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    matter and both referred to Pythagoras t...

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    Sir William Hamilton's Lk< R Ll ;^ Lectu...

    William H amilton ' s division of the mental faculties is , tliat consciousness is not , as such P ^ 'ious metaphysicians as Locke and Reid ¦ had taught , a special faculty of the mind , but the universal condition and prerequisite of all ^ conceivable mental states . The , following words , from Lecture IX ., on " Consciousness—its special Conditions , contain a . clear arid forcible statement of the doctrine : —^ "In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental phenomena , these are all seen to comprise one essential element , or to he possible only under one nee ssary condition . This element , or ¦ condition _ is Consciousness , or the knowledge that I , —that , the Ego exists , in some . determinate , state . m tins knowledge thev appear , or are realised as phenomena , and with this " knowledge they likewise disappear , or have no longer a phenomenal existence ; so that consciousness may be compared to an internal light ,

    by means of wliich , and which alone , what passes hi the mind is rendered visible . Consciousness is simple , —is not composed of parts , either similar or dissimilar . If always resembles itself , differing- only in the deurees of its intensity ; thus , there are not various kinds of consciousness , although there are various kinds of mental modes , or states , of which we are conscious . Whatever division , therefore , of the mental . phenomena may be adopted , all its members must be within consciousness ; that is , we must not attempt to divide consciousness itself , which must be viewed as comprehensive of the whole phenomena to be devided ; far less should we reduce it ; as a special phaenom ' -f cnon , to a particular class . . Let consciousness , therefore , remain one and indivisible , comprehending all the modifications , — all the phenomena , of the thinking subject /'

    Gonsciousness having been viewed in its general relation :-:, Sir W . goes on to analyse its more particular modifications ; in other words , the special faculties of knowledge . They are these—and in then- classification Sir \\ T . iiamiltoiv is original : — I . The ¦ ' ¦ presetitativefatuity , comin-ishig external p erception and internal pei'ception , or self-coiTsciousiiess . IE . The : conservative faculty , or memory . ITT . The reproductive faculty , comprising reproduction without will , or suggestion ; and ' . reproduction with wil . 1 , or reminiscence . IV . The representative faculty , or imagination . V . The ulaborati-ve faculty , comprtrison , or' faculty of relations . VI . " The regulative iacuit y , reason , or common sense ;

    Anything more clear , exhaustive , and self-evident than this classification of the intellectual powers we cannot conceive . Translated into jwjmlar ^ unscientific language , it simply means this . The processes which our minds can perform , as revealed to us by consciousness , are these : — -I . The mind can receive an impre .-s . -non , idea , or item of knowledge , either from without , through the senses , or by introspection upon itself , or reflection . II . By memory it can preserve for itself and lay up in tfie store-house of remembrance such items of knowledge . III . These are recalled to consciousness , either by accidental suggestion , ^ or by the willed effort of * recollection . IV . The kaleidoscope of imagination can reproduce these ifomo nt * Ij-nn ? v 1 i » r 1 nrn in now nrtinlilllflfcimiS ! 1 . nd foi'lllS . ¦/ nuv % i Vrf *»» » . ^/ -- ¦ ¦

    4 > U >^ A * A ^ >* 1 ? * . V »» JW v * ,. . **>>* —•» . » .. — . ^ - » — — - — — / and so enrich the mind with self-combined creations . V . The faculty of reasoning can also reproduce for itself new creations , by elaborating and marshalling the items of its knowledge , into successions suggested by tlie relations of cause and effect , moans and end , premise and conclusion . VI . All those faculties of the mind arc exercised ' nuclei . ' the control , and in conformity with the supremacy of tlie reason , that is ,, * ' the power . the mind has of being the native source of certain necessary or a priori cognitions ; which cognitions , as thoy are the conditions , the forms , under which our knowledge in general' in possible , constitute so many fundamental laws of intellectual nature . " Such aro the necessary idea of causality , the conditions of time and spaco , & c .

