On this page

• Text (1)

  Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

  • 

    Untitled Article

• Transcript

  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

    Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

    Untitled Article

    mighty battle , which we do not seek to cheapen , British exploits , on the European field at least , are limited to Navarino , and the operations on the Syrian coast in 1840 . We leave to more competent military critics to judge the merits of these exploits . We shall simply take leave to say , that neither the destruction of the Turkish fleet , nor the bombardment of St . Jean d'Acre , nor the expeditions of the British armies and fleets against the Hindoos , the Chinese * and the Gafres , will persuade us to take the recent prophetic utterances of Lord Clarendon seriously . If it was a question of intrigues , if intrigues alone could bring an empire sustained by a million bayonets to destruction , the genius of the English Ministry would be far more formidable to Russia and the Continent . Portugal and Spain , Morocco and Algiers , Messina ; Naples , Rome , Milan , Florence and "Venice , Switzerland and Hungary , more especially Greece , Egypt , and Turkey , bear witness' enough to-the power of intrigue , and to the art of paralyzing your enemies one after the other ( and by . ¦ enemies '' we mean every state which asserts the right to live its own life ) , at one time by isolating and then insulting , at another by letting loose the tempests of revolution . . '' ¦¦ '•

    But these resources have not sufficed to intimidate Russia or to make her accept humiliations in the East . Notwithstanding the powerful co-operation of France , the ' success of English policy , now that the struggle is to be decided by the sword , is at least problematical , except' in one sense—we mean the ruin of continental commerce as in 1848 . England seeks her recompense in the contest itself rather than in its results . That France and England meant war while professing peace is proved by their rejection of the Vienna note . Had there been the least sincere disposition to peace , they might well have been satisfied with the modifications imposed by the Four Powers- upon the original demands of Russia . But while the Four Powers drewr up that ! Note -which Russia ; , relying on their ^ 66 d fairti , ^ as induced to accept * the influence pf one } Ambassador at Constaritifldple prevailed ; over the unanimous 1 decision : b £ Europe ; and war was precipitately declared . ' ¦ . ¦ , ¦;; '¦ '¦ ¦ ¦'¦ .. ¦' ¦; - '¦ - ' ^ -: '¦ '¦/¦ ¦¦ f ' -r ' - •¦¦ , ' ¦ ' '¦• ¦ \ ~ -. - ^ - ;¦ ' j

    The Sultan seriously believed in the rights ofindependence and . sovereignty which the Western ; Powers affected to attribute to him in ordbr to prevent his guaranteeing to Russia , the only act of his which could have proldnged the dying hours of his Empire , and averted the disasters that are now desolating the Eastern -vrorld , Chris - tian and Mussulman alike / Here let us pause : tp note dries episode ifi the diptortiatic ; drama . which passed almost unnoticed . The refusal of Tiit-key to accede to the Vienna propositions had been secured by Lord Straiford beforehand . In July ( des lc mois de jidllet ) , , the British Ambassador had suggested to the ^ Turkish Miiiistry the idea of convoking an extraordinary council of sixty dignitaries , to ; submit tothem the Russian demands in this form : are they compatible with the interests and honour of Turkey t The

    reply could not but be negative under the influence , at that time allpdwer- - ful in the Ottoman councils , of the' fanatic Mehemet All , the Sultari's brother ^ in-lawywho menaced the Sultan himself with the vengeance of the Softas . And this reply -was solemnly recorded by a public act signed by all the high dignitaries of the Empire in , and out of , office ; by all the chief secretaries of the Ministries and the chiefs of the Ulemas ; in short , by every personage who could possibly form a part of any ; 3 VIm ( stiy . This proclamation was profusely distributed throughput the empire .. Jt was thus that , at the instigation of Lord Stratford , the honour and interests of the Porte were irreparably committed against the demands of Russia , even if those demands were , in a modified form , supported by the Concert of the European Powers .

