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Leader (1850-1860), 26th May 1855, Edition 2 of 2, Page 19

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      Baiiiey's Philosophy Of The Mind. Letter...

      ( Besides warning us against a too acquiescent use of metaphors , Mr . Bailey suggests an excellent canon , when treating of imaginary . mental transactions : Nine-tenths of the speculations of transcendental philosophers , as far as they" have come under my observation , appear to'bemade up of absolutely imaginary events . , To make the subject plain ,, it may be needful to remind you that alLthe events dnd facts tin'the world may be arranged under two heads—mental facts ,: and physical facts . " In the philosophy of the human mind we have to deal with both , because changes in , our physical frame are not only indispensable for the , perception of external objects , but are continually producing other variations in ithe state of our minds ; and such

      variations of intellect or emotion again affect the body , as is obvious in the _ ease of voluntary actions . When a man , for example , is in a low , sluggish condition of thought and feeling , the application of a stimulating substance to his stomach will enliven both : while , on the other hand , the sudden announcement of calamity may deprive that organ for the moment of its usual vigour , at the same time that it excites the powers of utterance to-. extraordinary . exertion . And so in innumerable other instances . Indeed , there is every reason to conclude that no mental state arises without having been preceded * by . a . physical change in the body , and without itself in turn producing such a change .

      Whether , nevertheless , this is true-or . not , oneithing is plain , that mental facts and physical facts , even when there is the clearest dependence of one on the other , are distinct as objects of knowledge . Mental facts can be gathered only from consciousness , or , more correctly , are states and events of consciousness ; and physical facts , being states and events of matter , can . be gathered only from external observation . Among the examples here is one : When I read in the pages of Kant , or of his expositors , that " all our cognition begins . from the senses , proceeds thence to the understanding , and finishes in reason , " I examine whether I am conscious of the two latter events , which are cleanly not of a physical character , and I do not find that-I am conscious of such an event or operation as knowledge proceeding from : the senses to the understanding , or of the subsequent operation of its finishing in reason .

      Described as they are in the passage quoted , such processes appear to be wholly fictitious . What I am conscious of is , that I perceive external objects , which is itself as much an act of the understanding , that is , of an intelligent being , as anything can be , and of itself constitutes knowledge ; that I afterwards think , or may think , upon such objects ; and that I frequently draw conclusions regarding them . And the following example , referring to a passage in Cousin , may be added : "It is reason , " he says , " which perceives both itself and the sensibility which envelops it , and the will which it obliges without constraining . " ; N " ow here we have divers imaginary facts . If the reason which hovers about M . Cousin ( for the faculty being , as he affirms , impersonal , cannot belong to him or

      reside within him ) really perceives itself , I can only say in my own case that I am not conscious or in any way cognisant of a separate entity called reason , making itself the object of its own observation ; nor am I conscious of , or even able to understand , such a phenomenon as sensibility enveloping reason ; and I am as little conscious that reason performs the difficult , if not impossible , task of obliging without constraining another power named the will . As they are stated by M . Cousin , all these are the imaginary transactions of imaginary entities , and vanish the moment you try to substitute operations for faculties . Had the sentence here quoted proceeded'from an English pen , it would have been at once stigmatised as jargon ; nor can I pass a more favourable judgment on such phrases as— " I myself am the instrument with which I know everything : " " ' est moi qui suis Tinstrument avec lequel je connais toute chose . "

      When , again , he speaks of the will being " the centre of consciousness , and reason its lit / hi , " I am incapable of finding any state of mind in myself answering to these plausible expressions . We cannot enter . upon the proposed classification Mr . Bailey gives in these Letters , —it would carry us beyond our limits ; but ^ content ourselves with referring the reader to it , as very superior to those adopted in other works -known to us . * In the Letters on the various-theories of perception , there is much suggestive criticism , and a dexterous disentanglement of the subject from verbal

      Ambiguities . His own position is what may be called a scientific vindication of the Common Sense school . He says we perceive external objects ; we know them ; we know them to be external , and there ' s an end of the matter . Better knowledge we cannot have . Now , while agreeing with Mr . Bailey in Jus main positions , both . as regards Perception and Idealism , we are not certain that we thoroughly understand , his criticism directed against Kant , and others > who are not Kantites , respecting our knowledge of things per se . Indeed , his language occasionally seems to imply that he himself has not rightly grasped the difficulty he professes to meet .

