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1092 THE LEADER. [No. 390, November 14, ...
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INDIAN MILITARY PltOSPECTS. The most wel...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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The Monetary Crisis. The Monetary Crisis...
charged by dealers on what Las always been counted perfectly good paper is 12 to 15 per cent . ; for inferior paper there is no market whatever . Our readers will naturally look to us for some exposition of the causes that Lave produced the present state of affairs , and the probable turn that they may be expected to take .
According to the Bank return made up to the 4 th inst ., the amount of notes in the till of the Bank of England was then 2 , 155 , 3157 . This , with 550 , 720 Z . in gold and silver , making together 2 , 706 , 035 / ., was all .. the ready money they had against deposits amounting to 17 , 595 , 8117 . They had no other funds but this 2 , 706 , 035 / . to meet the demands of their depositors , and to discount any bills that Were offered to them . And this at a time when our mercantile community , deprived of their usual remittances from the United
States , were urgently in need of accommodation . The amount in the till beiug so small , and the demand for discounts out of proportion large , money naturally rose in value according to the unerring laws of demand and supply ; and so the Bank Directors first raised the minimum rate to 9 per cent , on the 5 th , and then to 10 per cent , on the 9 th . This simple statement will , we feel persuaded , offer an easy explanation to the inquiry why the rate of interest is now so high .
We have now to take another step , and endeavour to ascertain how it happens that our Bank Till is so low—so ill-provided to meet the pressing wants of the commercial world . As we have stated above , the Bank Till contains only 2 , 700 , 000 ? . iu notes and bullion to meet all its engagements , and to serve as a fund out of which to make advances to the mercantile world . Four
months ago—viz ., July 16—the till contained 6 , 104 , 94 j 57 ., or two and a quarter times its present amount . The rate of interest was then 5- ^ per cen t . Since that time we have had numerous arrivals of gold from Australia and elsewhere , but the precious metals have passed away far more freel v than they arrived , until we are reduced to our present figures . It is not difficult to ascertain at least some of
the causes that have produced this result . For many months a continuous draiu of the precious metals has been going on regularly to China and India . We have been purchasing most extensively silks and tea of our ' enemies ' the Chinese , who have taken few goods in return—the balance has been paid ia silver . A similar state of things has been going on in India , where , with English money , some hundreds of miles of railway are now in course of construction .
Within the last few years English capital has been largely expended in the construction of rail way 8 in France , Austria , and Belgium , on the continent of Europe , and in Canada and the United States in the Western World . Concurrently with this distribution of British capital all over the world we have seen the most extraordinary development of our trade generally , evidencing itself in the fact that from the year 1841 to 1857 the figures have increased from 45 , 000 , 0002 . to 120 , 000 , 0002 .
Taking these matters into consideration , ia it a matter of surprise that the value of money should be extremely high ? Is it a matter of surprise that money should be scarce when our principal debtor , the United States , with " whom we transact at least a fourth of our whole foreign trade , is for the time being in embarrassed circumstances and compelled to stop payment ? Is it a matter of surprise that 10 per cent , should be charged by the Bank of England , when money can be readilv employed in New York at rates varying from 24 to 60 per cent . ?
The question has no doubt passed through the minds of some of our readers—How long is this state of things to last ? Is there airy remedy for our present distress ? We venture to suggest one or two considerations , which may tend to remove any undue anxiety . The very fact of the high rate of interest will lead men in "business to diminish their engagements ; 'with a diminution of business will come a diminished demand for money ; as money becomes less in demand the rate of interest will of course fall .
These causes are already in operation . Our exports are greatly diminished ; the New York merchants are sending back goods most recently shipped to their port , and our money dealers are avoiding , as much as possible , all new advances , even at the present extravagant rates . There is one circumstance that is very encouraging in the midst of this emergency , viz ., the absence of panic in the City . It * this great fact that distinguishes the pressure of 1857 from the disastrous crisis of
1847 . In spite of numerous mercantile failures— -in spite of the stoppage of the Liverpool Borough Bank—and , still more—of the Western Bank of Scotland and of the City of Glasgow Bank—with their hundreds of branches and millions of deposits , the commercial world pursues its ordinary course , not without deep anxiety and the most cautious watchfulness , but calmly , steadily , as threatened by a great calamity requiring tlie exertion of alt its energies to ward ofty arid conscious that an unwise fear is the means
most calculated to hinder the exercise of the cool , ealm judgment which alone can carry it through any period of political or financial difficulty . One other fact seems worth } ' to be recorded with reference to the present state of affairs . The very morning that the newspapers announced the stoppage of the Western Bank of Scotland , the funds rose ^ per cent . This result surprised many , but it is not difficult of explanation . The failure of banks whose leading principle it is to receive money
at a high interest from all who will deposit it with them , lias induced many persons to place their ready money in the funds , rather ' than expose themselves to the embarrassments that would follow from further banking difficulties . The public are beginning to understand that it is better to invest at the present low prices in a Government security ^ , first , because their money is there perfectly safe ; and secondly , because it will probably in the end pay them better than even the 8 and 9 per cent , of the joint-stock banks .
