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Leader (1850-1860), 9th January 1858, Edition 2 of 2, Page 16

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      Eraser Begins The New Year With A Number...

      taking the chorus from his lips . He , too , thinks just as we have been thinking . Vive Beranger ! It is the secret of his fame . The Dublin University Magazine contains a second paper by Doctor Latham on the « Ethnological Relation of the Irish to the Northmen , ' in which he wars vigorously against the originality of the Norse mythology and literature . ' Harry Lorrequer , ' who has been so long absent from the pages of the Dublin , resumes his old place in the present , number . The title of the new story is * Gerald Fitzgerald , the Chevalier . ' The leading characters are Jacobites , the period the middle of the last century , and the scene of the opening chapters the neighbourhood of Rome .

      An The Leadeii. Fno. 407, January 9, 185...

      An THE LEADEii . fNo . 407 , January 9 , 1858 .

      Are The Days Of Monthly Magazines Gone B...

      Are the days of monthly magazines gone by ? We do not include in this expression of a doubt Blackwood or Fraser , which are institutions ; but we speak of new , and likely , competitors . The conductors of the Train begin the new year with great spirit , and their motto , Vires acquirit eundo is at all events realized in the contents of the present number , which are sound and strong in character and substance . It is difficult for a periodical to shake off its first reputation : On est loujours Vesclave de son premier talent , and the Train , by its very title , and , perhaps , by the names of its conductors , has been supposed to be necessarily a ' fast' publication . Some of the articles have occasionally , we confess , been a little too Totony for our taste , and probably for the taste of that important personage , the General Reader ; but there has

      always been a wonderful amount of interest and amusement for the price—a shilling ! And the Train has now settled down into a sober rate of speed , with , we trust , a proportionate increase of safety to all concerned . The light literary skirmishers are reinforced by a big gun or two , and the instructive is added to the amusing without any loss of character . The January number opens with tlie first instalment of a story , ' The Dead Lady ' s Ring , ' by the author of 'Sketches of Cantabs / reminding us more than once of the peculiar power of Wixkie Coixins ; we can scarcely pay it a higher compliment ,

      or give a better idea of the force with which it fastens upon and compels the reader ' s interest and attention until he stops breathless at the close of the chapters , and-with feverish impatience asks for more . Mr . Godfrey Turner ' s sketch of a London Fire' is very pleasant reading , and his verses , 'The Fleeting and the Abiding , ' prove that he has heart as well as wit . Indeed , wit without heart is but crackling thorns . Under the title of * Soothing the Savage Breast , ' Mr . Yates describes the nightly vocal haunts of London with a graphic fidelity due to an intimate acquaintance with his subject , and to a shrewd , kindly , and observant eye for London life . .

      Two young periodicals deserve special notice—The Atlantic Monthly and The Month . The Atlantic is based on the principle of cordial co-operation between British and American authors , and claims a distinct place among monthly magazines . The Month is the first ' monthly' established in New South Wales . It is carefully written and pleasantly varied , and promises to do credit to the colony .

      The Campaign Op 1815. ^Second Notic E.] ...

      THE CAMPAIGN OP 1815 . ^ SECOND NOTIC E . ] ffistoire de la Campagne de 1815 : Waterloo . Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Charraa . London : Jeffs . The results of the operations of the 17 th June , as we have shown , * were decidedly in favour of the allies . At dawn on tho 18 th , the chances which , a few hours before , had ranged themselves under the banners of Napoleon , had passed over to Bliicher and Wellington . Napoleon had , indeed , succeeded in uniting two-thirds of his force in front of Wellington ' s chosen position ; but while he was separated by nearly twenty miles from Grouchy , and while Grouchy was at sunrise as far distant from Bliicher , that audacious veteran had united bis whole force at Wavre , within little more than half the distance of Wellington ' s right flank . At dawn on the 18 th , when Bulow ' s corps was moving up to St . Lambert , and Bliicher was preparing to follow with the larger part of his army , Grouchy was still at Gembloux , * anxious and undecided , ' and uncertain what route would put him on

