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    but , instead of exacting anything like territorial indemnity , she at once pressed for additional privileges , and if she had obtained those additional privileges for her co-religionists in the Turkish empire , I have no douDt that the invasion of the Principalities would never have taken place , or would immediately have ceased on the Sultan complying with her demands . But of course we felt—Europe fVlt—that the independence of Turkey would be as much endangered by the cession of such rights and privileges as were churned by Russia as it would have been had sne made a positive demand for territorial indemnity ; and therefore it was that the pretensions of Kussia were resisted . " . Now , my lords , I have been supposed to say also that I desired , or did not object , to a return to the treaty of Adrianople , because I stated that if we could obtain a peace which should last for twenty-five years we should not do

    amiss . ( llear . ) Nor should we ; but when I said that I never forr a moment meant to convey the impression which it seems my words have produced . I never said a , word to imply that I desired to return to the treaty of Adrianople . What I said , or intended to say , was , that the treaty of Adrianople has given us peace for twentylive years , and that it by , any treaty which the fortune of war might enable us to make , we should secure peace for nn equal length of time , we should not , considering the instability of all human affairs , do so very far amiss . Therefore , my lords , I am quite at a loss to conceive upon what ground any one should dare to say , first , that I have claimed the honour of making the treaty of Adrianople , and , next , that I approved of or was indifferent to its conditions , and ¦ was ready to renew it without reference to the present posture of affairs . I have explained to your lordships how it

    came that I insisted the other evening upon the limited ex ^ tent of the territorial acquisitions which Kussia has made in consequence of the treaty of Adrianojple . My statement upon that point is perfectly true ; It is incbntroverTible j but it was intended to be qualified in the manner which 1 have now stated to your lordships . I feel , therefore , that 1 have nothing further to say of the treaty of Adrianople . " It has also been said that I recommended a return to the status quo , or , at least , that I would not object to it . Now , my lords , this statement surprises me more than anything , because 1 thought I had taken special care to explain that point in my answer to the observations of my noble and learned friend . I stated that that might be the canse of some apparently ambiguous expressions used by Austria and by Prussia , as compared with the expressions used by ourselves , and I said that Austria and Prussia might be desirous

    to restore the status quo ; but , at the same time , I made the specific declaration tliat that was by no means applicable to us—that is , to England and France . You are aware , my lords , that before the declaration of war the status quo was all that we hoped for—all that we desired—all that we attempted to obtain , and that was the condition which the Turkish Government signified its willingness to agree to . The treaty of Vienna was framed upon the understanding agreed to by all the four powers , that the relations between Kussia and Turkey should revert to the status qtto . We thought that was quito as much as the Emperor of liussia could expect us to offer , and much more than ho liad any right to expect . Bat , my lords , we proposed that in the hope that we should be able to preserve the state , of peace , and that we should be able to avert our entering upon a course where all the evil passions that war engenders would

    be let loose . But the instant that war was declared , the state of the question was entirely nltered . { Loud cheers . } From that moment everything deponded upon the war itself , and we are left free to exorcise our own judgment—to do tlmt which we thintwill best suit our own interests and policy in framing the terms of peace . From that moment the- status quo was entirely at an ond . ( Cheers . } Very well . I also said , as to the terms of peace , that liowever desirable , however necessary we might think certain terms to be , still it would be unwise iu us now , in the present state of the war , to lay down any conditions of peace as those to which alono we will accede . These must depend -upon the events of the war ; and in tho debate to which 1 have already referred I recollect I did say that tho conditions of poace would bo very different if we found the itussinns at Constantinople from what they would be if wo found

    our-Bolves at St . Petersburg . Well , my lords , within these ' points lies the whole acopo of the variance from the status quo . How far wo may deviate froin tho status quo no man ' can at this moment say , becauso that must depend upon ' events which are not within our power absolutely to control . ; 13 ut . this we enn say , that tho independence and integrity of Turkey aro undoubted conditions—they constitute the siim qua non—that must bo secured , und secured cf tictuttlly . ' { Chews . ) But liow this is to bo done must again depend upon the progress of events , in tho course of t io negotiations which may tako place at tho moment . But that ( security ' must bo taken—security for tho independence and integrity of Turkey , so fur as depends upon Russia , ik reully tho object from which wo uro determined not to ilopkrt . ( Cheers . ) But again , I say , how that i » to bo / obtiun / l neither 1 nor uny man in this IIouso is ablo to suy . Wo know what our is

