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    994 THE LEADER. [SattoeAY,

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    Taxation Reduced To Unity And Simplicity...

    accurately proportioned to the number of persons under his care , and the amount of property in his possession . Taxation ought not to follow the proportion of profit or income , for that is not the proportion of the expense incurred by all for each , and is , therefore , not the true basis of repartition of expense . A business or a house just as much requires the means of protection and justice , although one yield no profit , and the other no rent . Assimilate in thought taxation to insuraiice , and the whole matter becomes very clear .

    Indirect taxation , not less expensive in its collection than direct , carries away from the tax-payer much more than enters the public Treasury . It deprives some of enjoyments they would otherwise reach , and it makes the reaching of them difficult to many more . Only of late have we learned , from the unexpected effects of remission of indirect taxation , how severe its unseen consequences have really been . Disturbance of the natural course of industry is also to be ascribed to indirect taxation ; and the disturbance is equally injurious when a tax is newly imposed , while it continues , and when , as an old tax , it is abolished : the difference being , that while an old tax continues , its effects are unobserved .

    These effects are due to indirectness of taxation , and to the concentrated pressure of indirect taxation on a few articles , and not to mere amount . They are needless , or , at least , artificial aggravations of the natural and necessary cost of justice and protection . Indirectness renders taxation and its effects a science ; while there is no reason in the nature of this expense , more than in that of any other , for its effects being so complicated and abstruse as to inspire doubt , breed sects , and mock investigation , as the pseudo-science of taxation now does .

    The principle that the contribution of each should be just his share of the charges incurred , leads to the establishment of two taxes—one on persons , the other on property ; the former proportioned to numbers , the latter to value . Leaving the personal tax for the present , visible and tangible property is the true subject of taxation ; and it should be taxed in the hands of its actual possessor at the time . Loans , bonds , mortgages , rent-charges , debts , bills , and intangible property of all kinds , are only representatives of property in other

    hands , already taxed in those hands , and therefore nut to be taxed again . Property which may any day be seen by a servant , may be shown to an assessor without additional violation of privacy . Concealable property , but a small part of the whole , may avoid taxation ; but if it does , it ought to pay five or ten times the tax it would have paid , if for purposes of litigation or police the action of the public authorities is ever required respecting it . Money , actual coin , may remain untaxed with little loss to the state , and much convenience of management , except where it is the direct object of

    commerce . Such a system , pressing equally but lightly on everything , would leave enterprise und industry perfectly free . No paths or objects would be interdicted to them by being made special objects of taxation . Nor would the state of any man ' s a / lairs be disclosed , since he would only bo taxed on his tangible and material possessions , irrespective of any rights or obligations by which his circumstances might be nfleeted . On Mich » plan the fiscal debates of Parliament would lie in a very narrow compass , and take but little time . Given the year ' s expense and the amount of assessable property , and tins year ' s rate is settled at once .

    Such is briefly the . substance of our former articles ; wo have to show in tlio . se which follow the application of the prinoipleH we have advanced to the taxation of Great Britain . Hut first ; we shall avail ourselves of the JJeport of the hite Committee on the Income Tax , to state the views of others , and in . showing where wo think them erroneous , to establish our own . * It would be easy to fill all our space with extracth from the evidence ; of ofiieial persona ; ind of others , exhibiting the uncertainty , vexatious character , and facilities both for evasion and oppression which characterize our present system of taxation . It ; seems it would not lxi easy in these respects to change for flie wor . se . We purpose , however , to confine ! this paper to questions of principle ; to discuss them it , will be suflicienL to notice a few representative opinions .

    Mr . Habbage blurts from the principle that , " all tnxution is in a large sense intended for the protection of person mid properly" ( 5448 ) . ile says , that , " property ought , to pny for its protection in proportion to its aihount" ( 544 K ) that , " he looks upon the total sum received by means of the f . txesas a sum to he expended in the protection of person and property during the * Wii purpose aluo to fj ivo an extended notice of the vory valuable and exhaustive work of M . Kniilo doi ( linirdin , entitled // Impol , and in ( hocourHO of it to exhibit the taxation of Franco . Koine points in the taxation of Ainoriea may nlno como under review aa we proceed .

