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    December 16, 1854.] THE LEADER. 1181

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    that have touched us all have long ago proved it to the conviction -of the people of this country . If you are fending reinforcements now , why did you not send them -. here before ? Why are you , in the months of November and December , doing that which you might have done a year ago ? "Oh , " says the Secretary-at-War , " it is very well to tell us to send men , but where are w

    to mouth , and . have not calculated the consequences of what you have undertaken ; and now the Secretary-at-War is telling the whole country that when they wanted reinforcements not a man was to be got . I want to know if you were equal to the position which you occupy . If you really comprehended the circumstances you had to meet , if you knew the stake at issue , if you knew that you had to deal with the solution of the most difficult political problem of modern ages , then why did you not have recourse to those measures which you now require at our hands ? ( Cheers . ") The militia is embodied and you offer an additional bounty . Why was not the militia embodied twelve months ago , and why did you not offer the bounty when you declared war ? Not r a

    word did you then say . All you wished to do was to postpone the Reform Bill , without compromising your character . These things might do for a moment , mid the common strife of parties ; but now that we have our all at stake—when we have not a Parliament political , but a nation political ; when we lave the people of this country thoroughly understanding what are the matters at issue , such conduct is not to be tolerated . Of all the courses that ever yet has been pursued by a Minister , that he should call Parliament together suddenly to us , and , I will show , suddenly also to themselves , and to say to us , you shall meet , but you shall discuss nothing , is a course the most extraordinary , and those who are capable of resorting to such tactics are not worthy of

    their position or of the spirit of the country which it is of the utmost importance to sustain and encourage ( Ckeers . ) In what position have you placed us with respect to your management of the war ? Why , there is not a gentleman , on the Treasury bench who must not feel shame when he contrasts the spirit ia which the Baltic fleet went forth , and the miserable results which have followed from it . Surely , when a Minister manages the affairs of the country in such a way as to bring it into a state of war with the greatest empire in the world , you will agree with me that

    such , a position should not have T > een arrived at , that such d decision should not have been come to but after deep thought , and after the most ample knowledge of the nature of that position * You may possibly have expected that your negotiations would terminate in peace , and I believe you did , because I know that when a body of men counsel together of different opinions as to the assumption of a most difficult aud responsible course , however varying their opinions , they have the consolatory conviction that they will never be called upon to act . I believe the Coalition Cabinet from the first flattered themselves with the

    belief that the circumstances which they have now to encounter would not happen during their lives . I believe the First Minister thought so , following a course of opinion different to that of the Secretary of State opposite , who always upheld the notion that it would be idle to dream of war against Itussia , carried on by her cherished and almost spoiled child . I believe the noble lord , in the abstraction of his study , indulging in dreams of what ia called Liberalism , may have felt there was no probability , especially in the company he kept , of doing that which he only dreamt of in early youth . All tliis I can conceive ; and I know it , further , from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Manchester , nnd the budgets of the Chancellor of the Exchequer . Wo know

    no two of them were ever of one mind , and I do not suppose any three of thorn supposed the result would bo as they have found it . I still maintain that each man must have had an < vrrihre / lenace . Hut no ono mode up his mind , and I leave you to decide what ia your position , having involved the country in war . You ought not to have taken such a course unless you were prepared for all the consequences which men of such ability , knowlodge , and wisdom must have anticipated , unless tliey chose wilfully to shut their eyes . I said just now they called Parliament together unexpectedly . I object that the Government hna done everything unexpectedly Everything ia done too late—doctors , nurses—all cuinu

    too late . When the catastrophe which every ono expected came at last—a hurricane— your trniiMportu wore wrecked . The pioture i « not overcharged . I » it n consolatory ono ? Then , wider » uch circuniKtnnco . i , Parliament is called together to in cot sub tiihmtio , and even that ia done when too . Into , You prorogued Parliament to the 14 th , thinking it unnecessary to moot , and then you deny your former ( Utciaion , and are obliged to Interfere with tho prerogative of tho Crown by thu scurvy , as 1 xniyy cnll it , means of nn Act of Parliament , and cull us together on tho 12 th . I tmould like to know wlmt influenced the »« gentlemen wlion they recommended their sovereign to prorogue Parliament till the

    14 th . The same circumstances existed then as a few days after , when a different opinion was arrived at . This is no ordinary occasion , and I want to know why Ministers have changed their opinions . If it is necessary now to provide for an immediate increase of our forces , it was necessary when they advised her Majesty to prorogue to the 14 th . In this deplorable state of things we are only sustained by th « remembrance of the unsurpassed heroism of our troops . A winter campaign would have been unnecessary if Ministers had had more foresight and sagacity . It seems , however , from a passage at the end of the speech , that it is not to our magnificent fleets or our heroic troops that we are to look for a termination of the war , but a specific is to be found in an alliance which her

