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Leader (1850-1860), 27th December 1856, Edition 2 of 2, Page 17, several French officers that this number...

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      by had been added to the list of killed and ¦ wounded at Alma ! It appears strange that , if the French had 1200 men hors de combat , they should only have three officers killed , which is all the marshal admits . We bore the brunt of the Alma ; we were destined to bear the brunt " Inkerman , and for a long time to take the heaviest duty at the sie « e . Thus jt came about : — ¦;¦¦'¦[ , , ° ' - In the evening [ of the 26 th ] Lord Raglan had a consultation with General Canrobert when the latter proposed that the allied armies should change their relative positions viz ' that the English , instead of being on the left , should take the right ; this the French urged we ought to allow , as , having obtained possession of Balaklava , we had a harbour in which to land our material , and that therefore they had only left to them the bays of Kamiesch and Kazalch , near Cape Chersonese , for the same purpose , and it would obviously he far more convenient for them to be encamped as near as possible to the spot where their stores , & c \ , would be landed- For these reasons Lord Raglan wa 3 induced to give war , and thus again occupy the most exposed , position , while our allies were protected on both flanks . The consequence was that we held , with a force numerically inferior to the French , the exposed position of Inkei-man on our right and of Balaklava . Lord llngUm was perfectly well aware of the danger to which he was exposed , for he had minutely inspected the whole position ; but the numerical inferiority of his troops prevented him from adequately occupying and fortifying it . General Canrobert had promised to reinforce the English on that side , but he failed to perform his promise until after the battle ' of Inkerman . Before that battle . w « s fought it had been arranged that the assault should take place on the , 7 th of November . After the battle , Lord Raglan , calculating that the enemy would be demoralized by his defeat , and that , as was actually the case , there would be great confusion in Sebastopol , proposed that the bombardment should be renewed , and that on the 7 th the troops should assault the place . But Gimrobcrt would not accept so heavy a responsibility ; and it was at this moment onlj that the coup de main , as originally planned , can be said to have lailed . It was clear that the army must either remain in the position it held , or abandon the Crimea . Lord Raglan showed his constancy of soul by adopting the former course , although it entailed on an army , numerically small , and comparatively unprepared , duties which -would have tasked the strongest . Here it is to be regretted that the Staff Officer does not sufficiently inform us of the measures taken * to ? rqvid e for the troopsunder then- new circumstances . Clearly the storm of November , by destroying all the winter clothing , accounts for much , certainly the fact that they Were few in number relatively to the work to be done accounts for more , of the sullcrings endured by the men ; but there still remains a large residue , and the Staff Officer throws but little light on its causes ; What he does , however , show very clearly , is , that the cry raised at home about his inactivity , the talk about his being invisible , were without foundation . There is abundant evidence in these volumes to show that he was abroad by day and by night , either in . the hospitals :, the camps , or the trenches , or ' inspecting the enemy ' s position , or surveying that of the Allies . : '"' - . ; . - . ¦ ¦ ¦ " ... . ¦ ; .. ¦ - ¦' ; ¦ . " .. ' / . . . ' . ' ¦ ; , ; '" ¦ ¦ ' . ¦ : . .. ^ . . ¦; Early in the siege , Sir John Durgoyne pointed out the MalakhofT as the key of the town ; the French general did not agi ee with him , holding that the key of the place was the Flagstaff" Bastion . When General Niel , sent by the Emperor , arrived in the Crimea , he at once concurred with Sir John , and in February it was arranged that the French should begin an attack on the jVIalakhoiT : — I understand that this resolution on the part of General Canrobert was finally adopted by the advice of General Kiel who differs altogether with General Bizot ( Chef du Corps du . Cic ' nic ) as regards the proper point of attack for the reduction of the town ; General Bizet ' s opinion being , as I some time ago mentioned to you , that the Bastion du Mat is its vulnerable point . On the other hand , General Kiel takes the view which Sir John Burgoyne has held from the very first , viz . that the Malakoff is the key of Sevastopol . The consequence of this is , that at last the French will adopt the iir . st plan proposed to General Canrobert by Lord Kaglan at ' the suggestion of Sir John IHirgoync . It i . s now much to be lamented that our allies did not in the first instance give way to Sir John's arguments , as there can be no doubt , humanly speaking , of the capture of the town , if liis propositions had been carried out . Canrobcrl ' s conduct became more perplexing every time decisive action was proposed . Thus it -was in April . On the morning of the 24 th instant , there was a great Council of War held at the English Head-quarters between the principal generals of the English and French armies , when it was arranged that we should increase our lire again to L 20 rounds per gun in the twenty-four hours ; and the assnult was fixed to take place at 1 p . m . this day . livery prepauition was made , the storming parties told oil " , the smallest details entered into , and , in fact , every precaution taken to insure success . It is not worth while , as the- attack never took place , for me to enter into the details ; suffice it . to say that tho English were to have assaulted the Great liedan in two columns , which were to have advanced cm each face of tho enemy ' s work . If successful , the capture of the town was looked upon as certain . To render our success more probable , the French were to assault in heavy columns the Mamelon redoubt nnd the Outrages Blanco , and it was thought that the fact of their attacking tho former work would so far occupy the enemy in the MalakofF batteries that they would be too much engaged in assisting the Mamolon , to interfeve materially in preventing the English assault on the Kcduii . On the left of the allied sieyic-works the French were to attack in throe distinct places , viz . Bastion du Milt , Hastion Central , and the Bastion do la Quaranlnine , and immense masses of infantry were told off for that purpose . Well , on the 25 th instant , about mid-dii }' , General Canrobert sent two general office ™ of his stall' to Lord Knglan to inform him that on further consideration he could not allow his troops to assault , as he and his principal generals had come to tho conclusion that it was not practicable . Our readers are woll aware of the details of the Kcrtch expedition . It was a little before this that the French Emperor broached his famous plan for operations in the field . He continued his meddling policy , and to that may be attributed , in part , Cunroburt ' s vacillation . General Pclissier was a man of a dill ' erent mould . We give two instance ^ of his iinnness . Here is a picture of him at the council of war held before the capture of the Mamelon : — Marshal Peiissior was nlso present , and mado a speech to tho officers previous to the Council , in which he stated that ho waa awaro that those whom he then addressed would be very diligent in devising various schemes for tho reduction of Sevastopol ,