    All this time , while negotiations were carried on , and peace was preached , and unhappy Turkey was victimised by her friends , the end of all these efforts and provocations was ivar . If at the outset Russia had been placed in an inextricable position , she had now no alternative but decadence and dishonour . Public opinion was misled by the secret operations of diplomacy preaching peace and provoking war , and by the vociferations of a revolutionary press , while the Russian Government scrupulously abstained from rousing the national susceptibility ; and even when Turkey declared war , she occupied the Principalities with a force limited to the strictly defensive

    and scarcely increased her armaments . She did not even prevent the exportation of corn when Western Europe was stricken with dearth . We cannot give clearer pi-oof of the good faith of Russia throughout the negotiations . She was the dupe of her own misplaced confidences in the probity of her enemies ; while she was accused of outwitting all the world by her diplomacy . ^ But there has been such an elaborate perversion of all theories of international law , and such a confusion of right and wrong , that the uava combat of Sinopa was actually considered almost an infraction of treaties , and called a butchery and an insult . Sinope has positively been compared with Copenhagen !

    Ihus passed the last months of 1853 , and it vraa not until February of the present year that Russia was driven to abandon her system of moderation , and to take up proudly the gauntlet of defiance b y increasing hoi' armaments and , giving publicity to the enemy ' s insults , So scrupulous had been the desn ; e of the Russian Government to lull rather than to excite the popular pasaioiis , that it had not cvon permitted the journals to publish the atrocities committed by the 'lurks at the capture of the Fort St . Nicholas , at the beginning of the hostilities , —such , for example , aa the crushing of a priest between two planks , and the crucifixion of u custom-house officer , by name Oouricl , by the soldiers of Sulim Puulm . But in February , at length Russia responded to the enemy's imprecations and insults b y patriotic songs , b y . . . - ^ 1 ALM

    ,, __„ _ £ l " ? " ¦' , / J (* V |^** ftM « MVMHVM « MUMH « yUW U MIUI * VJV «*** V ^\ A A ] 11 , 1 *\ A VV 1 AAVH wore all the more formidable from her ancient hatred of the oppressor of her Clvux-oh nnd faith . In Xtil'Z the K ; iistiian people know only ono enemy—Napoleon ; now it beholds two Wuatorn nations tho satellites of JNlahomct . in 1 & . 12 it had ' not all the consciousness of power ; id had not traversed the capitals of Eunope as a liberating army : now the consciousness of real strength and . of . its intellectual and moral development , in ox nl tod by tho presumption of invincible prowoas , and by tho holiness of the cause which it is ( summoned to dofVindi Without assorting that Russia is invincible , it is clear'tot any ono who'has studied the diameter of the Slave populations that it will take , ton years' successive disasters to shako tho confidence of Russia m her government sihd herself . Military glory is capable of great deeds :

    but the consciousness of duty and the confidence of faith , which are the basis of the moral character of the Russian army , inspire a more persevering courage than the prestige of glory : ' and when these feelings are temperedt % the religious convictions which novJ animate the Rtlssian army and people , we may well believe that army superior to all dangers . We once travelled in the East in company with a French colonel , a veteran of the grande armee . He had been a captaia at the battle of Krasnoie ; the most profound and affecting impression lie had preserved of that field was of one evening when the fire of the armies was slackening as if by a tacit consent of both parties ; he was at the outposts , at a very short distance from ' the enemy ; the calmness of the Russian soldiers , leaning on their muskets , and regarding the French with an apathetic bonhomie , struck the French with a superstitious terror . One can , understand the mot of Napoleon , that with such soldiers it is not enough to mow them with grapeshot , you must knock them down afterwards .

    The -present war assumes the character of a national -war ; the menaces of the alliedileets to the north and south of the empire stamp it with this character . isTot so the western nations ; they will onl y feel the war in taxes and "burdens ; the popular passions will subside ; is it sirpposed that one campaign will bring the contest to a close—that the destruction of the Russian fleets , and the bombardment of a few towns on the coast will reduce a government to sue for peace which feels itself invincible in the inexhaustible sympathies of agnation ? The Russian people asks : " What have we done to these men in the West that they should insult us and make war upon us ? They come among us to get rich , and our rich men go to spend their money among them ; we sell them wheat , and flax , and timber ; they send us nothing but finery . Forty years ago they laid waste our country , ' pillaged Our churches , profaned the tombs of our Czars : and when pur emperor , ¦¦ Alexander , ledus ; into their cities , we did not break a jia , ne of glass ; yet they . are attacking us again because our emperor has prevented the Turks from . persecuting the orthodox faith . " . ¦¦ " ¦¦

