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    ^^ Y f l8^2.] ^Me VEADEn. 43 *

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    LETTERS FROM PAKIS. [FEOM OtJtt OWST COR...

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    Professor Newman's Lecture On England's ...

    When the great conflict with Napoleon was terminated , we had forgotten for what principle , W > had been fighting ;—« hici * c aUy was , to restrain the tyrannous encroachinenfc of a S We acted after victory as though no tyranny but Na-» S s was formidable ; and we ensured t » Europedespotism , iWo ^ sioh , insuri : ectionsr invasion , aUtho ^ astana . the impendftf / strun-ffles . When ministers are allowed to meld a . vast power , we ouffht at least to insist that they shall give public reasons for everytct , as ajudge does : Lord Castlereagh would not have sitmca tto Treaty of Vienna had he been , expected publicly to defend the details . * . . ¦ . . , Aiaun ; Secrecy makes it impossible to form public opinion beforehand ; hence public enthusiasm is not forthcoming when ( the time of action arrives . Defenders of the late ministry are iheacd to say , that it abandoned the Sicilians because it feared that the English public would not support them ! Why , how could we ? Who of us can possibly unrtfvel the web of

    diplomacy ? A blue book comes out a year after the facts ; and then , at last a few persons who have much leisure get some insight fbut * partial one only ) into the case . The English public to this day is kept in total ignorance that we lave any mbral obligations to Sicily more than to France or to Sardinia ; and then complaint is made of the apathy and selfishness of the public ! If England is to be amoral power , publicity is essential for all lieracts . Her state papers should * be short , morally reasoned from broad and fundamental p rinciples , and ordinarily published on the day of delivery , without any vote of Parliament ; nay , most of all when Parliament is not sitting . The half year ' s vacation IB now a time of wholly unchecked despotism . The argument of " necessity of secrecy forthe public service , " must be reserved strictly for details of military movements . In negotiations , conspirators and tyrants need to be secret ; but a great state , with an honourable cause , has nothing to gain by it , and

    everything to lose . . _ Publicity would not all at once secure , but it would conduce to , the habit of dealing on broad moral principles . TSo others can be right between nations . Lawyer-hke subtlety is unjust and disastrous . A war or peace which cannot be popularly and concisely expounded , is assuredly a bad cause . Ivot till the popular intellect is the tribunal before which our statesmen plead , will our foreign and colonial be as moral as our home policy . 1 . " jSTob ought we to admit , as a final criterion of international right the private decisions of a few learned men . " Many of our inconsistencies rise out of uncertainties concerning right principle . To recover a few hundred pounds Don Paciftco we blockaded Athens , spent and destroyed a hundredfold of the sum claimed , and risked widespread hostility . Yet when tea Englishman is brutally cut down in the streets of Tuscany we revenge him by meek notes that , receive insulting replies . Here the principle is in controversy , whether a private

    . Englishman voluntarily residing or travelling in a loreign country , ought to be under the protection of British law . If there is a treaty to this effect , of course he is ; yet such treaties taay be Ordinarily undesirable . If there is no treaty , one would think that no external jurisdiction should interpose , except in the extreme cases which justify intervention even on behalf of strangers . By claiming to enforce pur own law for the proteetioji of our subjects abroad we involved o \ a ? selves in , war with . China ^ and are how again in war with Birm » . These wars must be endless ; and unless cheeked by abandoning our principle of interference * threaten ruin * to pur Indian empire by its own growth . Far more discriminating has hitherto been the . conduct of the United States . Where their citizens trade or travel voluntarily , they have left them to the laws of the foreign country : but now they are bravely undertaking _ to enforce humanity on Japan , which murders or . encages sailors driven

    by tempests on her shores . The distinction , between voluntary and involuntary approach to a country seems to nie here the cardinal point . But pardon me this digression : I had meant to say , that all such questions ought to be solemnly and publicly debated by Parliaments , not settled in a private study _ by a learned jurist or historian . Where party spirit does not intervene , English assemblies have no lack of the highest wisdom . Did our Parliament leave to local authorities local and petty questions , and the mere application of principles , and give more time to great moralities , it would be far more dignified , and do far higher service . 5 . " Nob , if forced into war , ought we to attack neutrals . " I * o believe many of my hearers will bo amazed at my protruding this axiom . Many are not aware that tliis is our habitual practice and an avowed policy , to which no State in Europe has contributed bo vehemently as England . I do not now speak of our having the other day attacked a neutral and inoffensive tribe

