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ApRiii 28,1855.] THE LEADER. WlZ
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RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN ARMY. Man y...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Revelations Of The War Ministry. It Was ...
before the Sebastopol Committee furnishes the proof corroborative of that necessity by laying bare the actual state of things in the departments at the present time . The Duke speaks of the war departments as they existed at the commencement of the war , and as , with some very slight change , they now exist . This country is engaged in a war with the most powerful state on the Continent . It was well known that our establishments had been rendered comparatively ineffective by reductions during the long peace , by disuse
of the machinery , and by the fact that we had only superannuated men of experience , or younger men without experience . It became , therefore , tenfold more necessary to have a vigorous , concentration of power in the department regulating the war . The necessity was recognised when a separate Secretary of "War was formed , the part having been formerly " doubled" by the Colonial Secretary . The conduct of the war is of course a subject for the Cabinet , and for the War Minister individually , as the member of the Cabinet to > whose undivided attention
the labour is given . " What , however , was the state of things when the Duke undertook the office thus divided ? In the first place , let us remark , there was no increase of his powers whatever . He was relieved of the colonial duties- —that was all . He was supposed to hold in his hand the general directions of the war . The discipline of the army , however , was reposed in the Commander-in-Chief , with the appointment of subordinate officers . Sometimes the
Commander-in-Chief communicated withjbhe Secretary for " War ; but , as we shall see , not always . The finances of the army were under the direction of the Secretary at " War , and are now virtually carried on by the Undersecretary of State for " War . When the Secretary for War , however , had to perform his duties , of regulating the movements of troops in the Mediterranean , he had , for cavalry and infantry , to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief ; for the artillery , engineers , and sappers and miners , with the Master-Generalof the Ordnance ; for materiel of a military
kind , with the Ordnance ; for food and transport , with tlie ^ Trea ^ ur ^ raiid ^ - ' in-the-m-ean--while , the Secretary at War communicated with the Inspector-General of the Medical Departments . It is not to be understood that this case presents the combination of a supreme authority and subordinate authorities . No ; in many respects the authorities were independent . The Treasury had its own views about the commissariat , and endeavoured to retain that department when the Secretary for War began the work of concentration . The Commander-in-Chief so
far exercised an independent authority , that he recommended to the Crown the appointment of General Lord I / ucan , Brigadier-General Tobbens , and Brigadier-General Goldie ; even departing from the usual practice of consulting with the Secretary of State before making such high appointments . Lord Ba g lan , Master-General of the Ordnance , was in command in . the Crimea , drawing the salary of his office at home , but not performing the duties . Not even performing , it appeal's by this
evidence , the duties as they were understood of the Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea . In April last year the Duke of Newcastle addressed a despatch to Lord Raglan , pressing upon him the necessity of making careful and secret inquiries into the state of the Russian army in tho Crimea ,, and the strength of the fortress of Sobastopol , the recent additions to the defence , and the amount of provision for tho garrison and town . But Lord Raglan " was unable to obtain , any of the information required by the despatch j" and ,
in short , he seems to have acted , to a great extent , upon his own separate and independent views , except possibly so far as he was swayed by other officers nearer to him , English or Frentik . The medical department , to speak straightforward , equally deceived the Duke as to the actual state of the stores and medical ministrations . The officials in the departments were , no doubt , writing the requisite memoranda and letters ; but the work was not
done . Wine was directed to be sent , and lemon-juice was ordered ; yet the wine did not arrive ; and the complaints that lemonjuice had not arrived were sent home from the very quarter of the world where lemonjuice is bought . Yet reports were also sent home that the men had all that they wanted . How is this ? Were men engaged in a conspiracy to tell lies ? No , they reported what they saw , or what they wished to believe . There must have been myriads of
letters , but emanating from so many sources , addressed to so many different authorities , and bearing such different reports , that the whole result is universal confusion—anarchy , non-government . ^ Early last year , Dr . Andrew Smith wrote a letter on the subject of military clothing , distinguished by great zeal , perhaps by an over anxiety on such subjects
as flannel , and addressed to the Military Secretary , in whose official pocket it seems to have remained ; the subject , we suppose , not being military , or incapable of a strong military appreciation . Stores that were wanted first were put on board ship under stores that were wanted afterwards ; medicines for Constantinople under artillery for Sebastopol ; and when the Duke of Newcastle
remonstrated with the Board of Ordnance , it was then discovered that " there was not that proper understanding between the Admiralty and the Board of Ordnance which ought to exist , " so it was then resolved to establish the Board of Transport—another department to divide the authority . This is how the Duke of Newcastle found things working under him : what is the change under Lord Panmuee ? The Committee has
not yet penetrated so far ; and if it tries , prohably-- -the-requirements .. ; of . _ public service" will bar its way . But we know two things . Some of the improvements begun by the Duke of Newcastle have been carried out ; but the chief of the office is not the energetic and conscientious Duke in the prime of life . Lord Panmube is more experienced ;
but lie is a martyr to enfeebling sickness . Do we wonder that the second year of the siege of Sebastopol has opened , and that the fire has lasted from the 9 th to the 25 th inst . without material change ? The army , the officers , and Ministers , can hardly tell us why we got before Sebastopol at all ; they cannot guess when or how we shall come away .