      'It is worth while to -advert more particularly to the proposition often reiterated by Rant , that we cannot know things in themselves—a proposition oxtensivcly accepted by modern philosophers . This is , in my view , a perfectly unmeaning assertion . We cannot form the slightest conception of knowing external things , except us wo do know them , i . e . through the organs of sense . Do you demur at this ? Then be so good as to tell me the precise signification of knowing things in themselves ; give mo a specimen of that sort of knowledge wo have not ; and point out how you have gained 8 , 0 curious n piece of transcendental information . No one manifestly is entitled to deny that our knowledge is of things in themselves , unless ho not only possesses the sort of knowledge which ho denies to others , and lms found on comparison that wo—the rest of the human race—have only a knowledge of-things as thoy aro not in tlusniiolved , but actually produces it for our examination . Till that is done , assertions about knowing thing * in themselves must bo regarded aa utterly without moaning .

      This seems to us altogether untenable . A man is not bound to know the things ho professes he does not know and cannot know , or else to rulinquish his avowal of ignorance . Mr . Bailey insists that the perception of external objeafca . is . a primary fact of consciousness . Granted ; but a primary fiict of consciousness is not a primary fact of objective existence—and Mr . Bailey ' s argument requires that whatever is true of the subjective should bo true of the objective , and true not relatively but absolutely , not partially but wholly . A simple illustration will suffice to clear our argument from ambiguity . A man receives a blow in the dark . Tho subjective- element in . thus transactio n'is a sensation of pain , which sensation corresponds truly enough with

      ; tbe external' cause of 'that sensation , considered solel y as a pain ~ producmg eause . 'But this cause , this dbjective element , which is fenown- only through pain , exists independently of-the man . He knows it must-exist ; -he-knows it is something external ; he knows it is not the pain ; but'he does not know what it is . Mr . Bailey will not contend that the stricken man knows the object because he-perceives the pain nor that he is bound-to'know what the object is before he can say he knows it not . Yet this is man's position with regard to external objects . We only know them through our sensations , and our sensations are only modifications of ourselves , produced by

      certain actions of things on us;—the whole nature of the objects does not affect us , only certain aspects affect us . Thus , recurring to the illustration just used , the man struck in'the dark perceives the pain , but knows little of the cause . In daylight he , seeing the cause to be a black wand , has increased perception , and knows more of the cause ; but unless he can examine that wand and so extend his perceptions , he remains ignorant of- ? whether it is wood , whalebone , or gutta-percha . With every increase of the avenues through which knowledge may reach him , he knows more and more of the properties the thing has " of affecting him ; but he gets no nearer to . a knowledge of the thing in itself . To know more he must be more . -

      _ Lest , however , the reader should object to a prolonged metaphysical discussion where only a brief indication of the contents of a new work was anticipated , we break off , referring all who are curious to Mr . Bailees volume , and expressing an urgent desire that Mx . Bailey will speedily give us a second series of such Letters .

      Widow Burning. Widow Burning: A Narrativ...

