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    Sept. 22, 1860] The Saturday Analyst and...

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    1 ( 1 j < » '. j J SUCCESSFUL SOCIALISM....

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    Social Science And Its Congresses. Rt^ H...

    before your eyes , has grown into a proverb ; and eating pork in Turkey , or beef in J Endostan , when persecution and assassination would be the penalty , would certainly be inexpedient . But the real question is , ought such institutions , prejudices , and . customs , as those which inflict penalties on . the eating of harmless substances , to exist ? What is the test by which to try them ? The Hindoos and the Turks will say that their prejudices and practices , are perfectly " natural ; " that they grow out of the " inherent ineradicable instincts of human nature , " and will point to prejudices and practices in Europe , which , in principle , are every whit as irrational . Mr . John Stuart Mill , in his work " On Liberty , " ( the most recent work that bears on this subject which has been published by a really great authority ) , writes as follows >— " Every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit , and the fact of living- in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest . This conduct consists first in not injuring the interests of one another , or rather certain interests which , either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding-, ought to be con sidered as ing fits" The Italics are ours , and we are bound to say that this throws not the least light upon the subject . What does "injuring" consist in ? What are , or ' -ought to be considered , " rights ? In some parts there is a " right" established both by " tacit understanding" and " express legal provision , " that every one shall have liberty , in the local idiom , to " larrup his own nigger ; " and to interfere with that right is an " injury . " We shall never advance one step in moralogy and sociology while rights and injuries remain the vague and undefined creatures of the crude opinions and prejudices that not only differ from generation to generation , but simultaneously under every degree of latitude and longitude , throughout the Whole face of the earth . We want some fixed principle , independent of mere ephemeral opinion and conventionalism ; some real objective positive law or relation of things , not the accident , but the criterion and the test whether laws , customs , and institutions . arc of their own inherent tendency , happiness-producing , or the reverse . And the answer to the question , what does happiness consist in , will settle this inclusively . It is obvious to every one that happiness consists in the having and doing of certain things ; or , to use a term which comprehends both having- and doing , in the satisfying Of certain wants , or rather , in certain wants being satisfied . But it is not ia the satisfying of all wants that may be felt that permanent happiness consists . The satisfying of some wants may be pleasurable for the time being , and productive of permanent injury to oneself , or to others , or both . The wants then in the satisfying" of which the happiness of mankind considered in its totality consists , are those , and those only , of which every one is salisjiable by each person -without prejudice to the satisfying of all of them by every person . Because , if Jones can't satisfy some particular want without preventing somebody else , as Bbown , from satisfying that or some other want , then . the happiness of society will be interfered with whenever that want is felt and sought to be satisfied . If it be asked " what if Jones does feel that objectionable want P " The answer is , that that is a pertinent question in ethology , a very important branch of sociology which teaches how . human character should be formed by suitable influence and conditions , so that those desires and convictions only shall be felt that prompt to happiness-producing conduct ; but that it is not a pertinent question in moralogy , the province of which is simply to determine what that conduct is . To put , then , the above explanation in a scientific form . " The happiness of the human race depends , on the satisfying of that list of wants , every one of which is satisfiablo by each , person without prejudice to the satisfying of all the wants in the list by overy person . " It now only remains to ascertain what these wants which we will call legitimate wants are ; and having arrived at the perfect abstract formula we shall have no difficulty in the practical elaboration . To the point—^ -thore are some universal wants on which the very existence of the individual , and the race depends ; the want of breathing atmospheric air , the want of food for example . And the satisfying of the want of food by one person neither prevents himself from satisfying that want in future , or the want of breathing in the present or the futuro ; npr does it prevent anybody else irom satisfying , ia the present or the futuro , oithor of thoso two wants of breathing and of food . To those wo may add tho wanta of ' clothing , habitation , health , education ( meaning mental and bodily oulture ) , knowledgo ( meaning acquaintance with tho laws of our own nature and the nature of things ) , liberty ( tho disposal of oneself as one ploasos , not us somebody else- pleases ) ; and it will bo found that oaph of those principal legitimate wants ( as wo will call thorn ) 13 satisfiablo by eaoh person without prejudioo to the satisfy ing of all of them , by © very person . Eyon in tho case whore thoro was but ono loaf among a dozen people , and that loaf was got possession of and oonsaiuod by ono of them , tho nonsatisfying of the want of food by tho remaining eloyon would bo asoribable . to tho soaroity of food , or to its unfair distribution—it would b 6 an inaoouraoy or a qaibblo , or rather slieor nonsonoo , to say that tho want of food on the part of tho monopolist , was of its nature not satisfiablo without preventing the like want from , being satsiilod by othortt . And , to pi'oaood : —if there i & any othor waut yrliioh is satiailablo witho \* t preventing any ono else from satisf y- ing it , and ulso without preventing anybody from satisfying tho above-spooijlled principal wants of food , olothiug , < feo ., then it is a legitimate want that avory ono should have liberty to satisfy j and nny prejudice or belief that condemns it is manifestly wrong . Wo have eruimorated " hoalth" among tho prinoipal wants ;