      but he begged to inform them , that on the 7 th instant the Mamelon Vert the Ouyrages Blancs , and the Quarries must be taken , adding , " Lord Raglan and l \ ave decided it ; — and he therefore wished to impress upon them , that they were there only tor the purpose of arranging and settling the best means of carrying this decision into execution . I understand that here General Bosquet took upon himself to dissent altogether from the views of the Commander-in-Chief , but was immediately stopped by General Prissier , vho begged to remind him of what he had just said—that the attack was decided upon . General Bosquet made no further remark . General Niel then got up , having m his hand a long written statement , which he proceeded to read as follows : In operations of this kind it is necessary to commence at the beginning . Now to commence with the left . " General Prissier here interrupted him , and pointing to the map , said , « We will suppose the left side not to exist ; we will speak as if there was no left . I know you are all gentlemen of genius and science , and could give me good advice tf I asked it . But I do not want it . The entire responsibility belongs toLord Raglan and to me . I have announced to you our determination : the Mamelon Vert , the Ouvrages Blancs , and the Quarries are to be taken on the 7 th of June . Now if any of you have suggestions to make as to the means of accomplishing this end , prqy state them . " You may imagine after this no one was bold enough to go contrary to General Pelissier ' s wishes , and the French generals for the first time were astonished to find that they had a man of spirit and determination as their chief , whose will was law . After this considerable snubbing , the Council resolved itself into a committee for settling the details and the plan of attack , which was accordingly done , and they also decided that a heavy cannonade should be opened four-andtwenty hours previous ; then nothing remained to be arranged but the hour at which the assault -was to take place . The French generals were for the most part in favour of an attack " aicpoint dujoury" as they said that their men could then be placed in the advanced trenches without Toeing observed by the enemy . This was objected to by the English officers of the Council , as they said daybreak would be the very time at which the enemy would be most likely to be expecting an assault , and consequently be prepared for it . In the middle of the discussion , General Pe'lissier interfered , and said , "Lord Raglan and I have made our determination on that point also . The attack will take place late in . the afternoon , with sufficient time for our troops to get established in the works before dark . " The Council was then broken up . Here is the fellow-picture of the general who dared to disobey the Em' peror : — , ¦ ' .- ' ;¦; .,. .: ¦ ' ; . ¦ . ' . , ¦ ¦ ' ¦ ¦ " : . ¦ , . . ' .. ' . ¦ ¦ " . . ' Shortly before General Pelissier left the French Head-quarters to witness the attack against the enemy's works on the afternoon of the 7 th instant , he received a telegraphic message from the Emperor Napoleon , ordering him on no account to assault the Mamelon , as his Majesty considered that it would be attended with defeat and disaster . General Pclissier quietly put the telegram in his pocket , and shortly afterwards mounted his horse and rode off to witness the capture of the Mamelon , & c-- ^ When all was over , and he had returned to camp , he showed it in triumph to some officers of his personal staff—a great contrast to General Canrobert ' s conduct when he received the order for the recal of the Kertch expedition . There are many extremely interesting passages in these volume . ? , throwing light on disputed points , to which , we should like to advert ; but . we trust we have given sufficient proof to our readers that the Letters from Head-quarters will afford much information to those who are anxious to obtain correct impressions of the late war . We cannot close our notice , however , without extracting one passage at the close of tlie book recounting the relative losses of the Allies . From the accounts of all who witnessed it , nothing could-be worse than the state of the French army during the first quarter of the year 1856 . They appear to have been indifferently fed and badly clothed ; typhus fever raging at the time among them drove immense numbers into hospital , where their state was truly deplorable . The ambulances were so dreadfully crowded , the medical officers so overworked , that many of their patients were necessarily neglected , added to which there was the greatest want of the most ordinary medicines , and a perfect dearth of medical comforts and even necessaries . In the months of January , February , and March , 1856 , between 30 , 000 and 40 , 000 men of the French army were acknowledged by the authorities to have died of disease ; this being over one-fifth of their force in the East . Yet during the severest weather of the months of December , January , and February , 1854-55 , when the English army was suffering its greatest hardships , and its most severe loss from sickness and disease , the deaths in proportion were not quite onetenth of the strength of the British force then in the East . During the war in the East the English loss was as follows : —Killed in action , 158 officers and 1775 inen ; died of their wounds , 51 officers and 1870 men ; died of disease , 55 officers and 15 , 609 men . It would appear also that 2873 men were discharged from the service in consequence of being incapacitated from disease or wounds ; . which makes a total loss during the two years of the war ( from the 31 st of March , 1854 , to the 31 st of March , 1 S 5 G ) of 264 officers and 22 , 187 men . This entirely agrees with , all we have heard from other sources . British army administration is not perfect , but bad as it is , it shows very _ favourably by the side of the administration of one of the armies of despotism .