    This is the skeleton of the Ilnmiltonian system of the psychology of the cognitions . Kswh one of the six ; divisions is most amply elaborated . And not only aro the author ' s own views slated with the fullest oxpatiatipn , but there in the most wondrouslv fertile and prolific citation of authorities , authorities of every ago and every school , authorities of every shade of opinion , authorities known as masters of philosophy , and unknown except to those who npproaoh vory . near to tho author ' s own recondite erudition . Tho wondrous learning displayed must strike tho most learned rcniior with tho deepest astonishment . That Sir "NY . Hamilton

    matter ; and both were referred to Pythagoras . The third . ' andfoiirth . the . two definitions of philosophy front its end > are , again , both taken from Plato . Of these the third is ,- —'' philosophy is a meditation of ¦' . deatH ¦ . ;** the fourth- — " philosophy is a resembling of the Deity insofar as that is competent to man . " The fifth ,, that from its pre-eminence , was borrowed from Aristotle , and denned philosophy " the art of arts , and science of sciences . " Finally , the sixth , that from the etymology , was , like the first and second , carried up to Pythagoras—it defined philosophy " the

    love of wisdom . " To these a seventh aim even aneighth were ¦ sometimes , added ,- —but' the seventh was that by the physicians , who defined medicine' the philosophy of bodies ; and philosoph y ^ the medicine of souls . This was derided by the philosophers ; as , to speak with Homer , being an exchange of brass for goidy and of gold for brass , and as defining the more known by the less known . Tlie eighth is from an expression of Plato , whojn the Theajtetus , calls philosox > hy " the greatest music , " -meaning thereby the harmony of the rational , irascible , and nppe tent ,, parts of the soul . "

    Of the manner in which the editors of these volumes have discharged their task , no commendation can be too high . The one , as doubtless most of our readers know , is the accomplished IVqfessqr of Mental Philosophy nt Oxford . The other is one of Sir William Hamilton ' s most distinguished students , and already known as a philosophical writer , by his excellent translation of , ' ' and commentary on , the Port Royal Logic . As editors , they deserve this high praise : they have done nothing more than was required of them , yet they have done more than tlie reader could fairly have expected . They keep clear of

    the impertinence ( and the temptation was strong to gentlemen who are themselves most accomplished metaphysicians ) of commenting upon the lectures themselves , or adding explanatory notes . On the other ¦ hand , the margin is frequently enriched with additional extempore elucidations , introduced by Sir William , m his delivery of the lectures , and obtained from the note-books of students , with notes extracted from Sir William ' s common-place book and miscellaneous papers ; and—greatest wonder . of all , and greatest service to

    the reader—rC very citation made , or -reference to the . opinions of others , by Sir William , is traced and verified by-the editors ; and the foot-note contains : the exact book and page where the passage . s . are tobe found . Thus , in the following sentences , to every name cited there is a note attached , informing the reader where he can at once peruse , the whole statement ' of the reviews reierred to . " Descartes distributed philosophy into theoretical and practical , with various subdivisions ; but his followers adopted the division of Logic , Metaphysics , Physics , and Ethics . G assendi recognised , like the ancients , these parts of Philosophy , Ldgie ,

    Physics , and IMiics ; and this , along with many other of Gassendi ' s doctrines , was adopted by Locke , Kant distinguished philosophy into theoretical and practical , with various subdivisions ; and tho distribution into theoretical and practical , was also established by Fichte . " To the first volume arc ap . ppn . dod excellent appendices , including fragments found in the author ' s do . de , written immediately before his death , < m " Kant and Reid , " " the Scottish School , " & c . To the second volume is attached an appendix to the whole , suflieiently ample , and at once al p habetical and rai & ann & ti . Who , with the smallest capacity of mental introspection , that hns ever approach urt- at * nn acolyte the steps of tho noblo temple of philosophy ,

    especially if led to his first worship by a hu , 'h ' priest ot the rites , can forgot the multitude of eo « llictin £ emotions , of wonder , awe , tho engcrwt curiosity , the consciousness , of . strength ami dignity , tho conviction of littlonesfl and innignificanco , tlmt at once ovcHloodod hi * mind ? In nil your previous education you have boon carried mvny irom yourself , into tho external world of jinturc , nn < l Uio past ages of history . You havo . boon lod in the past wondrous ' nrinH iiml a < mj )

    tuwas the most learned man that Europe has seen since Julius ; Scaliger , we believe cannot be denied . And there is the most thorough absence of all pedantry . Pegasus is kept in thorough control ; and you arc strongly reminded of the graceful and well-moulded eiauliteness of ¦ " Paradise Lost , " when you see in these lectures , studded as they are with quotations , and references , that so -apposite are the citations , so ' appropriate the context of original commentary or correction , ¦ th at were it not for the would hardl

    inverted commas and foot notes , you y know that more than one mind was contributing the ideas . The whole text runs with continuous and unbroken clearness . Apart altogether , from the high original merits of tiie lectures , their value as an eclectic manual of the history of metaphysical , speculation is unequalled-. As a fair specimen of the general style of the lectures , and as illustrative of our latter remarks , we extract the following on the- definitions of philosophy , from one of the nine popular introductory lectures .