      the track of the Prussians ; and it was not until he arrived at Sart-lez-Walhain that he knew for certain that Bliicher was at Wavre . When from the garden of the notary Hollaert he heard the first cannonade at Waterloo , Bulow had nearly reached St . Lambert , and Bliicher was galloping alon g the road to join him .. While he was debating with GeVard whether he should ' marcher au feuf and strive to take part in the grand battle which it become evident was in progress in front of the forest of Soignes , or whether he should move upon Wavre , the superior energy , promptitude , and daring of tho allied commanders had effected that combination which decided the fate of Grouchy ' s master , of his own , of France , and of Europe . Napoleon was fairly out-generaled . He believed the Prussians were far awaythey were near at hand ; he believed he was the strongest at the decisive point—a few hours disclosed to him the terrible foot that his enemies had effected the masterstroke in war , and had brought the larger to boar upon the smaller force with irresistible effeot . They and not ho were the stronger at-the-pointrof contact : — — ~> - «~~ — " ¦¦¦¦¦ > —< - ¦— ~^—¦—«— - ~— . — - — , , — ,

      Here we may dismiss Marshal Grouchy . Colonel Charras partially attempts to vindicate his conduct at the expense of Napoleon . It is a tempting theme which Charras treats at great length and with great force , but not altogether to our satisfaction . Obviously , we cannot enter into the merits of Grrouchy ' s . manoeuvres hero ; nor cun we afford space to explain why he exercised no practical influence whatever on tho battle of Waterloo , We will not enter into the question whether he could have dono better than he did . Tho single fact that he was taking breakfast at Sart-lcz * Wnlhain at mid-day on the 18 th , upwards of fivo-and-twonty miles from tho extreme * Leader , December 19 ,

      right of Napoleon ' s position , is sufficient in itself to show that he . and his force did not press with a feather ' s weight either on one side or the other . Grouchy thus neutralized , Napoleon was left to fight it out alone on the field of Waterloo . All things considered , there was at first a pretty close approximation to equality between the combatants . Napoleon had a splendid army . He had a slight superiority in number ; he had more infantry , more cavalry , and between seventy and eighty more guns . But , above all , he had an army composed of the soldiers of one nation , nearly all inured to war . These were his advantages over his rival . But Wellington had in his favour a very strong position , and the promise , the certainty of Prussian support ; and he knew well that , if afforded at all , that support would be afforded in a manner the mo 3 t advantageous to him and the most disastrous to his enemy . He had also 23 , 000 British troops , and upwards

      of 20 , 000 Germans , some of them hardly inferior to the best of their British comrades . These were his advantages . On the other hand , he had upwards of 17 , 000 troops Dutch-Belgians , upon some of whom he could not rely at all , and upon the remainder he could only place a partial reliance . These were his disadvantages . For the rest Colonel Charras only finds one fault with Wellington—the fault of not concentrating his whole force upon the field of battle . Strongly impressed with the belief that Napoleon might attempt to turn his right by Nivelles , he had actually upwards of 20 , 000 men detached upon his right and rear . If we take the tactics of Napoleon , who threw the whole of his force into the fight , as a standard , this was undoubtedly an error . The strategy of Wellington , however , may be regarded from another point of view ; and the detached troops , the greater part of whom could have been easily rallied to the main body , may be looked upon

      a 3 a precaution against a disaster . This is not the place in which to attempt a popular description of the battle of Waterloo even in outline ; but we may pause a moment over some of its grander features , and afterwards correct some of the errors in the detailed , but hardly happy , account in the pages of Colonel Charras . Ea ^ er as he wa s to make sure that Wellington still held his position , NapoTeon , apprehensive , as he alleges , that the ground would be too heavy for his artillery , delayed the moment of attack until the forenoon was nearly spent . Colonel Charras , rejecting the plea that the state of the ground and the fatigues of the troops rendered this delay necessary , thinks that the French army might have been thrown into action as early as eight o ' clock . " Tout le temps ecoule depuis , " he says , " e ' tait du temps livre a

