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    of oor alliance that lasting and honourable peace for Turkey and for ourselves which we were unable to procure by the means of negotiation . Sir , in adverting to the present state of Europe , every one is naturally anxious to learn what part will be taken by Austria upon this subject . I have always maintained that , whatever might be the interest of England and France in defending and protecting Turkey that the interest of Austria is much greater . It is impossible to conceive tlie Emperor of Kussia succeeding in what must now be acknowledged to be his desire , and establishing an effective control , if not an acknowledged dominion , over the Principalities , and an increasing and predominant influence in Turkey , without his having complete command of the government of Austria . I cannot conceive that the independence of Austria would be maintained if Russia was

    to extend her power m the way in winch she now seeks to extend it ; bnt , sir , in order to consider this question , it is necessary also to bear in mind the difficulties which Austria must have ' to deal with now that , on more than one side , the Russian armies can approach at no great distance from her capital , and that it would have been imprudent in her to commit herself to arms against Kussia unless she had been fully prepared ; and that , with regard to two of the kingdoms subject to her sway , those kingdoms have been in very recent years so greatly disturbed as to make it more perilous to her to enter into hostilities than it would have been if no such danger had existed . It lias therefore been the policy of Austria , declaring that she concurred witli us in our object , to attempt , as long as possible , by negotiations to obtain a settlement of these questions . She has more than once declared that , although

    the principles that her Majesty has laid down , and the object that her Majesty liad in view met with her full approbation , she did not despair of the Emperor of Russia evacuating the Principalities and agreeing to fair and equal terms of arrangement , so as to maintain the balance of power in Europe ; and lately , she has sent a message' which has been published in the newspapers within these few days , asking Russia to evacuate the Principalities , asking her to fix a . term for that evacuation at no remote time , and transmitting also to St . Petersburg the protocol of April , agreed to at Vienna between the four powers , in which it is declared that it is the object of the four powers that Turkey should be attached to the system of Europe , that the empire should form part of the genet-al balance of power , and that arrangements ought to be carried into effect by the gejieral consent and concurrence of the powers of Europe , in order to obtain that settlement . "

    lie then referred to Russia ' s answers to Austria , characterising them as evasive , and as not adopting the indispensable basis to peace that the Sultan , be recognised as &n European sovereign * with all the rights of sovereignty over Ms own subjects . "We must endeavour ' to obtain , by the arms of those powers which are already engaged in war , such conditions as may be necessary for a just , an honourable , and a safe peace . ( Loud cheers . ') With regard to Austria , with regard to the part that she may take when she gives her answer , all I can say is this , that although she raight be mistaken as to her policy , although I think she has been mistaken in hot joining sooner and more frankly ¦ with the Western Powers in the endeavour to enrb the ambition of Kussia , yet 1 cannot believe that she will forfeit the engagements into which she has entered . She has now entered into engagements not only witli the Western Powers but with Turkey ; she has declared to the Western Powers that if the Principalities arc not evacuated by Russia , she will use forcible means in order to canse them to be

    evacuated . She has stipulated in a convention with the Sultan of Turkey that she will endeavour to secure the evacuation of the Principalities by negotiation , but if those should fail by other means , and that sho will be ready to furnish the number of troops necessary for that purpose . I conceive that by this declaration and by these engagements Austria will bu bound to take part in the attempt to drive back Kussia , from the unjust aggression which she has made . Whether she may , with that hesitation which lias been unfortunately p rotracted too long—( loud cfteers )—attempt ngdin to obtain from St . Petersburg some better and some moro satisfactorj assurance , I urn unable to say . Wo have no control , of course , over the councils of the Emperor of Austria . With regard to the policy of Austria , as I have said , I have no doubt ; neither nuvo 1 any doubt that she will honourably fulfil her engagements . Uut with diilicult circumstiincossurrounding her—with but half support from the kingdom of Prussia—she may consider it necessary to obtain a favourable answer from tit . Petersburg . "