    " The term philosophy , I may notice , which was originally assumed in modesty , soon lost its Socratic ami etymological , signification , and returned to the meaning of wisdom . Quintilian calls it nomeii insolentlssimum ; Seneca , nomen invidiosum ; 'ISpictetus counsels his scholars not to call themselves " Philosophers ; " proud is one of the most ordinary epithets with which philosophy is now associated . Tims Campbell , in his Address to the Rainbow , says :

    " 'I ask not proud philosophy 'To tell me what thou art . ' ' 'So much for the name signifying ; we proceed now to the thing signified . AVere I to detail to you tlie , . various' definitions-of i > liilos 6 p hy which philosophers have promulgated—far moiv , were I to explain the grounds 6 h wliich the author of each maintains the exclusive adequacy of his peculiar , definition—I should , in the present stage of your progress , only perplex and confuse you . Philosophy , for example , —and X select only a few specimens of the ' . more illustrious definitions ,- —p hilosophy lias been defined : and of

    —Tho science of things divine and human , the causes in which-they are contained ;—The science of effects by their causes ;—The science of sufficient reasons ;•—The science of things possible , inasmuch as they are possible ;— 'Th-e science of things , evidently deduced" from first principles j—The science of truths ,. sensible and abstract . ;—The application of reason to its legitmate objects ;—The science of the . relations of all knowledge to the necessary ends . ' human reason ';—The science of the orginal form ., of the ego or mental self-,- ^ -The science of science ; — The science of the absolute ;—The science of the absolute indifference of tho ideal and real—or , The ; identity of identity and non-identity , & c . & c . All

    s \ ieh definitions svre ( if not postively erroneous ) , either so vague that they afford no precise knowledge of their object ; or they are so partial , that they exclude what they ought to comprehend ; or they are of such a nature that they supply no preliminary information , and are only to be understood ( if over ) after a knowledge has been acquired of that which they profess to explain . It is , indeed , perhaps impossible , adequately to define . philosophy . . For what is to bo defined comprises what cannot be included in a single definition . For philosophy is not regarded frpm a single point of view , —it is sometimes considered as theoretical , —that is , in relation to man-as

    a thinking and cognitive intelligence ; sometimes as practical , —that is in relation to man as a moral agent ;— and sometimes , as comprehending both theory and practice . Again , philosophy may cither bo regarded objectively , —that is , as a complement of truths- 1 known ; or subjectively , —that is , as a habit or quality of tho mind knowing . In these circumstftneo ' s , I shall not attempt a definition of philosophy , but shall endeavour to accomplish tho end which every definition proposes , —make you understand , us precisely as tho imprecise nature of the object-mattor permits , what is meant by philosophy , and what aro lie sciences it properly comprohonds within its

    sphoro .. " Asa mattorofhistorylmnyhero , howpyor , parenthetically mention , that in Greek antiquity there wore in all six definitions of philosophy which obtuinod celebrity . On thoso collectively there arc extant various trentlaos . Among tho common tutors of Aristotle , that of Annnonius jlonnia ) is tho ohlost ; and tho fullest is one by » w annoymous author , lately published by Dr . Cramer , iii tho fourth voliuno ot his Ancoduta Oraeca Parinivn . iia . Of tho six , tho first and socond doflnu philosophy from its object-mnttor , —that which Jtis . nbout } tho third and fourth , from its ond , — -that for tho sako of which It is \ tho fifth , from its relative pro-eminonco j and tho sixth , from Us etymology . The first of thoso definitions ofphilor sonhy is— " tho knowledge of things cxlstont , aa ' oxistont . " Tho socond is— " tho knowlodgo of things llrlno and human . " Theso aro both fVom tho

    objectto contemplate tho J ticuiH of material erwlion ; your ullriKioii Iiiih beon occupied by tho jjivnt deed * tlmt other men < hU---iho rich words Hint olla-r men njioku . -It * i ^ cottisl » student , you hiivo i . |> fill H »« h moment boon at flchool , muk'i' ¦ iiiHtruclorH who tnuuht you authontativoly what you > im . « m'cui ) t uu < l hc . liuvo , bocauaq thov fold it you Kor , by the sad necessities of Scottish education , oven when a . t tho University you npnvonchod thoHli . dy ot tho lughorlwmaiuiioB , you wcro instructed , us a schoolboy , m the elements of grammar nw \ vorbivl ontioiBin . iho summer rooow olupHiw , nnd ognin you return to

    Matter And Both Referred To Pythagoras T...

    Ko . 469 , March 1 Q . 1959-1 THE LEADER , j

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), March 19, 1859, page 13, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_19031859/page/13/