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Leader (1850-1860), 24th September 1853, Edition Town of 2, Page 927, Untitled Article

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      has scrambled to the Czar not only with , indecorous haste , but bearing undignified and 111-diffested propositions . Had the Porte been consulted by the Four Powers ere the last protocol was transmitted to St . Petersburg , the modifications , afterwards inserted would hare formed part of its text as recommended by the Allies , and the absurd contretemps which Europe has fallen into would have been effectively obviated . The sense of this Note had , it is true , been comjnunicated to Russia beforehand , and it must ever remain an uncertain question whether

      if these subsequent alterations had then formed part of the proposals , Russia would have given her adhesion with equal readiness . This course , however , would have reduced the question to the most perfect simplicity ; for the alterations suggested by the Porte were , and are , thoroughly in accordance with the views of two , at least , of the Allies ; and the Allies having thus embodied them in their Note , it would have only remained for Russia to accept or to refect them .

      The Allies now stand somewhat committed to the proposition so hurriedly presented ; and the question has become one of interpretation . Austria is stated to have already interpreted this Note in her own way , and to have seceded from joint action with the European Powers , specially on the grounds above mentioned . Whether this retrogression be owing to the cause alleged is , indeed , problematical ; but the Vienna Note , whether nursed in falsehood or in

      good faith , for honest or for deceptive purposes , has proved a-failure . It is the last of the consecutive blunders made by Europe , solely , perhaps , because it is the last thing Europe has attempted . The principle involved , however , and the question of right , remain unaltered . The duplicity of RuvSsia has become bared to the world , and her object better understood and more distinctly defined . The substance of the despatch addressed by Count Npsselrode to Baron Meyendorf , separated from its insolence , * and its bombastic and insupportable

      self-sufficiency , flatly rejects the Turkish emendations ; and a second despatch , proceeding from the same source , is found to amount to a declaratory act , that the interpretation given by Russia to the meaning of the Vienna Note is diametrically opposed to that intended by the mediating Powers , and that thus the question is no longer one of mere phrases , but of vital substance . The words of every agreement , however , are of vital importance , else why so much care expended upon their preparation ? In this case , the welfare of a nation is involved ; in others , perhaps tho question of a property , or

      or a . creed—that is trie only difference The fjuostion , however , is now more distinct , more important , more menacing . Secured in her position , Russia no longer needa tho subterfuges of diplomatic phraseology : it is no more , therefore , a , confirmation of old rights , but a demand for fresh privileges . Upon what principle of law or justice does Russia base her preferential daims P Confessedly unablo to produco tho cusoa of oppression which constitute the va ^ uo pretexts of her demands , Russia cites the privileges conferred by former treaties , an establishing hoi" ri < rht to additional favours . This absurd

      and unprecedented pretension she has supported by tlio forcible occupation of Turkish territory . ¦ It will now bo my purpose to review , in a few jvorcla , tho evonts winch preceded this reprehotiMiblo proceeding , and the falsehoods and docepUoufl which have characterized her policy , ' I'oni the . appearance of 1 ' rinco MensehikolF , to Mio . NeHsolrodo declaration . When that formidable embassy reached Con"I'iinliiuoplo , and was received with such eclat } tho Greek population , the first uneasy fooling ' -hat had been created considerably diinininhcd ° } tho announcement of the object which this "' plonmtuj invasion had in view . The

      litnporor only desired satisfaction upon tho quos' ° n of . the Holy Places where undue preferences » " ¦« boon accorded to France . The French Goy ^ -nuuent quietly and unostentatiously withdrew 1 h dliututt ; certain lmvilogen wore conferred upon 1 l <> Kiiasiim Church , and Prince Men . sehikou"do-(; ll ^< l that ho wan " perfectly satisfied . " j } uf , 10 r < il >( illion in . Montenegro , the Austrian do" > iuln for compensation , tho disturbances rumour ) . >> Hl . ocl to iu various parts of the Turkish linx-P" ' '» the distracted and uncertain eounoiln of . < 'MiH , vero scarcely to } m . HH over without un J'Wucoi nont | br their " increaHO , m $ hq fivyourablo