    Warming with , these cheers , Lord John plunged , into indiscretions , and begun to define the peace he ¦ w ould he satisfied with ;—being continuously cheered , and . by both sides : — ' I say , with such a proapoct in the past stato of affairs , wo ought to ondoavour to ' obtain ncbuntifs against tho nggveseionfl essontiul to it . I hold that ; it its impossible- that the nrrangemont which was made by tho trc .-ity of Adrinnoplo with regard to tho rrineiprilitu's should bu cigaiu assented to—an nrrangemont which givos to tho Emporor of ltuuniu upon tho merest protonco tho power of assuming tho possession of tho two proviiicoH of JMokluvin and Wnlliiohm ; which givos him tho power of occupying with mi unued foreo two pvovincos containing 4 , 000 , 005 ol inhiihitmits mid 1 Bay Hint underhuou

    ciroumstniioos it ia impossible that tho integrity of lurkoy , or tho Imlnnuo of power in Euivpo , can bo ticcurcil Uy reverting to Uioho Uontii'H , or moroly roatflrinp ; tho status . quo ante . ( Cheers . ) But tliuro in another mode , in which tlio Position of UuBuin ) m « boon and ia nwnudni' tho iiulo-Iionaonco ol TuiUey , « nd tho iutoRi-ily of Kuivpo . Tho ohtHl j Iishinout of ii croat forlrouH , propm-oil with nil tho oonil . i . imllon o ¦ m-fc , uiudo a « improgiinlilo n » It is pusMblo for nil t . > elf li ? ? ! ' m *? "taillill (? within i ( H portli very lurtfo llocl oi hiio-ol-battlo Mlilpa really at any timo to cmni down with 1 T ^ l I " " to t »>« BoHphoruH , plaom IWlu in a ponl lif ! T " ««^» In Iymt .. mdnK to Turkey , ^ Ll , l « n n , n Sr U'y " ^ r ™ 00 lll ( 1 l ) 0 ^ x ^ larod Ju Tt tuli T . - n V' ° r Ol UllMHil 1 iu tllQ S 1 > ino moimclng altitude , lhnt m tho great project , tho exiting tvoiiUoa .

    I have thought it right to state , not particularly , but generally , the views of the Government with respect to the securities we ought to obtain , but what those special securities will be , in what manner they will be signed , or on what terms they should be framed , is not a subject that I can go further into than I have already done . I believe we shall be ready , as we have been ready , to communicate with the Government of fiance upon the subject . I have now reason to believe that the views of the Government of the Emperoi of France coincide with our own upon the subject . We shall be ready also to communicate with the Government of Austria when they wish to know our opinions with regard to such a settlement of the war as in our opinion would be alone

    secure , honourable , and just ; but I must say , and I say it with regret , that I see no symptom of the Emperor of Russia being at present disposed to grant such conditions as I have hinted at , or to give securities such as I have said are desirable for securing the integrity of Turkey and the independence of Europe . I cannot say that he is a £ all disposed to depart in any respect from those demands which were made by Princ * Menchikoff , and which aimed at subjugation , this is the great acquisition that Russia has steadily kept in view , and from the time of the Empress Catharine down to the present moment , she has pursued the same course to attain her object . "

    He added a phrase about " material guarantees " being required for the future . Appealing again to the House to present a " unanimous" front to Europe , he referred to the question of the " autumnal recess . " He admitted Mr . Disraeli ' s right to do as he had done—suggest such a thing ; but the House must not be allowed , to pass any resolution , to that effect . Her Majesty ' s advisers could not consent to shackle themselves by any pledge as to what they ¦ would advise : summoning ; Parliament being her Majesty ' s prerogative . He sat down , amid general cheering , greatly complacent .

