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    1180 THE LEADEB, . [Saturday,

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    On Tuesday, The Queen Opened The Third S...

    ternal circumstances that be was prepared to propose a reconstruction of this House ; and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer , when called upon in his official capacity to propose the first vote for the carrying on of the war , anticipated , not merely the expenditure necessary for the transport of troop 9 , but the expenditure necessary for the return of those troops to this country all in the course of the year . I think , therefore , sir , it is necessary for us to consider the great importance of this phrase . Last year the noble lord said that he did not consider evea a war with Russia was a circumstance which ought to prevent a reform in Parliament , if the country thought a reform of Parliament was necessary . The noble lord now has found out that this is a

    great and not an insignificant war . The Chancellor of the Exchequer , when lie was of such a sanguine complexion that on his first proposition of expenditure he anticipated , in the very language of his speech , that the troops would return to this country in the course of the year , proved to the House that the war would not be a war really , but a demonstration . ( Cheers . ) I am not now imputing it to the Government as matter of blame ; at the same time I reserve to myself the right to impute it to them as matter of blatae ( laughter ); but I say it is quite clear that the Ministers of this country , at the 'commencement of last session , had no conception whatever of the position in which they were , or of the magnitude of the circumstances which they had to encounter .

    ( Ckeers . ) My right hon . friend the member for Droitwich has , I think , indicated , under these circumstances , thfe course which a Conservative Opposition , rightly distinguished from other Oppositions to which he has referred ; is justified iii taking . When her Majesty appeals for support—Tvhen heT Majesty tells us that she is involved in a great war , and asks us for our assistanceit is our dutyj uader those circumstances , to express to her Majesty that there are no means at our command that we will not place at her disposal ; but surely , if it is so evident , so demonstrative , so transparent that her Majesty's advisers find themselves in a position which they did not anticipate- —which , they had not the prescience or sagacity to suppose would occur—it snrely is

    Aot an unreasonable or factious course that , while we ^ ay we are prepared to support her Majesty in -this great struggle by every means in OTir power , we reserve to ourselves the right of expressing an opinion on the conduct of the Government in respect to this war in the interval , and' to judge from that conduct of the manner in which : they may spend the resources which , we may place at ' their ; disposal . - ( Cheers . ') We have had a speech from the only Minister who has condescended to address the Honse ' of Commons tmi 8 suddenly summoned . We have had a speech of detail—I may

    say of statistics — adverting to" subjects which never have been introduced into out discussions , and which lave xeaUy in . no sense met the great objection which has been urged by my right honourable friend . The Secretary-at-War has proved to us , according tohisview , that the hospitals at Scutari at this moment are admirably attended to and regulated . I lope they are . I am Trilling to believe , upon the statement of the right hon . gentleman , that they are in that position . The right hon . gentleman has endeavoured to persuade us that the medical assistance which the

    army enjoys is sufficient , ' or , at least , as great as any Ministerial ability could have supplied . I hope that it is so . All that the riglthon . gentleman says I entirely believe . But , were it otherwise—if it were true that there had been this cruel suffering and apparent neglect —if it were true that the commissariat (" which no one has attacked , but which the right hon . gentleman has so elaborately vindicated ) had been so deficient—if there had been too few servants , too few nurses , and a meagre commissariat , I am sure that I should not lave been one who would have attemptedj from such a circumstance , to bring- a charge against ' tie Administration of this country . I remember- —and I may refer to the words , for 1 dare eay no one else remembers thorn—that

    , having last year to touch on this subject , 1 said to myself that at tho beginning of -war , after a peace so prolonged as that which "wo were so blessed by Providenco to enjoy , the difficulties of inexperience must be so great that it would be moat unwise and unbecoming for tho Houbo of Commons critically to examine tho conduct of individuals who , after all , must be animated by sentiments as humane and influenced by responsibility niucl greater than tvo ourselves can feel . And to night , Sir , I have not heard any expressions uBod in this house impugning tho arrangements of tie commissariat or arrangements of a Burnlar kind to which I have adverted ; but to accusations that may have appeared in nnony-. rnous quartern tho right hon . gentleman h « s found time

    to make nn olaborato answer , though no member of tho Qovornmont las found timo to inako an answer to charges brought in debate aguiiiBt the Administration by a member of this House , expressed with a knowledge of tho subject , and convoyed with ability , ami In a spirit deserving , in my opinion , the thought and attention of this assembly . ( Chenra . ) I will advert in a momont to ^ vhat was the charge brought forward by my right Ion . friend—a charge , lot me again impress on this House , not brought forward in tho way of ostentatious accusation as tho foundation of motions against tho Government- ^ - not brought forward with nny anxiety to damage ther character , tho position , or tho conduct of tho Government , but brought forward necessarily from

