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    Bm . TjapcT^i^.P^ s^r r Qfe^gfe Smm^Ff 1...

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    ;.;. THE SUEZ CANAIi. TtfijtoHjr a stron...

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    The Campaign In The Crimea. It Is Just A...

    lesson was not lost on the Allies . They had assaulted from a great distance ; beside the fire of the place , the guns of the fleet had inflicted severe losses on the stormers ; and it -was determined that no more risks of that kind should be run . After a l © ng interval , daring which heavy losses were incurred by the Allies in sapping onward to the fortifications , the time for a final storming operation approached * In vain the enemy tried * o frustrate the purpose of the Allies . Severely pressed by the constant fire of the

    besiegers ; straitened in his means of supplying the garrison and the external army with food ; discouraged by previous defeats and with no hope of ultimate success , Prince Gobtsohakopi 1 reported in July that he could not much longer hold the city . It was then that the authorities in St . Petersburg , in spite of the objections of Paskiewitoh , ordered that a last desperate assault should be made on the line of the Tchernaya , in the hope that the Russian columns might once

    more bivouaek before Balaklava , and by gigantic efforts on all sides compel the Allies to raise the siege . The attack on the Tchernaya failed , as it could not but fail , for the enemy were powerless to break through a position so strong in itself and so stoutly defended . The battle of the Tehernaya was , therefore , the beginning of the end . Nothing now remained for the enemy to do but to resist to the utmost when the assault should be made , and retreat with rapidity when the MalakhofF was won . The MalakhofF was

    carried on the Sth of September ; on the 9 th the iEiissian garrison was on the north side of the bay ; and on the 12 th everything that had floated in the harbour of Sebastopol had been destroyed . The Allied flags floated over the ruins , abounding with the deserted maferial of War . . The first half of the campaign in the Crimea has , therefore , run its course , and ended with that triumph in which we have constantly believed . Its military results are too great" for' present comprehension . If the ¦

    two ' most powerful nations of Europe have been kept at bay for nearly twelve months , Bussia , the giant military power , whose main business for forty years has been to perfect her military institutions , has offered \ ip army after army in its defence , has drawn profusely upon all her resources- — -men , money , materiel - ^ h ' as risked everything and spared nothing and has yet been ; defeated . The Kussian army has been , beaten in every encounter ,

    and , prave as it is , cowers beaten behind J ^ igea of IrikermanJ and the waters of the bay of Sevastopol . The expedition to the Crimea , profoundly conceived , but in its earfier stages imperfectly executed ; , has been proved to be wise by the result : We have supplied our troops with ease ; , the enemy with difficulty . We could transport our regiments to Balaklava and Kamiesch almost without the loss of a man ; the

    divisions of ; the enemy marched across desert steppes , destitute of water ; frdnv one extremity of an empire to another . While the length of time that has elnpsed since the siege was begun has only caused the enemy to suffer additional losaefl , the prestige of the Allies , tarnished by the events of 185-1 ) , has been amply vindicated in 1855 . By the campaign in the Crimea we have moire than defended Turkey , we have inflicted , pounds on the enemy which half n century will not heal ; mid the crowning result of our policy is , thatrwe have shaken to its foundations the preponderance of Russia , nob only in the Black Sea , but throughout the East .

    Bm . Tjapct^I^.P^ S^R R Qfe^Gfe Smm^Ff 1...

    Bm . TjapcT ^ i ^ . P ^ s ^ r r Qfe ^ gfe Smm ^ Ff ,

    ;.;. The Suez Canaii. Ttfijtohjr A Stron...

    ; . ; . THE SUEZ CANAIi . TtfijtoHjr a strong fascination in the idea of a ^ hip canal uniting two sens . It supposes

    a . change , effected by artificial means , in the configuration , of the earth . ¦ > It iguores the limits of nature , and proposes to create—not to discover—new highways of war and commerce . The engineers of our day design to shorten the East-Indiaman ' s voyage by a process more v direct , if less romantic , than that by which MAGEiiiAir startled the Portuguese in the Phillipines , and by which so many intrepid explorers have sought to penetrate the accumulated winters of the Arctic Pole . In

    all ages such projects have engaged the attention of thoughtful and enthusiastic men . In all ages , also , they have been delayed by doubts and objections . The Nicaragua Canal still remains a theory ; that of Suez has not advanced beyond a partial survey and the approbation of a vice-regal government . M . de ] Lesseps , the " minister plenipotentiary" undertakes to persuade English opinion into the approval of his scheme . His method

    certainly renders him liable to no suspicion : the case is zealously , if not conclusively , argued . M . de Lesseps appeals with candour to the public opinion of England , and anticipates , though he appears to undervalue , the obstacles to his plan , which may , upon various grounds , be suggested . He cannot conceal that the views of France , in strenuously advocating a ship canal through the Isthmus of Suez , must be more than commercial . Her trade with

