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    JtrCT 21, 1855.] THE LEADER, 693

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    THE WAR IN ASIA. The Russian generals in...

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    Modern Fortification. It Is Quite Probab...

    Whether the Allies take or do not take those astonishing works that have held them at bay now for ten months , the operations of the siege will hare demonstrated the utility of earthworks for purposes of defence . From this point of view , therefore , and in this important department of warfare , the military art of modern times is likely to date from the siege of Sebastopol as from a new era . It has always been the boast of engineers that any fortress can be reduced within a given number of days if all the rules of art be observed ; and indeed , ever since the Turks invented the system of approaches by sap , the power of the attack has overwhelmed that of the defence . Fop many years the art of fortification has been studietL with enthusiasm ; the object being to recover for the defence that superiority which it enjoyed before gunpowder vraa invented . A most implicated and perfect system was the result ; but it so happened that it was calculated mainly to resist an assault , and that it was powerless to resist beyond a given time a regular attack by cannon . The bastion system provided , for an irresistible fire along the ditches and over the whole of the ground in their front . But at the same time the besieger in attacking the bastion , an angular work of solid masonry , could plaee bis batteries in such a position as to rake the battery of the bastion and dismount all the guns , himself remaining exposed only to an oblique fire . While the cannonade continued the sap was pressed forward , until it arrived at the ditch of the fortress , when , the guns being silenced , it was not difficult to smash the wall of the bastion into a breach , and carry it by storm . Ifc will be remarked that the superiority on the part of the besiegers consisted in the overwhelming fire they could bring to bear upon a given point . The question for the defenders , therefore , was how to construct works so as to force the besiegers to meet a direct fire , when the chances are that the fire of the fort will be superior . MoNTAiiEMBEBT proposed to build stone batteries in tiers ; but to this it was objected that no stonework cau stand against cannon shot , fired from guns almost or quite con-¦ cealed from the besieged ; and the objection was held to be fatal . Yet the sieges of rSilistria and Sebastopol would seem to revive ^ the . plan , not , it is true , in stone , but in earth , ajid to give once more the system of defence a chauce of regaining its superiority . V It ie to Mr . James Feuguson that we owe v 4 h ( D ! revival of the , theory of Montalembert , improved by the substitution of earth for stone , ; £ nq to- the Turks really that we owe the reivijral of the practice . In point of fact , Shuinla is an entrenched camp defended by ! . earthworks , and very little dependent upon stonework . The redoubts of Shuinla have jbeen ; long iu existence , and were greatly imiproyed in . 1853-54 . Next came Silistria . It oWas , found in 1829 that the Russians obtained i « Wii » menscj advantage by seizing some com-. Winding , ground that almost looked into the iwaljn- Upon this ground , the site of the tJtaseian batteries in 1820 , the Turks confflkqdtcd earthen redoubts of the rudest kind ; v fl » MUey resisted General Schildkks and the . IVttflt :, Russian , army . But the new system Reived its fullest development at Sebasstofroj , nibMp ^ FjSRaussoN ' fl proposition is that earth dtJMd be used instead of stone ; that the guns of the- forfcresH should be so placed aa to wing to bear upon any point a heavier fire than can be brought to bear upon the fort ; from that point ; and that a ditch , wet ; or J ^ yg encircle tho works . This phin , poohllftptad by our engineers , ie iu actual opora-JtW &; fit Sebaetopol . There , whether by design , or impelled by necessity , the Busman

    engineer ToDiiEBEN has produced so perfect an illustration of Mr . Febgttsson ' s plan that Mr . Fjsbgtjsson himself cannot suggest any improvements . There are long lines of embankment , of great depth and width , broken into heavy batteries , in some places , notably at the Flagstaff and the Malakhoff , rising tier on tier . It is almost impossible to get an enfilading fire as in the bastion system . The consequence is that the fire must be direct ; hence the necessity for guns not only equal , but superior in weig ht and number to the guns of the enemy ; the Russians had heavy ship guns , we had lighter guns until this spring ; their direct fire literally smashed that of the French—hence the failure of the bombardments . It is obvious that as long as there is earth , guns , and ammunition , there are numberless chances of defence , only limited by the stores of food . It is also obvious that embankments are cheaper , and what is equally important , more easily repaired than masonry . Thus , to a great extent , it may be fairly considered that the Russians have demonstrated the superiority of the Febgusson system of fortification over every other . Its simplicity is , probably , the obstacle to its adoption by our engineers . But we must not forget that Sebastopol is an exceptional fortress , defended by an army , who have entrenched themselves around what really seems an inexhaustible arsenal , and having free communication with the resources of an empire on one side . In point of fact , the contest in the Crimea is between two armies , one defending itself behind earthworks , the other attacking from behind earthworks . Sebastopol is not an ordinary fortress , but a position . It also remains to be seen whether the effect of the fire of the Allies was really so contemptible in the second and third bombardments as the fanatical advocates of earthworks would have us believe . In the second bombardment the Flagstaff was rent from top to bottom , only a portion of one tier of guns remaining entire . The Malakhoff was nearly silenced , and remained so until the cannonade ceased , when it was repaired . The Mamelon was snuffed out very soon , although subsequently renewed . And in the last bombardment this redoubt was literally pounded to fragments by shot and shell . It remains to be seen , also , what effect both horizontal and vertical shell-firing will have upon earthworks , when properly applied . Although we admit , with the writer on " Modern Fortification" in the Edinburgh Review , that the balance of practical argument lies on the side of the earthwork engineers , yet we do not think with him that " it has heen proved heyond a doubt that an abundant supply of guns placed on earthworks may restore the superiority of the defence over the attack . " And for this simple reason that the art of attack in the case of Sebastopol was taken by surprise , and may amply vindicate its old superiority in the next [ encounter , as it has begun to do during the latter part of the siege . Wo would also remark that extensive earthworks require something more than guns to defend them—they require more than garrisons—they require armies .

