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    helping him forward on his road towards this aim . Such a guide the English writer at the present day will nowhere find . " Shakspeare he considers a dangerpus model ( but indeed all models are dangerous to minds that " copy" them ) , and lie prefers the Greeks . If his counsel be rightly interpreted , it will be useful to that large class of Amateurs who write verse but who are not " born Singers ; " but , if rieidly interpreted , it will lead the despairing classicists to exclaim with ¦

    Charles Lamb , " Hang the critics , I'll write for antiquity !" Our own belief is , that schools of poetry are the changing fashions of one eternal spirit ; and that good poetry is everywhere the same in its essential conditions , everywhere fluctuating with the fluctuating modes of thought and language . Purther our belief is , that all conscious imitation is weakness , andthat " models" produce no real good , though little harm , because the servile mind is one which if emancipated would not be strong . To study models with a view to emulate them is not the same as to study them with a view to imitatethem ; the one is an invigorating—the other an enervating study . We have tarried so long over Mr . Arnold ' s preface that we must defer till next week all attempt to characterise his poems .

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    THE GUtOUJSTDS OF BELIEF . Westminster Review . New Series . No . VIII . October , 1853 . AH . VIL The Universal Postulate . John Chapman . Accobdxng to promise we return to this number of the Westminster Meview , for the purpose of considering a little more nearly the very remarkable article with the very unpromising title of The Universal Postulate . It is an inquiry into the grounds of our belief in an external world ; an endeavour to reconcile Philosophy with Common Sense , not as Reid did by the incessant assertion that Common Sense was right , but by a profound elucidation of the psychological process through which it ana all other beliefs are possible and valid . There is so much compact matter in this article that any attempt to reproduce it in the extremely abridged form necessary in a iournal like ours , runs the risk of being

    unreadably abstract , or else of doing the argument injustice by omissions . Let us urge the student , therefore , to read the article itself with severe attention , taking our notice as a sort of fingerpost . Every logical act of the intellect is the assertion that something is . This is what we call belief . Each major premiss is a belief ; each minor premiss a belief ; each conclusion a belief . An argument is . a series of dependent beliefs . Belief , then , is the ultimate psychological fact which we can never transcend . But it appears that there are beliefs of two kinds- —some of them irresistible , indestructible ; others doubtful , untrustworthy . What is the sign by which we distinguish them P How are we to settle , beyond cavil , the beliefs which are trustworthy , irresistible , true ? The sign is their invaviableness , in other words , the inconceivableness of the contrary : —

    " If we assign as a reason for any belief the belief on which it rests , and then assign for that belief an anterior one , and so on continuously , it is clear that we must eventually come to the end of the series—must arrive at some primordial belief of which no proof can be given . This remains true , whatever theory we hold respectingthe origin of our knowledge . For if we say that all knowledge is organized experience , and that , in assigning one belief in proof of another , we are simply assigning a wider experience in proof of a narrower , it is clear that we cannot continue to assign wider and wider experiences in proof of each other , without arriving finally at the widest . As our experience had a beginning , it follows that ,

    in tracing it backwards , we must ultimately come to our first or deepest experience —an experience which has no other to rest upon . Similarly with the hypothesis of fundamental ideas . An analytical . examination of beliefs must eventually bring us down to these ; and for these the hypothesis itself implies that no reason is assignable . Hence , whether our lowest beliefs be innate , or derived from experience , it is equally clear that , as they do not admit of proof , we can but say that they invariably exist . And whilst this fact of their invariable existence is alone our warrant for thorn , it at the samo time expresses the necessity we are under of holding them .