    ooject —our main object at leutit—and of com bo by one mode or another wo will obtain that without which peace is impossible . " I think , also , pxcoption has been tnkon to some expressions of mine , us if 1 expressed duubt or dwboliof ofuny danger from Hussinu tigga-emon . Now , I wish hero to miv that 1 havo tho tm > atoMt ulunn as to UtiHHmn utfgrcs . ijori ugttmst Turkey , lint ngninttt tlint aggression in any hlmpo —whether in tho shape of influence , whether in tho tjhnpo ot conquest , or in uny othur ntodo —\ v « uro prepared t « protect her . But , with reaped to JUu «» ijm nggiWuion upon uwope , indopondout of her designs upon Turkey , I certainly ( UU express no great alarm , beoauho 1 foci no Ki-euL ul . irm , I ? V " ™ . cliuul' t 0 focl lcliH lllld It- *™ ovory day . ( L < in

    France to be more powerful than Russia and Austria put together , and it is , therefore , impossible for me to look upon Russia with any great alarm out of her own frontiers , or in such a light as would induce me to think that it would be better , to enter at once into a state of war in order to repress dangers which I do not feel . Danger from Russia against Europe appears to me mainly , if not entirelv , to depend upon her power in Turkey and in the East . If ' that power be checked—and it is to be hoped that we shall succeed in keeping her entirely free from exciting further alarm in the Turkish territories—then I cannot possibly think that there need be any very great alarm as to what she may do to Austria , or Prussia , or Prance , or England . ( Cheers . ) This , however much it has been misunderstood , was really all that I meant to express as to my general incredulity of any danger from Russian aggression . I have now shown

    your lordships what sort , of aggression it is that I am afraid of , and what sort of aggression it is that I am not afraid of . I am not a-ware that there is any other part of the observations which I addressed to your lordships the other night which requires further explanation . I believe I have already explained everything which , from being misunderstood at the time , appeared to be calculated to excite feelings of distrust in the Government . " My lords , I wish I could eonfine myself to this explanation ; to the full expression of the sentiments I entertain , and which appeared to me necessary to be explained . I could have wished certainly that I might have been spared the necessity of saying anything about the extraordinary and absurd imputations—the personal imputations—to which I have been exposed . ( Loud cheers . ') I have no fear that your lordships , who are accustomed to weigh the actions and the sentiments of public men , will fail to comprehend the motives from which I have acted ; and the misrepresentation of them has been so ludicrously absurd that I

    feel—indignant as I am—I feel it would not be worthy of the position which I now occupy—it would not be worthy of the memory of those with whom I have acted—it would not be worthy of my own character , if I were to condescend to enter upon any justification of my personal motives . ( Loud clie&rs . My lords , it is true that I have more than any other man struggled to preserve the state of peace for this country . I have done so because I thought it my duty to the people of this country- ^ -my duty to God and man—to exhaust every possible means of preserving peace , and my only regret is—though 1 trust your lordships will acquit me on that point-rr-my only regret is , that I should not have done all , and lest in any way I should have lost some possible means of averting the greatest calamity that can befal a country , for , however glorious any wat may be * the calamities which accompany it are heavy enough greatly to outweigh that glory . I know it has been said if you love peace so much , you are unfit for war . My lords , though peace is so dear to my feelings , Still I am onnyinoP'l of tho nowssity of tW « war But how do I wish to make war ? I wish to make war in

    order to obtain a peace ; and I know well that the best mode of making war in order speedily to obtain a peace is to make war with the utmost vigour and determination . ( Loud cheers ) . My noble friends near me know well enough that , peaceable as I am , I have never shrunk— . that , on the contrary , I have given my most ready concurrence to the most active measures of hostility and warlike preparations . Nay , more , I believe I may say they will admit that I have personally been more urgent than perhaps any other man in exhorting the speedy concentration and advance of the allied forces north of the Balkan in support of the gallant army of Omer Pacha , and to extend a helping hand to Austria in order to enable her to carry out her professions . ( Cheers ) . This , except for the warmth of the feelings under which I spoke , I ought not , perhaps , to say ; but it is the truth that , in the course we have taken I have

