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    is road 724 ^ H E Ii E A T> E -R, [No. 2...

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    ESSAYS IPROM THE "EDINBURGH REVIEW." Ess...

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    The Future Of German Philosophy. Gegenrr...

    ; , - ¦¦ ¦• • - « -. . r > a ~ nn njdls " iruit" can be obtained . In fact , the SS ° ^ na ^ H ? ar labou « to map out the which fctoSSlS 3 R-SSf abused of being the originator of the French «^ + iS , S PhiiosoDhy , he is , on the other hand , as in the present work , ™™ Sl for ha ^ g formed a step towards the speculative systems of G ^ maty in ^ ttiig ideas of reaction , thus severing ideas from things . TtSrs & va Professor Grippe , is the fundamental error of philosophy , and , from ? £ aeSS downwards , has issued in nothing but the bewilder-£ 2 ot of the human intellect . Kant ' s classification of Infinity and Universality as ideas a priori , and of Space and Time as purely subjective forms of the intelligence , is a further elaboration of this fundamental

    . »«« . ThpM » Mra « t terms on which speculation has built its nuge _ error . These abstract terms on which speculation has built its nuge fabrics are simply the x and y by which we mark the boundary of our knowledge : they have no value except in connexion with the concrete . The abstract is derived from the concrete : what , then , can we expect from a philosophy the essence of which , is the derivation of the concrete from the abstract ? The chief argument in favour of a priori ideas , as insisted on by Leibnitz and Kant is , that they can never be arrived at by induction ; that induction may lead to the general but never to the universal , and that , nevertheless , this idea of universality is found in speech and in thought with the mark of necessity . But this argument will not bear a rigid examination . The language of all peoples soon attains to the expressions in the

    all , universal , necessary , but these expressions have their origin purely observations of the senses ; they are simply a practical expedient , and are valued only under certain well-known and presupposed conditions . To isolate such expressions , to operate with them apart from experience , to exalt their relative value into an absolute value , to deduce knowledge from them alone , and to make them a standing point higher than all experience—this , which is what * Partnenides and all speculative philosophers since him taye'done , is an attempt to poise the universe on one ' s head , and no wonder if dizziness and delusion are the consequence . These views are familiar enough to us in England , but to find them urged by a German professor is not so familiar . A system of logic , says Herr Gruppe , which assigns the first place to general ideas , and makes them prior to judgment , inverts the true order of things . The true object of investigation is the formation of ideas from ludements . and in order io ascertain the law of their formation , we must

    direct our observation to those cases in which a new judgment or perception occurs , and is embodied in language , to the mental process which takes a discovery in natural science is made and is expressed in words , to the place when development of language , and to the application of language by children . In these three ways the formation of" general ideas is dailycarried forward . According to these tests , every judgment exhibits itself as a comparison , or perception of likeness in the midst of difference : the metaphor is no mere ornament of speech , but belongs to its essence , though usage gradually dispenses with it . When we say the evening sky is red , thelily is white , it may seem as if red and white were independent , immediate ideas ; not so , when we say the sky is rose-red or rosy , tie lily snowwhite or snowy . Again , when we hear a child call the neighbour ' s dog , not a dog , but Caro , because its own dog is named Caro , we see the origin of the idea of speciesor of general ideas ; this is the first step towards the

    , remotest abstractions . A consideration of examples , taken from the doctrines of natural science , shows , what has hitherto been overlooked by logicians , that every true judgment inevitably alters the idea both of the subject arid predicate . Thus , when we say granite is volcanic , we modify both the idea of granite and of the predicate volcanic : a new quality is attributed to granite , and the predicate volcanic receives a wider extension . Kant , then , was mistaken in regarding synthetical and analytical judgments as two distinct classes . The true statement is , that every analytical judgment has previously been synthetic , and every synthetic judgment is such only once , and immediately , becomes analytic . B y a synthetic judgment , the idea , of the predicate passes into tbat of the subject , and is incorporated with it , so that when I repeat this judgment it is necessarily analytic . Thus ,