      an opportunity was not to be ( it never has been ) lost by Russia . When , according to the full belief of Europe and the satisfaction of the bewildered and beleaguered Porte , Prince Menschikoff had expressed his satisfaction with the advantages accorded tothe -. Greek community , the question was deemed terminated , the Russian Ambassador , in direct contravention of all diplomatic usage , and in complete outrage of all principles of justice , delivered a second series of demands , and retired to Buyukdere , there to await the final decision of the Divan . This

      building of cupolas and custody of keys had only indeed served to mask the true object of Russian diplomacy . This new ultimatum—for such it was —demanded a de facto and de jure right of protectorship over the Christian Greek population of the Turkish Empire , and that these uncivilized and semi-barbaroiis subjects of the Porte should be placed " upon the footing of the most favoured nation . " To have accorded this would have been

      to constitute them virtually independent , for Russia interprets this clause as conferring equal privileges with those accorded to the embassies of Europe in the Turkish capital , and as inducing a train of other consequences at which she alone would have cause to rejoice . Apart from the unauthorized nature of these requirements , they were couched in the most insolent terms , and demanded a categorical and instant reply . Alarmed by such threatening demonstrations , Europe profferel its aid to extricate the Porte from its dilemma ; the aid proffered was accepted ,

      and negotiations followed . Encouraged by the evident alarm of Europe , and its infelicitous councils , the threats of Russia were followed by speedy fulfilment ; her troops crossed the Pruth , invaded Moldavia and Wallaehia , seized the reins of Government , demanded tribute , appointed their own . agents , occupied the frontier upon Turkey , and virtually incorporated the Provinces . The fleets , whose advance into the Black Sea and the Baltic would doubtless have sufficed to stay this

      aggression , remainly idly and ignomiuiously at their anchorages , and henceforth having acquired without striking a single blow the advantages of a successful campaign , Russia contrived at once to negotiate and to continually advance fresh troops into the Principalities . Fortified at length in her military position , and assured , as it appears , of Austria ' s support , Russia throws off the mask and deliberately asserts claims , compliance with which would abolish Turkish sovereignty in Europe . But whence does Russia derive her right ?

      The treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople contain clauses securing certain privileges to the Greek communities under the guarantee of Russia . It was originally asserted that these treaties had been violated by the Porte , and that Russia had therefore just grounds of complaint . This would , indeed , have authorised Russia to insist upon tho due execution of those treaties or to demand their confirmation . The ' first of these

      courses would have been preferable , since the latter would appear to call into question the validity of the documents themselves . Russia at first favoui * ed both these plans , and tho Porte offered , to confirm , and did confirm , the privileges insistod upon . But this was not what Russia required . She knew that no romissness in carrying into effect the provisions of a contract would enable the holder of that contract to demand

      fresh and additional advantages . Ho could indeed legally and justly insist upon tho duo performance- of the provisions of that agreemont , and that too to tho fullest extont , but unless with the uncoorcod assent of tho other contracting party , no alterations could bo mado and no claim to any such alteration could bo enforced . Dallying , therefore , with tho first demands , creating a war of words , transferring the negotiations from point to point , and at length gaining time sufficient , Russia points to her military position and requires stipulations unauthorised bv her

      agreements ; to which she has not tho shadow of a claim , which are not contained in any one of her treaties , and which are decidodly opposed to the desires of tho European powers The first glimmer of light upon tho grave nature of the fresh obligation sought to bo fixed upon her is afforded by Turkey . Europe nndoratanclH for the first time tho true naturo of tho demands , and offers to support Turkey by a separate declaratory reading of ( ho Vienna note . Austria objects to this , and declines to guarantee Turkey against future Jiggro . stjiou , For J , Uo present tho matter remains [ km ,