    " It results , then , from all that hag been said , —first , that the existence of beliefs is the fundamental fact ; and second , that beliefs which invariably exist are those which , both rationally and of necessity , we must adopt . "

    The writer then criticisos Whowell and Mill on "Necessary Truths , " and after landing on the position that tho best warrant wo can have for the belief in anything is tho porfect agreement of all pre-existing experience in support of it , he deduces the logical conclusion that the " inconceivablenoss of its negation" is tho truest test any belief admits of : — "If all our knowledge ia derived from experience , then our notions of possible * nd impossible aro derived from experience . Possible means—not at varianco with our experience ; impossible means—wholly at varianco with our experience . Clearly , unless we possess fundamental ideas , or can gain a knowledge of things ] themselves , no logical process can give to tho notion , impossible , any larger meaning than this . But if , at any tima , tho inability of men to concoivo tho negation of a given proposition ( simply proves that their oxperionco up to that

    tune , has , -without oxcoption , confirmed such proposition ; then , when they assort that its untruth is impossible , they really assort no moro than when they assort that its nogation is inconceivable . If , subsequently , it turn out that tho propositio n iff untrue ; and if it bo , therefore , argued that men should not havo hold its Untruth impossible because inconceivable , wo reply , that to nay this is to condemn t'Hi use of the word impossible altogether . If tho inconceivability of a thing bo < <> iiNi ( loml insufficient warrant for averting it . "> impossibility , it is implied that there can exist a sufficient warrant ; but such warrant , whatever its kind , must ' >«! originally dorivod from experience ; and if further experience ' may invalidate ' ? warrant of inooneeivablenosM , further experience nray invalidate any warrant '" i which we assert impoHsib'dity . Therefore , we should call nothing'impossible . " - In favour of Uiirt tout , it , in urged : —

    ' What in the object of any Much test' ' . To insure a correspondence botwoon " '»|« etive beliefs and objective facts . Well , objective facto aro ever impressing . ' UllllH < lves upon us ; our experience is a register of the . se objective facts ; and tho K'lMuuuvablonoMN of a thing- implies thai , it i « wholly at varianoo with the register . ' Kven wero thin all , it in not clear how , if every truth iH primarily inductive , , "I- hotter test of truth could exist . But it must be remembered , " that whilst ' . 'y ° ' these fjiots , impressing thonuiolvos upon uh hio occasional ; whilst others j ' im " U ° V "' - tf " lol : i ' ' ? Homo ^ am miiveiml and unchanging . These univernal u | uuchnitg ing' facts an * , by the hypothesis , certain to establish beliefs , of which

    the negations are inconceivable ; whilst the others are not certain to do this -and if they do , subsequent facts will reverse their action . " - It seems to us that the obscurity of this question may be somewhat enlightened if we present it under another aspect , and in lieu of considerlnoobjects as matters of Belief consider them , as matters of Experience ! Belief is experience ; experience of a sensation is belief in a sensation ; to have a sensation and to believe it , are not two processes but one . It is clear , therefore , that the invariableness of our experience is another phrase for the invariableness of our belief ; and the so-called " Necessary Truths " rest on a basis as wide , but no wider , than that on which particular truths rest . When we say , " This apple is sweet , " we say our experience of this apple is that it is sweet : when we say , " Two parallel linescan never meet , " we say our experience of two lines in parallel is that that

    cannot meet without ceasing to be parallel . That " fire burns , " . that "the whole is greater than a part , " are two beliefs—two forms of our experience . Now , as we only know through our experience , and cannot transcend our experience , the distinction between invariable and variable truths is the distinction between invariable and variable experiences . We do not believe all apples to be sweet , becauseour experience of apples is that some are not sweet , but the child who had never tasted apples other than sweet would believe as firmly in the essential sweetness of apples as in the truth of a whole being greater than its part . Thus it is with Pain—or any other sensation . We cannot disbelieve in its existence so long as it exists ; no effort of the mind to conceive its negation will negative it ; we believe—we experience it . In like manner the ever present reality of objects cannot be disbelieved j we cannot doubt the pain while it lasts , and the sensation of an external world is always lasting . From this we return to our author : —

