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    Max 19 r 1855,] qrmBi li-IE.AiPsE-Bl 4&9

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    The Maynooth Commission. In Answer To Th...

    sldered , at Schumla — threatened Odessa , threatened Sevastopol , threatened Anapa , threatened every place in tie Black Sea , while it gave security to the navy in its waters . It was , in itself , an excellent position . But , no sooner wa 3 our army embarked—no sooner did we « give a hand to Austria , ' who was about to rest upon ittban we withdrew it . I think that act of withdrawing the hand—of sending the expedition to the Crimea , after Austria had invited our co-operation ifl the Principalities—I think that that was as great an error in diplomacy as it was in warfare . I ventured to caution the Government at the time of the effect it would have upon Austria . We have never to this day been in the same position with respect to Austria that we were when

    that offer of co-operation was made . What did she say when informed of our intention to send the expedition to the Crimea ? ' That alters my position . I cannot venture to incur the responsibility of fighting the Russians by myself . You have withdrawn the forces that might have assisted me , and upon , which I relied . ' And what have we done , almost at the moment of entering into the negotiations , when it was of the greatest possible importance to have the cordial assistance of Austria ? What did you do ? You withdrew the Turkish army ; you sent it from the Principalities to Eupatoria ; you withdrew it at a moment when it was necessary for the Austrians to have something to rely upon . You left her ¦ vrith a line extending from the Pruth to the north of

    Gallicia , exposed along the whole line to the attack of the Russian army , with Germany , uncertain , behind . Can you complain of the conduct of Austria ? And if you see that Austria has been acting with undue timidity , impute it to your own mistakes—the mistake of the expedition to Sebastopol—the mistake of the expedition to Eupatoria . Those two mistakes have paralysed Austria ; and your army is now in a position in which it cannot assist the Austrian army , and you may depend upon it Austria never can give you any assistance . " Lord Ellenborough then pointed out the mistake of leaving our army at Varna in such a condition that it could not move . Had it been able to move , and had it advanced , we should have had more than

    120 , 000 troops , French , English , and Turkish ; Bessarabia would have been in our possession ; the campaign might have been recommenced from the Dniester ; and the first victory would have placed Odessa , Nicolai , and the Crimea , in our hands . However , it was determined to send an expedition to the Crimea ; but two conditions , essential to the success of that enterprise , it was impossible to fulfil . It was impossible to send a sufficient force of cavalry , or sufficient animals to move the army ; and the consequence-of these defective arrangements is , that the army has since been beleaguered between Sebastopol

    and the sea . The Government were also chargeable with great indiscretion in having sent a large army across- the sea , during the autumnal equinox , in four hundred vessels , without having sufficiently reconnoitred the place , and without having obtained information from any quarter as to the character of the defences , and the probable amount of the forces there employed . Any general so acting , and failing in his attack , would have been brought before a court-martial and dismissed the service . As regards the sufferings of the troops , is there any man who does not believe that forethought might have

    prevented many of these ? " I think the opinion of all all men is this , that however deficient may have been the system , it is not system alone which has to be impugned , but the conduct of the men by whom the system has been carried out . My lords , to attribute everything to the defect of system is the subterfuge of convicted mediocrity . ( Hear , and laughter . } Mediocrity succumbs to system ; ability dominates it , and forces men to effect what mediocrity would be unable to do . Public zeal , seconded by public

    ability , will impel almost every system into the right coutbc ; but that has not been done , and one of the most disastrous circumstances , in the contemplation of all that has been produced before the committee , is thus not so much the defect of system , which may bo remedied , but the extent of mediocrity which pervades the whole of the departments . It is this which has led tho people of thia country to tho very general belief that it is ab-. solutoly necessary to adopt another principle in tho selection of officers for public employments . I entirely accede to that . "

    Tho Reform Bill , in keeping out many men of faculty from the Ilouso of Commons , hud operated injuriously by limiting a minister in the choico of his colleagues . Thoeountry must insist , howovor , upon the necessity for selecting tho members of n government with tho solo view to their fitness for oflico . "My lords , how can wo , sitting horo by hereditary right , conferred , for tho most part , upon our ancestors for thoir services to tho Stiito , for their fitness for public employment , how can wo refuse to adopt that principle which ia tho principle of our own origin ? It wiw bocuuso my father was a great lawyer , uud not because ho wan a party man , that ho was soloutod for tlio groat office- of Chiof Justice , It was not favour ,, it wiim ( it . hobs , that made 'Mr . Yorko chancellor , and afterwards an carl ; it was not favour that made Sir James Harris a groat diplomatist and E « rl of Malinotibury 5 it was not favour that raluoil tho father of tho noblo viscount opposite

