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      1216 The Leajke. [No. 4.04, December 19,...

      1216 THE LEAJKE . [ No . 4 . 04 , December 19 , 1857 .

      Itttentttltt —

      literature .

      ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ W ¦ . ¦ Critics Are Not The Legi...

      ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦ w ¦ . ¦ Critics are not the legislators , but the judges and police of literature . They do not make laws—they interpret aad try to enforce them . — Edinburgh Bevieto .

      ¦ ' M ¦ : Wb Lave Just Received A Volume...

      ¦ ' m ¦ : Wb lave just received a volume that will be cordially -welcomed by our readers—Mr . Herbert Spemceb's Collected Essays . These papers , wlricli were originally contributed to various leading journals , principally the Quarterly Reviews , are now gathered together and republished in a single volume , uniform in size and type urith Mr . Hebbebt Spencer's other

      works . As a portion of the volume—* The Haythorne Papers *—originally appeared in our pages , and most of the other Essays were noiiced in . the Leader at the time of their appearance , we have little else to do than acquaint our readers with the fact that they need no longer hunt up these striking papers in the pages of the various Reviews to which they were at first contributed , but may possess them for themselves in a permanent and convenient form . "We ought to add , however , that these Essays pre-eminently deserve republication . Mr-Spencer says , in his preface , that the articles were severally written with the view of being ultimately collected in a permanent form , and that each is the result of a much greater amount of thought and labour than 5 s usually

      bestowed on Review articles . Ail who are acquainted with the author ' s writings will know that this is perfectly true . "With the most extensive command of special fact , and a wealth of illustration that brightens his pages with picturesque detail , Mr . Hebbebt Spbncbb ' s special power is philosophic , his chosen work being to search for higher laws . Every paper written by him gives the result of his search in some particular direction , and the value of his Essays , therefore , mainly consists in the principles they evolve and illustrate . In any special science he looks for the radical ideas which connect it with , other sciences , in any particular branch of knowledge the harmonizing principles which connect it with the whole . The volume before us affords an excellent illustration of his peculiar power as a thinker , as well as of the range of his

      labours . The Essays contain high and original generalizations in science and philosophy , literature and art . While , however , his range of speculation is thus catholic , there is , our readers are aware , one most important , but muchneglected , field of inquiry which Mr . Spencbb has made peculiarly his ownthe debateable ground between physiology and psychology . Of the rare zeal and success with which he has cultivated , this fruitful field , the new volume contains many happy illustrations . "We may refer in particular to s The Haythorne Papers , " and the Essay on c The Origin and functions of Music . ' Of the more political and practical papers in the volume we may note as of special value the one on ' Railway Morals and Railway Policy , ' which excited so much attention on its first appearance in the Edinburgh Review three years ago , and another on 'Overjjegislation / which originally appeared in the Westminster .

      The Marquis Of Nobmajiby's Version Of Th...

      The Marquis of Nobmajiby ' s version of the incidents of 1848 will not remain unanswered . M . Louis Blanc is preparing for the press a formal exposure of the inaccuracies contained in the diplomatist ' s narrative . "Written in the English , language , and inspired throughout by English feeling , this work will probably procure for its author such an English recognition as he has never yet obtained . It will prove him to be not only a master of English fiterary art , but an adept in English habits of thought .

      The Campaign Of 1815. Ijfatoire De Ut Ca...

      THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815 . Ijfatoire de Ut Campagne de 1915 : Waterloo . Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Charras . London : Jeffs . ( Fibst Abtxclk . ) This work of Colonel Charras will be welcomed by all military students . The campaign of 1815 must have a perennial interest for them . The book u written with care , soberness , and impartiality . It is perfectly fair to the English and the Prussians . Towards tie French army it is , of course , loyal throughout . It brings no charges against the Dutch-Belgians . On the other pand it unduly praises the military abilities of the Prince of Orange , a leaning that may be traced perhaps to an amiable desire on the part of Colonel Charraa to repay in some degree the hospitalities of the Dutch people , and the facilities afforded to the historian by the authorities at the Hague . There is also a deep tinge of personal animosity to Napoleon , for whose

      fallibility iio allowance whatever is made , an animosity which leads to some injustice . But for this it is easy to account . We set aside altogether any political motives that might be supposed to have animated the historian . We are sincerely willing to believe that his greatest object was the truth ; and ire can well understand the strong feelings of even a Frenchman , who loves truth , when be reads the stories of Waterloo written by his countrymen . It must be confessed , too , that the authors of these stories may be excused to a great extent , since they have founded some of their most flagrant statements on the writings of Napoleon . They were in the position of

      Colonel Cbarras before exile made him familiar -with the scone of the struggle —they believed , and he believed , aux Merits do Napoleon . ' It was a study of this brief campaign , * les Merits de Napoleon a la main / that raised doubts in the mind of ^ Colonel Charras , led him to the sources of history , ad finally landed him in very clear , and generally Bound , conclusions Mspecting the truth . The sources to which he had recourse were the literature of Waterloo , the archives of Paris and the Hague , and the personal ) Mj * timoj » jF or survivors . After reading his book , he says , " Un % mm « panitra peutrttre bien diminue ; mais , en Tevanche , l ' ann ^ e fr ancaise timjftra gtaa grande , la France moinu abaissee . " In plain English , the Praters of 1814 and 1315 are thrown wholly on the shoulders of Napoleon . TQus , it jpaust be confessed , is a noteworthy fact in itaelf ; but it becomes ¦ acre so ^ rhen "We remember tH & A Colonel Charras is not only a Frenchman ,

      mt a soldier with high , scientific acquirements and great professional knowft \ s not easy to compress into the space at our disposal even an outline of the astonishing events of June , 1815 , so as to remind our readers of the capital errors of Napoleon and of his antagonists . Although so short , being practically determined in four days , although simple and bold in its dramatic movement ^ yet it was so full of complicated incidents , so swift and grand in its development , so overwhelming in its issue , that , as we see , whole volumes are absorbed in its narration ; it attracts around Itself a whole literature ; the last word respecting it can hardly , perhaps , be said in our day ; it will certainly be one of the great subjects of speculation to the critics of all time . Nor could it well be otherwise with , a campaign destined to manifest the tremendous fact that the Nemesis he had conjured up had at length overtaken its warrior-worshipper ; that Napoleon , whose power had been , built on battles , had in battle suffered irretrievable defeat and hopeless ruin .

      Colonel Charras strikes the key-npte of his estimate of Napoleon ' s proceedings by endeavouring to . show that in 1815 he did not display that prodigious energy and fertility of resource in collecting , equipping , and organizing troops , for which he has hitherto received great credit . We will here take that for granted . Colonel Charras seems also to lean to the opinion that Napoleon would have acted more wisely had he waited for the invasion of France by the Allies , instead of becoming the assailant , and if he had used the grace allowed him to improve and augment his army . This also we will take for granted ; but if it were admitted that Napoleon ' s view of the course it behoved him to adopt were correct , then it cannot be denied that the moment chosen was altogether in his favour . He had the initiative . His immediate opponents , Wellington and Bliicher , uncertain where , if it fell ,

      the thunderbolt would strike , had scattered their troops far and wide over the country between Liege and CourtraL By an agreement with their imperial allies , they were precluded from sending even a reconnoitring party across the French frontier , and were , therefore , compelled to depend for intelligence upon spies . Napoleon knew the disadvantages of their situation , and resolved to make the most of them . Without a declaration of war , without any warning , he suddenly concentrated his troops to strike at the point where the allied armies came in contact . On the 14 th of June all was uncertainty ; on the 15 th Napoleon ' s troops , in compact and converging masses , rose , as it were , out of the earth , and sprang into the midst of the Allies . So well timed , so swift had been his advance , that when Napoleon held his legions in hand on . the left bank of the Sambre ,