    " He had a very impartial witness to the effect of that speech—he meant a brief telegraphic report of it which had appeared in a paper which had probably the greatest circulation of any on the continent—LTnclependance Beige . Mark the position which we were in . The noble earl had justified a great deal of the delay , languor , tardiness , apparent vast-illation , and hesitation in the whole course of our proceedings on the ground of his wanting to carry with him the Governments of the continent , especially of the German Powers . Then here was a paper published on the borders of Germany , with an immense circulation over the whole of Germany , and what " was the statement in that paper ? The gentleman who reported for it endeavoured to exercise a very w ¦ ¦ * i m—

    impartial judgment , and in his telegraphic despatch , which gave a very few lines of each speech , that of the noble earl was thus reported— ' Earl of Aberdeen a essaye Justifier- la conduite de la Russie et a plaide la cause de la paix . ' That was the view of the speech which he ventured to say was entertained over the whole of the continent ; and he asked , was it a matter of no importance that those opinions should go forth , even thongn the noble earl was not suppor ted in them by his colleagues ? He thought , for a short summary , that that gave fairly the tenour of the noble earl ' s speech , for he thought that the noble earl had justified the Emperor in some acts which he had adopted , and had pleaded very strongly in favour of peace . "

    Lord Clanricarde attacked the Government for the delay in the preparations for war , and imputed it to Lord Aberdeen ; he criticised the appointment of the Duke of Newcastle as War Minister , and declared in favour of Lord Palmers ton . Making a general attack on the Government , he remarked upon the number , 330 , with -which they came into power , the great increase , 400 , during last session , and the striking fact that this session they cannot carry their measures . " Was the reason for this state of things that there was any want of ability in the members of the Government who sat in the other House ! He need hardly say anything with regard to the reputation , the ability , and character of Lord John Russell , a statesman respected by ah ! men , followed by many , than whom no one possessed greater practical Parliamentary experience . Was he unaided upon the bench on

    which he sat ? He had upon the one side Lord Palmerston , indisputably the most popular man with the country in either House of Parliament , and on the other side Mr . Gladstone , a most accomplished . debater , undoubtedly the most acute logician in either House , whose power of reasoning was almost capable of proving that black was white . The Government consisted of a combination of men eminent for administrative capacity , who were at the head of a great party , and'who , besides that party , were supported by a great number or omer , aumm ^ u T .-v , » ifiSS attached friends . How came it , then , that they were in the precni ^ n ^ .,, * . u jj a < j described , for no one could deny that they had been deieatea day after day , and obliged to withdraw measures they had proposed , so that , practically , tlie servants of the Crown could not carry on the business which they thought it desirable to carry on ? He attributed it to the First Lord of the Treasury . " ( Cheers ami laughter . )

    Neither the Parliament nor the country has any confidence in Lord Aberdeen ; and Lord Clanricarde , were it nofc for the humble position he occupies , would propose a vote of want of confidence I Lord Beaumont admired the moral courage with which Lord Aberdeen had put himself in what some would call a humiliating position , in order that he might explain a speech . Certainly it had removed some suspicions , but was not quite satisfactory . IjOrd Beaumont then inquired whether a paragraph published in tho Press—a journal representing Lord Derby in the press—was accurate .

    ! invariably urged the most decided course of action . ( Loud cheers . ) My lords , 1 havo now no more to say . I wish to confine myself to this subject without entering upon other topics more or less connected with the war—with the events that led to it , or that may follow from it—I wish to remove understandings which I feel to be perfectly erroneous interpretations of what I said , and I now declare that so far from my former endeavours to preserve peace disqualifying me from winy ing on tho war , I think , though of course 1 may bo wrong in the pnrticulnr means , I think wo ought to have recourse to the most expedient , the most prompt , the most successful means of carrying it on . ( Cheers ) . I maintain , and assert , that my very lovo of pcaco induces mo now tc enter upon this war , which I unquestionably buliov ^ to be a perfectly Just war , and therefore it is tlutt I—so long as 1 havo anything to do with the Government—shall unquestionably carry it on in such a manner as will be most likely to secure benefit to England , and to establish a safe and

