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Public Affaibs.;) THE LEADER. 645
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SATURDAY, MAY 21, 1859. ¦
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¦ ¦ ' •¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ . There is nothing'. so r...
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the disinterested declarations of the Fr...
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fact. It may be regarded as a test paper...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
Public Affaibs.;) The Leader. 645
Public Affaibs . ;) THE LEADER . 645
Ad01307
THEATRE ROYAL , HAYMARKET , jJUrider the Mana « ement of Mr . Buckstone . ) Positively the last week but one of the new Comedy of The World and the Stage , " and last week but one of the engagement of Miss Amy Sedgwick . _ , On Monday , May 23 rd , and every eyenine ^ dunnff the week ( Tuesday excepted ) to commence , at 7 , with the Comedy ^ of feSfeE ^^ SWfBSSSS-^ tef wS the Easter Extravaganza of ELVCTRA . wit * themagnificent scenery by O'Connor and Morns , and last ^ one mdFng wftn A DAUGHTEK TO MABEY . & a & KS & S iBSSSSc ® . ^^ ' * ^ toirnikhtonlS Miss Amy Sed ^ ck ; Jolante ( on ^ ha occasion ^ Miss Balan Zamora , Miss Emily Allen , Hostess , ^ AftSivhich , LEND ME FIVE SHILLINGS . Golightly , Mr . Bucksto . ne . ' ^ flSy ^& if v ^ Awnt terminates on Satur - fo * June 4 t Stagc Manager , Mr . Chippendale . OFFICE , NO . , CATHERINE-STREET , STRAND , -W . C .,
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Jm ** t X ,
Saturday, May 21, 1859. ¦
SATURDAY , MAY 21 , 1859 . ¦
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¦ ¦ ' •¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ . There is nothing ' . so revolutionary , because there ia nothing so . unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when ail the world Is by the * ery law of its creation in eternal . progress . —Ds . Arnold . ~ ¦ ¦ '
The Disinterested Declarations Of The Fr...
the disinterested declarations of the French Emperor , and to look to his character with its profound dissimulation , its long cherished ambition , and its unbending will , as affording ground for alarm ; we must also view the conduct of Prussia with considerable uneasiness . By resisting the wish of Hanover—stimulated by Austria—that a federal army should be assembled to threaten France on the banks of the Rhine , Prussia has certainly increased the hope that she will act with prudence ; but the speech of the Prince Regent , and the hatred to France excited in the minds of all Germans who remember the marauding campaigns of the first
r ^ ¦ . THE POLITICS OF THE WAR . fJlHE political movements of the Continent , if - *? less immediately exciting arc not less important than the marches and counter-marches of the hostile forces whose operations are now watched , with such intense anxiety . Were we able to feel cer-tairi that the conflict could be circumscribed in its area and confined to its avowed object—the settlement of the question whether the hateful dominion of the House of Hapsburg shall cease in Italy—there could be no hesitation in throwing our sympathies heartily on the side of France and Sardinia ; but we are not only compelled to doubt ^
Teutonic race . The interest of scores of petty princes will lead them to support Austria if their subjects will permit it , and thus preserve for themselves a little longer the baby game of Royalty in miniature , which they have so long been playing . Prussia has a difficult .. task to arrange this confederation of minor monarchs , and gieat ' allowance must be made for the obstacles to plain speaking that her position entails ; still we could wish to see her take higher grounds , and separate more distinctly the free Protestant interests of Germany from the Popish despotism of Austria , which is not , and never can be , a real watch the of
German Power . We should course Germany with deep interest , under any circumstances ; but we do so now with the additional motive that our own chance of keeping the peace depends very much upon the attitude she assumes . The French Emperor ought to be certified of the moral support of all Europe , provided he keeps strictly to the letter of his promises . There would then be some reason to hope that , af ter the bankrupt despotism of Austria had suffered a signal defeat , the Italian question might be taken out of the hands of the soldiers , and made the subject of diplomatic arrangement . If * however , Louis Napoleon should be made to feel that he will be thwarted by Germany , even in those points in which he is riffht , the chief blame will not rest on
his shoulders if the war assumes European dimensions . Immunity and approval for domnr anytliing that is reasonable , and in favour of the Italians against their cruel tyrants , or , oh the other ^ hand , a ° strong confederation against him to resist the extension of French dominions— -these are the simple alternatives that should be offered to the French Emperor . They would be just , and far more likely to keep the peace than the shuffling uncertainties in which secret diplomacy delights . The success of the French loan proves that the Emperor can readily obtain five times as much money as he wants for present purposes ; and with money in his pocket , and—as we hope he soon will be—with victory over the Atistrians in his hands , no one can expect that he will'submit to t rifling from any opponent .
Europe should be determined to offer him no excuse for doing wrong . Austria has furnished a pretext for one war . Letnot the Germans furaish a pretext for another . . ; The behaviour of Austria ought to unite all hearts against her . The retirement of Count Buol , and the substitution of Count Rechberg is a proof that unmitigated military despotism , and subserviency to all that is bad in Popery , are the principles dominant at Vienna , while the atrocities committed upon the inoffensive inhabitants of Piedmont show that the young Emperor is desirous of ie-enacting the scenes of disgusting cruelty that rendered his pet , General Haynau , infamous durinjr the revolutionary war .