    twelve months for which it is raised" ( 5451)—that " taxation is payment for services done" ( 5448 )—and that " you should not charge the man more than it costs to protect him" ( 5593 ) . The application of these just and intelligible views is , however , marred at once by assuming that " the most practicable way of arriving at the amount" of the property ( which " ought to pay in proportion to its amount for its protection" ) " is to see what is the value it produces , or what it would let at" ( 5448 ) . But is it so ? What would Chatworth let for ? and what would the value of Chatworth let for , if laid out in workmen ' s houses ? A public-house in London lets in great part by the number of barrels of beer it sells per

    week ; a shop according to the probable advantage of its situation . There are' objects of great value incapable of producing revenue , and which could hardly be let at all . What would Del Piombo ' s " Resurrection of Lazarus , " at the National Gallery , let for ? or the " Greek Slave , " the Ninevite winged lions , or the drawing-room at Northumberland House ? Again , there are objects produc ing a great revenue which could not be let . Who would rent a London physician's head ? Again , that may be let which produces no profitable return whatever . How much is annually given for rights of shooting" ? Income , then , by no means follows the ratio of property , although property in an important sense is often indispensable to income . What a thin" - will or will not let for is no certain measure

    of its value . The contrary , however , being assumed , it is further assumed that all incomes ought to be taxed alike , for that all equal incomes—not now equal properties—cost the community equal sums for their protection ( 5593 ) , But let us look at cases . A merchant has had half-a-dozen adventures at sea , with very chequered results , and the balance in his favour at the end of the year is 1000 ? . A landowner derives 1 O 0 OJ . per annum from property worth 30 years' purchase , and covering half a parish . A manufacturer derives 1000 ? . a year from some improved machinery worth 5000 ? . A conveyancer earns 1000 ? . per annum in his chambers , with 500 ? . worth of

    books and furniture . A legatee annuitant receives 1000 ? . per annum in virtue of a naked , intangible right , without property or effout at all . Can it possibly cost the state the same sum to protect the immediate possessions of each of these ? Or , to take a converse set of cases . In three contiguous dwellings sit three persons—a writer of popular books , who earns 400 ? . a year ; a working watchmaker , who earns 120 ? . a year ; and a widow who lives on an annuity of 70 ? . a year . There is nothing in the pursuits or circumstances of these to prevent each having exactly the same amount of property requiring protection , although their incomes arc so different .

    We think , then , Mr . Babbage s two assumptions , that equal properties produce equal incomes , and that equal incomes cost the state equal sums for their protection , may be safely set aside as an incorrect foundation for a system of fiscal policy . It is alleged ( 5475 ) that although it would be right to set aside si certain share of the preqterty of the country for the expenses of the government , if it could be done at once and for ever , yet that " if you tax

    property by a succession of annual taxes , you must tax it upon its successive produce .. " This by no means follows in the sens *; required by Mr . Babbage's conclusion . Although the tax might bo paid out of the annual produce , it would not , follow that it should be paid in proportion to it . lie is misled by the ambiguity of his own word " upon , " and by bis incorrect assumption that the value of the thing protected is measured in all eases by the annual income ! from it .

    But then , although he luid at first taken the income only as the nearest , sipproxiinution to the value of the property ( 5457 ) , he says afterwards , that " the revenue is the thing to lax" ( 54 ( 15 ) , and that "the produce is the tiling protected" ( 5 ( i 5 (>) . But the stale often lias to protect property from which no income arises , as an empty bouse , a failing manufactory , or an unsuccessful ship . Then as to mutters which do not even profess to be sources of income-Mr . Habbnge and Mr . Warbur-< on both object to taxing pictures and articles of taste generally , lest , the enjoyment of the owner should be nun-red by the recollection that they occasion him the

    cost , of a tnx ( 5 (> 74 and 518 : 5 ) . But . the principle would go to leaving uniaxed the architectural decorations of a bouse , the oinbcUislniientnof pleiiNiirc-grounds , the menus of scientific and literary enjoyment when distinct from views of profit ,, and the entire apparatus of luxury and even of com fort , down to the limit ; ol necessaries , below which My . Mill , in his turn , and for quite * as good reasons , would levy no tax ( 51458 , < tc ) . Hut no reii . son is given why this extensive duns of possessions , the great , object of worldly effort and ambition , should be protected at , thti expense of the rest of the community , and not at Unit of their proper owner ** .

