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    3OQ TEE JiiEJlD-E^R, ^SAgvog sMg,

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    THE WAR. The fire from our batteries, at...

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  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

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    The Sebastopol Committee. Monday. Ok Thi...

    dd & ats Utt the / 4 MaBhing -tools 'were * at < an . earlyrperiod brooffhfeana « r his « £ br * K * s . m > iiceiin iaynamtte lettier ,. « n & heiiootoed'uponrthat'Bs so > yery important-a matter that he « imm * aiately * wrote totthe Ordnance department , dfisiriag ^ to "have -a thorough investigation of it . They reported to him » in a . manner which he thought -was unsattsfewtoiy , and he « ent -their report sto Lord Raglan , ano >« 9 k * d * un whether there Was any truth in at . Xord Kttglan ^ instituted 'inquiries , and wrote to him ( witness ) to . * ay * aat'iaariyof-the tools were of a very inferior character . By means of a second inquiry , instituted at hfe-r * equest * bythe' Ordnance- authorities , it was found out thnfthe objectionable tools had been made at the outportsi depots , and-were of- a very antiquated description . ( Adatyh . ) Hethenanthnated to the Ordnance that the transaction was a very reprehensible one , and hoped that there-would be no repetition of it .

    iBeferring to the assertion that Lord Raglan disapproved of the-expedition to Sebastopol , the Duke said that the very contrary was the fact . Speaking of himsslf . officially , he -said he had not a . deficiency of power , but a deficiency of means . In order to enable any Secretary of State for War to carry oiit his duties satisfactorily to himself and the public , there must be very material changes in all the war . departments . He was hampered by his subordinates . He was bound to say , however , that everybody under him evinced the greatest cordiality , and made the greatest efforts to do their doty . He did not attach blame to any individual , but bethought 'the system was bad .

    WEDNESDAY . * g ? he examination of the Duke of Newcastle was eoncluded on Wednesday , when his testimony consisted mainly-of an amplification of his previous evidence . The chief additional points may be briefly summarised . He said the responsibility- of authorising expenditure was conferred on Lord Stratford de Redcliffe because he had the means of obtaining all requisite supplies from the Turkish Government ; but it was not intended that he should-personally interfere with the hospital . Generally with the

    speaking , 'the witness was dissatisfied organisation of the medical department , of the Ordnance , and-of the / Gpmmissariat . At an-early period he anticipated that- ^ he ^ flystem of sea-transport would be found defective « in its ^ working in time of war . It was impossittle to have any fixed idea as to the arrangements necessary "foT fche wintering-of the army in the Crimea bo long as the result of the siege was unknown ; but admirafete - « yinter ' quarters , Sebastopol being taken , might h ** e been had in the south of the Crimea , or the

    Bospfeqtxis ^ 'and , said the witness , " I provided for both contingencies . " . Immediately a fterwards , however , his G * ace observed , in answer to the Chairman , that "he conldnot say" whether he had provided for the contingency of Sebaatopol not being taken . " Because , " added the Chairman , " that contingency has happened . " At wlrieh-there was some laughter . iO ? he 'more extensive scheme of organisation in the War Departments proposed by the witness as Minister of ' "War Tvaa overruled by the cabinet . It'was determined by the cabinet -that nothing should be done beyond'theseraratidn of the two aecTetaryships and » the It

    removal dT the Commissariat from the Treasury . would have been of the greatest importance to the poSlic-service if thosearrangements-had been made before the breaking out . of the war ; b ' ut he was of opinion that'the greatest difficulty and mischief would-ensue if extensive alterations were made at a period when it was ; necessary for every one to be working as 'hard ^ aa he cotilfl . Although the system might be faulty , yetthere 1 w « re moments "when it was almost preferable to eontinne > fbt"a'short time a faulty system -than to adopt a better 1 owa / Which would take two'or three months , or & longer time , to get into gear .