      WIDOW BURNING . Widow Burning : a Narrative . By Henry Jeffreys Bushby , of the Inner Temple , Esq ., Barrister-at-Iiaw , late of the Hon . East India Company ' s Civil Service . Longmans Mb . H . J . Busiiby has reprinted from the Quarterly Review an article on Widow Burning in India , with a Postscript . We learn from him the interesting and instructive fact that Hindooism is in a fair way to be overthrown , not by the preaching of Claphamite missionaries , but by the publication , going on . through the liberality of the East India Company , under the auspices of Professor Muller and Wilson , of the orig inal and authoritative documents of the religion , the Vedas , which have been overlaid with a mass of Brabmiriical superstitions and corruptions . There is no

      authority in the Vedas for Suttee ; on the contrary , there is a precept that when a man dies , his widow " shall go up into his house , " which , by a rather awkward corruption of the text , has been read " shall go up into the fire . " The discovery of this want of authority has forwarded the cause of the abolitionists more than the ai-guments of morality or political influence . But not only do the Vedas say nothing about Widow Burning , they say nothing about the greatest gods and goddesses of modern Hindustan ! They say nothing about castes , metempsychosis , the incarnation of Vishnu , or the triune mystery itself ! Mr . Bushby may well look forwar * to the bewilderment of the devotee . But , unfortunately , a superstition which has once taken a complete hold of a people , and become part of their moral nature , will stand a good deal of criticism directed against its source . We recommend the Brahmins , thus endangered , the theory of church authority

      and development . Peahaps it would be only justice to mention that Mr . Bushby has been under considerable obligations to Colonel Tod ' s admirable work on Rajpootana , the text-book , fro in which so many volumes have been derived—without acknowledgment .

      Papers Of Lord Metcalfe. Selections From...

      PAPERS OF LORD METCALFE . Selections from the Tapers of Lord Metcalfe . Edited by John William Kaye . London : Smith , Elder , and Co . 1885 . The insecurity of our position in India is the continually recurring theme of Sir Charles Metcalfo ' s public and private correspondence . Our power is precarious because it " does not rest on actual strength , but on impression . ' The fidelity of the Native army can be depended upon only so long as success attends our arms . ( Every temporary reverse < that has overtaken us ,

      has proved the utter hollowness of our tenure . We are merely encamped in India , and the feeling of the population among whom we have pitched our tents is universally unfavourable . " All India is at all times looking out for our downfal . Tlie people everywhere would rejoice , or fancy that they would rejoice at our destruction ; and numbers are not wanting who would promote it by all means in their power . Our ruin , if it be over commenced , will probably be rapid and sudden . ..... From tho pinnacle to the aby ss might be but one step . " Again : — handful f

      Our situation in India has always been precarious . ... We are still a X ) Europeans governing an immense empire without any arm hold in tho country , having warlike and powerful . enemies on all our frontiers , and the spirit ofthaafloctwn dormant , but rooted universally among our subjects . That insuperable separation which exists between us and our subjects renders it necossary to keep them m euDjeotion by the presence of a military force , and impossible torepoao couiidenco in tueir affection , or fidelity , for assistance in tho defence of our territories . And again : — Our Government is not a national Government that can rely on the affections of its of

      subjects for defence against foreign invasion . It is tho em-no a go ern en over a conquered country that it cannot trust the people . _ Our subjects are , intorn , 1 « non . oj ready at least for change , if not ripe for insurrection ; the bus j «^ ° I ™ *™ votaries of fate . We can retain our dominion only by a large mil t-uy «« tab hslu e t and without n considerable force of JUritish troop ., the fidelity of oui native mmy could not bo relied on . ,. , .., , The slightest check b quickl y magnified into * a ° ™»** u % ^ ? £ £$ intelligence , spreading like wildfire , " . mined , ately e * pitas the 1 a , > cs unU speculations of the millions whom we hold in subjeotion . i-h ™ , * tho commencement of the ^^^^^ J ^ TZ ^^^^ cS ^^ St ^ : ^ ^ ^^ -Sn ^ lS - occLsS SSE milted suicide by swallowing pounded duinion ; 1 b . On ^ y ^^ os the Nopuulcso war and the first siogo oi Bhurlpoio , the ill-success oi our

      Iyra Y 26,1855.3 !T M E Ilmjk E> B B. 4*...

      iyrA y 26 , 1855 . 3 ! T M E iLMJk E > B B . 4 * 8 ®

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), May 26, 1855, page 19, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_26051855/page/19/