On this page

• Text (2)

  Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

  • 

    .$&wmmtjmwifol : T<mffii &m>&.Tmm m*

  • 

    DRIFTING. The nation is perplexed. It ha...

• Transcript

  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

    Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

    The Redan. Much Misapprehension Prevails...

    cona * sfce & MM 3 Mtimftoff Bastion and'the little Redan , wHiehWere connected by . a curtain * or wail of earth Tunning from one to the other . The Korniloff Bastion was the citadel'of the whole , and to prevent its being turned , or entered l > y the rear , the . Russians had closed up . the gorge , or outlet , behind .

    But'the connecting curtain , the Little Redan , and the Central Bastion on the town face were ' open in the rear . The importance of this distinction will be speedily seen . As the French had carried their sap , or artificial cover , to within thirty yards of the defences , it was arranged that a simultaneous attack should be made on the whole

    Malakhoff front ; and that when the French columns were firraly established ! in the Korniloff Bastion , the English should storm the Great Redan , and the French the central Bastion on the town face . The reason for these multiplied attacks , even although the Malakhoff was stormed , was that they were required because the garrison was an army , and it was necessary to occupy them as much as possible on as many points as possible . The grand point was to secure a firm hold of the Malakhoff . Suceess or defeat on other

    points had quite a subordinate importance . If they were successful , then the Russian retreat would have become nearly impossible ; if they failed , then ultimate victory would have been secured by the capture of the Malakhoff . The chances of success were great , because you can never tell how an army will behave when the citadel of his defence has been taken .

    The French captured the Malakhoff in admirable style in a quarter of an hour , and secured it in the rear against all chances . "We should here remark that the dashing Zouaves and Chasseurs who first entered the work not only had a short thirty yards to run , but that the engineers who followed them speedily constructed a sheltered road into a bastion , so that reserves could pour in without loss . The attack on the IAttle Redan and the curtain failed , because although they were carried at the first rush , the French could not hold them in the face of the heavy firfi frn-m + Ji « "Rnssin / n bn . tfcerifis that looked

    directly into the rear of these works , that of the steamers in tlie harbour , and of the masses of troops Imrled against our brave allies . Coming to the attack on the Great Redan , we find our troops subjected to a similar repulse from similar causes , heightened and increased by the peculiar circumstances under which the attack was made . From the nature of the ground , and the flanking fire of the enemy's batteries , our engineers had found it utterly impossible to carry their approaches nearer than two hundred yards from the front of the Redan . Another

    circumstance of no small weight is , that our attack being made after the storming of the Malakhoff , the whole garrison of the place were on the alert , and must have been quite prepared for the assault . Instead , therefore , of rushing thirty yards to their terrible work , our men had to run two hundred ; instead of bounding over a short space not swept by the fire Of the enemy , they had to traverse a long distance witliin short range of

    68-pounders charged with grape ; instead of surprising the enemy as the men who entered the Korniloff Bastion did , the British troops found him prepared . e Nevertheless , the storming columns , at the signal from the Mamelon , clashed forth like lions . But they were shattered in the transit . Officers q , nd men foil in scores before the hail of bullets . Tlie 20 b men who formed the ladder party bad their numbers sadly thinned . 3 fot' this was the least part of their wraio tftflk . When they arrived at the ditch

    they were blown ,-and -their order was destroyed . Tke severity of the ordeal through which they passed maybe estimated by the fact that only four leaders of parties reached thework , ana only one brigadier . Nevertheless these gallant fellows dashed over the parapet , mastered the salient of the work , and drove the enemy to the breastwork at the base . The few who entered the ^ edan in disorder got at once under cover , and began to fire on the enemy , And here > the advantage of the Russian position became > manifest . They occupied tke base of a triangle and its flanks , covered from fire by the breastwork and the flanking traverses .

    The enemy , therefore , poured into the angle of the Redan occupied by our men a concentrated and converging fire , which could only be replied to by a fire divergent from the angle to the base . It is said that our troops should not have fired at all , but have charged at once . And it is easy to say this . But such a charge could only have been made by troops in a solid formation ; and for this there was no room in the confined angle of the salient . Colonel Windham , with a heroism above praise , did his utmost to form the men and carry the breastwork ; but as fast as they showed themselves in line , they fell

    under the concentrated musketry and grape of their foes . "When the supports arrived they only added to the carnage , for the salient was already too crowded . Had a stronger column been sent from the trenches , it would have . been exposed to the murderous fire of the flanking : batteries in its transit , and would have offered a surer mark in proportion to its numbers' ^ Xet , under these circumstances , the British soldiers held the Redan for nearly two hours , and did not give wayuntilthey were literally forced out b y the overwhelming numbers , augmented by the expelled garrison of the Malakhoff , which pressed on their scattered bands . The causes of the failure in the

    three unsuccessful attacks were all similar ; and if there be any disgrace in the failure , it falls as mucli on the French , who assailed the Little Redan and Central Bastion , as it does on the English , who attacked the Great Redan . Bub there is no disgrace . All these troops fouglit like men , and failed only as heroes fail . But there may have been some mistake in the plan of attack ; on that we will offer no opinion , but frankly state that we do not see

    any other mode by which the difficulties could have been decreased . There may have been some mismanagement in its execution on the part of those high in command ; of that we have no evidence . But , although we have great confidence in the British army , we candidly coiifess that the circumstances attending the attack on the Redan , and the character of the despatch in which it was described , have considerably lessened what confidence we may have had in General Simpson . The army wants a now chief .