    ( Viscount Canning ) to the office , of- which the just reward was the title which the noble'viscount now'possesses ; it was not favour that raised the brothers Cecil , and made them the ministers of Elizabeth and Jamesthe founders of two great families . We are here by the services of our ancestors ; and is it for us to turn round and say to the people— ' It is true , our ancestors rose by their fitness , but our relations enjoy advantages by their connexion with us and'by favour . ' No ! I trust that you will adopt a different view for the interest and honour of this house .. I trust that you will agree on this occasion to place yourselves on the part of the people , and , adapting yourselves to public opinion , go to the foot of the throne and state there the complaints which

    you have to make . I trust that you will show that you are fully impressed with the greatness of the crisis in which we stand ; that you feel all the dangers of the contest in which we are engaged . I feel myself that , during this contest , protracted as it will be , we shall often have need of the support of the people . I desire to secure that support by identifying this house with public opinion . I desire to place the country and people on our side ; to present to the enemy we have to encounter the aspect of a united people ; and I feel confident that we should obtain a secure and an honourable peace by acting together , freely supported by the general affection and co-operation of the country . My lords , I beg to conclude by moving the following resolutions : —

    " ' To assure her Majesty of our continued support in the prosecution of the just and necessary war in which , her Majesty is engaged : " 'To declare the sincere gratification with which we have regarded the perfect community of counsels between her Majesty and the Emperor of the French , and have seen friendliness established and increasing between the French people and our own ; events full of hope for the future to other nations as well as to ourselves : " ' To express our admiration of the many deeds of valour by which the allied forces in the East have illustrated their brotherhood in arms , and our satisfaction that the brave army of Piedmont is now called to participate in their actions and in their fame :

    " ' To declare our persuasion that , amidst all their disappointments , the people of this country still retain the generous feelings which led them at the commencement of the war willingly to " place all the means required from them at her Majesty ' s disposal—that they will still protect the weak against the aggression of the strongand that they are not prepared to consent that Russia shall , by her increasing preponderance , so control the Turkish Government as practically to hold

    Constantinople within her grasp : " ' To acquaint her Majesty that , while we admit and lament the privations to which war necessarily subjects all classes of the people , we yet venture to assure her Majesty that they would in so just a cause bear those privations without complaint if they could feel that the war had been well conducted—that the troops had not been exposed to any hardships which could have been avoided by forethought—and that everything had been done , to finable them to achieve decisive success :

    "' Humbly to represent to her Majesty that her people , suffering privations on account of this war , have as vet had no such consolation ; that , on the contrary , we " cannot withhold from her Majesty the avowal of our conviction that the conduct of the war has occasioned general dissatisfaction , and given rise to just complaints ; and that we must humbly lay before her Majesty our deliberate opinion that it is only through the selection of men for public employment , without regard to anything but the public service , that the country can hope to prosecute the war successfully , and to obtain its only legitimate object , a secure and honourable peace . ' " ( His lordship sat down amidst loud cheers . ) Lord Panmure said that the resolutions commence with truisms which no man can contradict , continue with hopes in which every man mtist unite , and then proceed to cases of misconduct of the war . Speaking of . Lord Ellenborough , lie said : —

    " Ho has gathered his opinions from public meetings lately held—{ hear , and laughter ')—and asse / ts that until tho proper men are placed in tho proper offices , and selected solely with a view to the public service of tho country , an honourable peace will never be effectually realised ; or , my lords , to use tho quaint expression , of my bon . friend in tho other Ilouso ( Mr . Drummond ) , until the square men are placed in the square holes , and the round men in tho round holes—( laughter )—or , still more , until that party with which tho noble earl is now permanently associated shall turn out tho Government mid occupy our places—( laughter )—nothing will go right in thu conduct of tho Avar . "