    '' Dismissing , however , all psychological explanations , which are allowable here only as being needed to meet a psychological objection , and returning to the purely abstract view of the matter , we see—first , that belief is fundamental , and that the invariable existence of a belief is our highest warrant for it ; second , that we can ascertain the invariable existence of a belief only as we ascertain the invariable existence of anything else , by observing whether , under any circumstances , it is absent from the place in which it occurs ; third , that the effort to conceive the negation of a belief is , the looking in the place in which it occurs ( viz ., after its antecedents ) , and observing whether there are any occasions on which it is absent , or can be made absent ; and fourth , that when we fail to find such

    occasions—when we perceive that the negation of the belief is inconceivable—we have all possible warrant for asserting- the invariability of its existence ; and in asserting this , we express alike our logical justification of it , and the inexorable necessity we are under of holding- it . Mean what we may by the word truth , we have no choice but to hold that a belief ' which is proved by the hiconceivableness of its negation , to invariably exist , is true . We have seen that this is the assumption on which every conclusion whatever ultimately rests . We have no other guarantee for the reality of consciousness , of sensations , of personal existence ; we have no other guarantee for any axiom ; we have no other guarantee for any step in a demonstration . Hence , as being taken for granted in every act of the understanding , it must be regarded as the Universal Postulate . "

    He anticipates an objection : Beliefs which once were shown by the inconceivableness of their negation to invariably exist , havo since been proved untrue ; and our present beliefs may one day share the same fate . Our answer is—the beliefs were true ; they represented the experience of mankind , which was the only test applicable , and they had the only truth possible , viz . relative truth . But having given this answer , let us now givo our author's : —¦ " There is , doubtless , force in this argument , though not so much as at first appears . As we hinted when commenting on his position , the evidence cited by Mr . Mill , to show that inconceivable things may yet be true , is not strictly applicable evidence . There is a wide difference in nature between tho cases in which the test has been found fallacious , and those in which we may regard it as trustworthy

    —a difference arising from the relative complexities of the conceptions involved . When , on receiving a sensation , the subject of it finding himself unable to conceive that he is not receiving it , asser ts that he is receiving it , it is clear that he deals only with one state of consciousness , of which he simply recognises the continued existence . On the other hand , those Greok philosophers referred to by Mr . Mill , who ' could not credit tho existence of antipodes , ' who ' were unablo to conceive , in opposition to old association , the force of gravity acting upwards instead of downwards , ' and who , thoroforo , denied that there could bo men on the other side of tho earth—were dealing with many states of consciousness , and with tho connexions between

    them . There entered into their proposition the concepts , Earth , man , distance , position , force , and tho various relations of these to each other . Evidently , then , those cases differ bo widely , that what may ho a legitimate tost in the first , may bo an illegitimate ono in the second . Wo must distinguish between those appeals to tho Universal Postulato in winch tho action of thought is decomposable , and thosein which it is itndecomposabk . In proportion ac tho number of concepts which a proposition involves is groat , and tho montal transitions from conce pt to concept aro numerous , the fallibility of tho test will increase , and will do th is because the formation of the belief it separable into many steps , each of which involves the postulate .

    "And hero , indeed , wo got hold of tho cluo which loads us out of this logical masjo . Lot it bo granted , that a beliof which invariably exists , though tho most certain possible to us , in yet not necessarily true . Lot it be granted , that either from insufficient experience , or from non-agreement between the subjective and tho objoctivo , the inconceivable and tho impossible may not correspond even within our mental range . Lot it be granted , that for tho validity even of a single iindooouipoKable act of thought , tho ITniveiw . l . Postulate i « an imperfect , warrant , liofc all this , we nay , be granted . Still , bo the tout fallible or not , tho probability of error in any inference will increase in proportion to tho number of times the truth

    of tho test has boon assumed in arriving- at it . If the postulate he uniformly valid , it must yet , happen , that as we are liahle to menial / . a / tsit . i , wo shall occasionally think wrt have its warrant when we havo not ; and in each case tho chuncc . i of our having douo this will vary directly as tho number of times wo havo claimed its warrant . If l , ho postulate be not uniformly valid , then a further noiu-eo of orror in introduced , the o ! foots of which vary in the same ratio . Hence on oither supposition , it follows that that must bo the iiiohI , certain conclusion at which , otartiiijr from t ] , o postulate itself , we arrive by the lowest assumptions , of the postulate . " Tlio romlcr will perhaps luivo Been whore we Hrpnralo from our author ; apparently on » . small point ; , but . on a point , winch j > to \ vh lar <»< T and larger « h the argument prococdn in Ha application to ItU-aliNm

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Nov. 26, 1853, page 1147, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2014/page/19/