    .$&Wmmtjmwifol : T<Mffii &M>&.Tmm M*

    . $ & wmmtjmwifol T < mffii & m >& . Tmm m *

    Drifting. The Nation Is Perplexed. It Ha...

    DRIFTING . The nation is perplexed . It has penetrated the breastwork of a cul-de-sac . The bombardment has succeeded ; tlie enemy ' s ramparts are blown up ; an amazing victory has filled all England with joy ; but where is the result ? The Ozab's army is beaten ; but the Oza . k ' 8 attitude continues the same .

    From Sebaatopol , then whither ? Russia proffers no capitulation . How to extort it ? wo have worked a little way into the surface in the Crimea—shall we go on , and by slow trituration destroy a district of the empire ? Obviously such a catastrophe has few terrors for AuaxA . ND . isit II . Wo cannot strike through that broken frontier at tho heart of his dominions . fiJupposo not a man of

    Prince GoBTSCHAaeoJEVFte ^ niy remaining . to the south of Perekop ; it wouM ^ be deft to the Allies to choose between < a " n active fatud * a passive war . They could guard the Crimea with the coasts of the Buxine and the Sea or Azof , and intimate to Russia that she should not trade on those waters , or collect taxes in those territories , until eertain settlements had been effected . This process might be continued for forty years without extorting a concession . Or , the conquerors

    of the Crimea might push on , across the Dnieper , and bury themselves in the recesses of "Little Russia , or startle with their drums the roving Cossacks of the Don . In another direction they might compel the besiegers of Kars to quit the ground , and hide in the passes of the Caucasus . Or , the war might be transferred to the Danube , or the Baltic . No one , we imagine , however skilful in the draughtsmanship of diagram campaigns , advises the Allies to attempt the invasion of Little Russia . But there are some who

    suggest au Asiatic expedition , to pierce the outworks of the empire , through the defiles of the Caucasus . It might be judicious in a political , as well as in a military sense , to open various avenues of attack ; but were the entire country between the Euxine and the Caspian cleared of Russian armies ; were even the Ciscaucasian territories , between Daghestan and the region of the Black Sea Cossacks , occupied by the Allies—supposing such a consummation possible—the vital elements of Russian power would remain

    undebilitated . Why should the Western nations of Europe , combating Russia , seek her most distant frontiers in the Eastern , the farthest from their own arsenals , the least important to her , from an imperial point of view , and only dangerous to feeble states , such as Turkey and Persia ? If we really intend to establish in the Crimea and in Asia practical barriers against Russian aggression , let England be required at once to furnish the fleet and the funds , and France the army ; and by this meaHS the Ottoman Empire may be

    protected , while it goes to ruin in its own way . Satire apart—these suggestions are ridiculous . Should the conquest of the Crimea have no effect upon the policy of Alexander II ., other conquests must be sought in other fields . The question of the day isin what fields ? It is at this point that statesmen find their cul-de-sac preferable to the wide arena in which armies might

    be unmanageable by diplomacy . Dip lomacy has staked out the ground , and Austria , in her turn , has become the judicious bottle-holder . But this state of affairs cannot long endure . There are two lines of attack , one of which must be selected , when our military operations in the Crimea have been brought to a close . The first is that of the Danube , and the second , that of St . Petersburg or Riga , on the Baltic .

    General Klapica . has circulated an erroneous statement respecting the occupation , by Austria , of tho Danubian Principalities . Austria has no monopoly of military occupation in those territories ; nor does her separate treaty with the Porte give her any claim to a veto upon the passage , either of a Turkish or of a combined army , through Moldavia and Wallachia into Bessarabia . In

    tho Convention of the 2 nd of December it is stipulated that Austria shall hold the lino of the Danube against all Russian attacks j due that the Allies , or any one of them , shall more freely , whenever their Cabinets ehall 00 determine , in and through * h ° . ^ 'j ^ K ^ t Otherwise the agreement of the *^* " ™ Austria would have contradicted ^ %£ » £ * £ Zco . ZoTlypoiJonhcOttox ^ Mm ^ o .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 29, 1855, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_29091855/page/11/