    of Kaffirs , and of having added them to our enemies by ravaging thoir country . This , no doubt , will bo diso wned as a mistake . Hut it was no mistake , when , having resolved to invade Afghanistan , we occupied the independent and neutral country of Sinde us Piissiigo-grour id . That act of violence caused the Sinde war ; and pur conquest of Sinde precip itated tho Seikhs upon India , With a long train of war , calamity , confusion of all moral principle , and mflnito embarrassments to come . Boo now how evil breeds its like . Our unjust occupation of fiindo to aid" Af ghan war stopped the moutns of our ministers when Bussia , in November , 1848 , occupied the Daiiubin . ii principalities with a view to the invasion of Hungary . Wo did not uaok Turkey in her resistance to this violation of her soil , wo Jiau u bad conscience . But it is from the seas that we principally ftttaok neutrals . If wo aro assailed bv France , wo retaliate bv capturing all

    merchant vessels which dare to trade to Frunao . Thus , neutral interests , of indefinite amount , aro confiscated at tho will and oonvonionce of any one powerful bolligoront . This enormity is politely called the / dtp of blockade . By applying it in 1708 we Htaryod to doath 20 , 000 oppressed Genoese , men , women , and children , in , order to capture a French army , It surrondorod with tho honours of war , " as soon as the innocents had been imjnolatcd . This is like stabbing a friend through thohoarfc , in order to prink an enemy who runs behind him . Tho atrooious deed joolc nine months in perpetrating ; and wo persevered , when irn m our shipn W ( J mw tho starving ladies gathering herbs and <» KBing roots on tho green embankments . Our two ferooiouH MtooltH on Denmark , a peaceful and friendly powory wore a still » nwo marvellous example how , whon onoo in a war fever , wo forin t

    H * - " an moral prmoii > lo , and , of course , with it nil wisdom , no « wnR ( flo for immodiuto victory . As to this law of blockade , it is ™> ° nuisance whioh makes war contagious , and forbids all real " ™ Wy . War boooniOH too heavy a weapon to uso it turns ! " « Mediterranean fleet into a Bh « im . Wo lVar to help an in-«" r ? i . P ^ 'P'o—especially if it bo Bmall , liko Sicily ; for wo ory , UUl , t wm C ) UJB 0 a jjurop 0 an war ! " , Yea , if wo attack !«' > ¦ . ' '( 1 P « i ' l \ ap » an Amorioan war , too , as in 18 U mill ¦* "i-s , whon tho United States joined our onemios booituau \ vp , " ™ " » ty . "i < W merchant vobboIh . That Amorioan war was then out ' calamity . It , iH nowour strength , if wo aro ' wise . It enables n ? y , tirl ium thin ovll prootioo by uttering the word ; for wo (? . rNT America will join ua . _ JlL Wm ought wo to voluntoor oxtomlinji n war beyond it »

    lH 1 . Allolm i" « diato ooiiHoquonoo of our abandoning freedom in fml . w > i iho tW (> nations for wltoin we had principally ln « i V' "VVJ whose froo constitutions wo had solemnly aoknaw' < K «« , —HwHy and Spain , —woro both ovorwlielinod by despotic tfrn . ? j UOf' 8 l wo ttidod io deliver irom Froiiah armioM in tlio Ki oat H trugjrlo against Napoleon , in ordor to hoo it Hubclued by l « ui Hr 51 108 ttt tho command of tho Holy Alliance . Tina was i" " i Pnioun and dreadful sight i but wo ournelvos cftUBOd it , "y » ot protesting aloud , for Poland und Italy in 181 * .