    . Nobody of importance now rising , Mr . Aixsock presented himself ; and Mr . Aleock , though a very able man , not being a Parliamentary personage , the House emptied . Mr . Alcock did not speak long ; he was dissatisfied with tfce slow movements of our fleets and armies , and recommended an early coup on the Crimea . Mr . Bankes , a Tory squire , urged an autumnal session . He hoped there would be no subsidy to Austria . ( Cheers . ' ) Mr . Hume , intensely Ministerial , praised everything , said nothing about an autumnal session , and only hinted at his conscientious objection to subsidies .

    Mr . Blackett was delighted with -what Lord John had said about Sebastopol . For the future , he hoped there would be less diplomacy and more war . He did not desire , the Austrian alliance ; and he feared that Austria meant to have the Principalities for herself . He also looked with suspicion on an alliance which might lead indirectly to England becoming a party to the oppression of " nationalities" crushed under the leaden sceptre of "Vienna . Mr . Cobcen , who re-collected a full House , commenced by a sneer at Lord John ' s sketch of a campaign , and At that attempt to turn the House of Commons into a council of war . The House had one advantage in that position ; the real power of Kussia ( in attack ) "was now ascertained , and he reminded the House of tlie vituperation and ridicule

    to which lie had been exposed tor speaking contemptuously of Russian strength . Had he not predicted rightly that Kussia could effect nothing without a loan ? In fact , her vast territory , over which she had to march armies , was the source of her weakness —that is , of her poverty . But Kussia was as bad to attack as incapable herself of attacking , and ho did not sec what material guarantees could be got from her . Were tho allied armies to attempt to march over Russian plains ? Tho Crimea presented a fatal climate to . Europeans ; the Crimea , therefore , could not be occupied ; more especisUly as tho population hated the Turks . Besides , had not the German Powers stipulated that if they joined us there should be no attempt to diminish Kussian territory : how , then , could wo take material guarantees , and yet hopo fox tho German alliancesP 11

    Ho then demanded consideration for tho Greek Christians in Turkey ; for while admitting that tho Greek monuvohy was a mistake , ho contended that tho Greek race had worked most mniu'kiilly in tho cause of progress and civilisation . Ho complained that Franco nnd England had taken every measure to put down tho Greek insurrection , whilo they had made nlodgcs and promises in fivvo \ ir of tho Christians in Turkey . Tho timo would conio when tho rights of tlicso men , who constituted three-fourths of tho population , nnd tho progressive ) nnd comrncrtful part , must bo accorded . It would bo ngi'cut blunder to alionato thnt class of tho population from ourselves , but wo had placed ouraolvoa in antagonism with tlumi by our conduct in regard to tho insurrection . llu thon xidiuulod tho -viowd of thoso who rujjardvd thin war as carried on for tho intorcbts of tho Ituliun ami Hungarian nationalities , and advorlud to tho doluaion that Lord I '^ hnerston , to whom many looked as tho individual to irlioin thu w « r Nliuuld bo ooiilidod , lmd dono anything for Huult nationalities . " And liov would tlio people of England endure a war which was not for freedom , but merely for tho Wuhan ' s sovereignty—which roprosontcu , in tho case of tlio Christians , tho oppression of nationalities ? Lord John , ho said , had taken tho plunge that night ; but if ho had spoken for tho Cubinot , ho had said too much to louve tho Uovornnient a clmnco oi' intornul pcftoe .

    Mr . Latabd was satisfied , to some extent , with . Lord John ' s declarations ; but he would like mote definite information as to how this money was to be applied . "What Lord John said -was different from , what Lord Aberdeen had said : and the House ought to make conditions . Lord D . Stuart -was decidedly in favour of an autumnal session , —and of Lord Palmerston . Lord John ' s was a " noble speech ; " and Lord John ought to be Premier . Mr . Disbaeli then rose , and did the most dexterous thing in parliamentary annals : made Lord John , destroy the effect of Lord John ' s own speech ! The speech , and the scene , are thus admirably summarised in the Morning Chronicle : —

