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    general p henomena ought to be studied before the special modifications of them- ' '¦ . ' . ' ¦ - . ¦ ¦ ¦ . ¦ ¦ . ; ' ¦ ¦ . ¦ . ¦ •• ' . ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ ' ¦ _ "" ¦ ¦ - - ; - '' ¦¦¦ . . . ¦ ¦' ¦ ';' - ¦ ¦ - : -: . .,.-. . ' ¦ , ¦ ¦ " ¦ . ' ; This is not the VTPPer pl&ee * general comparison between organized and inorganized matter , in their various essential parts . At present , it is sufficient that we recognise thelogical necessity of separating the science which embraces organized matter from that relating to inprganized matter , jind of not prpceeo ^ ng' to the study of organic physics till after having established , the general Ja # s of inorganic pJiysics .

    As to inorganic physics , we see at once that by continuing to adhere to the order of generality and of dependence of the phenomena , they must be divided into two distinct sections , according as they refer to the general phenomena of the umVerse , or specially to those which are presented to us by terrestrial master . Hence we have celestial physics , or astronqmy , geometrical and mechanical ; and terrestrial physics . There is the same necessity for this division asi ' therewas for the preceding one . Astronomical phenomena being the most general , the most simple , and the most abstract of all , it is evident that the stud y of natural philosophy ought to commence ' with them , since the laws to which they are subject act on those of all other phenomena , they themselves beings on the contrary , essentially independents In all the phenomena of terrestrial physics , we

    observe the general effects of universal grayitation , besides certain other effects that are peculiar to themselves , and that modify the -first . It follows that when we analyze thesimplest terrestrial phenomena , whether it be a chemical phenomenon or even a purely mechanical one , we always find it more compound than the most complex celestial phenomenon . It is thus , for example , that the simple movement of a falling body , even when that of a solid only , really offers ( if we woulcl take into account all the inn * uencing circumstances ) , a more complicated subject of inquiry than the niost difficult astronomical question . This consideration clearly shows how indispensable it is that a distinct separation be made between celestial physics and terrestrial physics , and of passing to the study of the second only after the first , which . isits rational hasis .

    Terrestrial physics are , in their turn , subdivided into two very distinct portions , according as they relate to bodies considered under the mechanical point of view , of under the chemical . In order to conceive the former in a truly methodical manner , there is evidently implied a previous knowledge of the other . For all chemical phenomena are necessarily more complex than physical piienornena ; they are dependent 0 n them , without acting on them . Etery one knows that all chemical action is subject to the influences of weight , heat , electricity , &c , and that , at £ he same time , it manifests something peculiar to itself wbich modifies the action of the preceding agencies . ¦

    The above , therefore , is the rational division of the principal branches of the general science of inorganic bodies . There is an analogous division , formed in the same manner , in the general science of organic bodies . All living beings present two qrders of phenomena essentially distinctthose relating to the individual and those relating to the species , more especially when it is sociable . It is chiefly in respect to man that this distinction is fundamental . The latter Order of phenomena is evidently more complicated , and more special than the former : it is dependent on it without influencing jt . Hence , two great sections in organic physics , namely , physiology , properly so-called , and social physics , which are founded on the first .

    In all social phenomena , we observe in the first place , the influence of the physiological laws of the individual , and also something special , which modifies their effects , and which concerns the action of individuals on one another . It is singularly complicated in the human species by the action of each generation upon that which follows it . Hence it is evident , that in order to study social phenomena in a proper way , it is necessary to tyegin with a profound knowledge of the laws relating to individual life . On the other liand , it by no means follows from this necessary subordination between the two subjects of study ( as some physiologists of the first rank have been led

    to believe ) , that we only see in social physics a simple appendix to physiology . Although the phenomena may certainly be homogeneous , they arc not at all identical ; and it is of radical . importance to make a separation between the two sciences . For it would be impossible to treat the study of the species under the collective point of view , as a pure deduction from the study of the individual , since the social conditions which modify the action of the physiological laws become there the most essential object of consideration . It follows that social physics ought to be based upon a body of direct observations , suitable to it ,- —having the while duo regard , as is proper , to its intimate and necessary connexion with physiology , pyopcrly so-called . We find , as the result of this discussion , that Positive Philosophy is naturall y divided into jfive fundamental sciences , whose succession is determined by a necessary and invariable subordination , baaed upon the simple , Imt profound , comparison of the corresponding phenomena . These sciences "re— -astronomy , physics , chemistry , physiology , and lastly , sociology . Th , p '" 'st relates to p henomena the most general , the most simple , the most abstract , and the most remotely connected with humanity $ they act on all the others , withqut being acted « w by them . The phenomena falling under t hist , are , on the contrary , the most special , the most complex , the most concrete , and thp niost directly interesting to man j they depend oiorc or less on all the preceding ones , without exercising any influence

