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    ^pot st /SI,, Ii^> 6c>y f - T'MtB i ti 1...

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    PROGRESS OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL AS...

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    The Pettifogging Church Inquisition. Tkf...

    AjPISINTBRESTED PKIEND TO HUMANITY . 3 ? HSB following letter was addressed to the Editor of the Temps , on the 17 th of June ,

    1831 : * 'l read in your journal of the 13 th of June the folio-wing paragraph : -r-• " Madame la Duchesse de St . Leu has been residing in London for several weeks . It is supposed that the ex-Queen of Holland is looking out for an opportunity to offer her son to the Belgians , in case they should find any difficulty in the selection of a sovereign . "

    * It appears there is a desire to ascribe my mother ' s stay in England to a political object . My mother is there simply because she was unwilling to separate from her only surviving son . ' Having taken up the sacred cause of Italian independence , I am obliged to take refuge in England ; France , alas ! being still closed against me . My mother aspires only to repose and tranquillity . As to me , far from entertaining any ideas « f ambition , my sole desire would be to serve

    my country , or liberty , in foreign lands , and I should long ago have been seen , as a simple volunteer , in the glorious ranks of the Belgians , or in those of the immortal Poles , if I had not feared that my actions -would have been attributed to ' views of personal interest , and that my name might alarm a timid diplomacy incapable of believing in disinterested devotion , or in the sympathy inspired by unfortunate peoples . ' Louis Napoleon Boxapahte . * London , June 17 , 1831 . '

    ^Pot St /Si,, Ii^> 6c>Y F - T'Mtb I Ti 1...

    ^ pot st / SI ,, Ii ^> 6 c > y f - T'MtB i ti 1 AIW ; Kr . ^ J % 9

    Progress Of Russian Policy In Central As...

    PROGRESS OF RUSSIAN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA . ( final article . ) When Sir Gore Ouseley arrived at Teheran , in the summer of 1811 , as ambassador extraordinary from the Court of St . James , a desultory warfare was being carried on between the Persian and Russian troops on the north-west frontier . On several occasions the Persians had come off victorious , through the gallant conduct of their English officers ; but it was evident that they would have no chance in a serious struggle . The Persian soldiers made excellent skirmishers , and skilfully availed themselves of every advantage of ground ; but they could not be brought to close quarters , or to sustain a heavy lire . One of themselves remarked to an English officer : "If there

    was no dying in the case , how gloriously the Persians would fight ! " And a general , who enjoyed a reputation for bravery , was not ashamed to confess ihat two Russian soldiers had once kept himself and a considerable body of troops at bay , by firing alternately , and at last effected their escape . They would say , too , that the Russians were so deficient in feeling , that , rather than retire , they would die upon the spot . Great , therefore , was the exultation at Court when it was known that a hundred Persians had fallen in the affair at Sultanboot , lor hitherto it hail been found impossible to got them within range of * the enemy ' s guns .

    Sir Gore at once perceivotl the necessity of putting an end to such fruitless hostilities , particularly when the reconciliation of England and Russia withdrew the British officers from the service of tha ^ hah . Uy his great and commendable exertiodj ^ Bn armistice wns therefore agreed Upon , and in ^ Wtober , 1813 , the treaty of Gulistan concluded . a disadvantageous war by a poace almost as unfavourable to Porain .

    The peaco of Gulbtnn was followed by a . definitive treaty between Persia and England , with a copy of which Sir Gore returned to his Court , leaving Mr . Moricr in charge of a flairs . The British Government not only ratified thio treaty , but enlarged some of the conditions in favour of Pereiu . Embracing these modifications , the treaty of Teheran wus concluded on the ' 23 th November , 1814 , by Messrs . Morier and Kllis —the latter gentleman having be (\ n expressly sent out ns a Bpecinl commissioner for this purpose . Tho treaty comprised cloven articles . The British ( Jovernn ^ Ont engaged to pay an annual subsidy of 200 , 000 tothauns ( 150 , 000 / . ) in the event of a war between Persia and any European Power , provided that it Woao not from an act of aggression on tho part of