    'The- 'Chairman then read a communication relative to the supply and construction of the huts for the Crimea , by "Messrs . Price and Cotter , ^ representing that they-sent in'their plans and specifications to the authorities , but received no-communications for several weeks , and-that Whenlthey applied to the © rdnancetherr plans and specifications wore lost , arid they were requested to'furnish fresh-ones ; that the "Duke afterwards- ordered them , on liis -own personal responsibility , to make the huts , but that a . peremptory order afterwards came from'the Ordmmte , -telling them to stop the works' ; that the 'Duke again ordered them to go on on'his own responBibilHy ; and'that the huts were finished and reached the Orimea onjlywhen they ceased to be wanted , and thousands of men-and'horses wore lost owing to the delay .

    ''The Duke— " That statement , as is too often the-case , i » 'a * very'highly-coloured one in many respects . I-never hwttd'thatthe'iilans had been lost ; but that the Ordnance 'sent word to ' stop the works , is true . Differences oT'opMltnvarose « s to the propor form of their construction ,-and theOrdnance sent to stay the works until that pmnt-was determined ; -but'that the delay , which was cTBy-two-orthreo-daya , entailed disasters I utterly Ueny . ItHls' true , the'htits mrived Hate in the Crimea ;; but they "Were in 4 nnple'thne to save the troops -from disaster . " l TRoiiebiytook place In the contracts for the Miriie ' rifles , * bd $ -great delay occurred in the executlonof those contracts . One of the first subjects to Which ho turned His , -attention -on' becoming "Minister -for "War was the inig ^ y ^ the WlnW Tlfles nnd . other small arms ; « nq , 'in conseqtwnwirfffhe dchry 'in the -manufacture of those

    « rms , . he ordered : 26 , 000 jriftes io ibe manufeotuxed _ iat Liege , whichhadtthe ^ efiect , . among- others , of precluding the -manufacturers there 'from leseeuting a ilarge ordertfor riflea . fbr -. the JRussians government , which wassgiven just after . witness had- orderedithem to mafeethe : 25 j 000 rifles for ithe English troops . ( A taugli ^ > He found such difficulties in getting the Birmingham tmanufacturers to supply the contracts for small arms , that he was obliged to go to Liegefor -them . There was . no meeting of : the Cabinet in August after the prorogation of Parliament , or in September , although that was an exceedingly important period of the campaign . The lowest state of the army was on . the 19 th January , when the total file d

    effective force of all arms , including rank and an officers and non-commissioned officers , . amounted to 26 , 080 . On the 23 rd December , the total effective force , including officers and non-commissioned officers , -wras 29 , 921 . In conclusion , his Grace reiterated his opinion that our military system ought to be reformed . He thought that the whole ' staff system of the . army in this country is erroneous . His belief was that we ought to have a staffof the army something . like that of the continental armies ; without that , the evils of the-existing system would never be . removed . He had reason to believe ithat considerable advantage would . be obtained by an examination of the Erench military system , and ifrom the assimilation of our own to it as . much as

    possible . Some time ago , with that view , he appointed a commission composed of three officers , to make inquiries into the subject -upon the spot ; and he believed those gentlemen hadjmadetheir report-tohis successor in-office , Lord Panmure .

    THURSDAY . The earlier part of the sitting on Thursday -vvas occupied in . hearing explanations from Mr . hotter , of the firm of Potter and ? Price , relative to the . huts supplied for the army in the Crimea . These substantiated the stateiments igiven before the committee on the previous day . It appeared that the order to construct the huts was given by , the Duke of . Newcastle , but that a vast a ' mount of time Avas lost in consequence of Sir Frederick Smith's perpetually telegraphing on the subject between London and Gloucester , first countermanding the order , then altering the 'construction of the huts , and finally in ordering them to be loaded and sent out . The huts were built upon" the -Portsmouth and Gloucester system , and