    from the simple act of judgment we ascend to the formation of ideas , to their modification , and their generalisation . And by a series of ascending generalisations we are led to the most comprehensive , abstract ideas . But by the side of these abstract ideas , to which we attain by an ascent from positive particulars , there is another set of ideas which owe tlieir origin to imprecise expressions and mere devices of language , by which we bridge over our . ignorance or eke out our limitation , and singularly enough these are the very ideas which have been enthroned as the absolute . Professor Gruppe , in common with many before him , makes war against the syllogism as upetitio principii ^ and even seems to reject it altogether as an instrument . He seems to us not to have rightly apprehended Mill's

    analysis of the syllogism and the function he assigns to it , since he makes it an objection to that writer's views that he gives an important place to deduction in his method . Deduction , as Mill shows , is not properly opposed to induction but to experiment , and is a means of registering and using the results of induction , indispensable to any great progress in science . But these are questions which this is not the p lace to discuss . What then , asks Herr Gruppe in conclusion , is the future sphere of Philosophy ? It must renounce metaphysics : it must renounce the ambitious attempt to form a theory of the universe , to know things in their causes and first principles . But in its function of determining logic or method , it is still the centre and heart of human knowledge , and it has to apply tliis method to the investigation of Psychology , with its subordinate department ^ Esthetics ; to Ethics ; and to the principles of Jurisprudence . A sufficient task !

    These are rather abstruse subjects to enter on in a short space , but we have at least been able to present one point of interest to our readers , in the fact that a German professor of philosophy renounces the attempt to climb to heaven by the rainbow bridge of * the high priori road , " and is content numbly to use his muscles in treading the uphill a posteriori path which will lead , not indeed to heaven , but to an eminence whence we may eee very bright and blessed things on earth ,

    Is Road 724 ^ H E Ii E A T> E -R, [No. 2...

    is road 724 ^ H E Ii E A T > E -R , [ No . 279 , Battopay ,

    Essays Iprom The "Edinburgh Review." Ess...

    ESSAYS IPROM THE " EDINBURGH REVIEW . " Essays ; selected from Contributions to the " Edinburgh Review . " By Henry Rogei In Three Volumes . New edition . ' Longnio The most important essay in this Miscellany is the one on " Season ai Faith ; their Claims and Conflicts , " with an appendix containing an atta < on Strauss . We say it is important because Mr . Rogers has obtained a cei tain name as an apologist , and not because the essay contains any very in portant matter . Mr . Rogers , so far as we can see , has never been at tl pains thoroughly to analyse the nature of Faith , or to find any grounds fc

    its existence , independently of a deficiency in the Christian evidence whic requires something to supply it . Analogies drawn from the trust we repos in the knowledge or advice of other people , or which a child reposes in tL direction of its parent , are totally irrelevant . In these cases there is r attempt to crush a doubt , or keep objections out of sight . There is a prc visional confidence , given on sufficient grounds , and withdrawn the momei the grounds cease to be sufficient . Moreover , this confidence's of a pract cal , not of a speculative , kind . It regulates our actions , which must be choice between alternatives , but it does not commit our intellects to th dogmatic assertion of that which we doubt or know to be false .

    Mr . Rogers is equally at fault with regard to probability . He admit that the evidence for Christianity is probable only ( faith making up what i wanted for affirmation ) , and then he tells you , with Butler , that probability is the guide of life . The guide of life of course it is—that is , of action ; bu it is not the guide of speculation—at 16 * ast it leads in speculation only t probable truth . We act on a balance of probabilities , because we must d so or not act at all ; but we do not call these probabilities certainties , o formulate them into dogmatic creeds . It is hard , indeed , to conceiv < that such a supposition could bo entertained for a moment by any man win really knows what conviction is . Mr . Rogers , therefore , must take othe ground . He must either prove that the historical evidences of Christianity uke the psychological evidences of morality , are not probable , but certain or he must show on some rational grounds , apart from metaphors am tropes , that the historical evidences of Christianity have a special claim where they are deficient , to be supplied by faith .