    Persia . And . this sum was to be forthcoming with the least possible delay , because it wais the Persian custom "to pay the troops six months in advance " - ^ -a custom certainly not honoured in the observance . We also shamefully agreed to deliver up any refugees who might seek shelter in our dominions , though we afterwards compounded for this humiliating clause by evasions almost equally disgraceful . It was likewise found necessary to set aside the 9 th article , which repudiated our interference in any contest between the Persians and the Afghans , when the siege of Herat , by the

    former appeared likely to compromise the safety of our frontier . Virtually , indeed , the 6 th article pledged Great Britain to the possibility of a war with Russia , and—as it is justly remarked in the Calcutta Review— " the pledge remains registered against us to the present day . " When the Russians seized upon the debated district of Talish in 1826 , they were evidently the aggressors , and we were therefore bound either to pay a subsidy , or to send a force from India , as the Shah might elect ; but , instead of abiding by the treaty , we then discovered that this was not the case of

    aggression contemplated therein ! For several years after the signature of this treaty , our relations with the Court of Teheran were of the most friendly nature . The army received the elements of European discipline under the zealous training of British officers of the Indian service , though the result proved less satisfactory than their exertions justly merited . A laboratory and an arsenal were founded , andevery step was taken to place Persia in an jSfficient state of defence against her formidable neighbour . But the fear of Russia continued to gain ground ,

    and many of the nobles , either won by Muscovite gold or through love of change , openly favoured her pretensions . Notwithstanding the verbal promise of General Ritescheff that the Ivhanat of Talish should be entirely restored , and in spite of the urgent remonstrances of Lord Cathcart , our ambassador at St . Petersburg , the Czar positively refused to make the slightest concession , and General Xermolof , whom he despatched to Teneran , gave the Shah clearly to understand that what the sword had won would by the sword be retained .

    Subsequently , in 1826 , Prince Mentschikoff made his appearance at Teheran , much in the same character in which he lately appeared at Constantinople . The principal object of his mission was to intimidate the Shah by threatening to form an alliance with the Khan of Khorassan , and thus create embarrassment on his north-east frontier . But Futteh Ali saw through the snare , and contented himself with replying that "he preferred the rivalry of Esau Khan to the enmity of England . "

    While Prince Mentschikoff was yet at Teheran , the Russians violently seized upon Gokchab , and the Persians , in barbarous retaliation , massacred the Russian detachments along the border . In September of the same year , Prince Paskiewitch totally defeated Mahommcd Mirza , who only escaped through the fleetness of his groom's horse , and in every encounter the Russian arms and fortune prevailed . At no one time , however , did the Prince ' s army exceed 10 , 000 men , and it is hardly possible that he could have achieved such rapid conquests had there not been treachery in

    the enemy s camp , and much less had Great Britain acted up to the spirit of the treaty of Teheran , and afforded the subsidy therein stipulated . But by this time it had been discovered that Persia was a feeble and worthless ally , and that Russia was a power with whom it was desirable to avoid a conflict , as long as it was consistent with absolute safety . Thus abandoned by subjects and allies , the Shah had no alternative but to accept the terms imposed by tho conqueror . The treaty of Turkonianchai , accordingly , ceded to Russia the Khanats of Erivan and Nakshivan , the disputed territory of Talish , the exclusive navigation of the

    Caspian , and an indemnity amounting to five millions of tomnuns , or about three and a half millions sterling . Of this sum the Shah himself furnished the larger portion , but the Prince Royal was held responsible for the remainder . In his necessity the latter whs fain to have recourse to any expedient that would g ive temporary relief . Among other measures ho accepted Sir John Mftcdonald ' s bond for 250 , 000 tomnuns , in consideration of tho Shah ' s renunciation of tho subsidy clauses of the treaty of Teheran . Hut even this hard bargaih was not faithfully executed , for tho envoy afterwards declared that he had exceeded his instructions , and was not authorised to