    the position -winch -we all occupy at this moment , from the sudden summoning of Parliament , which calls upon us , by the motion of the hon . gentleman opposite , in a certain sense—I admit in a restricted and limited degree—to express our opinion on public affairs . Before I adveort to what was the distinct and really the only charge , yet so important that no other was necessary , which , has been made by my right hon . friend , let me for a moment take this great question out of that cloud of the details of office with wlich it has been conveniently encumbered by the Secretary-at-War , and place it in its true and rude simplicity before the consideration of the House of Commons and of the country . It is some nine or ten

    months ago , after an agitating year of warning , that her Majesty was advised by her Ministers to send a message to Parliament to announce a declaration of war against Bussla . I say that no Ministers ever gave such important advice to their Sovereign under such , favourable circumstances as my Lord Aberdeen and has colleagues . Why , look at tie facts ! They lad a unanimous Parliament , and a unanimous people . The war was popular . Tlis House had expressed its willingness to vote any supplies , without any reference to party confidence " whatever , which her Majesty ' s Ministers might propose . Tley had an overflowing Exchequer , They had a prosperous people . In addition to all tlese advantages , they lad tie most powerful ally in tie world .

    ( Cheers from both sides qf the House . ") Let it be understood , you entered upon war under these circumstances . These circumstances are forgotten in the petty views and the petty details and the petty consequences which steal into our debates on this subject . We hear of the inconvenience of free Government to powerful political action . It is said that , although the public spirit under a despotic Government may not be equal to the spirit of a free people—that , although the conscript ( not too adroitly mentioned by the Secretary-at-War ) may not fight as the militiaman who has been voluntarily enlisted , a despotism has still the advantages of unity of design , of singleness of purpose , and of that decision , vigour , and effect which is tie consequence of such antecedents . But

    her 3 Iajesty ' s Ministers had all the unity of despotism and alltlespirit of a free people on tleuc side . ^ Vtat they wanted they might lave had as readily as tie Emperor of Kussia wlen le signs a ukase . Tlere was no number of men , no amount of treasure , -wlicl tley might not have commanded , and- ¦ tie money was given' freely by a free people , and the ¦ men . were animated by tlat immortal spirit wlicl has rendered their achievements the mark for the approbation of an admiring world . ( JJkeers , ') They have , they say , an overflowing purse , prosperous people j and a popular war . They have the most powerful ally in the world ; Tley have tlis combination of circumstances in their favour , on entering into this war , which no Minister at any

    period ever enjoyed before . I now ask the House fora moment to turn'round and consider not whether there were sufficient nurses or surgeons at Scutari—not what should be the amount of pots of marmalade which should be sent out towards the support of our starving troops—but I ask this House to consider -what has been the effect whicl this Ministry , with these enormous and ever-increasing advantages , have obtained . ( Opposition cheers . ) Tou determined to attack the powerful ruler of a country against whom yon had declared war in two opposite quarters of the world— the extremities almost of his vast dominions ; you fitted out arnnatlas to attack him in two seas ; you sent out an army which was to attack him in tie most important fortress in Europe .

    Wlat have you done ? The Sccietary-at-War sneers at tie notice which my right Ion . friend lad taken of tho achievements in the Baltic . If tho ideas of the Secretnry-at-War , tlat the national success is a sufficient return for the efforts of tlis country , are correct , and tlat our success is to bo measured by our achievements in the Baltic , tlen I confess I have little lope , and I shall have less hope than I at present possess of the successful conduct of tie -war , if carried on by the present Government . Wly , sir , let mo recal to the House thus strength of tho united fleet that entered tho Baltic . It was greater than any armada that over figured in the history of our times j it was greater than tho united fleets of ITrance nnd Spain that met Nelson at Trafalgar .

    Lot mo recal to tho House the circumstances under TV-Inch that important fleet was inaugurated . It occasioned'a debate in tho House of Commons , and thoroforo I hove no " doubt it will be in tho recollection of every one present . Tho head of tho Admiralty of this country , tie profound statesman and experienced senator who had so long presided , at various periods , over that department himself , was' a guest at a public dinner which was given to tho commander of tint important imtorpriao . A ¦ most experienced statesman of tlo country ,, one who had presided so long over tho foreign

    affairs oif tho nation , a department wliioli , it is supposed , Imparts jv peculiar character of discretion to human conduct—that noble lord was also pronont upon that occaeion , and in the face of ICuropo , nnd b « foro an admiring , an applauding England- —those , two of tlo men of whom , in this House , wo a * o mont proud , two of tho statesmen to whom Europo looks up with the moat respect , tho most dread , tho most awothose tTvo statesmen wore present as tho principal guests of a public banquet given at a political club , in ordor to inaugurate tho captaincy of * l » i » groat