    " He ( Mr . Disraeli ) said that he had been listening for nearly six hours to strictures upon the Government by its principal supporters . He had not thought his own suggestions for an earlier sitting than usual an unreasonable one , and he supported his view by a reference to the proceedings of last autumn . Had Parliament been sitting a short time before the massacre of Sinope , in all probability the fleet would have been ordered into the Black Sea in time to have prevented that catastrophe . He considered that that night had been pregnant with important declarations on the part of Government . They had heard at last a distinct announcement of the object of the ¦ war . He adhered to his previous opinion , that the

    war had been caused by the discordant elements of the Government , but he had never interfered with the conduct of the war itself . He had heard with consternation the statement made that night of the united resolution of the Cabinet . He proceeded to state what lie had understood Lord John Russell to say ; and , on Mr . Disraeli ' s coming to the destruction of Sebastopol , considerable sensation was caused by Lord John Kussell ' s rising and explaining that he had only meant that Russia ought not to be permitted to keep so large a naval force in the Black Sea . Then ( exclaimed Mr . Disraeli ) for six hours we all have been in a fool ' s paradise . He dwelt for some time upon the ! difference between what

    Lord John llussell had been understood to say ( from which consolation had been derived for the language used in another place ) and what he declared himself to have said . He had not thought the speech , as he had understood it , the most prudent in the world , but he lmd regarded it as an authoritative declaration on the part of the Ministry , and it had been received as satisfactory , and more than satisfactory , by all the supporters of Government . After six : hours it turned out that this statement was illusory , and now he had a right to demand of the noble lord what was his policy , if he had one . Nothing so extraordinary as this had ever taken place in his parliamentary experience . After enlarging upon this theme , and showing how Lord John's supposed declaration had formed a basis for the arguments they had heard , especially those urged by Mr . Cobden as

    to the German Powers being opposed to the depriving Kussia of territory , he ironically took credit to himself for having prevented terrible misconceptions by his mistake , which had elicited from the Lord President the explanation that no new policy was being pursued , but merely the old one which had been , adopted-all along . All he apprehended was , that the telegraph might already have taken the supposed announcement to St . Petersburg . Honourable gentlemen who had drawn such painful distinctions between tho policy of Lord Aberdeen and of some of his colleagues , would act unfairly if after what had passed tlicy continued to do so , as it was now clear that there was no difference between the policy of Lord Aberdeen and that of Lord John Russell . It was a consolation to know that tho Cabinet , though a coalition , was united in the intention to pursue the war fcobly to a mean termination . "

    Lord Palmerston attempted a reply ; but Mr . Disraeli had bewildered the Ministerialists , and Lord Palmerston was not successful . Lord John had said , in effect , that Sobastopol was to bo destroyed ; and Lord Palmerston refused to back out of that hint , stating thnt Lord John spoko for all his colleagues—which tho House didn't believe—and was , at any rate , of opinion that Lord John had hlundered . As to tho German alliances , whilo Franco and England acted together , ho did not care who stood aloof . ( Cheers . ) Tho question of a prorogation must be loft to tho Government ' s discretion . Thon commenced tlio confusion , which loft Lord John in a pitiablo position , having to give up anoLhor night to an explanation of what Monday night had meant .

    Lord D . STii . vnT said that as Lord J . Russell had mado a retractation of what ho hailaaid , and as Lord Aberdeen was reported to have nindo n speech nearly diftinotrioally opposite to that of Lord J . RubscII , the llouso ought to have timo to obtain further information , lie moved that progress bo reported . Lord J . ItuHHHi . i . Jonied that lio had rotracted anything ! and after soino explanation profossod hie inability to sco why tlio voto should not bo docir ded on . Mr . IIicnlky concurred in tho view that Lord J . Russell had iioeiuontiilly lod tho lloaao into a material mistake .

    Untitled Article

    July 29 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 699

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), July 29, 1854, page 699, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2049/page/3/