Belbek river , affording more or less protection against cavalry ? There , with a well-provided redoubt at the point where the only road from the

    interior splits in two towards Sebastopol and Balaklava , you , by your position " , already had restricted the communications of Sebastopol to that narrow convex where it is now your bad fortune to be pent up . You would have cut off all their supplies from the interior , and no reinforcements could have entered Sebastopol without having first to fight separately an open field tattle , wherein , certainly , the Russians are no match for your heroes there . Instead of that , your army has been established so as to leave Sebastopol perfectly free to communicate with the whole empire of Russia . This is a strategical error , in my humble opinion , not even justified by technical considerations . By besieging the north instead of the south of Sebastopol you would have encountered more of permanent fortifications , which is no difficulty for engineers , but would have encountered less of an entrenched

    camp , witu less numerous a garrison , which makes your real difficulty ; and at last , once the north side fortifications taken , you -would have become masters of the town alike : whereas , on the contrary , the taking of the town will not make you masters of the northern forts . You would , have to return for besieging them to where you had better have begun , were it not more likely that , in taking the ' town , you would either have to do what you did at Bomarsund , anil sail off , and swiftly too , or would have , in your turn , to stand a siege , with the difference that , while you were the besiegers Russia had to stand the siege in a fortified place ; you , on the contrary , would have to stand it amid ruins , yawning , shattered , and smouldering . Even as to the tattle of Alma , glorious as it 1 ms been in personal gallantry , from thecomniander-in-chief down to the lowest in rank and fie I nnot hel that it has been

    ca p thinking a wanton sacrifice of valuable life , and very defective in plan . A strong position should never be attacked when it can be carried by turning it . And this was evidently the Case . A march of two English miles up the Alma must have forced the Russians either to retreat or to change their front with the loss of all the advantages of the position . Not the wings of the line of battle , but the position had to be turned . And as to the battle itself , why , the plan of turning both the wings of a line of battle is certainly the worst plan which could be imagined . It is condemned by theory as well as by all the history of modern warfare . It did not succeed on " the right wing of the enemy where it would have been of importance ; the success on the other wing was just so much as if the French had been bent on the generosity of preserving the Russians from bein"

    driven into the sea , in case the English flanking movement succeeded . And then the battle was reduced to u parallel attack in front , which will say so much as a perfect absence of any plan at all . It was a bull-fight , breasts against breasts , aad horn against horn . The impetuous bearing of the French soldier , and the stern courage of the English soldier , ha-ve carried ^ the day . The French have gloriously maintained their military renown , and the English soldier deserved the more praise , as your shilling and poundfashioned military regulations give him a very scanty share in those impulses of noblu ambition which the French soldier draws from the conscience that ho carries the materials to a Marshal ' s staff in his knapsack—a neglect on your part , bythe-by , which is a dim spot on tlio shining robe of English civilisation . They havo gained the day—all

    honour to them—but the 4000 woundod and dead laid low on that day could havo been spared forsooth . However , all these and lileo misUikea enter only i ' ov secondary considerations in estimating tho situation such ub it is , Tho chief error ( if not mom ) on the part of tlio Wvstorn l'owors is in tho very idea of beginning a war against Kussia by a systematic campaign in tho Crime : i . Not that I am of opinion that this war should havo boon brought or should bo brought to an end without wresting tho Crimea from the Czar , and destroying his Black Sou . Hoot ; but I am decidedly of tho opinion that , if an attack on Sobaslopol has not . or could not havo been tried by a naval coup da main , tho very next d : iy after the outrageous slaughter ut Sinopo , a systematic expedition to tho Crimea ought to have been one of the last strokes , and by no means tho first 5 in no case one which I would havo undertaken to donl before I had , by successful victories in ttesaarabia . and around Odessa , driven tho Russians buck from tho IMaulc Sou ,

    and perfectly isolated tho Crimea from tho rest of tho Russian empire . Thun taking my stand with tho main ti » dy of my forco in a convenient locality , somewhere above Qduasii Cwhieh , roinomber , might havo boon aocompliuhed as circumstances wore up to tho half of September ) , I certainly would luiva scut some 30 , 000 men to tuko tiabutitopul . who , horoos as they are , with a gallant , iiHolligont , and experienced chief at their head , as Lord Kughui is , would havo dono their work up to this day unilor suoh circumstances , and would havo found MunsoliikolF cut off from every hope of relief , fighting , at tlio heat , but for military reputation , as Gunoral Chassis ili . l at Anlivur |> . Uut , iu llio nionn while , I would lmvo boon poriljclly content with knowing tlio Russian fleet wan utterly paralysed by tho very prosouco of your vastly suporiw squadron in tho lJlaok Sua ( an amy task with that naval forco . and with a little vigilanoo ) . I would hiivo boon rut her R lail to know timt tho necessity of keeping Sobustopol woll garrisoned would sorvo mo liko a diversion , by kooping no much siaallor the main Russian »* nny , which I wan enmigdd in tlufoiUinc . But , before dofosaing tho HubhIiiiis duclnivoly iu tho field , in no case would A huvo severed my disposable forces . a » y < iu did .

    Untitled Article

    December 2 , JL 854 ] THE ! LEADEB . 1135 ^* ^ — M » ^ »» r « Wh »^ igi»—IMi ™* . r ~~ M-r ^ mi-MllB III I III MM Mil ** " I ..---. i .. 1 1 . . _

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 2, 1854, page 1135, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2067/page/7/