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Leader (1850-1860), 29th March 1856, Edition 2 of 2, Page 11, March 29, 1&>6.]

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    • pMt Mora.
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    • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

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      March 29, 1&>6.]

      March 29 , 1 &> 6 . ]

      THB IBAD'EtBit 299--

      Notic Es To Corre Spondents , Wmwmm Tlol...

      NOTIC ES TO CORRE SPONDENTS , WMwmm tlOll . , , _ .: . ^ rtnmnnmiicatioIlS . ttto often

      | 1 KS 2 SK ISK ^ Tra ^ S impossible , ^ yfessessasteja riah , " read " Secretariat . " ^

      I The Conferences With Instructions He W...

      I the Conferences with instructions he was- compelled to forego i that an open clause m the conditions des i gned to cover the result of expected successes in the Crimea ,, was turned to the advantage of Russia , after the capture of Ears . Indeld , when the Treaty is promulgated , we have little doubt that beyond ex-I s . . ' r * v anv ^ mTTiATit of Russia a ^ .

      one conspicuous evil , illustrated at every crisis by the total . neglect of what are contemptuously and vulgarly styled abstract principles . The Corn Laws were repealed not because they were unjust , but because the poor were starving . Catholic Emancipation was conceded , not be-! cause it was the right of the Catholics , but . because a rebellion blackened in the gaze of 101

      torting ; uujuu n" < - v ~ . ~ - ~ formal submission to the public law of Europe , it will be a vague and illusory document . I he \ boundary question - will be left unsettled , beyond the mere admission that there is to be a new Danubian frontier ; the political settler ment of the Principalities will be deferred ; I i ii . . _*_ : _ j- ~_ nnn < iv > n

      i Parliament . The public never careu - Military Reform , until men , horses , and equipments , perished in the very midst of war , under a system that had lasted , unreproached , during forty years . It is not to be expected that the populace should comprehend these things , or be awakened to their import without such a met

      pemaps cne smisiei suggrov . ^ ^ Ally will be adopted , and the rights conceded to the Christians of Turkey will not be I placed under general guarantees . Practically 1 Russia will be what she was before , except that her relations to Turkey will be altered , and , in a diplomatic sense , amended . It there ** a meaning in treaties , it is impossible Uw o ^ o . elir . nlr > sooft aeain repeat her attack

      chanical illustration as was supplied m ne i crisis of 1854 , on the plateau before Sebastopol . But the professed politicians , the statesmen , the agitators , what did they say of Reform % It was only in the penny almanacks that , before the outbreak of the war , the English nation was warned that its military institutions would be failures in the hour of need . l __ . _ m ¦» ^ . i * i _ _ Jl x — . £ ? n vw * - iialiii Ifa tne leaas to icw iwm

      AFTER THE "WAR . The dilemma of the Plenipotentiaries at Paris is not so serious as to admit of a doubt of peace . It is not a difference of policy that postpones the signature of the Treaty , but a diplomatic punctilio , arising from the claim of the King of Prussia to be recognised as one of -the High Contracting Powers . He has been invited to record his adhesion to the principles of the special settlement between Russia and the " Western witnnoias nis assent

      on the Ottoman territories . . That is a point I established ; and , strictly speaking , it fulfils the original objects of the war . It does not fulfil , of course , the hopes of enthusiasts , or ¦ the schemes of political philosophers ; but , in this instance , popular disappointment is the obvious result of immoderate expectation . ^ Tf . „ j » nvmir fo Bstimafce . precisely , the ¦

      Practically , war ^ that affect the external relations of Great Britain . But , collaterally , singular politicalde-I velopments have appeared — the . Trench ; alliance , the Sardinian participation in the attack upon Russia , the revival of the Mol-I davian and Wallachian national claims , the I internal reforms of Turkey , and other results I — , ¦ '¦ it ¦ 1 - - _ _ L A 1— «« -1 1 ^^ V

      JLt WC V 3 JLJ *« 4 . V 5 £ * i T v * - « . * . »* v "" - " " * i v ~ result to Great Britain of the Russian war , we are baffled by the uncertainties of the future . We have gained nothing .. But , from the lessons we have learned , we might , were we a wise and earnest nation , gain immeasurably It was never desired that territorial advantages , should follow the challenge we aave to the ambitious policy of the Emperor Nicholas . All that was possible was the achievement of pure glory—not animal exul-+ ^™ fW in pi . nries .-but a heightening ot our »¦«¦ /

      * ^ j which ean only be lmperiectiy represent » , the Treaty of Peace . ' The Treaty will be a deception ,, but to reasonable politicians , not a disappointment . If will be the expression of French Imperial policy . ' Grreat Britain-made . war at . tlie . instigation of France , makes peace at her bidding , and cannot expect " record , in a diplomatic convention , political successes which she has not gained , and which she has not deserved to gain . i