    also on a modification of both . The contract was finally finished on the _ l 1 th of ' December ; but no definite orders were given to the contractors as , to whether the huts should be made on the Portsmouth or the Gloucester plan . The diversity of plans adopted increased the expense to . 21 . 10 s . per house more . " The first contract price of the huts was 25 / . per hut , and each hut weighed 2 tons 8 cwt . The Ordnance , by the alterations ,. addedto the weight and expenseiof the huts , but not to -the accommodation . He experienced a difiicultvin obtaining his money . There was a-dispute which was " finally settled by Mr . tflayter , of the Treasury . Each hut was . calculated to contain twenty man . Witness ' s / firm'subsequently - supplied 1850 similar -huts to

    the " ( French Government , and the contract was completed . ia ~ iLve > weeks , _ . _ There . appeared to be . a great , confusion i of vjuri * diction : inthe transactions he . Hadin " this matter with the various war j departments . XThe French thus were cheaper , and lighter . than the JBnglish ; thore was less material , > and they were more serviceable , though a little lower . . ^ Bhere-was not so much cubic space in them , which'wasito avoid the heavy winds about Balaklava ; and they were very much easier to ihe taken up in front for the troops . Deputy Commissary-General Smith said ho was > stationary at Constantinople , and his duties were to act upon alL orders eent from the Crimea by the Commissary-General . He established stores and magazines at

    Constantinople , -which possibly could not be seen by those who had « aid Jthere " -were no stores , as they wore under the barraoksun one case ,. and in anothertwo miles . from Constuntinorrte . They contained , largo quantities of-provisions , salt meat , rum , and other supplies , and there were two extensive ) granaries on < the Asiatic side of the Bosphoros . -Ho never experienced-any inconvenience from the forms , 'or complaints from the officers iin the army on the score of forms , and eould . not suggest a more simple one than that in use 'for provisions'and rations . With Tospect to the issuing'of . green coffee , ho said it-was never the practice < of the Commissariat to issue it in any other than a Taw' state ; and tliat 'he heard'only a few -isolated instances of compluint . He was mot ordered immediately to send'cattle'from

    Constantinople , 'but'only after the hurricane at Baloklava . There was no difficulty in Obtaining them , there being ; large ' quantities in reserve at - Constantinople The hurricane -very iseriously orippled , by delay , the operations of the 'Commissariat . In-consequence of the wreck of the -vessolfl , and owing to it , the troops wore loft 'Without 'fresh meat at 'Cormtantinoplo . The delay tlmt'took ' nlacQ'in-the caee of the Hntbinger , employed to convey vegetables to Buluklovn , which dolayresuUeil in the ^ whole ortho greater -part of those vegetables 'being -spoiled , 'he attributed dittany to Admrrnl'Boxer'in dotaining'the uhip unnecessarily long . in the Golden "Horn . Admiral Uaxer was tlio -supreme naval uuthority at 'ConBtontinonlo . . There was an 'English lhnrbour- » mastor at' 'Constantinople , . 'but 'ho -had 'no control -wer the . "naval'tenrsnOTt . "Ho"waein 0 t > able'to

    send albme chareoal 'he ^ was . asked ^ or , owing * w , want of transport , though-he had treason to beli that at that-. time vessels were lying at . Balaklava doin nothing . * Wtitness then read a letter he wrote an the 2 fef November to ¦ Commissary General JFilder complainiiiff 5 the want of transport ; a passage of which—statin g ftS " Admiral Boxer was a confused man , and that the shipping-masters who came to Constantinople hadneit her respect for iior fear of him" —created considerable amusement . He regretted b . e had not copies of the letters im wrote to Admu-al Boxer from time to time iinportunino

    him to meet the wnnts of the service , winch , unfortunately , the . admiral characterised as a bore . ( Laughter } He attributed most of the great delays and difficulties in the sea transport of the commissariat stores to Admiral Boxer . He must , however , say Admiral Boxer had an incomplete staff ; added to that , his duties were exceS . sive ; but he had not the administrative genius necessary for conducting such difficult and complicated duties a < s devolved upon him . Witness gave other details of a technical character ; but their repetition would : not be of interest to the general reader .