Military critics were puzzled at the movements of Count Gyulai , and they have only become intelligible now it is apparent that they were the operations , not of a soldier , but of a marauder . Making every allowance for exaggeration , it is plain that the Austrians , instead of carrying on the war with the decent humanity of a civilised nation , have deliberately and designedly plundered and devastated , with circumstances of sepoy brutality , the unfortunate district of Piedmont , in which no resistance was made or attempted . Such _ a Power deserves the utmost execration ; and if it should fall under the assaults of the hero of the coup d ' etat , its punishment will , because it is more ignominious , be also more just . The mobilisation of a portion of the Russian army , said to amount to about 200 , 000 men , is a step rendered obviously necessary by the attitude of other Powers ^ and ought not to excite alarm , unless some good and japecifio ground for distrust should appear . If such a . movement leads to greater caution on the part of Prussia , it will do good ; and it should also bo remembered that , although Russia may one day bo glad of French aid in schemes not consonant with English interests , she can have no desire to see Napoleon Jll . imitate the aggressive conduct of Napoleon I .
Napoleon and his marshals , have created grave doubts whether the influence of the Court of Berlin will be exerted for peace or for war . *• ' Prussia is resolved , " says the Regent , " to maintain the basis of international law and the balance of power in Europe . " What basis . of international law ? What balance of power P are questions anxiously asked in all quarters . A vogue declaration of this kind looks \ ery muoh like a threat against France—not for what she may do , but for her avowed purpose of turning the Austrians out of Italy . Of course , the success of such an operation would change the " balance of
the power . " Europe might easily find another way of balancing herself but the particular balance now existing would bo overthrown ; and , unless compensation wore obtained by the union of Germany , Frnnoo and Russia united would be almost omnipotent , so far as the Continental States wero ooncornod . Prussia is weak against Russia , as herstratogiatshavo often pointed out :, through the partition of Poland having givonto tho former Power positions of groat military vnluo ; and it would be unwiso for her , or for any patriotic . Gorman to stand by and seo Austria depressed without making any movement to guard against the undue subordination ot its
Fact. It May Be Regarded As A Test Paper...
fact . It may be regarded as a test paper , proving his ability to emerge with honour from a competitive examination in the grand art of " how not to do it . " The thing wanted was , that a large number of ab . lebodied ¦ men , of various ranks and classes , scattered throughout the country , should , as speedily as possible , become good rifle shots , arid sufficiently acquainted with military movements , and especially with the art of skirmishing to render a hostile march through their own
district a matter of extreme difficulty arid risk . With some hundred thousand regular troops , a consider able force of militia , serviceable pensioners , and dockyard labourers , accustomed to drill , the country need not be anxious for a larger number of soldiers to act in masses and fight a new battle of Hastings , with improved results . What we desire is , that in reckoning the chances of invasion , a foreign power should have to set down every copse as a fortification—every hedgerow as a line of defence ; and look to a contest not only at select spots with a few thousand professional men , but to a harassing , tormenting , and deadly fight
with the people of every district through which an enemy attempted to push his way . _ . Were a moderate proportion of the four millions of adults that England alone contains anytliing like as skilful with the rifle as their forefathers were with the bow , and able to execute the simple manoeuvres that would be required , no fall of autumn leaves in a brisk gale would be more striking than / the way in which an invading army would be stripped of its members , and see them cast helpless upon the ground . With a country and a people like purs , we could reduce invasion to a grim practical joke that the most foolhardy despot would be afraid to
try . We cannot prevent our neighbours falling out . The Popish powers must hate us for our Protestantism , the despots for our liberty , and those who seek the false glory of conquest must see in us a people who , in defence of justice and civilisation , would be very likely to tear the ensanguined laurel from their brows . With the lapse of ages jealousy and bitterness may die out , but in the present state of society envy waits on proud positions , and to be as successful as ^ England is to possess few reliable friends . It is vain , there- , fore , to deny that we are surrounded by dangersT ; since the Peninsula war they have been small ,
because we have been relatively great ; and they will dwindle into insignificance whenever we adopt rational means of developing and methodising the resources at our command . We do not want a system of national defence which is the offspring of a panic , and destined as speedily to pass away , but a sufficient modification of national habits to permit military exercises to take their turn with those outdoor sports which contribute so much to the vigour of our race . The Government scheme can have no such effect , and is , indeed , int e nded to oppose it . It is not an encouragement , but a formal enunciation of obstacles carefully adapted to affairs
hinder Englishmen from touching military . In the first place , nothing can be done without the lord-lieutenant—a sublime functionary , dwelling in a paradise of Crime de la creme , far removed from the skim-milk of common life . Those who are very desperate for uniforms , and longing exceedingly for drill , may propose to this great person the formation of a corps . They must be willing to buy their own arms and accoutrements , and hand over to the friendly Moses , or the propitious Nicoll , a considerable cheque in return for the uniform which the lord-lieutenant may approve . They must be officered by any blockheads who ins
will help to keep up the political influence ot lordship ' s party ; they must be prepared to leave their business for eight days in each four months ; and take the oath of allegiance before practising the goose step .- They would be liable to bo called out on the recurrence of actual invasion , or thq mere " appearance of any enumy in force on the coast ; and to be ordered off to any" V ^ ° , ud ( l ? Wlthm the limit ' s of their engagement , « whether the same shall extend to any part of Great Britain , or be limited to any distract , county , city , town , or place therein . " ... Thus , for twenty or thirty pounds a yoar ^ which would bo getting off cheap , including pio-mos and dinners , tho loss of all the working days in a whole month , and much personal inconvenience , Junalishineii may bo permitted to contribute to tHe sa / bty of thoir country by learning tho use of arms , General Pool has recapitulated some of the advantages incident to this kind of soldiering , but ho
A DAMPER FOR VOLUNTEERS . Gunbr / vi * l ^ Ri- ' a circular on Volunteer Riflo Corps proves his fitness to bo a member of a British Cabinet in days when Parliamentary Reform is a dim oxpeotanoy , and not a palpable
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), May 21, 1859, page 13, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_21051859/page/13/
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