    Majesty has concluded with the Emperor of Austria , from which she anticipates important advantages for the common cause . I hope the noble lord ( J . Russell ) -will condescend to address the House , and 1 would impress on him that the House expects that on this subject he should speak with some degree of frankness . We are asked to assist Her Majesty to prosecute the war with vigour . I say we can't decide what means are necessary , unless we have some idea of the assistance we are to have from our allies . The alliance is an honest , sincere oneprecious , generous , cordial , and sincere . It is generous when we recollect the vituperative tone in which the Emperor of the French was spoken of , a little time ago . •^ Nothing is more creditable to the Emperor and the

    French , nation than that they have forgotten that , and co-operated with us in this war . I remember a . Secretary of State was expelled by the noble lord the President of the Council , because he expressed confidence in the character of the Emperor Napoleon . The First Lord of the Admiralty engrafted on his manifesto against Lord Derby's Government a diatribe against the Emperor Napoleon . I remember" another member of the Cabinet , not so illustrious , determined to outdo the right hon . gentleman , and not only abused the Emperor , but maligned the people of France . I recollect the present head of the Government raised an objection to the Government of which I was a member that we had shown anindeeent haste in recognising the Emperor Napoleon .

    jJut the alliance of France is ba 6 ed on . higher grounds ; it is an alliance of the people which required no secret article . A year ago , when the massacre of Sinope had laid low the spirit of the nation , darkened by the incapacity of the Government , the First Lord of the Admiralty rosp and admitted the misfortune , and said we all learn From experience . The . massacre of Sinope took place in order that we might obtain the alliance of the German Powersi Have the German Powers become your allies ? I do not yet see that there is a secret article in favour of Prussia , hut Austria has entered into a treaty from which we are to anticipate important advantages to the common cause . With regard to that treaty , the noble lord may perhaps tell us that it is not yet ratified , but that

    when ratified it will be laid on the table . I can hardly believe , however , that a man of the great abilities and lofty spirit of the noble lord will make such a wretched excuse . It is not an unusual thing , when a Minister is demanding from the House of Commons great sacrifices for his Sovereign , that ho should say what is the simultaneous assistance we are to derive from those allies . If this assistance ia to be clogged with some cumbrous machinery , the intervention , perhaps , of what are called the " Four points , " then , I say , it will be the greatest hallucination over heard of to imagine that Austria is going to supply any of its means . The present Coalition Government was formed on four points ( a lattghy—1 st , the preservation of peace ; 2 nd , the

    extension of free trade ; 3 rd , Parliamentary reform ; and 4 th , national education ; but if these Austrian points are not easier of accomplishment than those which tho noblo lord promised us , and for which some gentlemen sacrificed their principles and some only their party ( laughter ) , but for which the noble lord sacrificed both , 1 for ono shall certainly feel that wo are not in a , position to receivo much encouragement from theso promises of tho Austrian Government . If tho Government will not be frank on thia subject to the House , it will , I venture to say , be wise in them to be frank to the people of this country . The spirit at least of that

    Austrian alliance ought , to bo communicated to the Houso of Commons Tho country ought to know if Austria is to act , or merely to watch the gamo and profit by it in tho end ? Ia it nn offensive and defensive alliance i * Will who send troopH ? Ia she to bo an ally that -will ratify her alliance in blood , like tho French ? If wo do not hear that to-night , then thia meeting of Parliament , and Una communication from her Majesty , will not huvo the effect which 1 earnestly desire . 1 nay , for mo no Austrian assistance— no four points , no secret Article ; but lot Franco nnd England together hoIvo thiH groat question , and establish and secure tho civilisation of Europe ( Cheers . ')

    Lord Joim KiJHHici . i .: Tho right , honourable gentleman opposite , tho member for Droitwich , in n flpcech of remarkable ability , and at thu namo time an 1 thought of groat . fniriMJHu , nuked for nn explanation from tho « crvaiits of the Crown with regard to novoral circmnHtanccR upon which ho had conceived doubt , with regard to Huveml objections whiuh hu entertained to tho policy that had been punmed . Arid he ended with miying , an I understood him , that although lvo entertained those

    objections they did not appear to him to amount to such a charge against her Majesty's Ministers as to induce him to take part in any effort to cause a change of Ministry ; but that if hereafter he should not find that they were carried on according t © what he believed to be the true policy of the country , lie would think himself justified to make some parliamentary effort for that purpose . Ttat declaration itself was a satisfactory one ; aud with the conduct of the right honourable baronet I have no fault to find . But the right honourable gentleman who has just spoken , has spoken in a totally different spirit . While his right honourable friend does not propose to displace Ministers , he has endeavoured by every means in his power to weaken the confidence