    Jtrct 21, 1855.] The Leader, 693

    JtrCT 21 , 1855 . ] THE LEADER , 693

    The War In Asia. The Russian Generals In...

    THE WAR IN ASIA . The Russian generals in the Caueacus and Georgia resumed operations in tho spring on an extended scale . Powerful reinforcements had reached their several camps , and their lino of attack threatened at once tho whole area from Batoum on tho const of tho Black Sea , to Bayazid on tho Persian frontier . Between those points lay the towns and lbrtilieii positions against which the main efforts of tho enoniy - \ voro last year directed

    —Akalzik , Kars , and a series of entrenched camps , the keys of Asia Minor . Should these be forced , the Russian troops would enjoy free quarters in the most fruitful provinces of the Ottoman . Empire , and seriously menace some very important cities on the Black Sea . It is to be remembered , also , that Constantinople derives a great proportion of its subsistence from the Asiatic shore , which has , nevertheless , been defended hitherto only by the rudest levies of the Sultan . The only diversion to be expected was from Schamtl , who is now reported to be dead , and who is , at all events , pent up within a circle of roads and fortifications guarded by the enemy . In England , the public has not bestowed much attention on the military situation of Turkey in Asia . Intent upon the siege of Sebastopol , it cares little to know why , though a few British officers have joined the Turks , General Vivian , with his embryo contingent , remains at Constantinople . It relies also on the spirit of the Circassian , tribes , and trusts to the defensive capacities of the Ottomans themselves . Meanwhile General GuYOur remains unemployed , and no intercession has been made for him , because " Austria was our ally . " But the Circassians fight like Scythians , and have never undertaken to defend more than their own mountain citadels , and the Turks , in their Asiatic conflicts , have not emulated the achievements of their brothers in arms on the Danube . Among our latest intelligence i 3 an account of nine thousand . Turkish militia flying at the sight of the Russian standards , and disbanding themselves among the villages . Through their slight powers of resistance the enemy has made alarming progress , and has nowassembled , within a few leagues of Kars , a force of not less than a hundred thousand men . The town is prepared for defence , but the enemy shows in greater power than was expected . Englishmen , prone to judge all things from their own point of view , are inclined to regard with indifference the fate of an Armenian campaign . They forget that a position which the enemy undertakes to seize at any cost must be worth securing . The dispersion of the Turkish armies on the eastern side of the Euxine , and of the tribes which preserve a persecuted independence in the mountains beyond , has been incessantly attempted since the outbreak of the war . From an aft air of policy , as it had long been regarded , it became a point of military importance , and on the opening of a new campaign warlike movements were commenced on a prodigious scale . A vast increase of the Russian armaments took nlace in Georgia , and on the lower plateaux of the Caucasus . These forces were distributed with a skill and celerity which explain the repeated visits of the imperial family to that province of the empire . Before the combined fleets broke the quietude of the Euxine , a Russian squadron incessantly patrolled between Soukum-Knleh and Batoum . If other circumstances wero wanting to prove the value set by the Czars upon this remote territory , thcy ' nre supplied in the constant multiplication of hill-fortresses , iu the huge military road which traverses tho Caucasus , and in the numerous engineering works by which Russia has there sought to pierce tho vitals of a tenacious nationality . Remark , also , her expenditure of revenue and o h « manMo , in order to connect her Georgian diatucte with the rost of her empire ; her waste . ot ads ^^ v ^^ sg'SS z ^^^^ tS ^ p ied-a-tcrr <> < m tM ^ 1 « ** th © 4 * UK * Sea .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), July 21, 1855, page 9, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_21071855/page/9/