A . considerable portion of the forty millions that figured in the Insfc-published balance-sheets of these establishments has been transferred to the Government funds , otherwise it would be impossible to account for a rise in the price of stocks in the face of large sales made within the last few days to provide for the necessities of the Scotch banks . Lord P-OiMEuaTON has acted in 1857 precisely as Lord John Hits sell did in a similar emergency in 1847 . He has authorized the Bank of England to issue , if necessary , notes in excess of the amount fixed by Pejbi , ' 8 Act
of 1844 . He sees that what the public require is not so much money , as tho conviction that thoy cari , if necessary , raise money upon tho deposit of good securities . Bankers and money-dealers generally have been holding large sums of ready money , far beyond their actual requirements , but simply tliat thoy might make themselves secure come what may . They havo been unwilling to do nny business that they could iitirly avoid , or to contract any now ongagemvents until tho heavy threatening cloud of disaster had cleared off .
It is no doubt mortifying to Lord Oveb ,-stone and the staunch supporters of Peel ' s Act to see their principle even nominally violated ; but it would be a great satisfaction to the friends of the measure if it should prove , as was the case in 184 : 7 , -that the Act was not actually infringed—that the Bank -were not compelled to avail themselves ot the license allowed by the Premier ' s
communication , and that not a single note had been issued in excess of the statutory limit . In 1847 the Bank Till . began to improve as if by niagie immediately the Treasury letter was issued . The same necessity existed then that is now felt ; what is wanted is not the issue of more notes , but the circulation of those already issued—not capital , but confidence .
1092 The Leader. [No. 390, November 14, ...
1092 THE LEADER . [ No . 390 , November 14 , 1857 .
Indian Military Pltospects. The Most Wel...
INDIAN MILITARY PltOSPECTS . The most welcome event announced by the incoming Indian mail is , doubtless , the relief of Lucknow , —a relief , indeed , to the anxious occupants of many an English hearth . The course of previous intelligence had rather led us to anticipate , with all "but certainty , " the glorious result now . formally notified ; and although our too sanguine expectations had well-nigh encountered a terrible rebuke —so imminent was the danger of the beleaguered
garrison- —we may well bo permitted to rejoice that ; all has ended happily . Yet , oven in the height of our exultation , -we find serious cause for ; mourning . The gallant HA-ViiLOCK and his band of heroes have added fresh laurels to former well-earned trophies ; but in the death of the intrepid JSTeill we are compelled to lament the removal from amongst us of one -whose late brief but splendid career had rendered his name a Household word .
Turning again towards Delhi , it is with deep regret thnt we notice the death , at . the early age of thirty-five ' ( from . the . ' effect of his wounds ) , of the- brave and highly-gifted NiCHOiiSON ; whilst an ' attack of cholera has cut off , in the midst of his valuable career , the energetic Commissioner GREA- 'm isi ) ( Bengal Civil Service ) , whose name has been , from the first , so intimately associated with the
operations ot the besieging force . "We find , too , that tlie general expenditure of life in the recapture of tlie Imperial City has far exceeded the original estimate . Sixty-one officers and eleven hundred and seventyeight rank and file are 3 io \ v reported to . have been killed and wounded on the occasion of the storming alone , and we are loft to believe that the succeeding six or seven days' fighting 1 must necessarily have involved a long list of supplementary casualties . At Delhi , indeed , the mutineers seem to have foutrht with all
the more obstinacy as hope abandoned them . Theirs , it is true , was an essentially desperate case . But oven at Lucknow , under altogether different conditions , tlie resistance offered by the rebels was evidently of the most determined nature ; nnd "this—notwithstanding that the catastrophe nt Delhi must have been perfectly well known to them at tho timethis does not look as if the game of mutiny wa 3 yet played out , in tho opinion , at any rate , of those most deeply interested .
"" We have said before , nud in our earncstjiess to escape nny such imputation , venture on repeating , thnfc wo are no alarmists . But as , at the very outset of this unhappy insurrection , there were those ( ay , and men high in oflico too ) wliopronounced tho discontents to have been terminated ( by the astute diplomatist , Colonel BntC 3 i ?) ere they had well come to ahead , so it will be no gi ' eat matter for surprise it * tho saino interested parties should persuade themselves , and try to persuade others , that 'Iniquity was struck down liko an ox . ' with a tangle blow : and that tho
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Nov. 14, 1857, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_14111857/page/12/
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