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    /timx&y%M8W. J BB R ~] 11,1 50SIA > . fe...

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    THE SINS OFTHE « SYSTEM.' It is impossib...

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    S.Ukvey Of The War. Some Important Chang...

    to the SHMrtb , « a ®( jb « t 4 oftier « levttti « B , ' bt 9 ttaa « d on the west % « he'Care € ^ g < Bay , an & on ^ iie "north , > by tbe 'great 'harbour , -am io & kmg to the south-east into > the wc * ks'on the rig-hit of the Allies . The Frendi now hold the extreme right beyond ^ rordon ' s Battery , and it soon became evident to the Russians that they intended to push < tiheir approaches both towards the head of the great harbour , and towards the MalakofF Tower . In fact , redoubts were thrown trp on the rising ground looting- down

    on the harbour j and the fire from , a British battery , not long since , drove off three steamers from their position on oar flank , and sank one . The Russians , alarmed at these menacing advances , adopted bold measures , seized Mount Sapoume , the hill on their extreme left , quicMy threw up a work there , and beat off the Zouaves in their daring assault upon that

    redoubt . From this height the Russians overlook our works , and the approach to it is covered by a converging fire From the batteries across the head of the harbour , as well as from the main line of defence . ^ Not satisfied with this , and foreseeing the great danger they would incur by yielding to the French advance , the enemy seized the Mamelon in advance of Malakoff , and

    established a redoubt there . This skilful operation enabled the enemy to dig pits for his sharpshooters right and left of the mound , in such positions as to enfilade the British right , and to sting the French in front with a constant and galling fire . So that the occupation of the Mamelon is a measure of defence , not , as has been represented , a measure of offence ; the object of the Russians in seizing it was not to gain ground upon us , but" to meet , and repel , if possible , the effort to gain

    ground upon them . For the possession of these pits and -the works on this hillock there have been several sanguinary struggles , in which the Russians have displayed true soldierly qualities , and have disputed the ' . ground with great hardihood and success . The whole of the recent conflicts have had for their object , on one side to retain , on tbe other to obtain , this hill , As the French , in spite of their defeats really gained ground daily , and as it was obvious the Allies could not suffer the

    enemy to hold this advanced post , the Russians , in anticipation ,-made a _ strong . _ sprjbie __ on . the night of the 22 nd of March , leaping suddenly upon the Allies , from Chapman ' s Battery to the French right : a fierce combat ensued in the trenches ; the Russians turned the advanced parallels , and the French and British charging at the point of the bayonet , and " pitching them over the parapets , " swept them back to their own lines . Following close , our daring allies chased the enemy even as far as the Round Tower . The result was great loss on both sides ; but the French seized and held some of the rifle pits so obstinately contested .

    2 . As to the north side . —Here the enomy is stronger than ever . A line of entrenchments reach from the Beibek to the head of the harbour , form the outworks of the Russian camp , and grimly enclose tbe large Star Fort , and the batteries on the sea face . From the head of the harbour westward , every cliff has its battery looking towards the Allies , and commanding the road along the opposite shore . On the plateau above the second Inkennan Light , the Russian divisions there encamped have flanked their position with abattis , and over the ruins of Inkermnn batteries have been

    established . Still further east , we find the summit of the steep defile leading up to Mackenzie ' s Farm from the Tchemayn , defended by earthworks that sweep the road ; while , below tlio defile , strong works have . been constructed to bar the passage of the Tchernaya either at Tchorgoun orTraktir . And , crossing the Tchernaya , wo find the old Russian encampmont at Kamara

    'Stilt fael & % jr « he ^ tfeniy . Whether enemy 5 rill W t * te * fio rtften t ? heire 'extensive Kites is quite fmoNjfeef qaesftidn . 3 . As to ike Allies . ^ -Therefore-, in any -field operations , the Allies mast either face the passage of the Tcherttaya , under a heavy fire , or turn it by a march through the country . to the Easts by no other mode , except by reembarking a portion of the force , and operating upon 'another line , can they "penetrate into the country . Their present position , from B & laklava to Inkerraan , is now impregnable ; bnt

    locomotion seems as difficult to them as holding their grotmd is easy . The Turks stSH hold Eupatoria , watched by a seemingly large Russian force , under Priwce Rai > zivii / l . Omar Pacha has visited the cantfp- of the Allies , and has returned to his post . Whether it be true as rumour reports , that he has marched upon Sfaki , in the direction of Simphefopol , or not , 'some movement of this sort , in combination with an Anglo * French advance tipon the Beibek , would seem to be on the cards ; ami also another line of separate operations which we refrain from indicating .