      between Fleurus and Charleroi , Bliicher had barely more than one corps at Ligny , and Wellington bad not moved at all . Blucher does not for one moment seem , to have doubted that the ostensible object of Napoleon was the real one , and he hastened the conceal ration of his corps d ' armee . But Wellington , ^ always cautious , was more than usually so , because he was not so well informed of what had actually taken place ; and although prepared beforehand for any attack , he was slow to believe that Napoleon ' s apparent object was his real one . Colonel Charras takes great and deserved credit on behalf of the Dutch-Belgian general , Perponeher , for occupym < r Quatre Bras . We do not question Perponcher ' s merit , but was it not natural that he , on the spot , with such precise information as the actual

      appearance of Pires dragoons and cannon at Frasne , he should judge more correctly than Wellington , less perfectly informed , at Brussels . The result of the operations of the 15 th were , that Napoleon had indeed carried his advanced-gTiard to Fleurus and Frasne , but he had not brought up the rearmost troops into close connexion with those in front , so as to be ready for another spring in the morning . Bliicher had put every one of his corps in motion at an early hour , but at night had not half his army within reach . It was not until eleven at night that Wellington , then for the first time in possession of indisputable information , directed his divisions upon Quatre Bras . His sole justification for the delay is , that he was not informed soon enough of the irruption of Napoleon , and that he feared , even so late as the 18 th , that he would be turned or attacked on his right .

      Dans cette journeV du 15 juin ( writes Colonel Charras of Wellington ) , si mal employee , on no reconnait nisa perapicacite si profonde , ni son coup-d ' oeil si sur , nison activite si habituelle . S'il avait eu devant lui le Napoleon d'ltalic ct de Ratiabonne , i ) aurait pu payer bien cher , le lendemain , ses lenteurs prolonged . But the Napoleon of Charleroi was a different being . The day ' s work had overwhelmed him , with fatigue at eight in the evening ; and he had not energy enough to draw all his divisions into such a compact combination as would , have enabled him with the morning ' s light to have begun his design of defeating his enemies in detail by sweeping the Prussians from their half-occupied position at Ligny and St . Amand .

      Napoleon did not on the 16 th repair the error of the preceding day . The velocity of his irruption had alread y slackened . While Blucher was hurrying up to Ligny every soldier within his reach , and while the British divisions were marching upon Quatre Bras , " l ' armee Francaise restait immobile dans les positions ou elle avait passe la nuit . " Napoleon had miscalculated the force before him . " II oubliait ses lenteura , ses retards de la veille et du matin meme . 11 comptait sans la tenacity de Wellington , sans l ' activite , l ' audaco do Blucher , toujours jeuno en depit des anne ' es . Souffrant , in < l 6 cis , abattu , il jugeait ses adversaires sur sti mesure . " In short , he had lost the advantage he had gained on the 15 th , when at eight o ' clock , five hours after sunrise , he put the army in motion . Napoleon did not anticipate a battle at Ligny ; did not foresee any serious resistance at Prussians

      Quatre Bras . When he was forming his army in front of the , unknown to him Bliicher and Wellington were actually looking on from the mill at Bussy , and concerting a plan of operations . Napoleon was too late . The Prussian army , which ho thought -was still scattered up and down the country , was , with the exception of one corj ) 3 , in position before him ; while the English army was gradually drawing together . Into the details of the two actions fought on that day we have not space to go ; nor is it necessary : the results are all . Napoleon delayed so long that he had jusfc daylight enough to win the field of battle from Blucher , and no more . Wellington , in spito of his delays , was able to collect sufficient troops to defeat Ney at Quatre Bras , and to stand his ground . BotU these actions are related by Colonel Gharris with tolerable impartiality , but Quntre

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 19, 1857, page 16, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_19121857/page/16/