    Lord l ' anniurc then explained that ho cordially agreed with a great part of the resolutions , but that , as other parts contain a censure upon the Government , he should feel it ; his duty to move that this quotation bo not put . When wo consider tho sufferings of our army , we must recollect that at tho breaking out of tho war we had been at peace for forty years , during which successive Governments outvied each other , not in promoting- the military education of England , but in economising it . " Tho noblo carl has attached groat blame to tho Government , becauso that army was sent into tho Hold iucanablo of moving . It is quito true there was no land

    transport attached to the army at that time . The oli waggon train had been abandoned ; nothing was set uj in its place by any Government , and when the army wan called upon to take the field , it was natural that tht means of transport should not be . sufficient ; but I am bound to say that every means , was taken to make that transport as complete as possible , and I do not believe that it was for want of means of transport that the army did not advance to the defence of Silistria . " The sufferings of the army during the winter arose from circumstances over which the Government had no control ; but the troopa are now in as gbod a state as when they left this country . From the beginning of February , owing , in great measure , to the

    means previously taken by the Duke of Newcastle and the Government of Lord Aberdeen , the army began gradually to resume its first condition , and to gain increased energy ; and since the beginning ot March the army has been deriving reinforcements . Notwithstanding his general charges , Lord EHenborough had not been able to show a single instance of any one connected with the war being in an unfit place . No one , indeed , knows better than he that it would be most unpatriolic and most dangerous to reflect upon the actions of men who are devoting

    their best energies and their lives to the service of their country . Nor had Lord Ellenborough set his hand upon one instance , in connexion with the civil service , of improper men being selected ; which , considering that he had advanced these abstract charges , he ought to have done . Lord Panmure then expressed his dissent from the opinion of Lord Ellenborough , that the reformed Parliament had failed in producing metf fife for the public service ; and , in answer to the complaint that ia these days Parlia =-ment is too much influenced by public opinion ,

    observed : — " I am one of those who think that public opinion is right in leading both Parliament and the Government , to a certain extent , and I should be sorry to see public opinion taking its views either from Government or from the transactions of Parliament itself . My lords , I now come to that part of the noble earl ' s resolutions which seems to me to pass a censure upon the Government . Now , I think it is deserving of your serious attention that three months have scarcely elapsed since we had a political crisis of perhaps the most extraordinary nature ever known in this country . During that crisis , the Government was offered to no less , 1 think , than four distinct statesmen . It was offered , amongst others to the noble earl opposite , of whose party the noble earl who moved this address formed one , at least from public report . Three months ago , the expedition to

    Constantinople , to Varna ; to Sebastopol , was exactly stated to be m the same position as it is now ; the neglect to carry the war into Asia was exactly the same as it is now , and yet at that time when the Government was offered to the noble earl opposite ( Lord Derby ) , and the noble earl who moved those resolutions was at the point which would enable him to carry out his views , that Government was deliberately declined by the noble earl opposite ; and I can hardly think it fair now that he should pass censure on the present Government for the position of affairs which he had himself had an opportunity to grapple with . But ia it for the good of this countryis it for the advantage of the conduct of the war—is it aafe—to be requiring within three months a change of Government , and agitating the country from one end to tho other ? My lords , this is a serious question , on which , I say , you will do well to deliberate . "

    Lord Panmure concluded by hoping that the present Government would be left to carry out their plans with reference to the conduct of the war . The Earl of Hakdwicke , in criticising the general conduct of the Avar , said that tho result of the blockade in tho Black Sea . was that the trade of Russia had been carried on through Prussia ; and tho result of the military expedition had thrown into tho hands of Austria two Turkish provinces . He called attention to the statement made by the Government last year that there was then a blockade in tho Black Sea , and to the fact , now disclosed , that there was in truth no blockade there at the time . f lll £ was a serious omission , since tho trade in the BlacK

    Sea and the Sea of Azoff ia of considerable magnitude . Then , with respect to the Baltic , it the uovernmont had provided vessels drawing only rom five to six feet of water , St . Petersburg would have been within the power of the / loot . As wyji'ds the Crimea ho thought that Odessa ought to have been fal ™ n by t o "let , because that town is the great emporium of supplies for tho . Bu « ian . army . Ho Kr ; : n £ : £ trt £ r S &*»^^^^ SS ^ . ss'r : & as ars « lord rinmiSS had noted to tho best of his power and aWllty ?« n ( J that therefore to him personally no bl hi in his in

    « mo r ^^'^ vLssed s confidence the "' KTrl ofBi o ^ expressed confidence the Go ^ Jnmont ? The condition of tho army is ra pidly improving , and the departments at home are toing S worked . He could no * seo that any wt-

    Max 19 R 1855,] Qrmbi Li-Ie.Aipse-Bl 4&9

    Max 19 r 1855 , ] qrmBi li-IE . AiPsE-Bl 4 & 9

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), May 19, 1855, page 3, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_19051855/page/3/