    upon tbem > Between these two extremes , the degree of speciality , of complication , and of individuality of the phenomena , is gradually increasing :, as well as their successive dependence . One very essential characteristic of our classification is , its necessary conformity to- the actual order of the development of natural philosophy . This is verified by all we know of the history . of the sciences , particularly during the two last centuries , where we are able to follow their course more exactly . Indeed , one sees that since the rational study of each of the funda- . mental sciences requires , as a preliminary , the cultivation of all those that precede it in our encyclopaedical hierarchy , it could have made no real progress , nor assumed its true character , until after a great development of the anterior sciences relative to phenomena more general , more abstract , and less complex , and independent of the others . It is > therefore , in this order that the progression * although simultaneous , must have taken place . This consideration is , in my eyes , so important , that I believe it impossible really to comprehend the history of the human mind without paying regard to it . The general law , which governs throughout this history , and which I have expounded in the preceding chapter , cannot be properly understood , unless , in its applications , we combine it with the encyclopaedical formula which we have just established . For , it was in the order laid down in this formula that the different theories held by mankind reached successively , first , the theological state , next , the metaphysical state , and last of all ! the positive state . If we do not take it into account when referring to the operation of the law of this necessary progression , we shall often meet with difficulties that appear insurmountable , since it is clear that the theological or metaphysical state of some fundamental theories must , have temporarily coincided with each other , and in fact coincided at times with the positive state of those which go before them in our encyclopaedical system , — -a circumstance which tends to throw upon the verification of the general law an obscurity that can only be dispelled by the preceding classification . In the third place , that classification presents the very remarkable property of marking with exactness the relative states of perfection of the different scvences , which consists essentially in the degree of precision with which the phenomena are known to us , and in the more or less intimate co-ordination of our knowledge of them . The more general , simple , and abstract the phenomena , the more precise are our ideas with respect to them , Mathematical propositions , for example , are the most precise of all . But Comte reminds us that precision is one thing , certainty another . An absurd and false proposition may be made very precise , and , on the other hand , although the sciences vary in the degree of precision , they all present results equally certain . The reader should not suppose that any one science is less certain in its results than another , because it is less precise . Lastly , the most interesting characteristic of our encyclopaedical formula , on account of the importance and multiplicity of the immediate applications which we can make of it , is that of directly determining the true general plan of a-scientific and entirely rational education . This is a direct consequence of the very composition of the formula . It is evident , in fact , that before undertaking the methodical study of any one of the furu amental sciences , it is absolutely necessary to be prepared by an examination of such of them as refer to the phenomena that go before in our cncj clopaedical scale , since the latter always weightily influence those whole laws are to be the subject of atudy . If the remark is eminently applicable to general education , it is as much so to the special education of the savems . The natural philosophers who have not in the first place studied astronomy , at least under the general point of view ; the chemists who before occupying themselves with their own science , have not previously studied astronomy , and , after it , physics ; the physiologists who have not prepared themselves for their special labours by a preliminary study of astronomy , of physics , and of chemistry ; —all want one of the fundamental conditions of their intellectual development . It is still more evident in the case of those minds who would devote themselves to the positive study of social phenomena , without having first acquired a general knowledge of astronomy , physics , chemistry , and physiology . It is a proposition at the very root of M . Comtc ' s system , that until the sciences are systematically learned in their natural order , which at present is seldom the case , a scientific education will bo incapable of realizing its most general and essential results . He proceeds to point out that it is not only as to doctrine that his encyclopcedical law serves as a basis for a scientific education ; it is of equal importance as to method . In passing from one science to another , we discover the several modifications which method ( essentially the same in all ) undergoes . A proper knowledge of the positive method can only bo acquired in this way . Each science develops characteristic processes of its own : one , observation—another , experiment of one sort—a third , experiment of another sort . And they ought to be taken in the encyclopedical order . "What rational product , of any great natural superiority , can come from a mind which occupies itself from the very outset with the study of the most complicated phenomena , without having first been made to understand , by an examination of the most simple- phenomena , what it is wo call a faw ' what it is to observe , —what is a pqsitivc conception , —what even is logical reasoning ? Such , however , is still at this day the ordinary course

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• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), May 1, 1852, page 421, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1933/page/17/