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Leader (1850-1860), 23rd June 1855, Edition 2 of 2, Page 12

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      Hereditary Government. The Administrativ...

      iii its early stages , but may outgrow in its later , reasonable cause must always be shown for its continuance ; and the real treason is not to question it , but to forbid it to be questioned . The day may have come when the blind feelings of the patriarchal tent , of the Celtic clan , or of the feudal manor must give place , as the basis of authority and government , to political intelligence and political duty . If so , the lot of that generation on which the change , with all its

      difficulties and perils , has fallen may be a hard one , but it cannot be refused . Let the advocates of the hereditary principle demonstrate its necessity or utility . Let them show that government by capacity , for which all are now calling , is compatible with the existence of a governing caste which all profess to respect . "We will owe them all the thanks due to those who convert contradiction into consistency and hypocrisy into faith .

      { The T Economical Administration ^ Tmas...

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      The Sebastopol Report. The Select Commit...

      THE SEBASTOPOL REPORT . The Select Committee , in its Report , has tenderly treated the character of public men . It has presented a strong summary of its opinions , based on the twenty-one thousand questions , asked and answered . But , upon the whole , it has fairly stated the incidents of the Crimean campaign , and even by its suppressions , has heightened the effect of the

      recital . Disengaging ourselves from the recollection of all that had previously been said or written , and adopting as inferences only such as are justified by the exact substance of this Report , we ask what is the result ? What would be the ^ esult in the mind of one who studied , in this record alone , the English method of making war upon a great and distant military power ?

      Some premises , however , are necessary . Forty years of peace had left Great Britain overflowing with affluence , free to draw for public services upon an unbounded fund of private wealth , possessed of arts and appliances unknown to any former period of war , and stimulated by the enthusiasm of a pugnacious and excited population . It was not a naval power that had engaged us in hostilities ; the trade of our colonies , and of friendly

      states , was therefore uninterrupted . France was our ally ; our enemy was one who had created amongst us a deep sentiment of auger and aversion ; our fleet having blockaded the Baltic , left our army and a powerful squadron to concentrate themselves on one point of the Russian territory . Nothing was wanting , in the general , condition of things , to support the expedition . The nation was rich . The ¦ w ar was popular . The seas were open . The factions were almost silent . The

      Government was left to prosecute its undertakings , and only a small section of politicians , little in favour with the country , desired to question its policy , or to restrict its means . It is true that the nation and the press were as improvident as the Ministers . They were blustering , exulting in powers not yet displayed , defying the enemy , and trimming bonfires and

      their lampa in anticipation of victories . Few gave their thoughts or their counsels to moderate this braggadocio , or to keep the Government alive to a senao of its responsibilities , and so England made warthe England of free institutions , chivalrous aristocracy , opulent middle classes , contented populace , patriotic statesmen . The first blow tojbe struck was in the Crimea .

      ; Tho Duke of Newcastle , therefore , direcWd , Lord Ra . ch . ajst , commanding the army inuVhe » East , to collect information as to tho military resources of the Russians in the Crimea , SJefone , the siege of Sevastopol " oouM foe ftttemptefl / ' he , said , apioh

      information must be obtained , for little or nothing was then known . Upon reports obtained- ^—not from Lord Raglan , who was required to obtain them—but elsewhere , Ministers founded an eager confidence in the success of the attempt . Iiord Aberdeen relied on a coup de main ; the Duke of Newcastle talked of wintering the army in Sebastopol , of ordering it to the Bosphorus after that fortress had been dismantled ; Sir James Geaham thought he had found " Crimean authority "—who must have been as ignorant as Sir James G-rahaM was reckless—for all

      necessary information ; but what did Lord Raglan say ? That his own information as to the power of defence possessed by the enemy he was ordered to attack was not precise enough to justify such a resolution ; but that he decided upon an invasion of the Crimea " in deference to the views of the ( ignorant ) British Government . " As to our ambassadors at St . Petersburg and Constantinople , who should have been the best instructed , they dismissed the subject by replying that they knew nothing about it . " We want lights in the cabinet of diplomacy , at least .

      The desperate enterprise , undertaken by Lord Eagian , who confessed he was in the dark , was commenced , and ministers dispersed to their holiday recreations . Between six and seven months passed , involving important official changes , and no Cabinet deliberations in reference to them took place . But the Duke of Newcastle was at his post , incessantly labouring , and suggesting

      improvementswith this difficulty , that he tried to repair a machine which he was forced to keep working , as though the engine-driver should at the same time handle the tools of the engineer . But , what with the delirium of the people , the delusion of the Ministers , and the hesitating acquiescence of the Commander-in-Chief , Sebastopol was attacked by an army which staked all on tlie event of one endeavour .