    India and the further East is not of sufficient importance to warrant of itself any special interest , on her part , in the accomplishment of so vast an undertaking . Her objects , in fact , are not those of a trader . It has been felt , for a long period * by the French , and by other European nations , that the possession of the Cape by England , and the predominance on every ocean of her mercantile marine , constitute the Asiatic seas and shores her peculiar realm . America alone rivals our commercial navv , or participates ,

    to any serious extent , in the Indian trade . The opening , indeed , of a water communication through the Nicaragua Isthmus will enhance the facilities enjoyed by the United ^ States for competition with our own flag along the teeming coasts of Hindostan , in the ports of Eastern India , of the Malayan Peninsula , of Siam , Cochin China , Tonquin , and- the Chinese Empire itself ; of . Japan , of the Indian Archipelago , -of"the scattered grouys around it , and even of Australia and New Zealand . Therefore ,

    the French are doubly anxious that one race and one language , though separated in polity , should not divide the sway of Asia , except along those frontiers which the Russians already command . The first Napoleon snatched at this scheme of emulation with England . To speak plainly , lie saw , and the . French nation has approved his instinct , that to destroy the geographical linftof demarcation between the Mediterranean and the Bed

    Sea would be to throw the Indian Ocean open to all comers , and to compel the establishment , by Great Britain , of an Oriental Malta , similar to . that which gives her , if not supremacy , at least equality in the Mediterranean . The material difficulties wo do not propose to consider . M . be I / esseps appears to depreciate them , while ¦ Captain AiiLEN , in his recent work on the Dpad Sea , exaggerates their importance . That which to

    the one writer ia' an insignificant objection , to the other is insuperable . Each , it must be remembered , rides a hobby . of . his own , though M . de Le ^ seps . appeals to a concourse of authorities , while Captftia A ^ i-en has only put" his mark " on the'map , to indicate a proposed canal from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Akabah , t hrough the Dead Sea , submerging the plain , of Esdraolon , drowning the holy city of Tiberias , i swampingthe spot at which the Jewa expect their Messiah to

    rise , overwhelming . a numb . . /; , pf ,. villages ^ driving out a small population , and op & te- ^ rat / ing two thousand square mi je ^ pf ' Ottoman , territory ; According to him , there is na perceptible difference between the levels of , the Mediterranean and the Hed Sea , so that , there , would be no current "to keep the chan * nel free . Thus the principal facility onwhipK , M . IiiNANT once calculated would be lost * Moreover , there would be no powerful rush of water to carry away the earth and rocks loosened by blasting ; the canal would have to be due , and the sand and stone removed

    by machinery , or by manual labour . Again * the seas at either end being shallow , enormoiis jetties would be required . But these engi < - neering necessities , fatal as Captain Ali , eis holds them to be , are included , in , M . DEj IjESSeps' calculations , as well as in those , which have influenced Abbas Pacha and are expected to influence the "Sultan of Turkey . The question is not , then , " Between two projects , which is the more fea ^ sible ? " it is rather , "Is it the interest . of Great Britain to favour M . de IjESSEPs ' . scheme , and to connive at the formation of a new sea-passage to India ? " .

    For ourselves , we have no sympathy with , the general alarms felt in connexion with this subject . The South-African colonies have no more right to prqsper upon the difficulties of the Indian roiite , than , the West Indies had to prosper upon the labour of slaves . The monopoly of an ocean is not a privilege on which any nation can justly found its claims to supremacy . Such a principle belonged to the age in which Venice held the first rank among commercial powers , in which Spain and Portugal disputed beyond the line the interpretation of a Papal Bull , in which Holland sought by fraud andviolence to close _ the ports of ; insular Asia against Sir Fbancjs Dbake and his successors . The East India

    Company long maintained this policy . of exclusion ; but ,, on general grounds , it i 3 not an , objection that can be put . fprward by one liberal state against the plans of another . It is a totally different thing to sanction the construction of a ship canal , under French influence , with the prospect of leaving it under French control . The future has its chances , its dangers , as well as its hopes . The combination of the French and British Governments for a special purpose may not be developed into a lasting alliance of the two nations . At all . eventsj it is an undoubted truth that when the interests of

    two nations actually or apparently diverge , no formal or diplomatic bonds can hold them together . No great act of European importance , therefore , ought to be-carried out without a recognition of the contingency which , may arise—of a war between Eng land and France . In that case , who is to guard the canal ? M . de I / Esseps says it muefc be , placed under a guarantee of neutrality . But who is to secure the securities ? In a conflict suph as that which ended in 1815 , what convention would have shut Napoi / eon out of Egypt ? If a British fleet were flying westwards round the Cape to fight another naval

    Aboukir , what but an overwhelming 4 force would close the Canal of Suez , and ^ prevent Frenclj squadrons from passing it | and ravaging the undefended coast-towna of ^ ndia ? It ia idle to " rely on the Turks to fortify its approaches ; the fortress of Tinelv must bo a SeuaatopoJ in strength . At Aden , indeed , tho English might construct their guard-house , but whatever landworka they , erected , a- powerful maritime armament , lodged in its harbour could never bo made superfluous . ; We have said that M . db Iijasajapa' manner ! begets no suspicion , but without ignoring a' * I I

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 15, 1855, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_15091855/page/12/