      Count Nesselroae ' s despatch to M . de Meyen " dorff , puts the dilemma thus : — " For of these two positions only one is possibleeither the alterations which the Porte requires are important , in which case it is very simple that we refuse to accede to them ; or they are unimportant , and then the question arises , why should the Porte unnecessarily make its acceptance dependent on them ?" The alterations here alluded to are already well known . The most important of them is that placing the Greek population upon the same rooting as the most favoured subjects of the

      Porte , instead of upon the same footing as the " most favoured nation . " There is , of course , a wide and irreconcilable difference here , as already previously stated . The Western powers understood the Vienna memorial in the same sense as the Porte ; the latter desired , not unnaturally , to fix with still greater precision and distinctness the true nature of the most important clauses . Russia has objected to a plainness , which would hereafterrender her tergiversation impossible , and Count Nesselrode , in " refusing to accede to these modifications , if they are important , " plainly indicates what was the foul and dishonest intention

      of the' Czar , and the use that would ultimately have been made of the indeterminate language of the allies . Turkey and Western Europe , and Russia , then , are now separated by a broad , well defined , and perfectly understood question . The whole matter has been so plainly exposed that no room for equivocation remains . Russia has no claim , either recognised in treaty or-arising from position , except such as a successful wrong and a formidable military attitude may command . Austria , which appears , consciously or unconsciously , to have

      carried on the Muscovite conspiracy at Vienna , has plainly inclined to the unjust cause of JSficholas , and , whatever may result from the present question , —whether peace may yet be preserved , or whether the Turkish soldiery precipitately hurl ba ^ k the wr ongs inflicted upon their country , and which they have borne so long and so patiently , —the guilt will rest with Russia . It would , perhaps , be ungraceful , at this moment , to point to the realization of fears that the

      timid conduct of the Allies would provoke the very situation they were most desirous to avoid . A sense of public duty , however , bids me state that a more dignified , a more determined , and a more worthy course of policy would have redeemed a name now dishonoured in the East , and would have been better calculated not only to preserve Turkey from unjust aggression , but to preserve the peace of Europe and the honour and glory of the British name . " Alpha . "

      Untitled Article

      THE GOVERNING CLASSES . No . IV . —THE DUKE OF ARGYLL * Among the other benefits conferred upon his country by tho late Sir Robert Peel , was tho establishment of a belief in six or soven young men of light hair and sanguine complexions that they were tho cleverest fellows in tho world . Sir Robert was the shyest of men , but bo instituted tho most audacious of political schools . They have all light hair and sanguine complexions , tlioy nro all fluent , self-sufficient , and pushing . Tfiero is the Duke of Newcastle , Mr . Sidney Herbert , Mr . Cardwell , Mr . Frederick Pool , and tho Duko of Argyll , all like ono another in character and temperament—certainly all of the same political class . They are , par excellence , tho " rising" young men . They were rising young men at sixteen , and they will bo rising young man at fifty . Fortunato England with such n relay of such consuls . Tho Duke of Argyll iu a chief governor : ho in n member of tho Cabinet which governs tho Governing Classes and- arranges British destinies . Can any one toll why P can a self-governing country guess why ? Not becauso bo is a Duko , for thorn aro plenty of othor Dukea open to Coalition offers ; not because ho is popular , for tho country knows nothing about him ; not becauso ho is wiso and experienced , for ho is only thirty , and very young of his ago ; not becauso ho has great administrative en parity , for J >« is put into an office—Privy Seal—' whom there is nothing' to do but tell the Premier that posterity will appreciate him j

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      September 24 , 1853 . ] THE LEADER . 927

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      * Tho intnntiou was , far no possible , in thin Boriea , to soleot imuwH in alphabetical order ; Imfc it may porlmpa bo CoriHidorod purdoimMo U «« t M » o writer ahoidd , h po pugsod , over tl \ o eubwei- of Uu > poacttt pko ^ U . f

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 24, 1853, page 927, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2005/page/15/