    makes a profit by it ; therefore part of his income tax is to be paid because the Newcastle manufacturer , and the railway by which he receives his goods , are ' protected . But even in so simple a supposed case as this it should be shown that the tradesman always makes a profit , always makes the same profit , and that two tradesmen buying equal parcels of goods always make equal profits—cases rarely to be made out , and probably quite as rarely occurring . Much more would it be necessary to show that income in all cases is mainlyaffected by Government , and that other circumstances do not much influence it where the action of Govern-,

    A principle occasionally peeps out indistinctly , which most probably underlies nearly the whole of the oni nions expressed b y Mr . Babbage and others , that in ! come is the proper subject of taxation ; it may perhaps be thus expressed : —That the protection a man enjoys and for which he should pay , ought not to be estimated by his immediate possessions , but by the effect of Go vernment upon the whole of the circumstances bv which he is surrounded , and that his interest in that effect is proportioned to his income . That is , to take a single thread of this tangled skein , a tradesman in London deals with a manufacturer in Newcastle and

    ment remains unchanged . Bat this is attributing far too much to the action of Government . A miller gains 500 ? . per annum by grinding corn ; probably his income would vary comparatively little whether the Government kept the country in a high state of order , or suffered it for a time o sink to the verge of anarch y . A manufacturer gains 500 ? . in a year by perfecting an article of fashion , the next year its day has gone by , and he gains nothing : yet , whatever the Government did for him in one year , it did also in the other . The general and indirect effect of Government is , then , no reason for taking income as the measure of taxation .

    But we cannot admit the assumption on which this argument rests—viz ., that payment may be justly required for indirect advantages . If a new line of omnibuses render my field eligible for building ground , am I to pay over part of the improved value to him who set it up ? If by draining my own field I rid my neighbour's house of fever , may I claim a share in what he saves out of his doctor ' s bill ? If the principle be admitted as to Government , why not as to other great influences ? May not Newton , Black , Watt , Arkwright , Lymington , Stephenson , and many more , claim to share in the vast accessions of wealth which their

    science or practical skill have indirectly created ? It is easy to see why this principle is not admitted . There is no consentaneousness between the parties ; there is no possibility of ascertaining or measuring the obligation ; . there is no possibility of foreseeing its extent or consequences . It seems for these reasons altogether as inadmissible in matters of government as of private life . An attempt is made to ascertain the relative interest of different classes in the Government by imagining tho loss to euch on its withdrawal ; and hero it is said that

    the poor man has a greater interest in good government than the rich , svnd the professional than the landed man . 35 ut ho also has the widow , the fatherless , tho decrepit , and , for his short remaining time , the aged , a larger interest than the hale , the * prosperous , and all who can help themselves . The father of seven children has a greater interest than the father of one , the married man than the bachelor , the saver than the spendthrift , the man who wisely uses and enjoys the benefits of society than the fool who neglects , or the scoundrel who would be more in his element without them .

    Tho argument proceeds on a false footing . i » () other business of life , except under extreme pressure , do we pny according to the value of tho tjiing to us , or who could adequately pay a successful physician Or if a physician cure a father of a large family , i « ^ paid butter than in the case of a lone and fnendU * bachelor ? If two fields be drained , and twice «» 1 Il"jJ be added by the operation to the value of one as lo ^ - other , nie the labourers paid twice as well ? 1 " U" ^ even if the value of Government to each of iw couW ' ascertained ( which it cannot ) , it would lie no ruw the apportioning our quota to its cost , unless wo dq > in thi « cawo from the rules which justly govern « 3 other . It ih the mischievous departure fl <) 1 " HIU | , ' and universal principles of conduct which « : lii «« y ^ ders Government , in all its departments , " "

    "t f » wwy . « i ) in « «» During the proceedings of tho eoinnnttu , »"" ^^ that incomes from land would Buffer lens ilm " ' , j | from profesHioim by a decay of Government . - - ^^ so , it , would not follow that professional »» : oIIU . ,, „ pay the iiiohL But it is not so . J "'»( 1 < 1 (; I u . saleable value from density of population and ^ ^ of tenure ; which density and security would » . „ ,. niinisb in times of disorder , an d leave the Ji » i ^ less ; while professional ability , of many kimW w ^ y ( ja i ' roo to wuk . uud certain to iljid , another Hciu ,

    994 The Leader. [Sattoeay,

    994 THE LEADER . [ SattoeAY ,

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Oct. 16, 1852, page 14, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_16101852/page/14/