    give more than 200 , 000 tomauns ; he promised , however , to obtain ; the 50 , 000 as a gratuity . Tii full reliance on British honour , and glad to escape by any means from his immediate difficulties , the Prince submitted to his fate , and annulled the obnoxious engagements . But we have reason to believe that to this moment the 50 , 000 tomauns have never been paid , on the p lea that b y accepting the less sum Persia bad waived her claim to the greater ! We now arrive at a new phase in the affairs of Central Asia . At length convinced of the inefficiency of Persia as the outer line of defence of British India , the Government anxiously ht

    soug to raise a new bulwark against the ad ^ vancing power of Russia . The Afghan kingdom was at that time governed b y Post Manommed , who wielded that fierce feudality—or rather rrdKvKoipavia—with singular ability and firmness . There is no doubt he was well disposed towards the English , and had we then formed a close alliance with him , we should probably have escaped a series of unfortunate successes and miserable disasters . Under the strong hand of Dost Mahommed the unruly chiefs would soon have been reduced to submission , and the moral support of England would have sufficed to set him free from all apprehensions "with respect to either the Persians or the Sikhs . Tt will be seen that

    we did actually avert the arms of the former power , but our assistance was rendered in such a purely selfish manner that it greatly tended to that lamentable error , the invasion of Afg hanistan by the British troops . In the meantime the Russians steadfastly pursued their design of inclosing Persia in their toils , by alternately employing- intimidation and acts of apparent goodwill . When the Prince Royal , in 1831 , was preparing to prosecute active hostilities against Khorassan , the Russian agent , Baron Ache , not only assisted him with his own military know ' ledge , but even promised substantial aid from his

    Government . The expedition was at first intended against Khiva , the possession of which has long been coveted by the Court of St . Petersburg , but the remonstrances of Captain Shee availed to postpone the campaign unfal the following year . In 1832 , however , it was deemed more advisable to proceed against Herat , as Prince Kamran was evidently aiming at rendering his principality an independent state . Again did English interposition succeed in preserving peace , and the

    opportune arrival of a bountiful supply of arras and accoutrements , together with a detachment of officers and sergeants from the Indian army , greatly contributed to the ascendancy of the British mission . Nevertheless , in the autumn of 1833 , Mahommed Mirza at length sat down before the walls of Herat . But the death of his father , Abbas Mirza , shortly afterwards compelled him to raise the seige , and hastily return into his own province of Azerbijan . Russia

    The conjoint influence of England and has induced Futteh Ali Shah to proclaim Mahommed Mirza heir-presumptive to the crown , and on that monarch ' s death , in the autumn of 1834 , the same influence enabled the Prince to ascend the throne almost without opposition . But although not insensible of his obligations to the British Government , Mahommed bhah still retained such a lively recollection of his terrible defeat atGanja that he deemed it futile to contend with tho colossal power of Russia , and seldom made an effort to assert his independence . Besides , the Russians willingly fooled him to the top of his bent . On his accession Le lost no time in

    declaring his intention of carrying his arms against both the Uzbogs and Afghans , and of reducing Khiva and Herat to their allegiance . Count Simonk-h secretly encouraged him in those warlike designs , and hinted at the aid he mig ht expect from the Czar of AH tho Russias . On the other band , the British envoy laboured strenuously to bring the Shah to a more peaceful frame ot mind , and insisted upon the necessity of plftc »» £ tho internal administration and the finances ottnc ^ ,,,, t ,,. ,, nm . » Wt ( > r mid more prosperous *^

    -ing . The urgent representations ot Mr . M w , ami subsequently of Sir John , then Mr . ? %$££ succeeded , indeed , in delaying tho ^ pe'W'on against Herat until the commcnceiuo to 1 W / , but from that time KuBMnn influence ™* P ^ a mount . Count Si . non . ch foU . vv I £ . J ^ ™ army to Herat marked « mU e » tonaiUorftblo placing the batten * - , g ^ " ^^ ven ordered tho rSi ^ o ^ r defers , > vhich had been

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 11, 1855, page 769, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/ldr_11081855/page/13/