    It is always difficult , often impossible , to understand the exact position of affairs in war . A day , an hour , a change of commanders , temper , too much or too little wine , may change the whole aspect of a campaign . We can unfortunately only judge by results . But it is not possible to deny that the present aspect of the war is extremely unsatisfactory , If Sebastopol were taken by assault it could only be partially retained ; if the siege were to be raised , the Allies must leave behind their

    artillery , stores , and ammunition . -If they enter on a campaign-in the country , they ^ will have enormous difficulties to surmount , because in the field they have lost the initiative , and are badly supplied with cavalry . It is true that if they seized , they could-make Sebastopol untenable , and the harbour impassable by means of a few batteries ; and if this were done , the whole of the army not required for the south side , might be directed against the north side . Whether the south side can be reduced is the

    practical problem that the Allies are now engaged in solving ; but beyond this , military authorities concur in the positive necessity for ulterior operations .

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    The Sins Ofthe « System.' It Is Impossib...

    THE SINS OFTHE « SYSTEM . ' It is impossible to avengo the lost army of the Crimea by loading any public man , or set of men , with the odium of its destruction . Blame attaches in many places—perhaps infamy somewhere ; but though neglect or incapacity have been proved against a few miserable understrappers , the result of the Parliamentary inquisition has hitherto been to clear particular administrators of much that had been rancourously or hastily imputed to them , and to lay open , under the framework of our official

    system , the sources of those evils by which our troops have suffered , and by which our reputation has been stained . For ourselves , we have always hesitated to ascribe culpability so enormous to any individual ; it has been too hard for us to believe that an English statesman would recklessly abandon an English army to famine and disease ; and Mr . Roicttucic ' s Committee has elicited very much to exculpate the late Ministers from the guilt of practices forming part of a system of which one of the chief evils was that it rendered them helpless , and mado them the slaves and victims of its corrupt

    routine . When we have said this , we are more at liberty to say , that the nation should feel degraded by these revelations , so hidoous , so incomprehensible , so afflicting . The public Ministry , confided without jealousy to the hands of ono predominant class , has been so abused , that thousands of men , dismissed to a

    distant eanspaign , have eScapefl the fire and Btrdrtf of -war , and perisffoed m agonies in British camps « fld hospftals . Nbthirig appears ¦ radre unanswerably demonstrated than that ottr governing orders , after forty y ^ ara * leisttfe , have learned no new arts of -military administration , and are radially incompetent to Cdhduct a war . Follow the Eastern expedition from our coasts to Sebastopol , and , step by step , error , failures , neglect , and senility keep pace with its movements , until the inglorious parallel ends in an hospital , with soldiers dying from change of diet , ordered by mistake .

    Abstaining , as carefully as possible , from , stigmatising individuals until their actions can be criticised in strict relation to their responsibilities and to their necessities , we may mark the "lines by which delay and hurry went on together , with blunders signalising almost every action , deficiencies in every supply , confusion in every department , disaster at every stage of progress . Perhaps no mistake was more prolific of ill than the inveterate tenacity

    with -which our Ministers clung to the hope of peace . Sir De Lacy Evans deposed that all things seemed to be managed under a persuasion that there would be no fighting , that magazines would be unnecessary , that wounds would not be suffered , that a Note would come from Vienna and restore the world to peace . Many of the officers in command laughed at the thought of a real war ; it is known that a son of Lord Aberdeen talked at Varna about

    the absurdity of going so far without a genuine object . Moreover , when these optimist deceptions had vanished , the nature of the service was mistaken . The army was provided as if it were destined to operate in a civilised country , where , villages would abound , and where materials would be forthcoming to meet the exigencies of the season . Spain lingered in the memory of many an untaught campaigner . Thus the ignorance of < 'the system , " as well

    as the fatuity of the Cabinet , sent our forces unprepared to their severe and deadly work . We shall not enlarge here on that infirmity of purpose which yielded to the counsels of Marshal St . Arnauo , trying to outstrip death , and to find for himself an atoning grave . These are serious points ; yet they do not explain the horrors of the Crimean campaign—horrors inexplicable , unless we connect them with the system .-out , of . which they sprang .

    The long European peace saw England competing with other countries in experimental feats of arms . It was supposed that military science had advanced , and that fleets would sail , and armies as well , with an organisation too perfect to admit of shortcomings , blunders , or delay . But the siego of Sebastopol was undertaken by an army almost as ill-equipped

    as that which , without a sapper or miner , invested and captured thirteen cities of Spain . Bad clothing , bad implements , and bad food were provided . The iron tools splintered after three or four blows on green wood or on hard earth . Had they been supplied without trial , there would have been neglect ; but they had been tried and condemned at Chobham , and

    were recklessly given out . Chobham was , professedly , a test ; then how monstrous to defy the conscquonces of this test , and to employ machines which it had proved to be useless ! But , as if to forbid the chance of happy accidents , even these wretched tools were scantily allowed . A regiment came to the Crimea with two p ickaxes and one spade—all intended for

    broken . A hospital at Scutan , tho reception of iivc hundred men was supplied with two bottles of port wine . " Green coffee became a malignant proverb in tho camp . Stores of planks wcro shipped for hutting , but no nails . Ships were laden with grain , bat no sucks . Some of tho regimental inochcino-chests wore found to bo empty . Amputating imple-

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), April 7, 1855, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse-os.kdl.kcl.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_07041855/page/11/