    most inevitable geographical limita / 'Jjif Eussia will attack Hungary , we may aid to repel Russian regiments from Hungarian soil : but by what moral , logical , or physical necessity does it force us to blockade or bombard St . Petersburg ? In 1832 , we made war on the Dutch forces in Antwerp ; tout we kept peace with Holland on the seas and everywhere else . If we wish to defend Sicily in Sicily , Rome in Rome , Hungary in Hungary , we are ablo to do something more or less effectual ; and certainly with the least possible risk of moral principle . But the moment that we justify attacks on innocence , peace , and industry , by the mere plea that this conduces to victory , we go adrif t on an unknown and incalculable ocean . Suppose that , in order to carry on war ¦•* more vigorously , " we sail to attack St . Petersburg . It niay be that the Emperor yields , to save his capital . G-obd ! But it may also be , that he is fanatically obstinate . Wo then either retire abashed at our own empty threats , or we lay his city in ashes , enrage our good

    friends the Russian people , rouse their patriotism against us , and only do worse harm to the Hungarians . Moreover , to bombard St . Petersburg , is to ruin hundreds of English merchants , and would thus raise among ourselves a powerful party favourable to the enemy . It is as unjust to call the commercial class selfish because they deprecate haying to pay for a war with their whole fortunes , as to expect provision shops to feed a town in famine . The ferocious Roman policy of habitually carrying war to the enemy ' s heart makes war essentially immoral , as an unlimited retaliation for a limited wrong . It is energetic ! Yes as it is to stab a man , because he will not pay us five shillings ! 7 . "We ought kot to be too timid to speak truth publicly . " I admit that prudence may positively enjoin silence on weak States , like Belgium and Switzerland . If this is our case , it follows that we nave no ordinary pubh' c duties in Europe . I do not treat that opinion as absurd . It might be urged that England is like a wounded warrior , whose first duty was to heal his

    own wounds , before encountering fresh foes . Our National Debt is our wound . From 1823 onward , when we did not dare even to protest aloud for the liberties of Spain , which we saved from Napoleon to abandon to the despots whom we had set up in power , —our only wise policy ( in my individual judgment ) was to withdraw our fleets , economize , pay our debt , and nurse our strength for ftiture service . If any one still says , we are too weaTcto dare to speak truth , this is the policy he ought to enjoin . But if , sines ' 1849 , it \ s too dangerous to be passive—if , wounded pr unwounded , we must defend ourselves—if armed neutrality is more expensive than a decided second part in limited war—if on these grounds it is right to be ready for contest , it is cowardice and folly alike to shut our mouths through fear . The anger of the despots against aa English minister who speaks plain truth in our Parliament , is some measure of the formidable nature of the weapon which we hold against them . The speaking of truth in English public life would before long overthrow is truxn is

    tyrannies in Europe . For fteedom an atmospnere , a subtle spirit . It pervades foreign countries , it breaks through the barriers of despots ; it invades their quiet , it overturns their elaborate plans . Therefore they hate it , they dread it , _ they persecute ft ; therefore they cannot afford Freedom to exist m their neighbourhood . But the ministers and statesmen who urge and entreat us not to speak truth too loudly , hereby confess that they are themselves already half enslaved . They warn us what will next come , if despotism be confirmed , and they point us to the wise course of doing the opposite of what they suggest . ' ¦ ¦' " " . „ Finally , to what positive conduct do these negations point ? I know that if it bo ever so right for England , m conjunction with the United States , to " take an initiative in Europe , there is no time for the formation of a public op inion for that . Events must stir and jmide opinion . But I will imagine a new reyolution to neutralize the iprce ' s of France ; and I then ask—What nnrrht , w « do . if some of the oppressed nations make

    insurrection ? If National Independence be our own right , if Legitimacy is indeed of value , if we would not be accomplices in Tyranny , we surely cannot desire—none of the great parties in England could desire—to aid the despots . All will in word avow neutrality , as the least thing which we owe to the nations . But we are apt to profess neutrality , yet by an unjust interpretation , and through the odious Law of Blockade , practically to take part against the insurgents . If avo would be truly neutral , we must recognise both contending parties alike , and defend our commerce to both alike , so as to enable both alike to traffic with us , whether for arms or for any other purpose . At the same time , considering how great aro our obligations to Sicily , and that we are at this moment accomplices in the oppression of Rome , wo seem to mo to have a deep debt to both those States , and that whenever we dare , we ought actively to restore them to freedom ; but , aa I said , without attacking neutrals or non-bellicrerents , or extending Avar beyond its most

