Current:

Leader (1850-1860), 16th June 1855, Edition 2 of 2, Page 12, SURVEY OF THE WAR. Since the second of J...

Page 12
Page 12
12 of 24

On this page

  • Departments (2)
    • p^jr^. TlCd VjJl] W ^r/*1 *f V M^^X > ^ ^jd J^- ^ a / aa/ _V,F T" P f \ . 1 p j£ JL, —s j rK " / ^>7^ W "^^ ^f ^ ? ^ »/ ^ \ ) ?
    • ~~ a \ \+ <~k if ? ;l$ttult£ ,$lirdtiC0» I *
  • Text (10)
  • Transcript

    • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

      Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

      ¦Ffl Dfifcv

      ¦ ffl dfifcv

      Co Wjhhw* 8 Pf Subscription To &/§&M^*Et...

      CO WJHHW * Pf SUBSCRIPTION TO &/§& m ^* Et- £ 01 S ° " ^ \ y * % iiZ & £ yfJvTo <& Q'emitted in advance . * " * N ^ i ^ fflffimSgKWers should be drawn upon the Stkand BraJra 38 a 3 » f and be made payable to Mr . Alfeed E . Galiowat , at No . 154 , Strand .

      Notices To Correspondents. During The Se...

      NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . During the Session of Parliament it is often impossible to find room for correspondence , even the briefest . No notice can be taken of anonymous communications . Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his good faith . Communications should always be legibly written , and on oneside of thepaperonly . If long :, it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . We cannot undertake to return rejeoted communications .

      P^Jr^. Tlcd Vjjl] W ^R/*1 *F V M^^X &Gt; ^ ^Jd J^- ^ A / Aa/ _V,F T" P F \ . 1 P J£ Jl, —S J Rk " / ^&Gt;7^ W "^^ ^F ^ ? ^ »/ ^ \ ) ?

      < 3 ap ^ S « c

      Saturday, Jtj^E 16, 1855.

      SATURDAY , JTJ ^ E 16 , 1855 .

      ~~ A \ \+ &Lt;~K If ? ;L$Ttult£ ,$Lirdtic0» I *

      ^ ttblir Mbit * .

      There Is Nothing So Revolutionary, Becau...

      There is nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to Keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation in eternal progress . —Dr . Arnold .

      Survey Of The War. Since The Second Of J...

      SURVEY OF THE WAR . Since the second of June , the date of our last survey , much has happened at the seat of war , and the Allies have made decisive strides towards final success . Pressed on by the energetic impetuosity of Pelissier , the French operations have been at once steady and brilliant ; white Captain Lyotts has swept over the sea of Azof like a tongue of flame , and General Brown has solidly entrenched his troops at Kertch and Yeni-Kaleh . Following the course we have hitherto adopted , let us consider each in succession .

      The Siege . —The solid and brilliant operations to which we referred above are the capture of the Mamelon and of the Quarries , the reduction of the redoubts on Mount Sapoune , and the shelling of the Russian fleet with captured Russian mortars ! These operations were triumphantly and successively effected between the 6 th and the 11 th of June , at which date tlie enemy had not molested our troops in their new positions .

      To estimate the value of those positions , the reader must understand their relation to the works of the enemy . Although the attack on the east side of Sebastopol was the latest commenced , it has received the greatest development , and has become the most important . The ground on which it is conducted is formed of alternate ridge and ravine . These ravines , in fact , intersect the plateau , and form the beds of streamlets that flow into

      the waters of the harbour . Each ravine , therefore , and each ridge runs in parallel lines down to the water , and consequently the conformation of the small angle of the eastern plateau defended by the Russians is of the same character as the larger portion occupied by the Allies ; that is to say , the Russian batteries are on the same ridges as the corresponding attacks of the Allies , with one exception , to bo presently explained . These attacks aro tho Irikermnu attack

      directed against the redoubts on Sapoune ; the Victoriaattack , next on its loft , directed against the Mamelon and MalakofF , two elevations on the same ridge ; Gordon ' s attack , which slowly but steadily creeps down towards tho Redan , meeting with the quarries on its way ; and lastly , Chapman ' s attack , on tho extreme left . Tho position of this attack is peculiar . It advances on a ridgo , bounded on one side by the Woronzoff ravine , on tho other by tho South ravine , and is quite separated from the

      Russian defences "by a turn of the " Woronzoff ravine into the inner harbour . Consequently Chapman ' s attack cannot proceed beyond the brow of the hill on whose top it is established ; and its gallant director will have to be content with giving a powerful support to the French at work against the Flagstaff , and the British engaged with the Redan . The progress made on the 7 th and 8 th of June consists in this , that the Allies have

      seized the three most commanding positions in advance of their direct attacks—Mount Sapoune that overlooks the roadstead ; the Mamelon , that stands higher than the Malakoff and far above the Redan , indeed , that commands the town and a great pait of the harbour ; and the Quarries , a strong post immediately in front of the Redan . So that the foremost parallel on this side includes all these forward posts , and materially reduces the superiority of the Russian position . The gallant way in which the affair was accombombardment

      plished—a short and sharp , a sudden onset , and sustained advance of storming columns in broad daylight , winning victory in an hour—this modus operandi must have chilled the hearts of the enemy . The new spirit that animates the French army is strikingly expressed in a laconic despatch from General Pjelissier , dated the 6 th of June . " To-day , " he says , " we have bombarded the enemy ' s external works , and to-morrow , please God , we will take them . " The General kept his word—taking also seventy-three guns and five hundred

      prisoners . Sea of Azof . —The steam flotilla have made a complete circuit of this inland sea . The operations have included the bombardment of Arabat , the burning of stores at Berdiansk , at Genitchi , at Marioupol , at Taganrog , at Gheisk . What tlie whole amount of damage done to the enemy by the destruction of his stores may have Tjeen up to the 6 th of June