    and there is an explanatory remark which occurs to us here ; it is a want that differs from such , wants as food , clothing , and habitation , in this respect—society , can , positively speaking , " provide that these last be satisfied in the case of any of its members ; while to restore an invalid to health , might be impossible ; but , nega- ¦ tively speaking , though society cannot secure health to a man dying of consumption , it can take care that no one shall do things prejudicial to the health of another ; and thus it can effectually secure to each the liberty of enjoying health so far as the acts of others , militating against such , enjoyment , are concerned . And this brings us to the definition of the terms " injury " " rights " mentioned above . It will be found that vague and uncertain as the word injury is , the thing signified is always resolvable into being prevented , or disabled froin having some want or wants satisfied . It is true that some wants are now considered " legitimate , " that are not legitimate , such as the want to hold slaves in some parts of the world , and that to interfere with the satisfying of these illegitimate wants is regarded as an injury—still the fact remains that injuries everywhere , in . the last analysis , mean the being disabled or prevented from satisfying 1 some want or wants . Our definition , therefore , of " injury" " harm , " is " the being prevented or disabled from satisfying the legitimate want . " And , as regards what are called " rights , " it will be found that these everywhere resolve themselves irrto the satisfying of some want or wants , though they may be in . the highest degree illegitimate . According to our definition , then , " human rights , " consist in the satisfaction of the legitimate wants . When it is said that " liberty " is one of the rights of man , all that can be meant in scientific language is that the want to dispose of oneself as one pleases , is a legitimate want , the satisfying of which is good for mankind and ought to be secured to each individual by the whole power of which society in its aggregate is master . This , of course , applies to human beings in their average normal state ; in some states of disease , for instance ^ it may be undesirable to satisfy the craving for food . And now to illustrate the . principle explained * by examples . Suppose it be desired to try whether the want to get drunk is a legitimate want;—we find that though satisfiable by each person without prejudice to the satisfying of it by anybody else , it is not satisfiable without prejudice to the health of the person getting drunk . Suppose the want to hold slaves be tried by this test ; : — here we find that while A is holding B in slavery , B cannot be holding A or any one else in slavery , it is therefore a want not satisfiable without prejudice to the satisfying thereof by others ; . moreover , it is subversive of the satisfying of all wants whatever on the part of the slaves , who are entirely dependent on . their owner ' s Avill , and who may be deprived of food , clothing , education , & o ., at his caprice . In this short paper we are necessarily restricted to the briefest outline of the theory , which , in its complete development , reduces moralogy to an exact science . Moral conduct , then , may be defined as that voluntary conduct which is consistent with the satisfying of legitimate wants by all mankind . If I can satisfy some want that I may chance to feel , without preventing any other person from satisfying that want , and without preventing any one ( including myself ) from satisfying the principle wants of food , clothing , health , education , knowledge , liberty ; why should not I be allowed to satisfy it ? There can be no reason , given why I should not , except that there is a prejudice against it in the mind of some individual or class , which is thus ipso facto proved to be absurd . And thus we have hero a t « st , furnished by a fixed objective relation of things , for determining whether any given law , custom , or institution , is founded in reason , or misohievous and absurd . True it is , that while cruel and irrational ordinances , usages , beliefs , and institutions exist , it may not be expedient in practice , to satisfy those legitimate wants—to do thoso innocent or positively beneficial tilings—which are proscribed and punished by them , But tho question of praotioaf . expediency is a mere . surfacC' -quGstion ; the mere A B C of the matter . What wo Want to know is whether a law , a habit , an institution , is in conformity with man ' nature and the nature of things or not , and this knowledgo is afforded by the test in question , and by no other method that has ever boon oven so much as suggested or approached .

    Sept. 22, 1860] The Saturday Analyst And...

    Sept . 22 , 1860 ] The Saturday Analyst and Leader . 813

    1 ( 1 J < » '. J J Successful Socialism....

    1 ( 1 j < » ' . j J SUCCESSFUL SOCIALISM . npTME in his old age and declining years—for doth not Dr . JL Camming advertise us that his latter end is near at hand ? Time , we say , is working stranger and stranger wonders every day . Wo settled it long ago that there was nothing now under the Sun" nothing now , nothing true , and it don't matter , " as the Yankee philosophor has it . As wo huvo advanced into tho middle of the enlightened nineteenth century , wo have all become more or loss utfecl up ; wo ha \ o settled it within ourselves that nothing could occur to surprise us , that wo hnvo fathomed tho depths of all that is wonderful , thut wo have oxhaustcd everything original , and , thnfc tho days of heroes , of strange revolutions , of romance , and of Utopian dreams , have passed away for over . But just as wo nro sinking into this comatoso ntnto of indifference , just us we nro folding our hands , and iroing to sloop , undor tho impression that tho day of fulfilment is over and past , uml that there i « . nothing loft for ws . to do , but to tlozo through tho remainder of our oxintonco , nml enjoy tho JruitH already . stored and garnered , lo , mid behold , nt this moment Old Time starts upbofore us in tho guiso of a young Iwrloquin , and plays nil tho prankY of his youth over again . No h % oefl " <> w''l-d ^ LookatGri 8 J ? rrJcG 4 KiBAUui ! jtfotW HtrwnjyoP Why hero are

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 22, 1860, page 5, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_22091860/page/5/