      Jrowers ; ne on me gruuuu . that he should sign as a negotiator , a participator in full , in the action of tn £ Council of Plenipotentiaries . This , at least , is the colouring given by public rumour , to the delay which has undoubtedly taken place . But it is not an insurmountable , or even a grave , difficulty . If , as is understood , the English Cabinet alone objected to the admission of Prussia on her own terms , that is not an obstacle likely long to interrupt the progress of the pacification . The momentum of Continental Europe , of every government , and of nearly continuance oi

      vuvivu c */* w ^—* » * — w - . character , of our prestige , of all that constitutes m oral power , which is the subtle , but unswerving basis of political power . Failing this , failng to exalt our naval and military reputation , merging our political and diplomatic existence , for a time , into that of France , exposing a thousand vices in our administrative system , proving that our Constitution admits of the preference of incapacity to talent , of aristocracy to merit , what can we do to save a remnant of advantage from the Russian war 1 ? What , but to abolish the organisation that i t ! , „„ , i ™ , Ti- » ri ;« r » nrrl fctafi nrincioles that j

      every nation , is against the the war . " Whatever have been Lord Clarendon's instructions they will be set aside . England , which asserted no principle when it was at her option to lead France into the confliot , cannot now insist on a point of etiquette , to humiliate the Government of Prussia . She has too uniformly practised the attitude of subordination to overcome , at this juncture , the will of her great military ally , in his own capital , with Austria and Russia assenting . Besides , no intelligent politician would risk , for a moment , the issue of the negotiations , for AW \ iiuu ai

      IXtXO U 1 U 1 V . CU UVVFLI ) * aj . ^ ww-. — ; - j . 1 have disgraced us , rely on the manliness and virtue of the nation , and be loyal to the spirit that has made us what we are . We have contracted -unnatural ties . We have forsaken things we once cherished to adore a strange phantom of lawless power ; but it was never by such recalcitrations thab England became powerful by sea and land , and took a leading position in Europe . After the war , there comes the work of peace , the thorough reformation , not only of our military , marine , and civil establishments , but of the influences by which t 1 , « v fixist : of tho electoral system , winch fills

      \ jJUO Oi * iVU \ Jk W A UlW * Al l £ > M » V ^ WijJA . vj »* vaa- > * . a . uj . jl King . We assume , consequently , that the Conferences will result in peace ; because all tho powers represented , except , possibly , Grreat Britain , aro determined upon the cessation of tho war . Wo only regret that our statesmen have raised a protest to which they cannot and dare not give effect . It is a gratuitous humiliation of their diplomacy—a humiliation they could ill afford . When , after this half-developed war , tho public opinion of Europe sums up the consequences , it will assign some politioal disgrace to England , and many politioal tricks , successfully contrived , to Franco . It will gradually become known to tho world , as it is already known to Btatesmon , that Lord Clarendon was sent to

      Parliament with factions , adventurers , and jobbers of tho Cabinet system which renders political government tho exclusive estate of a few families—of forty families , ' by tho average of ' the last hundred years—of tho Army system , by which merit ia accidentally and rank systematically advanced—of tho Civil Scrvico system , by which tho ntupiclity of ono generation is mado tho precedent of another- —• of ovory public department which fosters incapacity for tho suko of corruption at tho expense of the community . Finally , and most essentially , that body of national opinions must be quickenod and purified , which sanctions political immorality , which is selfish , lethargic , and sceptical . This in the ono needful reform— -tho

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      Saturday, March 29, 1856.

      SATURDAY , MARCH 29 , 1856 .

      Pmt Mora.

      pMt Mora .

      Here Is Notmng So Revolutionary, Because...

      here is notMng so revolutionary , because there is nothing ' so unnatural and convulsive , as tiae strain to keep things fixed when all tTie world 13 by the very Jaw of jts creation in eternal progress . —Db . Abnold .

      | Prussia And The Princess Royal. We Do ...

      | PRUSSIA AND THE PRINCESS ROYAL . We do not see how the royal family of England could have contracted a marriage for this engaging Princess more advantageously than with I the heir , in the second degree , to the powerful Protestant , and , in a certain degree , constitutional throne of Prussia . Without reckoning above its value the political liberality imputed to the nephew of Frederick William , he and his House are beyond 'the reach of a Concordat , and it is more to the interest of England to be related , through its royal family , with the only to

      first-class Protestant monarchy , tban oe compromised with any pervert of a Popish line , or to quarter on its pension list any of the miniature dukes and princes of Belgium , or Germany . Leaving France and Austria out of the question , tho one being governed by a I Thunderstorm , the other by a Roman Catholic despot recently married , what are the reigning families of Europe 1 The heir presumptive to the Belgian throne is already married ; Sardinia is a Catholic kingdom , governed by a widower , whose eldest son is scarcely fourteen vears of age , Tho Tuscan Grand Duke ij 3 a absolutist

      slave of the Papacy , an ; on » «* scale . The King of Naples , Catholic and despotic , is naturally in league with the worst despotisms of Europe . If Spain were not excluded from an English alliance by hor religious institutions , the heir to her crown is a princess four years old . Portugal , again , enjoys that constitutionalism which is consistent with the domination of tho Roman Church . Groat Britain herself baa not a prince to spare , nor is it the recognised practice of Courts to pass by the opportunity of a royal marriage without going abroad for now relations . The Princess , then , must search the Baltic kingdoms or tho kingdoms of Germany lor a husband . The heir-apparent to the Lutheran

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), March 29, 1856, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_29031856/page/11/