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    September 20, 1856.] T H E X E A 3> E B,...

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    NAPOLEON IN RUSSIA.. FTistoire du Consul...

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    A Matter-Of-Fact Metaphysician. The Scie...

    He is more at home in physiology than in anatomy , as may be gathered by the following : — Amongst the various uses of the parts of the hand are the following : — Employment of the nails in scraping , peeling , scratching , & c : scratching a person ' s face with the nails is a mode of conflict to -which women and children occasionally j resort . Snapping the fingers : when negroes snap their fingers it is a sure sign of desperation . 3 t is common to snap the fingers after taking a . pinch of snuff to clear them of the loose adhering particles . The fingers are sometimes snapped at a person in derision . Snapping the fingers is a common action with boys . Shooting marbles with the knuclles . . It is propel to add that The author reserves the right of translation .

    September 20, 1856.] T H E X E A 3> E B,...

    September 20 , 1856 . ] T H E X E A 3 > E B ,. 907 ¦

    Napoleon In Russia.. Ftistoire Du Consul...

    NAPOLEON IN RUSSIA . . FTistoire du Consulat et de VEmpire . ByThiers . Vol . XIV . D . Nirtt . The fourteenth volume of M . Thiers ' s work contains a history of the Russian campaign of 1812 . It begins after the passage of the Niemen ; it ends after three hundred thousand soldiers had expiated by death the irrational temerity of the advance on Moscow . The chronicles of the -world , says M . Thiers , do not record an act of policy so hopeless or so false . The undertaking -was at once unnecessary and impossible . Napoleon ' s real objects were in Spain , -where his armies should have been ; for them lie should have even sacrificed apart of his continental acquisitions . He might hiive guarded , the Vistula , so as to secure another JTriedland whenever a hostile movement was attempted by the Czar , and there fce might have : smitten the Russian Empire with far greater force tlian on the Dwina or Moscowa . But to follow the enemy across a region they had swept with fire , to be led into a vast interior without an accessible boundary on any side , seemed nothing less than infatuation . Russia can never be conquered , except by a European league sincerely established in the interest of European liberty . To defeat her at any point is difficult , to overwhelm her , impossible , feat to march upon Moscow -with Europe secretly conspiring against him , with hatred springing up in his rear , and desolation spreading in front of him , when by challenging an attack in Germany or Poland he niight have quelled Germany and Kussia at once , was , indeed , blind and desperate . Hoi * , supposing that the enterprize had been , in any sense , feasible , was it judicious . to attempt it with the means that were then at the disposal of the French . Emperor ? Legions he had , indeed , but not the veterans of Austerlitz and Friedland—these were perishing in Spain . A few , no doubt , still marched with Ney and Davoust , but were lost in the crowd ofyoung conscripts , some strong and insubordinate , others docile and weak ; so that the heroes of the old campaigns were incoherently niingled with soldiers who pined for an opportunity to desert their ranks , or -with recruits uriiriured to war . Three hundred thousand of the one quality would have leen preferable to six hundred "thousand of the other . There would then have been only half as many to feed , and , being fed 3 . there would havebeen twice as many left to fight . If , then , with such warriors as followed him in 1807 , Napoleon found it necessary to resign his schemes across the Njemen , was it less than desperation to attempt a march , doubly long and difficult , with the untrainedforces he possessed ml 812 . As ifJt were not enough to contend against disasters in Spain , where his most Irilliant levies had been consumed , and against the hatred of Germany still unappeased , he _ dragged an unwieldy host a prodigious distance , to fire the rage of populations among ¦ whom he had been hitherto only known by fame . It appeared as though lie must stand alone , as though the combination against him must be universal . Such is the moral of the narrative as presented ^ with ^ analytical summaries interspersed , by M . Thiers . He carries lis criticism farther , and from condemning the policy of the expedition , proceeds to condemn its tactics . Napoleon , entering Russia on the t 26 th of June , wasted eighteen days at Wilna . Throwing Davoust , with his division , upon Bagration , he supplied liiin with inadequate forces , in the idea that he ought to reserve to himself a concentration perfectly irresistible , in order to overwhelm De Tolly . Arriving at Witebsk , he again lost twelve days ; quitting that position , he hesitated , perhaps , too long to ascend the Dnieper as far as Smolensk , that he might at that point out-general the enemy ' s double army . At Smolensk he was seduced by a result , unexpectedly brilliant , into the fatal advance towards an liorizon that would have receded as he went , had he marched across the Ural , or towards the Frozen Sea , or the deserts of Tartary . At the great battle of the Moscowa he delayed hurling his Guards upon the enemy until it -was Xoo late to annihilate them . At Moscow , though he had formed a profound and elaborate plan for retiring upon the D wina , he suffered himself to be o \ er-Tuled by his subordinates ; then , though feeling the insecurity of his position , lie refused , from pride , to unmask his necessities and confess himself in full retreat , and preferred to procrastinate while precious days went by . . Again , having devised a movement through the beautiful country of Kalouga , where tie Russians might have been defeated , and the army fed , he sacriliced his convictions to those of inferior men . Compelled , at lust , to fly by the desolate westward route , ho made no arrangements for the march , and did absolutely nothing , personally , to mitigate the sufferings of bis troops . At Krasnoe , by an error of judgment , he lost an entire division . After the miraculous escape at the Berezina , he might have gathered up the fragments of his power , and struck at the enemy a blow that would have changed disaster into glory . But this he failed to do . M . Thiers , presenting this array of 4 mcontestably accurate' statements , affects to mitigate their forco b y supplying all the qualifying circumstances of the position ; but his criticism is as confident as it is penetrating . Every point in his synopsis , however , ia susceptible of minute and various argument , and it "would be pure quixotism to pronounce , any opinion of M . Thiers ' s military -views in their retroactive application to the campaign of Napoleon Bonaparte in Russia . We shall best introduce M . Thiers as the historian of that event by noting the opinions and processes of reasoning characteristic of his work . Searching for the causes of this climax of disaster , M . Thiers finds man } of a date earlier than that of the invasion of Russia . Various historians systematic npologists of the Empire , havo attempted to show that the disintegration of the imperial ai'my only began during the retreat from Moscow in the midst of insufferable cold , privations , and fatigue . But public docu- ' ¦