      —the date of the attack on Gheiskwe cannot say , but in the first four days of their operations , including those at Kertch and Yeni-Kaleh , no fewer than six millions of rations had been destroyed—in other words , the provisions for an army of 100 , 000 men for four months . It is now placed beyond a doubt that vast supplies were drawn by the Russian army in the Crimea

      from Kertch and Genitchi . Anticipating a descent of the Allies , and unable to prevent it , for several days previously to the arrival of the expedition , the enemy had been saving his stores at the rate of 1500 waggon loads a day , and forwarding them from Kertch to Sebastopol . Tho Allies also found both cattle and forage in tho vicinity of their quarters sufficient for their subsistence for somfi time .

      At the latest dates tho Allies occupied strongly entrenched positions at Kertch and Yeni-Kaleh , the earthworks on tho land side being defended by tho guns captured from tho enemj r . Tho Russian troops , under General WitA-NGHi-i , liad retreated to Arghin , a place not far from tho neck of tho peninsula ,

      whence they could readily act either in defence of Arabat or KufTn . Tho paucity of their numbers , tlie facility with which thoy yielded the batteries commanding tho strailtt , although the position was of such vital consequence to them , aliowa cither that Priucc GonTSOUAKOFir lias no troops to spare , or that ho has determined to concontruto lii »

      forces around Sevastopol . The Allies fully understand tho value of their now position , and will , no doubfc 7 rmiko tho moat of it ; but whether Sir Guonoia Bhown will be reinforced for an advance upon tho loft renr of the Russians around Sebastopol , or not , it is impossible to say . Although attended with lasting results , all the work in the Sou of Azot

      has not yet been accomplished . It seems there is a second military road across the Putrid Sea , west of Genitchi , and it is understood that boats for an expedition to destroy it , and probably also to penetrate the Don are now being sent out from this country . But the most striking result of the Kertch expedition , and the operations in the Sea of Azof , is the abandonment of Soujak- Kaleh and Anapa . That the enemy should give up the former fortress and concentrate the whole

      of his troops in the latter , was not surprising . It was a sound proceeding . But that he should suddenly quit Anapa , and give place to the Circassians , shows that the pressure exercised upon him must have been very great . The reason for that precipitate flight is this : Anapa , and nearly all the Circassian forts , were provisioned from the Sea of Azof . The appearance , therefore , of the Allies at Taganrog and Gheisk , and the gathering of Circassians on his line of communications with the Kuban country , must have convinced the Russiau commander that

      the best thing for him to do would be to fly . The fall of Anapa alone would be a great result of the expedition to Kertch ; for Anapa was the last of the Circassian fortresses —the last hold of Russia on the eastern shores of the Black Sea . To these successes no doubt in our next impression we shall be able to add others equally important . The Russian army in the

      Crimea is reduced entirely to the defensive . The initiative , so long held by our foes , is theirs no longer . We have posts on both their flanks ; we have cut off one material line of communication ; we are in great strength on their front . The next step , whether it be against the fortress or in the field , cannot fail to bring us close to the crisis of the campaign .

      The Leader. [Saturday,

      THE LEADER . [ Saturday ,

      The Prince Consort On Free Government. T...

      THE PRINCE CONSORT ON FREE GOVERNMENT . The Radicals who called upon the Crown to interfere and help us out of our diplomatic and military crisis , have got what they might have expected , but what , to judge from their past expressions of opinion , they did not desire—an intervention of tho Prince Consort , who in a speech , distinguished as all his speeches are by real intellect , lectures us on our factions and our undiplomatic debales , and tells us significantly that constitutional government is on its trial . Tho Prince ' s speech will tell , and deserves to tell : we only hope

      it will not tell in a wrong way . Free institutions are on their trial : but they are not being tried at their proper worft . They aro not made to carry on diplomacy or diplomatic wars . They will do very well , and always have done very well , to carry on ft war of self-defence or a war of principle In either case all is plain , unmistakable , and felt by every heart . There is no secret object that any diplomatist need keep " locked in his inmost bosom . " There is no danger of ambiguous language aa to the terms * to bo demanded of tho enemy . There idi uo PV ^ ^^ f ^ T ^ ^^ H 4 ¦ ft * ¦ JK ^ .- ^ ^^ ^ " ^^ ¦¦¦ m' ™ ^ ^ ~^ / b winch

      chance of success for uny faction may endeavour to persuade the nation that its sacrifices are uimocoHsiuy . The rig ht men are borne irresistibly to tho heiul oi affairs , and tho contest " is entluiaifttilioiuly carried on till the end , which all alike nec ; k has been attained . What contests in hint'ory are comparable to those which free natioua have gone through for freedom P Wh » t < -oiij » - oils have been more wise and stoudfaHt tlmn those of free nations in such contoata r ¦ " you wnnt to overreach for a small object , you must have secret diplomacy to do it . . 11 )' wnnt to raise war taxes for an unworthy oi uncertain object , you muat have deHpouo

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), June 16, 1855, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_16061855/page/12/