    ho" His Highness Prince Mcttcrnich , at tho special and personal request » f his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria , has embodied in a State paper his view of tho arrangements which , in the prosent condition of affairs , may conduce to a just and honourable peace . ' We havo reason to believe that theso views havo boen communicated , although , not officially , to tho Earl of Aberdeen ; and that little doubt prevails , from previous communications that have taken place , that they will be substantially adopted by tho English . Minister . " Lord Abeiipe-en ' s reply was characteristic . " Tho noble lord has addressed a question to mo which I am perfectly ready to answer , and I hope to bo ablo to answer satisfactorily . I observed the paragraph in tho paper which . ho has quoted , auid I admired , its ingenuity , because , my former acquaintance and friendship with Prince MottomicU hnving been known , it was a very good notion to throw out tho idea that I was engaged in negotiations with him in tho

    nourablo pence . " ( J ^ oud and continu , ed cheers . ") Tho Marquis of Claniuoa . iu > b described the speech of Lord Aberd ee n as n , " retructation , " and was saluted -with cries of " No . " He repeated the descriptive word , and the dissentient murmurs were renewed . Then he wont on to make a general onslaught upon the foreign policy of Lord Aberdeen , It was all very well t o write a despatch iu December , when tlie treaty was signed in September , 1820 . What hud Lord Aberdeen dono to prevent tho signing of tho treaty ? Why , when tho " disastrous " treaty was proposed , the Minister of Turkey asked Knglnud mid France , and Austria , and Prussia what ho had hotter do , and they said sign . Lord Aberdeen has boon " tho most constant , tho most zealous , th « most powerful , " supporter of arbitrary government . On every possible occasion ho haa opposed tho recognition of rcformo in tho countries with whiuh he hud to deal . Was ho not tho

    maineenso which wns endeavoured to bo implied-by the writer of that article . Therefore I thought it very ingenious , But 1 can only say this : that what tlie Emperor of Austria , may have dono in consulting an old nnd valued- servant , and I hope lie may Imvo consulted lain , but whether ho has or not , I am perfectly ignorant . My noblo and loornod friend- ¦ mentioned Prince Metternich tho other night with praise , nud I took up tho muno strain . I have soon it reported in aomo pnpor , tlmt tho Einpcn > r wns about to " tako tho advice of . Prince Mottcrnioh , and that ho has dono so tho paragraph , itljndml to \ fi , I hope , in that part correct . Whether it bo so or not I ennnot any . All 1 know it ) , an far as I nm concerned , Uicro in jnat tho huiuo amount of truth in it aa in all tho . » th »* — iinputnUuna against mo , which 1 Imvo tlie happinowKi ^ aeoJhfe , < Ir \ y after day—naanclj , not nningle ttyllublu . J Cftcp& . y ^ . ft » o Imnpuim tlutt aiiic-o 1 havo been in ofiicoy ^ twrt ^ atn-w ^ . * formerly was will * IVinco JWuttmndi , luaith ^ d ^ mft ^ W ! indirectly Imvo I had any coiiHiiuuicfttiou witlr h ||) a pj ^ f . ' Inat your and a lialf until u / W duya ugo , whcSUn Biajj'faoft * . of mino told mo hIjo wuh writing to Pruico RM ! fv'W \ $ rS * suid , ' Pray muko my boat remembrances to m ™ >' r ' V « W ^^ ' , audlnuylttcr . ) {*» v t ; ,.. '( l U . p 1 Lord Buoijciiiju * declared that Lord i ^ bcMcep . l « tqi

    stay ol Dom Miguel ? Did ho not continually find fault -with the Quiulruplo Treaty ? Did ho not stigmatise the gallant revolution of Belgium as " tho most saiiRolcBs and unintelligible recorded in history ? " Lord Aberdeen did not tho other night reply to tlio luminous speech of Lord Lyndhurst , but to that of the Foreign Secretary . What was its ctflict abroad ?

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    July 1 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . tfO 3 ^ t ^ am ^ n ^^^ mBOKX ^ c ^^^ Knmu ^^ K ^ a ^^ t ^ m ^ aa ^^^ BBB ^ am ^^^ mmmmaa ^^ sK ^^

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), July 1, 1854, page 603, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2045/page/3/