    Mr . Rogers unfortunately belongs to that school of apologists , who in stead of trying to enter into the doubts and difficulties of sceptics ( which considering the aspect Christendom now presents , can hardly be ipso facti criminal ) , sets himself to work to put them down by chopping logic and U stop their moutlis . He has borrowed from Butler the universally applica ble , and therefore almost universally -worthless , argument from analogy ; ant this he uses indiscriminately upon everybody , as a policeman uses bis truncheon on a crowd . In this way he may break some heads ; but he will not satisfy a single heart . We advise him first to do that which Ms Mastci most unconscientiously failed to * do—to analyse the argument from analogy and see how far he is really justified in reasoning from nature to revelation from the body to the soul , from the temporal to the eternal destiny o

    man . Mr . Rogers is a very despotic logician , and very intolerant of a rbgica slip in his opponents . Let him reconsider the following page of his essay and learn charity : — Secondly , we are fully disposed to concede to the objector that there are , in tin bpoks of Scripture , not only apparent but real discrepancies , —a point which many <> the advocates of Christianity are , indeed , reluctant to admit , but which , we think , m candid advocate will feel to be the less true . Nevertheless , even such an advocate o the Scriptures may justly contend that the very reasons which necessitate this admi-v sion of discrepancies also reduce them to such a limit that they do not affect , in th * slightest degree , the substantial credibility of the sacred records ; and in our judgment Christians have unwisely damaged their cause , and given , a needless advantage to th < infidel , by denying that any discrepancies exist , or by endeavouring to prove thai they do not- The discrepancies to which we refer are just those which , in the courst of the transmission of ancient books , divine or human , through many Ages , —theii

    constant transcription by different ha / ids , —tlieir translation into various languages , — may not only be expected to occur , but must occur , unless there be a perj > etual series of most minute and ludicrous miracles—certainly never promised , and as certainly never performed—to counteract all the effects of negligence and inadvertence , tt guide the pen of every transcriber to infallible accuracy , and to prevent liis ever de viating into any casual error ! Such miraculous intervention , we need not say , has never been pleaded for by any apologist of Christianity ; has certainly never boon promised ; and , if it had , —since we see , as a matter of fact , that the promise lias never been fulfilled , —the whole of Christianity would full to the ground . But then , from a large induction , we know that the limits within which discrepancies and errors from such causes -will occur , must be very moderate ; we know , from numberless examples of other writings , what the maximum is , —and that it leaven their substantial authenticity untouched and unimpeached . No one supposes the writings of Plato and Cicero , of Thucydides and Tacitus , of Bacon or Shakspeare , fundamental ly vitiated by the like discrepancies , errors , and absurdities which time and inadvertence have occasioned .

    a scholar and a conscientious man . In freely examining the documentary evidences of Christianity , ho has only exercised the aamo privilege nnd performed the some duty tliat Mr . Rogera ' s ancestors exercised nnd performed for him in freely examining the claims and evidences of the Church of Rome . And } > therefore , to tell such a man to " rclnpso into his native stolidity , " & c . & c ., is neither wise nor just . Do let us remember that in this momentous controversy we are all aliko interested in finding the truth , ami learn on nil accounts to show courtesy and charity , so long as we have to deal witU honest men .

    One would suppose that the difference between errors of transcription , such as occur in the manuscripts of the classics , and the discrepancies alleged to exist between statements in the Gospels , as between the genealogies and the accounts of the birth of Christ , could scarcely have been overlooked by any candid controversialist . We have said that Mr . Rogers ' s mode of argument ia objectionable : his tone is often equally bo . Strauss may have erred , and if he has erred Mr . Rogers will do him as well as others a service by confuting him . But he haa written learnedly and conscientiously , and he is entitled to the treatment of .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), July 28, 1855, page 724, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/ldr_28071855/page/16/