    untorpnse . What were the expectations wbich tlese speakers permitted the country to indulge in ? We are at this moment entirely engrossed in the important affairs which have taken place in the Black Sea . Fot more than two months the feelings of every hearth in this country have been absorbed ; but at that moment no one thought of the Black Sea or of Sebastopol . They were of minor importance , and of diminutive proportions as compared with those vast preparations , and . that enormous armament which was draughted from our shores under the blessings and the benison of our most exper ienced statesmen , and it had the advantage , moreover , of being commanded by a true Reformer . ( Laughter ?) " Well , the Secretary-at-War pretended that

    the capture of Boinarsund was all that was intended or thought of for the moment . I will not say -whether the Secretary-at-War never heard of Uomarsuud , because he is a well-informed gentleman , and it might be personal , but this I do know , that I have read , in a very authoritative document , that it was not only projected , but at one time it was settled , that Bomarsund and the fortifications in tie Baltic slould be destroyed , preparatory to the entrance of our fleets into that sea , and therefore , under those circumstances , and remembering the policy which was afterwards partially followed * I hardly think it was worth while to send for a Marshal of France and 10 , 000 French troops to destroy that wlich a company of marines would have finished in a few hours , and -which , at all events , tvas not accomplished by that vast armada which lad been sent out . Surely , tlen , my right Ion . friend was not irregular in

    alluding to the expedition to the Baltic , and saying that , altlough one of our greatest enterprises , it las not been attended by any results at all commensurate with the expectations of the country . Why did not the noble lord the President of -the Council propose a vote of thanks to those who were concerned in tlat enterprise ? ( Cheers from the Opposition . ) Had the noble lord proposed such a vote , I should lave been glad , for we should have been enabled to make inquiries , arid the Ministers might have been able to throw some light on that perplexed and obscure subject , and might have afforded some satisfaction to the public mind . Then , sir , I come to the second-rate scene in which the 'Government are concerned—tie Government which , let me impress upon you , entered upon this with advantages which no other Ministry ever yet experienced , and with a combination of circumstances in their favour wlich

    never can occur again probably in the history of this country . What did you do with the army wMcli you sent ? You explained " your conduct , and you explained their course ; but your explanations < lo not affect the result , and you cannot deny that they have accomplished notling—that the . plans which , you lad devised were barren and fruitless . Tie Secretary-at-War tells you that you were watching all that time the course of events , and that such troops as might have been spared by the peat , which was not contemplated , would have influenced the conduct of tlo Russian forces ; but le has not told us that If it was necessary to move those troops they would have been moved . Whatever might have been the fate of Sili « tria—whatever might have been

    the conduct of tie Turkish army on the Danube—you have not answered the question wbether you had sufficient means to assist them ; and I think the member for Aylosfrury has fully demonstrated tlat you could not . Then , what do you do ? You . attack with a force of 20 , 000 or 30 , 000 men a fortress probably as strong as Gibraltar . And under what circumstances did you undertake this enterprise ? The Secretary-nt-Wnr tells you that ho did not expect tho reserve , but he tell ? you that his object was to strike at tho heart of Buseiu and the power of liussia in tho south ; and therefore they attacked Sebastopol . Bravo words , these ! But if you attack the plnco at the wrong time , and with ineffective means , you lave no excuse for your conduct .

    That brings me to the point which las been raised by tho right honourable gentleman tlo member for Droitwich . My right honourable friend the mombor for Droitwich happened to make an observation that our army were embarked without tents , upon which the Secretary -at-War dilntcd immensely upon tho question of tents . What wns tho question of tents , the question of surgeons , tho question of nureos , tho question of lint , and other questions of that kind with which tho Sccrotary-at-Wm- for an hour and a Xinlf occupied tlic House , comixaetl with tho general policy of tho Ministry , which had undertaken wnr with the greatest military 1 ' owor perhaps in tho world , with tho greatest means , and under tho moist favourable circumstances . Why , Sir , with respect to the question of tents , that was

    Hatiisfnotorily nnsworod by the monitor for Aylcsbury . But I will not nrguo tho question on such miserable dctailrt « h this ; hut I will re : or to tho charge-which hns lieon mada by my right Jioii . friend , and which has never boon answered . Why , when you undertook ao ratih nu ontorprino as tho invasion of Itussia with 25 , 001 ) inon , < lid you not immediately make Who preparations to inorortHO , to tmpnorl , and to sustain your force ? ( Opposition ofteera . ) What annwer lrna the Soerotary-al-Wnr nindo V Tho Sccrotary-at-Wnr roads us a catalogue of rolnforcomonts nont after tho event . ( Renewed Opposition cfieera . ) Tho very ovidoncu which tlo Socrotarvat-W « r bring * forward proven tho juntico of tlio chur ^ o of my right hon . friend . If , indeed , it wore necessary to demonstrate tho juotico of tlmt charge , tho stern ovont * t

    1180 The Leadeb, . [Saturday,

    1180 THE LEADEB , . [ Saturday ,

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 16, 1854, page 4, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_16121854/page/4/