    ¦ which the country may feel in their efforts ; he has endeavoured to weaken the alliance between this country and France , and has raised every objection that his fertile mind can create with respect to an alliance upon which we have recently entered ; he has said everthing moreover -which was calculated to damp the hopes which this country indulged of a glorious termination to the war . Sir , I cannot say , therefore—after the speech of the right honourable baronet the member for Droifrwitch , and especially the feeling manner in which he referred to two members of the House , one of whom is now no more—that there was one germ of patriotism in the speech of the right honourable gentleman the member for Buckinghamshire . ( Cheers . ') The right honourable

    gentleman began with a most curious prologue , which seemed to me at this late hour of the night to be peculiarly unnecessary . He began with a protest in favour of liberty of speech in this House , and said itwas his determination to resist any attempt which Dlinisters might make to suppress the usual freedom of speech which you , sir , ask from her Majesty at the beginning of every session . I ani accused sometimes of never speaking without offering an encomium upon . Magna Charta . ( A laugh . ) Were I to do so now , it certainly would not be more out of place and unnecessary than the right honourable gentleman's eloquent vindication of the liberty of speech . We certainly have a very grave question before us , and we are engaged in a great war . The right honourable

    gentleman says , that we never conceived the magnitude and power of the enemy . Isfow tlie ri ght honourable geiitleman the member for Droitwitch alluded to a speed of mine made last session , which has induced me to look back to the report that was given of it at the time , and I find these yords in it . " It is in this mighty contest that Europe is engaged , and it were to mislead the House if I were to say that , being engaged with such an , enemy of immense power , of great influence and talent , we yet hoped for an early termination of the contest . " That shows , at . all events , that I did not attempt to diminish the greatness of the contest in which we were engaged . But , sir , with regard to the mode of carrying on the contest , although certainly I shall not attempt to

    go over the ground which my right honourable friend the Sccretary-at-War went over with such remarkable ability , dividing « nd illustrating every detail with spirit and eloquence , yet , sir , there are some points of this contest which . I shall venture to touch upon before tho debate closes ; and , first , I would speak with respect to the army which we sent to the East . That army so sent out at the request of Omar Pasha , took up a position at Varna and its neighbourhood ., by which it was supposed that afterwards it would be made use of to raise the siege of Silistria . The right honourable gentleman says we have not yet declurcd whether that army was provided with the means of transit ; but I will again say on that subject that means of transit were provided ,

    and had tho siege not been raised , no doubt they would have been used , by Lord Raglan . Again , my honourable , friend tho member for Aylesbury complains that tlio army was landed in tho Crimea without being at once provided with tho means of transport . Why , docs lie suppose that lord Raglan could have sent orders for such means with tho enemy clone upon him when he landed ? Still there were means provided at Varna and its neighbourhood , but the main question was whether such an expedition should bo undertaken . In considering that question I beg the IIouho to consider what must have been the alternative to that . We had sent an army to assist Turkey ; not only an Knglish but n French army was assembled in that country , nnd tho Danube having been reerosscd by the enemy , what wan the courses open to us ? Should wo have taken tho army back to Constantinople , nnd allowed it to remain there tho rcMtoi "

    tho mimmcr ? No ; it xs quite obvious such a course would have been a great disappointment to the people oi thin country ; it would have been a great disappointment to tho army itself , and tho national spirit would hnva been nhukcn by taking a couvho which implied so great , a funv of tho forcOH of KuHsin . Well , then , ( should we order tho army across tho Dnimliu to not iiguiiiNt the KuhhIiui nrmyV If we hud done i-o , -wu should have been met , by the immense force * collected in llotwurnuiu , ami therefore no siurh movement could h-nvo boon uudcirtulctn with any i-flWt , There ronmimid ,, therefore , tho question of tho expedition to tho Crimea , « i « l although there were ninny purlieu ngalnrtt lliat expedition , there wer « some of tl »« nMi'st . »> cn both in the French nrmy and licet and lite Knglihh nrmy and Hoot -who Hpoko with confluence of nurli an expedition . 1 comfuHN 1 wu « ono of thoHO who lei * ooH ( Wloiie « iu it . 1 believed it was a great riok , but I bolicved there iv «» a great object to bo

    December 16, 1854.] The Leader. 1181

    December 16 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 1181

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 16, 1854, page 5, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_16121854/page/5/