      l'inconnu , perdu absolument ; et souvent , a la guerre , des pertes de ce genre ne se reparent pas . Wellington devait mesurer avec bonheur les retards de son adversaire . " The weakest part of the British line was the left wing . The right , covered by Hougoumont , was impregnable ; the centre , naturally strong , was rendered stronger by the outpost at La Haye Sainte . Napoleon recognized at a glance the weakness of the allied left , and determined to assail it , hoping to break through , and thus effectually sever the British from , the Prussian army . He did not even suspect , as Colonel Charras justly remarks , that Wellington had a good reason for accepting battle with his left 'in the air ; ' that reason being the confidence he felt in the early support of the Prussians , without which he would not have fought the battle at all .

      The combat began by a persistent and fruitless attack upon Hougoumont , and a tremendous fire of artillery ( heard by Grouchy at Sart-lez-Walhaiu ) from the right centre of the French position . This fire was intended to shake , disorganize , appal the British troops , and to prepare the way for the first grand attack—that of the infantry of the French right wing upon the British left . But before D'Erlon could launch his columns , the wandering gaze of Napoleon had caught sight of troops at Chapelle St . Lambert . They were Prussians ; yet even when he learnt that they were Prussians , when he learnt that the whole Prussian army had concentrated at Wavre on the evening of the 17 th , he still believed he could check Bulow ' s corps , and beat Wellington . Colonel Charras evidently thinks that Napoleon should have retreated the moment he discovered that a Prussian army was

      marching direct upon his right flank and rear . He did not . He trusted his star . ' Lobau was detached to control Bulow , and D'Erlon was sent against the British left . As our readers probably know , this grand infantry attack , the first great event in the sanguinary drama , was an utter failure . The heavy French columns advuncing in echelon , left in front , were met by Picton ' s division and our heavy cavalry , and literally hurled backwards by the rapid application of the bullet and bayonet , or tho irresistible charge of the British dragoons . Of the four columns , not one remained entire ; five thousand men were put / tors de combat , between two and three thousand of whom wore made prisoners ; two eagles were taken , and upwards of thirty—Charms says fifteen- —pieces of cannon rendered useless for the rest of tho day . Colonel Charras attributes tho defeat of the French to the strange formation of the columns . This ia an interesting point : —

      " Soit malontondu , " he writes , " dans la transmission do l ' ordro , soit aberration du mare ' chal [ Ney ] ou de d'Erlon , lea divisions so formeront , chacune on masse pleino , par batuillons deployc ' s , a cinq pas du distance loa uns des nutrcs . . . . [ There woro four echelons . } Lu distance d ' un dcliolon a l ' autro fut de quatro cents pas ; chaquo division avait huit bataillona , excoptcJ cello do Donzolot , qui en avait ncuf . Cos e s tranges colonnoa prC'sentuiont done ioi douze , la vingt-quatro ot vingt-sopt rungs d'dpaisaour et un front variant do cent cinquanto u deux cents homines , suivant la force dos batalllons . " Colonel Charras says that this formation placed the infantry at tho mercy of cavalry . But it cannot bo denied that it placed thorn at the mercy of infantry-al 80 ,-for ~ tho-moinent 4 liey _« ama » wjthin ^

      tho concentrated fire from the thin red line put them into confusion , iina they found it impossible to deploy . Tho bayonet and tho sabre did tho rest ; no attack was ever made witli more spirit j no attack was ever more completely repulsed . The French infantry were routed from tho field . Not a single column gained tho crest of tho position , except whore tho flight of Bylandt ' a brigade had left an interval . This brigade was not , as Colonol Charras states , overthrown and dispersed by the impetuous shook of tho French . There was no overthrowing , no shook . Before even tho skirmishers could reach them , Bylundt'o men , appalled by tho sight of tho masses in their front , fled to the rear . Unfortunate in his great infantry attack , wasting many men in an obsti-

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 9, 1858, page 16, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_09011858/page/16/