    necessary limits . Moreover , if intervention ot other despotic powers takes place , bo as to m anifest the conspiracy of despots , then beyond a doubt a league of free states to support liberty is just and expedient ; and until it can be made , England should act alone . Do you ask what Wo can do ? That is a military question , into which it ia too late to ontor : but I do not hesitate to avow a civilian ' s opinion , that if the forces of Franco wore but neutral , ifc would only need a stront / toiU in England , and elio could , oven without tho aid of Arnonjca , revolutionize Jiuropom throe months , in spito of all tho efforts of Russia and Austria ; and to do this , at any imaginable oxponso of money and arms , would bo to us a very economical » nd prudent proceeding . Allow mo one more topic . Thoro are persons , I loar a class , amonr us , who lovo legal freedom by a sliding scale of geography . They would die for freedom in England , they abhor tyranny in Franco , they do not quito liko it in North Germany , they are satisflod with it in Austria , they liighly iipprovo ot it in Italy , tno

    and they are spiteful against froodom in Hungary . Ojiico unoiont Persians , thoy value tho dignity or nations by the inverse ratio of geometrical distance . To nuch I would w »» h to nay : Guntlomon or poors ! if you desire to load England , know your own race mpro wisely ! Broods of men do diUor ; but tlio highoat aro soon ruiuod wheroyot law is overpowered , unions thoy booomo nrnrtyrn in struggling for its restoration ; and the lowest races aro quickly clovatod whoro law and ireeaom aro secured by antagonist forces . You lovo , and ivro proutloi , English legality , English security , and porhaprt . Hughs i progress . Yet Englishmen havo not uoblor natures than Italians , or Bohomiana , or Hungariunfl . Wo have no iiitrimuo right to liberty moro than other mon : our island and a Dutch ( ji'my , not our virtue , saved it from James II . Lot us not bo highminded . Our froodom and laws will bo exposed to a Htrugglo ot infinite danger if doapotiHm make ita conquests poriniinont over tho breadth of tho continent . Tho Hungarians and ItuhaiiH woro not lancieu

    fighting your battle , and you , alas ! know it . You thorn enemies to ordor , booauao t hoy ntnitfg lod against mwil foroign oppronuion I JJut if Micro bo anything cortiiin m tho 1 Uturo . lt ) in , that doapots will now oonrjuci ; togothor or Jail together . You cannot separate tho onuno of fiouifl Bonaparte Irom tluit oi tho Jesuits , from tho niianilo of oardinalH , tho , briil , ul po 100 ol NaploH , and tlio fortrofls-priaoim of Austria , ifou tmiinot havo liberty at homo and contented ulavory abroad . 11 ovor Mio fltnufgloH for froodom on the continent beg in to dio away , rtoHjiotio intriguo will oiyolo auoli ' JSiiirlhhnton a ^ i you , nnrt an onnm > u » future will riso boforo JStiglanil , which it may bo too lato for Amorioa to avort . Wo havo no rounonablo Hoourity that Europo ehull not horoaftor booomo what Asia is , if tho loroosot tyranny prevail in tho proaont stage of ovonts , Lot tho English fVionds of Auafcrla look to tho Baatorn world , and to tho old Roman ompiro , and loarn , that despotism triump hing by HoKlioxa 18 ooiiservutivo of nothing but ruin « vnd putreitvcllou .

    ^^ Y F L8^2.] ^Me Veaden. 43 *

    ^^ f l 8 ^ 2 . ] ^ Me VEADEn . 43 *

    Letters From Pakis. [Feom Otjtt Owst Cor...