      For the success of that endeavour the excitement of the nation was well prepared . For its failure no one provided . No adequate military reserve was kept at home . The army of the East was created by a strain on our entire establishments . From June to November , though it had become apparent that the enemy was powerful ,, the

      necessary preparations were neglected . \ V hen reinforcements reached the Crimea they were unorganised levies , as incapable of endurance as of action . No means beyond ordinary recruiting were adopted to restore the shattered regiments , or to render the militia available , until tho crisis had arrived , and all had to be pushed forward with precipitationthe fruit of alarm . When a new Minister of

      War was created , the Minister had no office , no instructions , no experienced subordinates ; he guessed at his duties , and paid tho moat feverish attention to those of least importance . Meanwhile the expedition was unfortunate ; " the wliole country was dismayed , " but " the Cabinet was in darkness . " Why P Because officials in the East deceived it , and it disbelieved tho press . The Duko of

      Newcastle " was not ( officially ) made acquainted until a late period" with " tho horrible mode in which the sick and wounded were convoyed from Balaklava to the Bosphorus . " An " indiscreet silence" on tho part of functionaries kept our ignorant Government inactive , though it sent out a commission to inquire , which was issued in October , 1 . 854 , and reported in April , 1855 . In tho interval an army perished .

      The Ordnanco Department , to which ia committed one of the moat important charges in tho service , was viciously constitutpd , and demoralised by tho squabbles of its officers . There was " no able hand to guide it , " ' * , twp officers were wanting , whoao functions

      the-most economical administration had been unable to dispense with in times of peace . ' ? Hence , the series of errors and defaults is pursued by the Committee , from the blu ndering system of transport to the Bosphorus , and across the Black Sea , to the still more wretched service of land-carriage from the harbour to the camp—in spite of two good roads left by the Russians , —the neglect to establish depots in the Crimea , the recklessness of depending for forage on supplies found on m m •^^ + **** __

      the invaded territory , the insufficient stores of food , the entire failure of the medical department , and the pestilential hospitals At Scutari , the Committee say , the first real improvements were effected through private benevolence . No private undertaking connected with the war has failed ; scarcely one public operation has succeeded . The Government , ignorant of the country in which it made war , was deceived by the persons on whom it depended for information . In this double fact is contained the moral of the

      Report . As to the exoneration and blame , the Duke of Newcastle is treated favourably , in consideration of his efforts , though the Report does not exhibit him with the capacities of a statesman . The entire Cabinet is censured for omitting to concert its measures in Council at a time of public emergency . It is also implied that the Government acted with lamentable want of judgment in refusing to put faith in the unhappy narratives published by the press . On Mr . Sidney Heebeet no opinion is passed . The Board of Ordnance suffers under the direct and severe

      reprobation of the Committee . Lord Aberdeen , personally , is accused of various omissions . Admiral Boxer , not having been examined , is not judged , nor is Mr . Commissary Filder . Upon the whole , little blame is imputed to particular individuals ; but the essence of the Report is , that with nearly every circumstance in our favour , except our long inexperience in war and our ignorance of the Crimea , wo carried on a mighty enterprise , with vast resources , in such a manner as to sacrifice thousands of

      British troops , to disgrace the nation , to throw a slur on constitutional government , and to risk a catastrophe which was only averted by tho magnificent qualities of the army , to which tho Committee refers in language of the most exalted eulogy .

      Church Extension—Church Diffusion. The C...

      CHURCH EXTENSION—CHURCH DIFFUSION . The Church of England is preparing a great effort of restoration . The movement ^ of Lord Siiaftesbury . and of Archdeacon Sinclair are only party , and not the most central parts , of a great whole . We do not mean that the entire body of tho Church is acting with unity of purpose , but it is acting in . tho main from unity of m 6 tive . That motive is tho restoration and extension oi its own power—a power in which temporal influence and material guarantees subservo spiritual control . Its leading inombora are aiming to recover its unity of action throng " the hierarchy which presides over the discipline of the Church , for it is in this that < he Church of England stands superior to tho

      other sects of " tho country . It has an episcopal staff that possesses in sonic casca nbsolute power . Unlike tho species of council which presides over tho action of the Disaentora , oven the most orthodox , _ the Bishops can agree upon certain proceedings , and carry them out ; and this powor many sections of tho Church arc labouring to

      restore . Lord Blandford moves tor _ «> commission on Cathedrals and Collegiate Churches , for the purpose of using tho bin aings and the funda annexed to those biuia-

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), June 23, 1855, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_23061855/page/12/