    FRIDAY . The first witness examined was Captain Dacres , R . X . of the Sanspareil , who stated that he went = to Balaklava on the 2 Gth of October . He entered into several details , the upshot of which was to show that the iarbour was not in the filthy condition which had been described by other witnesses , although he acknowled ged that it was always overcrowded . Captain Milne , of the Admiralty Board , who had the direction of the transport board , was next examined . His evidence sought to prove that all had bee n done which it was possible to > do . He said , however , that he thought the consolidation of the two departments of Somerset-house and Whitehall ought to have taken

    place long ago , for much inconvenience arose under the old system in consequence of Admiralty business being cai-ried on at the two places separately . He was not prepared ~ to admit that the transport department was the only one which had failed ; since every demand made upon it by the Government had been strictly and promptly complied with . The Tequisition made upon him for the sending out of winter clothing and huts was ^ so sudden that some time was lost , owing to the ¦ difficulty in obtaining transport vessels . With regard to the forms \ ised in the Admiralty , he did not think there waS any superabundance ; at all events , not too many to check the efficients discharge of the duties of the-service .

    3oq Tee Jiiejld-E^R, ^Sagvog Smg,

    3 OQ TEE JiiEJlD-E ^ R , ^ SAgvog sMg ,

    The War. The Fire From Our Batteries, At...

    THE WAR . The fire from our batteries , at the latest advices , still continued , though we seem as far , as ever from getting ipossession of Sebastopol , or being forced to retrent . The Russians , with a' deadly . determination to-dispute every inch , repair almost directly the injuries -which our guns iproduce ; the Allies , with an equally deadly determination to advance , keep getting-nearer- and . nearer . Ao . , the walls , aud are now bringing their tremendous weight of metal to Mar upon tlie fortifications . And so these Titanic foes stand glaring . at each other in mortal combat , each , apparently ,. tooatrong to yield , and not strong enough to triumph .

    . , . » The . cannonn . de opened before daybreak . A wretched morning . ushered tin the > work ; for a lieayy mist hung over the . earth , and scuds of drifting rain , carried by a strong wind , drenched the poor shivering gunners asthey served the artillery , fortunately for us , however , the windcarried the ram . nnd snioice over towards the liuseians , who were halt bnndeu uy the incessant beating in their faces . J 3 oth . sides might have quoted Ben Jonsou ' s line : — 11 It rises-like a unoming full of fate . "

    ' « Our fire , " says the Daily News Correspondent , wj directed principally against the advanced line of laissura defences around the arsenal and Kanibelnain surb rb , commencing from the two new redoubts on the rifelit « Careening'Bay , and following the line of «« woiKs w the south , or . Admirrtlty Harbour . Thw 'cowprel ends the-Lunette battery immediately above ^ f *™ " ^' on the 'left-or -west side ; a new -mloiint thro „ ,, mp lately on the cliff above the roadstead , nnilrtil : luiw to the left -than the 'last-named work ; the Mnnieltm redoubt ; and tho Malakhoff , lledan , and Burmtk on

    The opening of the batteries wns kejit so cjoso ueoret that the llussians were taken complc-tciy *^ surprise , and for a moment were nlniost -pjin « V » They soon , 'however , got tho ( Flagstaff ba tery ™ Tiny ; 'buttheaJoundTowor and the - M « m £ lon J « J some time before -they could answer to our-voiutfj and , for Imlf an ho \ ir rtfter they ¦ commenced . i ^ ¦ were but-feeble in their demonstrations . ^ " , own monwero astonished ; for notlnng was *»

    Of the intention the night before . Sovcr « This-grand operation was prefaced uy _ »*¦¦ Troceedingfl df a strategical-character on btnsu frhe Huwinus had connected thoir ^ H l crf deep trend ,, rflildli'thepr Joined-on to ?^ £ d n fth 0 trenteh -cloao 'to the 3 ? rcnch < nvtte . IW n » u

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), April 28, 1855, page 6, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_28041855/page/6/