    ments , the correspondence of officials of all rants , from generals to prefects , prove that Napoleon had long ceased to command that perfect organization which -was one essential and secret of his military triumphs . By these witnesses the slow decline of the army . is attributed to the exhaustive action of successive and incessant wars , to the inconsiderate enlistment of youths of feeble frame and immature constitution , and to demoralizing influences creeping in hour by hour . In the Russian campaign the soldiers were overworked and insufficiently fed , the cavalry regiments were dismounted fey a mortality among the horses , and it was very early during the progress of the expedition that men , drilled under the eye of Napoleon Bonaparte ; became vagabonds , prowlers , and pilferers . Even when Murat , captain , of three myriads of horsemen , caracoled like a knight in the lists ^ resplenxlent with lace and plumes , long before the fires of Moscow had lit up , for » moment , the measureless abysses of the invaded empire , disaffection had ¦ brought a taint into the camp , so that the conqueror was better obeyed than loved by the half million of men lie was conducting to ruin . Moreover , what became of his protestations concerning Poland ? He was master of the Polish provinces , and his scheme was to detach them from Russia , that he might connect them witfi Saxony , and even tliis fantastic restoration - \ ras only to be partial . A population of sixteen millions , and an army of eighty thousand , he had flattered himself , would rise -within the Russian Empire , and clear the way to conquest . Such was his menace addressed to the Emperor Alexander . But -when the Poles solicited his active alliance , he gave them a . reply the most ambiguous and discouraging . They asked for independence— -the recognition of an independent Polish . State—and had Napoleon sincerely desired to cleave the mass of the Russian Empire , that would have been his policy . Instead of which he only attempted a plausible vindication of his acts in connexion with his avowed sentiments . He thought and felt with the Poles , he said ; at the assembly of Varsovia he would . have voted as they did ; he revered patriotism as the first virtue of civilized men . But he had many interests to conciliate , many duties to fulfil . Had he resigned when the first , or the second , or the third partition of Poland was attempted , France should lave stood up armed as the champion of the Polish people . Indeed , he should rejoice to be the restorer of their laws , and a part of their territories , when victory had justified the undertaking ; but he recommended them to act for themselves , with spirit and unanimity . Then was uttered the sinister epilogue to these professions . He had guaranteed the dominions of the Austrian Emperor , and would sanction no disturbance of his Polish provinces . 'Whatever policy there may have been in his resolve to maintain the French concord with Austria , it was too ppen a betrayal ^ of selfishness to tell the Poles subject to Russia , his enemy , that a Polish insurrection would be patriotic , and to tell the Poles subject to Austria , his ally , that a Polish insurrection would be seditious .