    LETTERS FROM PAKIS . [ FEOM OtJtt OWST CORBESPOITDENT . J Letter XIX . Parish Tuesday Evening , 4 th May , 1852 . The noble conduct of the Magistracy of Paris / in the aiTair of the Orleans property , seems to have set an example , which it has become a . point of honour to imitate . Instances are being recorded , on . every side , of Provincial Magistrates declining to recognise the Government of Louis Hapoleon , and refusing to iake the

    oath prescribed by the new Constitution . Among these intrepid men we notice M . Estancelin , member of tho Oonseil General of the Seine Inferieure ; M . Granger de la Mariniere , member of the Conseil General of tho Nievrej M . Lebeau , member of the Conseil General of the Pas de Calais ; M . Faillyi deputy , and member of the Conseil General of the Deux Sevres ; and another , a member of the Conseil General of the Somme . But , la addition to these individual cases , we have regularly constituted bodies adopting the same course : the Tribunals of Commerce of the towns of Havre , Thiers , and

    Evreux , have respectively refused to subscribe to the oath . I have also to relate another instance of the courage of the Magistracy of Paris . The journal Le Corsair had been seized for an article criticising the government of L . Bonaparte . The question involved was as to the application of the new law , which transfers the trials for oftfences of the press , from the Civil Courts , ' and places them under the jurisdiction of the Police Correctionnelle . The case having been heard by the Conseil de Paris , a sort of Commission of Inquiry , was dismissed , the Conseilh & v ' mgdecided ^ hatthe article published by the Corsair was not culpable . The Government considering itself disgraced by this verdict , has appealed against the decision ; and the affair will be brought before the Chamber of the Mises en Accusation ( Court of

    Indictment ) . But the celebrated M . de Belleyme is the president of this court . It was M . de Belleyme who , ia 1830 , on the occasion of the ordonnances of Charles the Tenth against the Press , delivered the famous verdict which condemned the printer of the journal Le Commerce to print the paper , notwithstanding the prohibition of the Government . It was M . de Belleyme who presided on the bench , in the recent trial concerning the Orleans property . We must therefore hope that in the affair of the Corsair he will dismiss the case . If such were to happen , it would be fatal to Bonaparte ' s pdwer—it would , in fact , be the re-establishment of the liberty of the press . The journals , shielded by the verdicts of the Magistracy , would be free , openly to criticise and blame the acts of the Government .

    The Empire is countermanded ; there are too many obstacles in the way . Not that the soldiers will be less vociferous in their acclamation of L . Bonaparte as Emperor ; but the sequel of the imperial farce is to be cut short : a third menacing Note having arrived from St . Petersburg . The Czar tells M . Bonaparte , that " he is aware of the farce which is being rehearsed , and forbids its representation for M . Bonaparte ' s benefit . That

    if tho comedy were played out , it should bo followed by a tragedy which the Czar , in person , was ready to bring to Paris . " This declaration of war , in caso tho Empire should bo proclaimed , was brought to Paris by the Generals Paskoof and Pouskinc , aido-dc-camps of tlio Emperor of Eussia . These two gentlemen havo been giving themselves the malicious pleasure , of repeating tho words of their imperial master , in all tho salons of Paris .

    So then tho Empire is not to bo , at least for the present . The Elyaco is greatly cluipfallcn . Our swaggering brawlers have dropped their loud talking . As for tho long boasted ftUe of tlio 10 th May , it haH quito lost its value in their estimation . This new state of mind was particularly visible at tho review last Sunday . The Socioty of Dfaembraillards woro thoro as usual ; but for tho first tirno theso three months , theso open-mouthed knaves did not utter a single Vive I'JSmptrenr . Probably their pay overnight had been forgotten !

    To tho fluttering dreams of anticipated triumph , have succeeded n complete state of dejection . Gloomy forebodings , and tho moat absurd fears perplex the ElyHinu mind . Tha fdtv of tho 10 th of May , is to bo followed by a banquet and ball on tho 11 th , given by tho itrmy to Lonin Bonaparte . All tho officorn of tho garrison of Paris « ro to lie thoro , aH wall m the deputations from tho rest of tho army . The Geiieral Currolet had botnin to no ml out tho invitations , when it

    was discovered that ninny of thoso who . hud boon invitotl' lmd givon their tickets away . This caused n good deal of alarm at the Elync ' e , and was viewed minultaneoiiHly n » a conspiracy on tho part of the army , a conspiracy of tho Legitimists , it conspiracy of tho Orlonnists , and a conspiracy of tho llepiiblicims . To prevent , thorofore , tho future Emporor from coming in direct contact with his onomios , it has boon decided tliut tho seat of His Imperial Miycsty shall bo raised at

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), May 8, 1852, page 7, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_08051852/page/7/