    Western Exairppe may spin subtle theories about the balance of power and the necessity of resti * aming the ambition of Russia , Jbnt they wiill be ; of little ayall against the simple natural feaspnipg of the Russian people ., It is only ' •' simplei ' . ideas thai ; can move the heart ; of a people : siibtle theories have onlybegotten sects and her ^ esies . jThis phantom of aggression has long , been invoked' ? tp rouse the Western peoples against Russia . Their good sense , we believe , will soon or late discover the hollpwness of the delusion . To England , indeed , conscious of her supremely factitious existenceji floating always in -the midst of fears—fear pf invasion , of emancipation of her colonies , of the renewal of the continental system—to England phantoms are realities .: Yet surely to her thefear- of Russia is a chimera ; Russia threatens neither her coasts nor her colonies ,, nor even her Indian possessions . :

    Russia is for ever accused of projects of aggrandisement . No . dpubfc when she first entered into the political system of , Europe she "bec . amethreatening to her neighbours . A young and vigorous nation entering upon civilisation created for herself wants which she could onlv satisfy by tv development proportionate tp the destiny assigned to her ; position 'between east and west . She milst have seas and harbours at north and soutt . The successors of Peter the iSreat faithfully fulfilled the task bequeathed to them by that colossal genius whose conceptions and previsions are still a eode , a political revelation for Russian statesmen . A century after his decease the conquests he marked out were accomplished ; but the material resources of

    his Empire remained to be worked out . The present successor of Peter closed the era of conquest , and devoted his energy to . the construction of those public works , canals , roads ^ railways , industrial and manufacturing establishments- whiclrwere to complete the conceptions of his ancestor . The most ridiculous calumnies have been published of late years ujpon the pretended hereditary policy of the Russian Emperors , and even aa apochryphal testament of Peter the Great has been fabricated for the purpose . These absurdities and mystifications prove at least that Europe believes in the perseverance of Russia in the accomplishment of the work which Peter the Great began .

    Just at the time when Russia's career of conquests was closed , and when that empire was no longer a menace , but a guarantee of the peace of Europe and the observance of treaties ; when all her attention was directed to internal and pacific developments , a retrospective and factitious alarm seizes upon the mind of the West , and fabulous projects of aggrandisement , never dreamt of at the time of the successive incorporation of the Crimea mid the , Caucasus , of Poland , Finland , and Bessarabia , are attributed to Russia . And tho multitude believe these fables . It is their privilege , But do you , statesmen' and serious politicians , do you credit them ? You do nod ; but you permit , you encourage these absurdities ; you stimulate and inflame theso fears of a distant enemy as a condition of your own security and impunity at home . You fear tho moral ascendant of Russia . To express our convictions with perfect frankness , wo believe your design to be reducible to the following formula : — England has succeeded in securing the cooperation of France for tho realisation of her own designs in the East against Russia . France hopes , in her turn , to secure tho co-operation of Russia

    and of Austria to vonliac hor plans in Goinnnny , and to complete what tho Kmperor of the French has always considered to bo his providential mission —tho restoration to tho empire of its natural frontiers . The idea is dazzling ; it is Napoleonic . f $ ut will all Germany'throw her weight into tho balance for a cause which is not hor own ? AVill sh . o compromise her destinies for tho advantage of tlio mercantile greed of England and the buflled and unsatod ambition of Franco ? Docs she not in « r . inctivelv per < ceiTC that tho " frontiers of tho Rhino 11 imply , soon or hitc , thoir inevitable complement , the Protectorate of tho confederation , tho Protoctornto ngain of the continental blockade and naval war which , with the aid of steam , will lnml tho French on tho English const Wo will not proceed further with this chain of deductions , which disnppoav boloro the , eternal principle of history , '' never to repeat ( l . ioff . A nutria and Prussui for having failed to " arrest those troubles nt thoir outset by an unequivocal policy , may he called upon to expiate fclioir fatal hesitations by defending tliu territory assigned to thorn in exchange Tor tho . ir honour * Will they do so ? For tho furtherance of thoir designs , Western statesmen ha-ve conspired with Gorman doawgoguea . Rusaui ' a natural solicitude in

    Untitled Article

    SapTisMBER 2 , 1854 . ] TH E tHADBft . 833

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 2, 1854, page 833, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2054/page/17/