Apriii 28,1855.] The Leader. Wlz
ApRiii 28 , 1855 . ] THE LEADER . WlZ
Reconstruction Of The Indian Army. Man Y...
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN ARMY . Man y circumstances have recently concurred to invest the Indian army with a degree of interest and importance which the British public seldom accords to any institution or subject not immediately and constantly before its eyes . Tho alacrity displayed by the officers of that service in undertaking to organise and conduct the Turkish Contingent , has inspired the nation with a feeling of respect nna consideration that has hithorto been most unjustly withheld , notwithstanding the distinguished achievements of that army . As long as war is actually raging in our Eastern possessions , tho brilliant exploits performed by our troops , both European and Native , fill every true British heart with the glow of triumph and martial prido . But when peace ia again restored , the glory
acquired in a remote country is like that won by our forefathers in the ancient days of Cbesst and Agincoubt . A few hard sounding names are added to the schoolboy ' s hated task , but society in general—which only moves and talks , and neither reads nor remembers—becomes serenely forgetful of the men who have contributed a new illustration to the glorious annals of the nation . Gentlemen by birth , position , and character ,
bearing the Queen ' s commission , and entrusted with difficult and important public duties in ; perhaps , the most valuable possession of the British crown , they are nevertheless unrecognised , alike by their sovereign and their fellow-countrymen , on their return to their fatherland . They have no military rank westward of the Cape , although they may have commanded entire brigades in the field , and turned the doubtful tide of battle . Nor
are they known as public servants , although their whole life may have been consumed in maintaining the integrity of the British Empire , and in administering laws and justice to tens of thousands of British subjects . No matter how distinguished his own services , or how illustrious his descent , not even a general officer of the Indian army is eligible as a member of the " Army and Navy" or
the Senior United Service" Club . His youngest child , though only a midshipniau or a cornet of horse , remarkable for nothing save ignorance and affectation , is entitled to a privilege denied to a veteran warrior who may have served , with honour to himself and advantage to his country , in every campaign , that has deluged the plains of India with blood since the battle of Assaye . The' distinction thus drawn between the two services
is most invidious and unjust . It is equivalent to a declaration that the officers of the Indian army are to be regarded : as mercenary soldiers in the pay of a mercantile community , and , therefore , quite unfit to be admitted into the society of their aristocratical comrades , who hold their commissions from the sovereign alone . It must be acknowledged , however , that this prejudice originally arose from the anomalous nature of the East India Company ' s power and dominion , and from the coarse manners and disreputable proceedings of the reckless adventurers . who Jn former times flocked to their standard . In
those days it was no rare occurrence ior ^ a military man to" amass a large fortune in comparatively a few years , and to return to England rich in wealth but poor in personal consideration . A very inferior class of men then entered the Indian service , and the state of the European society in that country was disgraceful and demoralising . It is , therefore , no matter of special wonder that the officers of the royal army looked down upon men whoso best attribute was a dashing courage , and who were totally deficient in those qualities which constitute the true Engto remark
lish gentleman . But it is needless that this order of things no longer exists . A more honourable , or more . intelligent body of men may not bo found in the British Empire than tho Indian officers of tho present day . They may possibly have more ot Saxon than of Normim blood in their veins , and few of them arc in a position to drive four-in-hand , or to bet a cool thousand on the speed of a horso and tho honesty of his rider . But they belong to " tho gentry" England , and nre , theroforo , befitting associates ior tho hihest and tho noblest in the land .
g Tho exclusion of the oificora of tho royal army from all sharo in the extensive patronage in the gift of tho East India Company is , undoubtedly , another and very natural , cause of thp jealousy that unhappily exists bet ween tho two services . With the exception of regimental appointments and tho Commander-
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), April 28, 1855, page 13, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_28041855/page/13/
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