      Several French Officers That This Number...

      several French officers that this number Bbcemjjer 27 , 1856 . ] THE LEADER . Wi

      Christmas Novels And Tales. Isabel: The ...

      CHRISTMAS NOVELS AND TALES . Isabel : the Young Wife and the Old Love . By J . C . JealFreson , _ Author of 11 Crowe Rise . " 3 vols . ( Bentley . )—Mr . JeaffVeson ' s novel is ji clever picture of modern life , a book written in an easy , careless , accomplished way , by a man who has seen the world . The manners illustrated are those of the West-end , with rural excursions , and glimpses of the moralities of Paris . The tone is that of light , allusive satire—satire of persons and institutions , practices and opinions . Mr . JeafTreson has studied to considerable purpose the various phases of polite society , and is happily exempt from the vice of exaggeration . His novel is consequently wiser than novels usually are , its irony being as temperate as its sentiment . Moreever , it has a flavour of originality to distinguish it from tho rank and file of threevolume romances . A mystery liungs about Frances Leathcby which is not unravelled without exciting a strong interest . Lord Brigden is delineated with tho care and closeness of real portraiture , a little impaired by the Cngliostro tinge with -which Mr . JeaftVeson has sought to render him picturesque . Isabel is at first exceedingly pretty , and , at last , uncommonly amiable . Nor is the scholarly pluralist less effectively sketched . Certain passages of the story , however , which turn upon the second love of the young wife , are of a very conventional stamp , and detract from the interest of the whole . We know , not long after Hugh is introduced , that the Kcvercud Marrie Dillingborough will join what actuaries call the decrement to make room for a more appropriate husband for Isabel . Various other commonplaces occur , but they nre species upon the surface , the general tenour of the

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 27, 1856, page 17, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_27121856/page/17/