    In another respect his fierce passions , overcoming even his own aetermination , induced him to convert a political conflict into a personal quarrel . Having attacked tie Emperor of Russia , while professing the strongest regard for his person , he insulted himthrough the envoy Balachofly who had to report to his master expressions of irony the most galling , and stripped even of the forms of courtesy . The character of the Russian monarch was particularly sensitive . He loved to consider himself surrounded by men of genius , and was often imposed upon by pedants and pretenders . He accompanied his armies , but dared not assume the active command ; at length , indeed , as M . Thiers remarks , he was all but turned out of his own camp , and desired to commit the responsibility of the war to his generals . When , therefore , Balachoff came to Napoleon with Alexander ' s last proposal of negotiation , he heard , and probably was bound to repeat , the language of a patron and a tutor . Napoleon scarcely hesitated to avow that he considered his enemy as little better than a fool . " What a reign his might have been ! " he said . " I gave him Finland , I had promised him Moldavia and Wallachia ; yet he has been persuadedto join my enemies , and to make peace with the 'lurks , the consequence being that he will have neither Wallachia nor Moldavia . Besides , he would have shared with me the glory of conquering England . But he has preferred a Stein , a Wintzingerode , a Beningsen , an Armfeldt—Stein , who was expelled from his own country ; Araifeldt , an intriguing debauchee ; Wintzingerode , a French subject in rebellion ; and Beningsen , a little more military than the other , yet quite an incapable . There is Pfuhl proposing , Armfcldt contradicting , Beningsen examining , and Barclay not knowing what to do . And what a part your young master plays in the middle of thia mob ! 3 tf ow , I give you my word of honour , that 1 have five hundred and thirty thousand men on this side of the Vistula . What have you ? The Turks will not help you : they are worthless , or they would not have made peace with you ; the Swedes seem destined to le led by madmen : they had a madman for a king , and tlcy have exchanged him for another , who is going mad also , or he , a Swede , would not ally himself witli you . " These are but gleanings from a lengthy speech addressed by Napoleon to Balaclioff , who drew up an elaborate report of the conversation , * ' very curious , and evidently very impartial , " observes BI . Thiers , who writes with the original MS . before him . The Emperor went on to talk of driving every prince of Russian extraction out of Germany , and sending them , home without crown or patrimony , and of obliterating Prussia from the map of Europe . At dinner he almost asked the Russian envoy which was tlie most ' convenient road to Moscow ! Every person present , according to M . Thiers , regretted his language ; butM . Balachoff , forced , for the s : ikc of diplomatic < fidelity , to defend his government and nation , made one or two replies , which i confused the oracular autocrat . When Napoleon disparaged the civilization . of Russia , on account of the number of convents existing in that ^ empire , i M . de BalacholT remarked upon the circumstance , that only in two European L countries— Spain and Russia—did tie religious spirit survive . The parallel - suggested between the actual resistance of Spain and the probable resistance of Russia seemed to touch Napoleon painfully ; he kept silence for r a short time , as if disconcerted , and did not again riot in that supreme , liberty of insolence to which he was so characteristically addicted . Wo must return to M . Thiers ' s forty-fourth , and forty-fifth books for , illustrations of another kind . The incidents of the . march and the retreat arc vividly presented .

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 20, 1856, page 19, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_20091856/page/19/